Industrializing the Corn Belt: Iowa farmers, technology and the Midwestern landscape, 1945-1972 by Anderson, Joseph Leslie
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2005
Industrializing the Corn Belt: Iowa farmers,
technology and the Midwestern landscape,
1945-1972
Joseph Leslie Anderson
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons, Economics Commons, Geography Commons,
and the United States History Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anderson, Joseph Leslie, "Industrializing the Corn Belt: Iowa farmers, technology and the Midwestern landscape, 1945-1972 " (2005).
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 1827.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/1827
Industrializing the Corn Belt: Iowa farmers, technology, and the 
Midwestern landscape, 1945-1972 
by 
Joseph Leslie Anderson 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major: Agricultural History and Rural Studies 
Program of Study Committee: 
R. Douglas Hurt, Co-Major Professor 
Pamela Riney-Kehrberg, Co-Major Professor 
Hamilton Cravens 
James Andrews 
James McCormick 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
2005 
Copyright © Joseph Leslie Anderson, 2005. All rights reserved. 
UMI Number: 3184581 
INFORMATION TO USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and 
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. 
UMI 
UMI Microform 3184581 
Copyright 2005 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 
11 
Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation of 
Joseph Leslie Anderson 
Has met the dissertation requirements of Iowa State University 
Committee Member 
Committee Member 
Committee Member 
o-Ma] o/ ro lessor 
Co-N or Pr fessor
For the Mai 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 1 
PART I. CHEMICALS 
CHAPTER 1. INSECTICIDE: WAR ON BUGS 18 
CHAPTER 2. HERBICIDE: WAR ON WEEDS 50 
CHAPTER 3. FERTILIZER GIVES THE LAND A KICK 82 
CHAPTER 4. FEEDING CHEMICALS 112 
PART II. MACHINES 
CHAPTER 5. PUSHBUTTON FARMING 13 5 
CHAPTER 6. MAKING HAY THE MODERN WAY 190 
CHAPTER 7. FROM THRESHING MACHINE TO COMBINE 215 
CHAPTER 8. FROM CORN PICKER AND CRIB TO COMBINE AND BIN 241 
CONCLUSION 282 
APPENDIX A. MAP OF IOWA, 1950 293 
APPENDIX B. TABLES 295 
APPENDIX C. ILLUSTRATIONS 299 
REFERENCES 336 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 3 51 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Iowa's rural landscape of today bears only slight resemblance to that of 1940. The 
similarities begin and end with the fact that much of the land is still used for agricultural 
production and of the land in production much of it is devoted to corn. To anyone who lived 
in the Iowa countryside or has studied its history, the first difference that attracts notice today 
is the lack of people. Except for spring and fall, it is possible to drive through rural parts of 
the state without seeing anyone except other travelers on the road. The days of passing 
several farmsteads each mile with people working outdoors in fields and farmyards are gone. 
Almost every farm family of 1940 would have kept a variety of livestock in lots and pastures, 
visible to passersby. In the twenty-first century it is possible to cross an entire county 
without seeing livestock, depending on the time of year or the route. Even fields look 
different. The old crop rotations of corn, oats, and hay are gone, as well as other crops such 
as flax. Today, com and soybeans dominate, packed in dense plant populations, a sharp 
contrast with wide rows of the 1940s. There is still a large portion of the state's acres planted 
to hay and pasture, but high land values require high returns from cash crops in modern 
agriculture. Finally, an ever declining number of barns, houses, and outbuildings are 
testimony to a kind of agriculture practiced by an earlier generation. The decay of many of 
these buildings indicates their obsolescence in modem agriculture.1 
From 1945 to 1970 Iowa farmers remade their physical and social landscape. They 
purchased, borrowed, or hired new machines, remodeled existing outbuildings or built new 
ones, changed crop rotation strategies, and began using purchased chemicals such as 
1 Lowell Soike observed the differences between contemporary and historic farm landscapes in the introduction 
to his essay, "Viewing Iowa Farmsteads," in Take This Exit: Rediscovering the Iowa Landscape, ed. Robert F. 
Sayre (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989), 154. 
2 
pesticides, fertilizer, and feed additives to meet changing conditions on the farm and beyond. 
Farmers scrambled to find ways to increase production by maximizing yields and gains while 
simultaneously minimizing losses in the boom times of World War II through the Korean 
War. After the Korean War, farmers continued to increase production by using new 
technology, but this time they did so during a "cost-price squeeze" in which real prices for 
what they produced declined faster than prices for what they purchased. All the while, they 
altered work patterns to accommodate new technology and changing social expectations. 
Farm families received a great deal of advice and assistance from agricultural extension 
professionals, advertisers and manufacturers, journalists, and bankers, but they were the ones 
who made the decisions that altered the nature of the Midwestern landscape.2 
Throughout the twenty-five year period after World War II, Iowa farm families were 
leaders in industrializing agriculture with new tools and techniques. This was in sharp 
contrast to the years the 1920s and 1930s, when, as historian Deborah Fitzgerald noted, 
outsiders such as college educated experts, journalists, and industry leaders were the most 
vocal proponents of changing the ways farmers worked. According to Fitzgerald, these 
outsiders encouraged farmers to adopt an industrial model of "large scale production, 
specialized machines, standardization of processes and products, reliance on managerial 
(rather than artisinal) expertise, and a continual evocation of 'efficiency' as a production 
mandate." While farmers in the Midwestern Corn Belt did make some changes during these 
years, most notably purchasing tractors and using hybrid seed corn, they balanced new 
2 Richard G. Bremer argued that after World War II farmers in the Loup River country ofNebraska used 
technology to manage the risks of farming in turbulent times. See Agricultural Change in an Urban Age: The 
Loup Country ofNebraska, 1910-1970 (Lincoln, NE: University ofNebraska, 1976), 202. The rural Midwest 
in the postwar period deserves more study. For a survey of farm changes in Ohio after World War II, see R. 
Douglas Hurt, "Ohio Agriculture Since World War II," Ohio History 97 (Winter-Spring 1988): 50-71. 
3 
technology with "making do." The 1920s and 1930s were years of limited change in the 
Corn Belt.3 
During the depression, farm families could not afford to make the kinds of changes 
outsiders recommended even if they wanted to do so. They survived with what they had at 
hand and depended on kin and neighbors to meet their needs. As depression gave way to war 
in the early 1940s, however, conditions began to change. Congress promised to support 
commodity prices in 1942 while simultaneously encouraging maximum production, and 
farmers began to earn enough income that they could look beyond meeting immediate needs. 
During the war, there was little opportunity to spend the income they made by producing at 
record levels for guaranteed prices. In 1945 farm families that paid off debts were ready to 
reinvest in their farm operations. People feared the next farm depression, just as they and 
their parents experienced after World War I, but they also prepared for a new world in which 
technology would help them solve problems.4 
The new world of agriculture was different both in terms of physical landscape and 
the social landscape. By the 1970s, new machines, chemicals, and buildings replaced human 
hands, older machines, and outmoded buildings. The application of herbicide, insecticide, 
3 Deborah Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003), 22-23. 
4 Several studies provide insight into the ways farm families persevered during the Great Depression. Mary 
Neth detailed the ways in which Midwestern farm women "made do" to preserve their farms, while Pamela 
Riney-Kehrberg documented the ways in which Kansas families managed to stay on farms and small towns in 
the Dust Bowl. Katherine Jellison showed how Midwestern women used technology to reinforce their roles as 
family producers rather than consumers during these years. Mary Neth, Preserving the Family Farm: Women, 
Community, and the Foundations of Agribusiness in the Midwest, 1900-1940; (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995); Pamela Riney-Kehrberg, Rooted in Dust: Surviving Drought and Depression in 
Southwestern Kansas (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994); and Katherine Jellison, Entitled to Power: 
Farm Women and Technology, 1913-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). Alan I 
Marcus and Howard P. Segal described the mood of post World War II optimism about technology in 
Technology in America: A Brief History (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, Publishers, 1989), 309-
311. 
and fertilizer was standard on almost all Iowa farms. A growing percentage of farmers used 
feed additives to cut livestock production costs. Threshing machines, corn pickers, stanchion 
milking barns, feeding livestock by hand, and the practice of storing loose hay were obsolete 
or on their way to becoming obsolete by the 1970s. Farmers planted more acres in corn and 
soybeans and fewer in hay and small grains, while new crop and insect pests made their 
homes in Iowa's fields and farmyards. Farmers of 1972 confronted new government rules 
about how they should conduct their business, especially the application of chemicals to land, 
crops, and livestock, and the management of livestock waste. The farm population was also 
shrinking at a rapid rate, with farmers either retiring or refusing to make some of the 
investments needed to stay in business in a changed world. 
Stories of agricultural change have been told many ways, but the ones that have been 
told first and in depth have been about institutions and people with the most education, since 
these groups and individuals left the most records. This study tells the story from the 
perspective of the people who raised the crops and livestock, just as Allan Bogue did in his 
1963 study of farming in Iowa and Illinois during the nineteenth century. Bogue focused on 
the farmer "with dirt on his hands and dung on his boots—and the problems and 
developments that forced him to make decisions about his farm business." But histories like 
Bogue's, emphasizing how people used cows, plows, and sows to make a living have fallen 
out of favor of the last few decades. A new generation of historians rightly brought 
innovative and previously neglected perspectives on rural life to the forefront. Most of these 
new studies, however, do not place production agriculture at the center of the story. As 
historian Robert McMath observed about rural social history, "Crops are grown and they are 
harvested. But with what, how, and by whom?" The details of agricultural production and 
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what they can tell us about rural people are too often left behind. In 1985 Pete Daniel called 
for historians of Southern material culture to "investigate the houses and tools that farmers 
used. Oral historians have time left to quiz farmers and former farmers on the old ways, and 
students of documentary photographs can analyze images from the past." The chapters that 
follow allow us to not only learn something about farmers and changes in rural life; we can 
learn about one of the most tremendous productive transformations in American history.5 
This transformation occurred after a period of relative consistency in agricultural 
production and techniques that lasted from around 1900 to the 1940s. By 1900, most Iowa 
farmers had moved beyond the farm-making phase of agriculture, with most Iowa land 
cultivated, grazed, or managed in woodlots. Farmers of the mid to late 1800s learned that 
they needed to apply manure to their fields and practice crop rotation, including tame grasses 
and legumes between crops of corn and small grains, to keep production up. During the 
nineteenth century, farmers phased out most of their pioneer buildings, fenced most of their 
fields and pastures, and used implements such as chilled iron plows, grain binders, threshing 
machines, and manure spreaders to farm a larger portion of their acres. These practices were 
common on Iowa farms at the end of the nineteenth century. 
5 Allan G. Bogue, From Prairie to Corn Belt: Farming on the Illinois and Iowa Prairies in the Nineteenth 
Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 1; Robert C. McMath, "Where's the 'Culture' in 
Agricultural Technology?," in Outstanding in His Field: Perspectives on American Agriculture in Honor of 
Wayne D. Rasumssen, ed. Frederick V. Carstensen, Morton Rothstein, and Joseph A. Swanson (Ames: Iowa 
State University Press, 1993), 125; Pete Daniel, Breaking the Land: The Transformation of Cotton, Tobacco, 
and Rice Cultures since 1880 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985), xv-xvi. This study puts users at the 
forefront without denying the importance of chemical manufacturers and extension professionals in the process 
of technological adoption. For Iowa farmers during the postwar years, herbicide was a product that would help 
them maximize production and reduce labor. As the following pages demonstrate, the fact that farmers used 
technology in ways that were not prescribed by manufacturers and experts suggests that they domesticated 
technology in the ways described by Nelly Oudshoom and Trevor Pitch. See How Users Matter: The 
Construction of Users and Technologies (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), 14-15. 
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While there were many changes in farming and farm life between 1900 and the 
outbreak of the World War II, in many ways farmers' relationship with technology and the 
ways in which they grew crops and raised livestock remained much the same as they had 
been at the turn of the century. The internal combustion engine, used for stationary power in 
the farmyard and as tractors in the fields, replaced many (but not all) horses before 1940. 
Farmers used tractors for heavy work such as plowing and disking or belt power, but 
continued to use horses for cultivating, hauling feed, and numerous other jobs. Even though 
the tractor replaced many animals in the 1920s and 1930s, it did not necessarily alter farm 
production. Most farmers rarely used implements especially designed for tractors. Instead, 
they modified older, horse-drawn equipment for use with tractors. More importantly, 
farmers still needed to practice the same type of corn, small grain, and forage crop rotation to 
prevent depletion of soil nutrients and build-up of weed populations and insect pests. Even 
though farmers needed less hay and oats to feed horses due to the adoption of tractors, they 
still needed a multi-year rotation system of different kinds of crops. Farm size, the number 
of acres cultivated, and number of farms were relatively constant from 1900 to World War II, 
indicating that tractors were not used to enlarge farms during this period. Instead, farmers 
used tractors to cut operating costs by using a power source that only needed to be "fed" 
when it was used rather than to expand production. Farmers did not utilize the full potential 
of tractor power until after World War II, when the mechanical and chemical changes 
depicted in this study became common. The most important change in production of the 
interwar years was transition to hybrid seed. Few farmers used hybrid seed when it was 
introduced commercially in the 1920s, but virtually all Iowa farmers planted all their corn 
acres with it by 1942. Yield gains through the use of hybrid corn partially offset losses 
7 
through government acreage reduction programs and helped farmers meet the increased 
demands of wartime production.6 
World War II fundamentally changed the old systems, marking a significant shift in 
the use of technology to replace human labor and to expand the scale of production. 
Manpower shortages, high production goals, government-sponsored research, and the social 
aspirations of a new generation of farmers combined to bring about a significant change in 
the way farmers raised crops and livestock. Farmers in the postwar Midwest decreased 
production costs by substituting machines for labor, using pesticides to destroy weed and 
insect pests which were obstacles to high crop yields and livestock gains, fertilizing fields 
with chemicals, installing automated feeding systems, and adding new feed supplements that 
accelerated animals' ability to absorb nutrients and calories. During these years members of 
farm families sometimes did jobs in hours or days that used to require days or weeks of work, 
often with the help of full time hired men and/or itinerant laborers. Farmers severed many of 
the ties to the agricultural production techniques of their parents' generation by 1970, 
creating a new physical and social landscape characterized by larger farms, larger herds, 
altered crop rotation and plant populations, more specialized production, rural out-migration, 
and a lifestyle that more closely resembled that of their urban and suburban counterparts.7 
6 Allan G. Bogue argued that important changes took place in the production in the Corn Belt between 1900 and 
1939, including the adoption of the tractor, hybrid seed corn, and the mechanical corn picker. These changes 
were important, but farming in 1940 looked so much like farming in 1900 that a person who successfully 
operated a farm in 1900 could successfully operate the same farm in 1940 without changing management or 
production strategies. "Changes in Mechanical and Plant Technology: The Corn Belt, 1910-1940" The Journal 
of Economic History 43 (March 1983): 2. 
7 Wayne Rasmussen labeled this period the second agricultural revolution. "The Impact of Technological 
Change on American Agriculture, 1862-1962," Journal of Economic History 22 (December 1962): 588. 
Changes in agricultural production occurred worldwide as farmers in industrialized nations applied industrial 
ideals to agriculture. For a comparison of how this process occurred in the German Federal Republic and 
German Democratic Republic, see Arnd Bauerkamper, "The Industrialization of Agriculture and its 
Consequences for the Natural Environment: An Inter-German Comparative Perspective," in Frank Uekotter, 
8 
One of the most important developments that provided farmers with the motivation to 
substitute machines and chemicals for labor was rising labor costs. This nationwide trend 
toward military service and urban employment accelerated during World War II. Regular 
paydays and the prospect of overtime wages were attractive to many people who had 
previously been content with farm employment. In 1945 a writer for the state report on 
agriculture noted that while farm wages in 1945 were the highest ever paid, there were record 
labor shortages. This problem continued through the 1960s. Even though farmers increased 
wages, compensation for farm workers was far below jobs in manufacturing, construction, 
and truck driving. Higher wages in other sectors of the economy put pressure on farmers to 
pay more for labor.8 
This decline in the numbers of farm laborers coincided with changes in educational 
attainment and career possibilities in the postwar period. High school graduation rates 
increased during the middle of twentieth century. Beginning in the 1940s more young people 
attended and completed high school, which meant they had more options for employment 
than their peers of a previous generation. In 1940 72 percent of sixteen and seventeen year 
old Iowans enrolled in school while 28 percent of eighteen and nineteen year olds enrolled. 
ed., Historical Social Research 29 (3) 2004: 124-149. The author is grateful to Dr. Uekotter for calling this 
article to his attention. 
8 Wartime labor shortages were acute in the Midwest, with the states of Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, and North and South Dakota averaging a loss of 27 percent of hired workers from 1939 to 1945. 
Rural depopulation did not slow down after the war, with both farm operators and hired men either 
supplementing farm work with city employment of leaving farming altogether. Walter W. Wilcox, The Farmer 
in the Second World War (Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1947), 100. For Iowa wartime shortages, see the 
Forty-Sixth Annual Iowa Year Book of Agriculture (Des Moines: State of Iowa, 1945), 15-16; and Paul J. Jehlik, 
"Iowa Farmers Using Less Hired Help," Iowa Farm Science, 6 (June 1952). For an example of the commentary 
characteristic of the postwar years see John D. Hervey, "A Kingdom for a Hired Hand," Successful Farming, 
March 1946. Wages are discussed in Paul R. Robbins, "Labor Situations Facing the Producer," in David G. 
Topel, ed., The Pork Industry: Problems and Progress (Ames: The Iowa State University Press, 1968). Donald 
Holley's study of the role the mechanical cotton picker and African-American migration played in shaping the 
South is a good example of how labor shortages and associated increases in wage rates helped convince farmers 
to use machines. The Second Great Emancipation: The Mechanical Cotton Picker, Black Migration, and How 
They Shaped the Modern South (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 2000). 
9 
By 1960, 86 percent of the former group and 48 percent of the latter enrolled in school. Farm 
boys who expected to farm upon graduation from high school often did so, but a minority of 
them did not. Thanks to the G.I Bill, many veterans from farms could afford to attend 
college, which contributed to the drain of laborers from the countryside. For workers who 
stayed, farm wages increased, too. With fewer workers, farmers who employed hired hands 
had no choice but to pay more for labor. While the rate of wage increase in the Corn Belt 
was not as fast as it was in the South, the real value of wages for farm workers increased by 
20 percent from 1950 to 1970.9 
Compounding the problem of rising labor costs was the cost-price squeeze. From the 
mid 1950s to the 1960s the costs farmers incurred increased faster than the prices they 
received for commodities. This situation was especially difficult for farmers from 1951 to 
1956. During those years, commodity prices dropped almost 23 percent while non-farm 
prices remained constant. An Iowa State College study indicated that average farm income 
declined from $10,247 in 1953 to $7,051 in 1955. As historian Gilbert Fite observed, the 
cost-price squeeze compelled many families to leave their farms, but it also helped those who 
were in a solid financial position with little debt to increase their landholdings or invest in 
their farms to gain economies of scale and to cut labor costs.10 
9 For the aspirations and realities of high school boys, see "What happens to rural high school graduates?," 
Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Homestead, 16 February 1957. U.S. Census of Population: 1960. Volume I, 
Characteristics of the Population Part 17, Iowa (Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 
173. Bruce L. Gardner, American Agriculture in the Twentieth Century: How It Flourished and What It Cost 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 172-174. 
10 Gilbert C. Fite, American Farmers: The New Minority (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 107. 
For the consolidation wrought by the cost-price squeeze, see pages 118-119. A good example of the kind of 
coverage the cost price squeeze received in the farm press is Dick Albrecht, "What's happening to farm 
income?," Wallaces' Farmer, 2 January 1960. Wallaces Farmer changed names several times during the study 
period, from Wallaces ' Farmer and Iowa Homestead to Wallaces ' Farmer and finally to Wallaces Farmer. I 
will use the latter citation throughout the following chapters. 
10 
The setting for this story of agricultural change is the heart of the Com Belt, the 
region where com and livestock feeding has been the distinguishing feature of the 
countryside. Iowa in particular is an important study area because it has been a leading com 
and livestock producing state for most of the twentieth century, and in the last fifty years 
emerged as a leading soybean producing state. As Gilbert Fite and Ladd Haystead observed, 
with more than half of the total crop acres devoted to com in the late 1940s, Iowa's 
percentage of com acres surpassed that of any other Midwestern state. Iowa farmers 
accounted for almost 11 percent of the total value of livestock and livestock products sold in 
the United States in 1950. Covering approximately 56,000 square miles in ninety-nine 
counties that span the Missouri and Mississippi watersheds, Iowa includes some of the most 
productive farm land in the world, especially for raising com. For most of the twentieth 
century, mixed farms of diverse crops and livestock have been predominant in all parts of the 
state, although there have been some regional specialties. In the glaciated north and central 
parts of the state farmers relied on cash grain production and livestock feeding, with some 
farmers raising other crops such as flax and sugar beets. The south and west have been 
excellent grazing country, while the northeast has been an important dairy region. Eastern 
Iowa farms specialized in grain production and livestock feeding. In spite of the differences, 
most farms in the state were more similar than different before World War II, with 
production by section of the state varying by degree more than in kind.11 
11 For a survey of the growth and development of the Corn Belt see John C. Hudson, Making the Corn Belt: A 
Geographical History of Middle-Western Agriculture (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1994). Ladd Haystead and Gilbert C. Fite, The Agricultural Regions of the United States (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1955), 144, 149. In chapter seven, Haystead and Fite focus on the characteristics of 
farming in the corn-soy producing states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Ohio. 
11 
There are two parts to this study, breaking down complicated and interrelated 
technological changes into discrete elements. Part one addresses the rise in use of chemical 
insecticide, herbicide, fertilizer, and feed additives such as antibiotics and growth hormones. 
Iowa farmers were on new ground with chemical farming. Only a small minority of farmers 
used chemical fertilizers before the war, and the new pesticides as well as synthetic 
antibiotics and growth hormones were products of wartime research and development 
programs. As a result, farmers climbed a steep learning curve with chemicals, using them 
and misusing them in combination with traditional cultural practices to control weeds and 
insects, while replacing animal manure with chemical fertilizer. Farmers who used this 
"package" of chemical technology realized tremendous productive gains in both crop and 
livestock production. They lived with many unanticipated consequences of their decisions to 
employ chemicals, including the proliferation of resistant species of plants and insects, and 
growing questioning from the public and government officials about the health and safety 
implications of farm chemicals. 
Part two shows how farmers used new mechanical technology to assist with the 
harvest of grain, soybeans, and corn, as well as the architecture of grain storage and 
automated materials handling. Farmers had a great deal of experience with machines, which 
allowed them to make a smooth transition to tractor-drawn and self-propelled harvest 
implements. Cost savings, the benefits of reducing dependence on hired labor, and gaining 
time to change work cycles or for leisure were critical benefits farmers perceived in using 
new machines. While some machines such as tractor-drawn combines and hay balers helped 
farmers reduce labor costs, other machines such as combines for corn and the buildings and 
crop dryers needed to store shelled corn rather than ear com were some of the most 
12 
expensive items farmers would ever purchase. Self-propelled combines and fully automated 
feeding systems were the tools of a minority of farmers as the 1970s began, but that minority 
was growing quickly. 
Each chapter covers the same time period, a repetitive strategy but one that offers 
excellent perspective. By discussing each technology on its own, readers will see the 
similarities and differences between farm practices and the trajectories of farm technology 
usage. Some changes were slow while others were rapid. Some practices raised 
environmental concerns among farmers and outsiders, others did not. By breaking up 
technological change into pieces, it is possible to see how farmers used each technique to 
reshape the landscape. Taken together as two parts and a complete project it is possible to 
see how each technological innovation complemented the others. In this sense, readers can 
understand the "bundle" or "package" of technology that farmers used to adjust to changing 
times and the ways in which farmers changed their times. 
The technological changes discussed in the following pages show that farmers 
directed much of that transformation. Farmers, simultaneously producers and consumers, 
decided what particular techniques would help them make a living on their farms. While 
advertisers, extension experts, bankers, and policy makers certainly had a voice in how 
farmers conducted their business, farm families were the ones who allocated resources to 
invest in new technology and lived with both anticipated and unanticipated consequences of 
that use. The choices farmers made about technology forever changed the physical and 
social landscape of the Corn Belt. Labor-saving machinery and chemicals, new crop 
rotations, new weed and insect species, and new structures and machines on the farmstead 
remade the land. This productive revolution also forced the issue of who would stay in 
13 
farming. A sizable minority of farmers on the 205,399 farms in Iowa in 1945 either would 
not or could not continue to farm in the next twenty-five years. The cost of purchasing or 
hiring all the new equipment as well as the increasingly expensive and complicated chemical 
package was too great or too daunting for many farm families. By 1970 there were only 
135,264 farms in Iowa.12 
This study is not a comprehensive account of all the technological changes on Iowa 
farms during the years of this study. Tracing every new development in Corn Belt 
agriculture would be a valuable undertaking, but that is far beyond the scope of this project. 
Many developments such as artificial insemination, changes in genetics and breeding 
standards, and larger, more powerful, and complicated tractors became common after World 
War II. These changes and more were important, but await future study. The mechanical 
and chemical changes depicted in the following pages tell a great deal about the ways 
farmers used technology and why they did so. Industrializing the Corn Belt is a chapter in 
the history of Midwestern agricultural production, not the final word.13 
12 Rural sociologists at Iowa State College explored the ways farmers adopted new technology at the time it 
occurred. Sociologists argued that there were stages of technological adoption and that the farm population 
could be segmented into categories based on the sequence that they adopted new farm practices. This project is 
informed by the work of the sociologists but the purpose is different. Rather than analyze the farm population 
to determine who was first, last and in between, the argument here is that farmers themselves were leaders in 
remaking the landscape. See "How Farm People Accept New Ideas," Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, Special 
Report No. 15, 1955; Joe M. Bohlen, "Adoption and Diffusion of Ideas in Agriculture," in Our Changing Rural 
Society, ed. James Copp (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1964); George M. Beal and Everett M. 
Rogers, "The Adoption of Two Farm Practices in a Central Iowa Community," Agricultural and Home 
Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, Special Report No. 26, June 1960. 
Historian Mark R. Finlay observed that not all farmers adopted a "Fordist" approach to agriculture in his study 
of postwar hog production. See "Hogs, Antibiotics, and the Industrial Environments of Postwar Agriculture," 
in Susan R. Schrepfer and Philip Scranton, eds., Industrializing Organisms: Introducing Evolutionary History 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2004). Forty-Sixth Annual Iowa Year Book of Agriculture, 1945 (Des 
Moines: State of Iowa, 1945), 737; Tenth Biennial Report of Iowa Year Book of Agriculture, 1970-1971 (Des 
Moines: State of Iowa, 1972), 344. 
13 Sam Bowers Hilliard emphasized changes in tractor power and the trend toward self-propelled machinery in 
his excellent overview of mechanical change in American agriculture written at the end of the period under 
14 
It is worth noting a few other topics and perspectives that fall outside of the scope of 
this work. Public policy is not a major focus, even though important elements of public 
policy were essential to some of the technological changes discussed here, including wartime 
policy changes to support prices and the ensuing debate of the 1940s, 50s, and 60s over price 
supports. Conservation policy and techniques were also significant during this period, but 
they are not central to the story. Policy makers, agriculture experts, and many farmers 
promoted or practiced soil conservation to varying degrees in an effort to save soil for future 
generations and to remove land from production to help support commodity prices. Farmers' 
attempts to preserve or change policy through lobbying groups or protest organizations 
deserve future study but are only mentioned in passing here. Visions of alternative or 
sustainable agriculture are beyond the scope of this study. Readers will better understand 
mainstream agriculture, not the fringes. Gender and sex roles are not central themes of the 
study, either, although most of the voices in the study are male. Women and men shared 
much of the work described in the following chapters, but much of the evidence for this work 
comes from men. This does not mean that men were the only farmers in the family or that 
this account is only a story of what happened to men. The labor of women, men, and 
children was still vital to many of the farm operations described in this study and their work 
and perspectives are recognized where it helps advance the story of technological adoption 
and adaptation.14 
examination in this study. See "The Dynamics of Power: Recent Trends in Mechanization on the American 
Farm" Technology and Culture 13 (January 1972): 1-24. 
14 Studies that address other important changes of the postwar period include: R. Douglas Hurt, Problems of 
Plenty: The American Farmer in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002); Willard W. Cochrane 
and Mary E. Ryan, American Farm Policy, 1948-1973 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981); 
Allen J. Matusow, Farm Policies and Politics of the Truman Years (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1967); Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, "Eisenhower and Ezra Taft Benson: Farm Policy 
15 
To tell the story of technology from the user's perspective means including evidence 
from the users. Several types of sources help bring farmers' voices to the forefront. Each 
chapter of the dissertation is under-girded by a thorough examination of Wallaces ' Farmer 
and Iowa Homestead, a farm publication specifically targeted to Iowa farmers. Wallaces ' 
Farmer is important because Iowa farmers were the intended readers and because the writers 
and editors also used the experiences of Iowans, including ample quotations from actual 
farmers and experts. At a more interpretive level, the editors let readers see different sides to 
most stories. They were not afraid to cover technology that did not work out as planned or to 
show debates among farmers or experts about which kind of farm family or operation might 
or might not benefit from new technology. Other farm publications have been valuable, 
including Successful Farming, Farm Implement News, and Agricultural Engineering, but the 
intended audiences for these publications were either nationwide or highly specialized. 
Furthermore, these other publications did not include as much testimony from farmers. 
Several types of agricultural extension records have also been central to the story of 
changes in farm production. The county extension directors' annual reports provide 
impressions of what happened at the county level. These reports reflect the viewpoints of the 
in the 1950s," Agricultural History 44 (October 1970): 369-378; James N. Giglio, "New Frontier Agricultural 
Policy: The Commodity Side, 1961-1963," Agricultural History 61 (Summer 1987): 53-70. For the issue of soil 
conservation, see Philip J. Nelson, "To Hold the Land: Soil Erosion, Agricultural Scientists, and the 
Development of Conservation Tillage Techniques," Agricultural History 71 (Winter 1997): 71-90. Farm 
organizations of the postwar period deserve more attention from historians. For farm lobbying from a political 
science perspective, see John Mark Hansen, Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991). The National Farmers' Organization was active in Iowa, 
although it has not been seriously studied by professional historians. See Don Muhm, The NFO: A Farm Belt 
Rebel, A History of the National Farmers Organization (Lone Oak Press, 2000) and George Brandsberg, The 
Two Sides in NFO's Battle (Ames: The Iowa State University Press, 1964). Several key studies devoted to 
women in farming and rural life have already been cited. For the story of alternative agriculture, see Randal S. 
Beeman and James A. Pritchard, A Green and Permanent Land: Ecology and Agriculture in the Twentieth 
Century (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001). 
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extension staff members rather than the farmers, but it is possible to read between the lines to 
see what farmers did and what they wanted. The county directors reported what types of 
information farmers said they wanted. Complaints from county directors indicate that 
farmers followed the advice of experts sometimes and often kept their own counsel. These 
reports are less valuable for the period after the mid 1950s. The more recent reports tend to 
be more about the extension service and less about the farmers, reflecting a change in the 
organizational culture of extension work. Annual reports from the state entomologist include 
correspondence, technical reports, photographs, newsletters, and other information that 
flowed between the Iowa State College/University extension staff, county directors, and 
farmers. While there was no annual weed specialist report, the papers of the extension weed 
specialist included much of the same kind of information that the annual reports of the 
entomologist contained. Extension agricultural engineers corresponded with manufacturers 
of farm implements as well as users, advising them on best practices. Finally, extension 
publications show the changing recommendations of the experts to match new research and 
results from cooperating farmers.15 
Farm record books have also been a good lens for observing the big picture as well as 
the nuances of agricultural change. By tracking what and when farm families purchased and 
how much it cost it is possible to see changes in production techniques and farm financing. 
These records also potentially obscure change, too, since only a small number of farm 
records represent a large number of farmers in the state, but they do confirm some of the 
15 Dorothy Schwieder, 75 Years of Service: Cooperative Extension in Iowa (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 
1993) is an excellent account of state extension activities from this period, including the role that Extension 
staff members performed in spreading the news about new technology. For a history of the extension service, 
see Wayne D. Rasmussen, Taking the University to the People: Seventy-Five Years of Cooperative Extension 
(Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989). 
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major trends in Iowa agriculture as well as the role individual farmers played in technological 
change.16 
Oral histories provide some insight into farm production. Farmers offered a wealth of 
information about what worked for them and what did not. They explained why using a com 
picker made more sense to some farmers than using a combine and why it was often 
economically more feasible to hire a hay baler than to purchase one. The technological 
adaptations and modifications to equipment made by farmers with mechanical expertise 
provided some of the earliest inspiration for this study and suggested the central role farmers 
played in leading technological change in the American heartland. 
Industrializing the Corn Belt is a study of farm life through the eyes of farm people in 
an important area within the Corn Belt. It is an attempt to understand farmers' diverse view 
points as they used technology to make a living, simultaneously remaking the social and 
physical landscape. Few farmers either adopted every technological innovation or rejected 
every innovation. Most of them, including those who left agriculture, used some techniques 
and passed on others. They made their own choices. The conclusion that farmers were 
leaders in the process of agricultural change in the postwar period is not a denial that other 
parties were important actors in technological change. Extension professionals, advertisers, 
journalists, and bankers all played important roles in advising farmers on how to meet their 
needs. They advised, counseled, and even pleaded with farmers to change their behavior on 
various occasions, but these outsiders could not make decisions for farmers. Farm families 
used new technology in ways that they believed would best meet their needs during a time of 
161 have been careful to acknowledge when farm record books either confirm on contradict the general pattern 
of farm decision making, purchasing, and production. These record books are still coming in to archives at the 
time of writing. Over the course of this project, several new collections have become available. 
tremendous change in the countryside, urban places, and in the relationships between urban 
and rural Americans. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Insecticide: War on Bugs 
In 1943 Iowa farm journalists stood up and took notice of a new crop pest, the 
European corn borer, declaring "Borer Racing Across Iowa." The European com borer 
crossed the Mississippi River from Illinois the previous year without attracting much 
attention, although it plagued farmers in states of the eastern Corn Belt for years. First 
introduced into the United States in the early 1900s, most likely as stowaways in broomcom 
imported from either Hungary or Italy into Massachusetts, European com borers entered 
Ohio in the 1920s and migrated across Indiana and into Illinois in the 1930s. Borer moths 
laid eggs on com leaves in May, and when the worms hatched they began eating the leaves 
before boring into the stalks where they transformed into pupae. In August those pupae 
emerged as moths and laid their eggs on com leaves, but this time the second brood lived in 
the stalks all winter before emerging the following May, repeating the cycle. Depending on 
the degree of infestation, these insects prevented ears from developing on the corn plant or 
even caused them to drop to the ground before harvest. Sometimes the stalk damage was so 
severe that the developing com plants blew down in strong winds. By 1943, com borers had 
spread all the way into the central counties of the state, causing significant losses in the com 
crop.1 
During the war years extension experts and farm journalists prescribed the same 
cultural control treatments for corn borers that they invariably prescribed for almost all insect 
pests; chopping com stalks after harvest, plowing under all remaining stalk material, making 
fodder or silage out of green com, and delaying planting to avoid the worst part of the 
1 
"Borer Racing Across Iowa," Wallaces Farmer, 21 August 1943. 
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infestation. All of these tactics interdicted the life cycle of the insect, denying it a place to 
spend the winter and reducing the threat for the next year. But in 1946 Iowa farmers began 
using a new tool to check corn borers as well as other insects that attacked livestock and 
plants. Dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane, commonly known as DDT, had been developed 
as an insecticide by the Geigy Company in Switzerland in 1939 and used effectively and with 
great publicity during World War II. The United States Army used DDT to check a typhus 
epidemic in Naples in 1943 by killing the lice which carried the typhus. In 1945, Iowa State 
College Extension staff worked with county agents and farmers across the state to 
demonstrate the efficacy of DDT on agricultural pests, inaugurating a new era of chemical 
insect control in Iowa agriculture. 
Between 1945 and 1970, farmers used insecticides to supplement and even replace 
cultural techniques to obtain important reductions in insect populations. However, farmers 
used these new chemicals on their own terms, experiencing varying degrees of success in 
manipulating their environment. By 1950, farmers faced two challenges to their independent 
chemical strategy. They discovered that some pests developed resistance to insecticide or 
naturally tolerated it. Insects that survived treatment could produce offspring that resisted the 
chemicals. Government researchers also reported that residues of insecticides could be found 
in dairy and meat products from treated animals. Farmers turned to new chemicals to solve 
these problems while facing more stringent federal regulations to avoid passing poisons on to 
people. Ultimately, farmers relied on chemical control as their first line of defense for some 
pests but not for others, using chemicals when it could help them maximize their investment. 
As the 1970s began, farmers could no longer use DDT and some of the chlorinated 
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hydrocarbon insecticides they had relied on, since the USD A, FDA, and state of Iowa banned 
them due to health concerns, but they had a new array of chemicals at their disposal.2 
The story of chemical insecticide demonstrates the relationship between farmers and 
technology. Farmers used the chemicals to meet their needs, accepting parts of the pest 
control message and rejecting others. Chemical insecticide became common before 1972, 
but there were important distinctions between the types of infestation, chemicals used, and 
even the type of farmers who used insecticide. While Iowa farmers began to treat their crops 
and livestock for dozens of insect pests in the years after World War II, this chapter focuses 
on three of the most widespread and commonly treated pests. Treatment for com borers with 
DDT peaked around 1950 before fading during the 1950s, giving way to the use of improved 
com borer resistant hybrids. By contrast, an increasing number of farmers used DDT and 
other chemicals for fly control. By 1972 livestock producers, especially dairy farmers, 
universally used chemical fly control. Treatment for soil insects such as rootworms with 
insecticides increased dramatically over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, outpacing the use 
of chemicals for com borer control. Iowa farmers frequently defied the directions from 
manufacturers and experts on how to use chemicals, responding to some parts of the 
chemical control message and not others. When chemical manufacturers advised farmers 
2 Many historians have treated the story of DDT and insecticides, although seldom from the viewpoint of the 
users. For a recent and comprehensive account of the insecticide story see Edmund Russell, War and Nature: 
Fighting Humans and Insects from World War I to Silent Spring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). Pete Daniel's Lost Revolutions: The South in the 1950s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2000) is the most extensive treatment of how farmers used insecticides and the effects of that use on 
animals, insects, and people. Thomas Dunlap demonstrated how DDT came to be perceived as a public health 
threat and the role of the federal government in regulating it in DDT: Scientists, Citizens and Public Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). For a recent study of chemical warfare in rural America, see 
Joshua Blu Buhs, The Fire Ant Wars: Nature, Science, and Public Policy in Twentieth Century America 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004). Two useful scientific overviews of the history and action of 
insecticides as well as herbicides include F. L. McEwen and G. R. Stepenson, The Use and Siganificance of 
Pesticides in the Environment (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979) and G. T. Brooks Chlorinated 
Insecticides, Volume I, Technology and Application (Cleveland: CRC Press, 1974). 
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that "It's time for action!" when "pests attack your pocketbook," farmers acted, but in their 
own ways and in their own time.3 
There were few options to stop the European corn borers that threatened farmers' 
crops at the height of World War II. Some farmers took the advice of extension staff and 
farm journalists to plow under corn stalks and use other control techniques to break the 
borers' life cycle, but they did not stop the spread of these insects. Estimates of crop losses 
due to corn borer infestations in the 1943 crop year were as high as 4 percent of the corn crop 
from Indiana to Eastern Iowa. Extension staff members characterized the corn borer as "the 
biggest [insect] problem facing Iowa farmers" in 1945, noting that estimated yield losses that 
year amounted to 6 million dollars contrasted with just 2.5 million in 1944. Each year the 
com borer continued to spread westward, so that by 1948 com borers had been recorded in 
every county in the state.4 
At the urging of the Iowa State College Extension Entomologist Harold "Tiny" 
Gunderson, farmers experimented with DDT for com borer control in 1946. Experiments 
3 Ronald Kline has shown how rural consumers adopted and adapted technology to meet their particular needs, 
often rejecting the goals of manufacturers, reformers, and government officials. Ronald Kline, Consumers in 
the Country: Technology and Social Change in Rural America (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000). Standard 25% DDT Concentrate Advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, 7 June 1952. 
4 
"Borer Racing Across Iowa," Wallaces Farmer, 21 August 1943; "Corn Borer Damage Over 4 Per Cent," 
Wallaces Farmer, 14 April 1944; Annual Report, Entomology, 1945, Summary, 3. The Annual Report for 
Entomology, later titled Annual Report for Entomology and Wildlife, is one of the most valuable sources used in 
the preparation of this manuscript and deserves some explanation. These yearly reports include a wide variety 
of information, including summaries of work performed by the Iowa State College (later University) Extension 
Entomologists, project reports, correspondence to and from the state entomologists, memos to county agents, 
technical reports of chemical and cultural control experiments from cooperating farmers, radio and television 
scripts and program outlines, texts of talks given to youth groups, surveys of insecticide use, photographs, 
programs from training meetings and conferences, newspaper clippings, and recommendations for insecticide 
use. Only a few years of these reports have consistent page numbers throughout the entire bound volume; most 
of them are not organized as a unit. In citing information from this diverse and invaluable source, the author 
has provided as much specific information about the particular evidence from within the volume. All of the 
reports will be cited as Annual Report, Entomology, accompanied by other identifying information and the year 
of the report. The collection is located at Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State University and listed 
as: Records, Cooperative Extension Service, Entomology and Wildlife. 
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with sweet corn growers showed between 90 to 100 percent control of corn borers in treated 
fields. Farmers read about a test at Kankakee, Illinois, where 85 percent of the pests were 
destroyed by dusting plants, resulting in yield increases of up to 25 percent. A writer for 
Wallaces ' Farmer noted that "It may be some time before the average farmer can use this 
method of combating borers," since the cost, estimated at $15 dollars per acre, was much 
more than farmers could afford. It was not long before chemicals for corn borer control 
became an affordable reality, as Iowa farmers saw a flurry of print materials from extension 
and advertisers promoting the economics of killing corn borers.5 
Outreach through pest control meetings, speaking engagements, radio spots, and later 
television programs were also important techniques for informing farmers about corn borers 
and control techniques. In 1945 extension entomologists drafted a script for a talk on corn 
borer control for use at 4-H club meetings that stressed cultural control techniques of deep, 
clean plowing of cornstalks before May 15, planting late, and using hybrids with strong 
stalks and ear shanks. Harold Gunderson distributed a skit written by extension drama 
specialist Pearl Converse to each county extension director for use at township level 
meetings in March, 1947. The skit highlighted both cultural and chemical control methods, 
using humor to get the message to the people.6 
Extension experts stressed a balance of cultural and chemical control but DDT was 
most appealing part of the pest control message. Farmers listened to clean plowing talks and 
attended demonstrations to learn what they could do to stop the borers. In 1946 the state 
entomologist and the agricultural engineers collaborated to sponsor seventeen clean plowing 
5 Annual Report, Entomology, 1946, Summary, 1 ; "Kill Borers With DDT Dust," Wallaces Farmer, 1 
September 1945. 
6 
"Corn Borer Control, Discussion for 4-H Club Meetings," Annual Report, Entomology, 1945; Harold 
Gunderson To County Extension Directors, 18 February 1947, Annual Report, Entomology, 1947. 
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demonstrations in eight counties. However, the state entomologist concluded that "DDT 
appears to be the best single weapon now available against the corn borer." He cited 
instances of farmers who used DDT to gain higher yields in fields that were free of corn 
borers. A cooperative venture with the Pioneer Hybred Company on a farm in Durant 
yielded twenty to twenty-eight bushels per acre more in DDT treated fields than in untreated 
fields. These were significant gains when the average yield per acre was approximately fifty-
five bushels. Without denying the value of cultural techniques, Gunderson and others made 
no such claims for their effectiveness, indirectly encouraging farmers to rely on chemicals.7 
In 1948 state extension mounted a determined, sustained campaign to promote DDT 
for corn borer control. In February, Gunderson articulated four points in the borer control 
program, which included purchasing resistant hybrids, early planting, and clean plowing but, 
as in 1947, his main emphasis was on DDT. Gunderson stated that every dollar spent on 
DDT would return five to ten dollars to the farmer through yield gains. An article titled "Use 
DDT To Kill Corn Borers" included information on cultural techniques, but, reflecting 
Gunderson's optimism about DDT, emphasized that chemical treatments would make 
delayed planting unnecessary. Claiming that "Old Ways Failed to Stop Corn Borers," the 
editors of Wallaces ' Farmer advised farmers to "use every method" to control the population 
of corn borers, but then systematically showed the weaknesses of each cultural technique, 
concluding that spraying with DDT was "about the only corn borer control method that the 
individual farmer can be fairly sure of." In November, a USDA and Iowa State College 
survey reported that a record number of corn borers would be wintering in Iowa. Observers 
predicted that more farmers would use DDT in 1949, since farmers and entomologists "are 
7 J. G. Gunning, "Plow to Kill the Borer," Successful Farming, March 1946; Annual Report, 1946, 1-2. 
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pinning most of their hopes in the corn borer battle on chemical treatment." These optimistic 
reports about DDT in the farm press overshadowed the attention given to cultural 
techniques.8 
Farmers applied DDT to first and second brood borers or sometimes both to kill pests 
and obtain substantial yield increases. Suggested treatment per acre in 1950 was one and a 
half pounds of DDT per acre, per application. It could be applied as dust or as a spray, 
depending on the equipment at hand. The important point about application was to get the 
chemical on the leaves and in the whorl of the plant, the place where the leaf emerged from 
the stalk, since this was the place where the larvae penetrated the plant. Many farmers made 
or purchased sprayers in the late 1940s to spray insecticide and herbicide. While there were 
many custom applicators in the late 1940s, many farmers believed it was a good idea to do 
their own work, as indicated by the remarkable increase in sprayers on Iowa farms from 
5,000 in 1947 to almost 42,000 in 1950. There were complaints about unskilled or crooked 
fly-by-night custom sprayers who moved through rural neighborhoods promising to spray 
DDT. These scam artists or incompetents applied improperly mixed chemicals or substituted 
some other spray, using "the magic name of DDT to fleece farmers." But these isolated 
complaints of fraud did not discourage many Iowa farmers from using DDT to see the results 
for themselves.9 
8 
"DDT Reduces Borer Loss," Wallaces Farmer, 21 February 1948; "Use DDT To Kill Corn Borers," Wallaces 
Farmer, 7 February 1948; "Old Ways Failed to Stop Corn Borers," Wallaces Farmer, 17 April 1948; "Keep 
Fighting Borers," Wallaces Farmer, 20 November 1948. O. T. Zimmerman and Irvin Lavine, DDT: Killer of 
Killers (Dover, NH: Industrial Research Service, 1946), is a good example of the kind of promotional material 
of the late 1940s. Also see Russell, War and Nature, chapters eight and nine. 
9 
"Stop Corn Borer Damage!," By Harold Gunderson, Agricultural Extension Service, Iowa State College, 
Ames, Iowa, Pamphlet 134, May 1948; "Controlling The European Corn Borer," Agricultural Extension 
Service, Iowa State College, Ames Iowa, Pamphlet 150, December 1949; Harold Gunderson and E. P. 
Sylwester, "Spraying—Babyhood to Manhood in 5 Years," E. P. Sylwester papers, Special Collections, Parks 
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Farmers who tried DDT were generally pleased with it, especially when they had a 
chance to see side by side comparisons of treated and untreated corn. John Ostercamp of 
Hancock County followed the advice of his county extension director in 1949 and performed 
a double test, leaving unsprayed check strips in the corn he treated and a few sprayed rows in 
the corn he did not treat. He found that in his unsprayed sections the com yielded seventy-
eight bushels per acre, while his sprayed sections yielded over eighty-five bushels per acre. 
A Kossuth County farmer obtained as much as fifteen bushels to the acre more com on his 
sprayed acres.10 
Chemical treatment for European corn borers had a rapid rise. In 1947, farmers only 
treated about 50,000 acres of Iowa com with DDT. The next year, they treated 
approximately 167,000 acres, while in 1950 and 1951, farmers treated almost approximately 
1.735 million acres, representing approximately 15 percent of 11 million acres of com in the 
state. This increase was due to the hype surrounding DDT, the seriousness of the com borer 
infestation, and the ability of the extension system to get the message out about the threat of 
com borers. The state entomologist collected reports of com borer egg masses in fields from 
across the state, mobilizing 4-H boys to gather data for the first time in 1944. The boys made 
corn borer counts and reported damage caused by the borers. These estimated counts 
allowed entomologists to predict the extent of infestations for both broods of borers. In 
theory, statewide estimates permitted farmers to know if they were at risk for either mid 
Library, Iowa State University; "Sprayer Market in '50 Looks Good," Farm Implement News, 10 February 
1950; Farm Radio Service, 11 August 1947, Annual Report, Entomology, 1947. 
10 Wally Inman, "Ready For The Borers?," Wallaces Farmer, 3 June 1950. 
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season second brood borers or if they needed to plan for a heavy infestation from the first 
brood in the following year.11 
DDT use for corn borer control declined just as rapidly as it rose. By the 1960s, 
farmers only treated a handful of acres with occasional jumps in use depending on the degree 
of infestation. One significant reason for declining com borer treatments was the relative 
difficulty in actually observing the insects. Unless farmers were diligent about looking for 
infestations it was difficult to know if corn borers were a problem. Corn borer egg masses on 
the leaves are no larger than a quarter of an inch long, while the borers themselves are thinner 
than a pencil lead and approximately one-sixteenth of an inch in length, making them 
difficult to see. Farmers who found com borers also had to work to determine the extent of 
infestation. Extension experts argued that the population had to cross a threshold to make 
treatment worthwhile. To discover an infestation, farmers conducted a random sample of a 
field. They walked into the field a specified distance, counted egg masses on one plant, 
turned ninety degree and walked another specified distance and then counted egg masses 
again. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, experts recommended spraying if the 
population exceeded fifty egg masses per 100 plants.12 
11 Yearly statistics for the estimated use of chemicals for fly, European corn borer, and corn rootworms are from 
the Entomologist's Annual Report summaries. The figure for total corn acreage is from 1949. Agricultural 
Statistics, 1950, USD A, (Washington, DC.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 46. At least three 
versions of a corn borer control pamphlet were in circulation before 1970. See "The European Corn Borer and 
its Control in the North Central States," Cooperative Extension Service and Agricultural and Home Economics 
Experiment Station, Iowa State University, Ames Iowa, Pamphlet 176 (Revised), October 1961; and the revised 
version October, 1968. 
12 USD A researchers worked on other methods of control for the European corn borer, including the release of 
154,000 wasp-like parasites in fourteen Iowa counties in 1944, attempting to replicate earlier success with other 
insects in California. Those efforts are not included in this study, since they were undertaken by institutions and 
not by farmers. Populations of predator species such as the four-spotted fungus beetle increased at the same 
time as the corn borer. The general story of biological insect control efforts in the years up to 1951 is covered 
in Richard C. Sawyer, "Monopolizing the Insect Trade: Biological Control in the USD A, 1888-1951," in The 
United States Department of Agriculture in Historical Perspective, ed. Alan I Marcus and Richard Lowitt 
(Washington, D.C.: Agricultural History Society, 1991): 271-285. For an overview of the four-spotted fungus 
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Even if farmers were aware of corn borers in their fields and performed the egg mass 
counts, they did not necessarily perceive them as a major threat. In early 1946, a panel of 
farmers at a corn borer conference in Cedar Rapids reported that farmers would not do much 
to control the insects "until after their pocketbooks have been hurt to the extent of 10 to 15 
bushels of com per acre," implying that farmers could live with losses from 15 to 20 percent 
of the crop yield. Similarly, the Benton County extension director observed that "The farmer 
who only has a moderate infestation does not do too much about them." As late as 1964, T. 
A. Brindley, the director of the USD A's Regional Com Borer Laboratory in Ankeny, Iowa, 
echoed this concern, adding that years of good growing weather compounded the problem. 
"It's difficult for a farmer who was growing 50-bushel corn 5 years ago and is growing 100-
plus bushels now to be concerned about borers," he observed. Treating for com borers also 
coincided with haying season, which made treating for borers a "nuisance" to farmers who 
wanted to make hay while the sun was shining. The difficulty in understanding the extent of 
corn borer damage was a serious factor in the limitation of treatment for the borers.13 
A comparison with chemical weed control (see chapter two) helps make sense of the 
decision not to spray for com borers. Farmers with fields infested by weeds could easily see 
the extent to which weeds were taking over a field even before the weeds were out of control, 
making the decision to use herbicide an easy one. Unlike European corn borers, Iowa 
beetle see C. E. McCoy and Tom A. Brindley, "These four-spotted bugs...Friend or Foe?," Iowa Farm Science, 
6 (May 1952): 12-13. In 1959, farmers read about the development of a "living insecticide," the bacteria 
bacillus thuringiensis, which produces a spore within the larvae of the borer moths that triggers a disease that is 
lethal to the borer. This bt corn became a significant technique for controlling European corn borers in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries as scientists developed technology to genetically modify seed plants. 
"New living insecticide to go on field trials," Wallaces Farmer, 7 February 1959; Keith Remy, "A biological 
control for the com borer?," Wallaces Farmer, 1 March 1964. 
13 European Corn Borer Conference, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 16-17 January 1946, Annual Report, Entomology, 
1946; Keith E. Myers to Harold Gunderson, 2 March 1946, Annual Report, Entomology, 1946; Keith Remy, 
"What's Happened to the corn borer?," Wallaces Farmer, 1 February 1964. 
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farmers had contended with weeds for generations, making the transition herbicide much 
easier than the transition to insecticide. 
The most important reason for the decline in treating for European corn borer was the 
development of new hybrids that were either resistant to the insects or tolerated them. This 
type of biological control was mentioned as early as the mid 1940s, when extension staff 
members suggested that farmers select hybrids that had strong shanks and stalks that could 
withstand some degree of infestation. In the 1950s, seed companies responded by breeding 
hybrids that were specially suited to withstanding the borers. Researchers actually collected 
borers and harvested egg masses to place in the whorls of the growing parent corn plants. 
Corn that survived the infestation in good condition became the parent stock of new hybrids. 
The inbreeding and development of the crosses needed to produce enough hybrid seed to put 
on the market took time, but seed com companies offered new and more resistant hybrids 
each season. Dr. Brindley of the Regional Com Borer Laboratory argued that the 
development of "resistant" or "tolerant" hybrids was one of the most important reasons why 
farmers paid less attention to chemical treatment by the 1960s.14 
Selecting hybrids that could withstand borer infestation was the economical way to 
fight the insects. Iowa farmers were already committed to buying hybrid seed, with 100 
percent of farmers using it by 1942, so there was no new investment needed as long as the 
variety performed as promised. Using resistant hybrids as a preventative approach was 
potentially more economical than chemical rescue treatment. In addition to the additional 
costs, spraying, as noted, could conflict with other pressing tasks such as haying, forcing 
14 Research and breeding efforts are described in a promotional comic book depicting a father and son visit to 
the Northrup King Research farm at Shakopee, Minnesota. "KX [Kingscrost] Research at Work For You," KX-
57-4, Northrup, King & Company, 1957; Remy, "What's happened to the corn borer?." 
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farmers to neglect other profitable work. Farmers also faced restrictions on feeding DDT 
treated silage to beef and dairy animals, since ingested DDT was stored in animal fat of beef 
animals and dairy products. Charles Havran of Benton County never sprayed for corn 
borers. His son recalled that "The big thing.. .was buying hybrids that had stronger stalks." 
Bob Nymand of Audubon County echoed this, noting that he did not treat his com for borers 
in the 1950s and 1960s.15 
Farmers who treated for borers did not necessarily make it a regular practice. Farm 
record books show that treatment for corn borers was sporadic, not only from year to year, 
but was seldom a practice people used on their entire acreage. Rudolf Schipull of Wright 
County sprayed for borers in 1951 and 1954. The first year he only treated twenty-nine acres 
with aerial application at a cost of $50.75. In 1954, two years after he retired from active 
farming, he used DDT again, spending $186.00, but neglecting to mention how many acres 
he treated or the method of application. Joseph Ludwig of Winneshiek County purchased 
117 gallons of DDT in 1949 for corn borer treatment, the only mention he ever made of 
purchasing DDT for his crops. William Adams of Fayette County made one purchase of 
DDT before his record keeping ceased in 1959. He bought eighty-three gallons of DDT in 
1950 without indicating how he planned to use it. The experiences of Schipull, Ludwig, and 
Adams confirm the fact that using chemicals to treat for corn borers was the exception rather 
than the rule.16 
15 Fremont, Conrad, "Resistant Com Checks Borer," Successful Farming, November 1942; Dennis Havran, 
interview with author, 11 January 2002, Des Moines, tape recording; Bob Nymand, interview with author, 30 
October 2002, Brayton, Iowa, tape recording. 
16 Rudolf Schipull papers, Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State University; Joseph Ludwig papers, 
Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State University; William Adams papers, Special Collections, Parks 
Library, Iowa State University. 
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Results from a 1959 survey of 100 Adair County farmers show the relatively low 
degree of effort given to chemical control of corn borer after the initial excitement of the late 
1940s. Ninety-five farmers participated in the survey, or approximately 5 percent of all the 
farmers in the county, with seventy-nine farmers reporting that they never treated for com 
borers. One person who treated in the 1958 crop year noted that he did so to obtain higher 
yields, but most farmers who responded explained why they did not use DDT. The most 
common response was that treating for borers did not "do any good," with others reporting 
that the infestation was not bad enough, that they lacked time to do it, or that they believed 
that it would not solve the problem unless their neighbors treated their fields, too.17 
While the use of insecticide for com borers decreased in the 1950s, farmers increased 
their use of DDT and other chemicals for fly control. As early as 1947, experiments 
indicated that beef cattle would gain weight faster and dairy cows would produce more milk 
if they were not bothered by flies. Each blood meal that a fly extracted from its host meant 
less blood supply for the host. Furthermore, animals twitch, swish their tails, and swing their 
heads to get flies off, all of which require movement and calories that could be used for 
production. Unlike corn borer infestations, flies were a very visible problem, since dairy 
farmers were in close proximity to their animals at least twice per day at milking time and 
beef producers observed cattle at feeding times. Cooperative extension demonstration 
projects in 1947 showed that dairy cows and beeves treated with DDT produced an average 
of over three extra pounds of milk production per day and gained a half a pound of body 
weight more per day than the non-treated animals. While many farmers did not keep the 
kind of records as the people who cooperated with extension service to conduct experiments, 
17 D. Ivan Johannes to Harold Gunderson, 4 May 1959, Annual Report, Entomology, 1959. 
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they did "watch the milk pail and the cream check" and noticed that after using DDT they 
saw increases in production in the summer when production traditionally dropped due to fly 
attacks. Advertisers reinforced the message, claiming that for only a few cents farmers could 
add up fifty pounds more beef per animal and up to 20 percent more milk with "Pestroy 25% 
DDT" manufactured by the Sherwin-Williams Company. According to one writer for 
Wallces ' Farmer, "The increased gains or extra milk from fly-free cattle are so valuable you 
"can't afford to let flies get started even for a week." These economic concerns made fly 
control chemicals an obvious choice for profit-minded farmers, just as planting improved 
hybrids made more sense than spraying for corn borers.18 
Farmers reported the near miraculous fly killing power of DDT in the mid to late 
1940s. Bert Brown, a farmer from Polk County who raised bulls for artificial insemination, 
was one of the early experimenters with DDT. In 1945 a group of farmers visited his 
operation with a journalist, who reported that after spraying there were some flies in his barn 
and that a fly would occasionally land on one of the bulls, "but the animals were not being 
tormented on a hot August afternoon." The next year, a dairy farmer from Mitchell County 
noted that "It works practically 100 per cent in the barn," while a farmer from Dubuque 
County reported "very good results from DDT application, both on the buildings and on the 
cattle." The relative ease of spraying was also impressive. Farmers who sprayed could 
simply stand on a fence board of a paddock or corral and use a low pressure sprayer to douse 
18 
"Farmers Strong for DDT," Wallaces Farmer, 17 April 1948; Annual Report, Entomology, 1947, Summary, 
p. 9; Pestroy advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, 1 June 1947; "New Chemicals Mean Death to Pests," Wallaces 
Farmer, 7 August 1948. 
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the animals, in contrast to the older techniques of driving cattle through a dip tank, which 
was wasteful, messy, and panicked the animals.19 
In 1947 and 1948 civic leaders and Extension professionals campaigned to rid the 
entire state of flies. Chemical control was an essential part of this campaign, with extension 
staff making an intense effort to get urban and rural people across Iowa to use DDT. In 
towns and cities, community leaders coordinated efforts to spray alleys and dumps and even 
provided residents and small business owners with free or low cost DDT to treat window and 
door screens, kitchen walls, and food preparation areas to eliminate the flies. They also 
encouraged farmers to spray their manure piles every two to three weeks to kill the emerging 
generation of flies. A Story County dairy farmer, F. H. Lodgsdon, claimed that "DDT is one 
of the greatest discoveries for farmers," since in 1946 his farm was fly-free all summer long. 
A farmer from Greene County declared that "a fellow's foolish if he doesn't take advantage 
of DDT to protect his livestock from flies." Farm sanitation was an important part of the 
effort, too, with extension staff and journalists goading farmers to remove manure piles every 
few days and to clean barns and piles quickly and get manure onto fields. Harold Gunderson 
likened using chemicals alone to being a fighter with one hand tied behind his back. The 
campaign generated interest the first two years, with as many as 85 to 90 percent of Iowa 
farmers practicing a complete fly control program. However, it also became apparent after 
two years of the war on flies that it was impossible to eradicate a species that had a life cycle 
19 
"DDT is Slow Poison," Wallaces Farmer, 1 September 1945; "DDT Raises Summer Milk Production," 
Wallaces Farmer, 3 August 1946. 
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of several weeks. In 1949, the percentage of farmers who practiced fly control declined to 50 
percent, indicating that there were problems with fly control chemicals.20 
The widespread use of chlorinated hydrocarbons to control flies created problems that 
few, if any, farmers anticipated. One of the first problems they observed was that flies 
developed resistance to DDT. While noting that Iowa farms could be made "fly-free" in 
1949, a writer from Wallaces ' Farmer asked "about flies being resistant to DDT?" 
Extension staff confirmed that flies that survived a treatment could reproduce and have 
offspring that would survive chemical attacks. Farmers who used strictly DDT for the 
previous two years needed to try other chemicals such as chlordane, benzene hexacholride, or 
toxaphene. In the early 1950s, the discussion of resistant flies and the new chemicals 
available to treat them was a regular feature in fly control articles in Wallaces ' Farmer?1 
Another problem with DDT was that there were health risks to animals and humans. 
As early as 1946, state extension experts cautioned that there were hazards associated with 
DDT, a fact routinely mentioned by the farm press. In addition to cautioning users that DDT, 
like any poison, was harmful to people, Harold Gunderson cautioned that oil based sprays 
should not be used on livestock and that farmers needed to follow directions. These oil based 
sprays were more readily absorbed through the skin or ducts, which meant that the chemical 
was getting to the animal, not the insects it was meant to kill. In 1953 extension pest control 
experts pointed out that DDT was no longer approved for application on dairy cattle or in 
dairy buildings. By 1960, there was a "general crackdown" on the misuse of farm chemicals 
by the FDA. Specifically, the FDA was on the lookout for insecticide residues in animal 
20 
"Declare War on Flies," Wallaces Farmer, 15 March 1947; "Farmers Strong For DDT," Wallaces Farmer, 17 
April 1948. Annual Report, Entomology, 1949. 
21 
"Iowa Farms Can Be Made Fly-Free," Wallaces Farmer, 7 May 1949. 
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tissue or products from DDT, dieldrin, aldrin, chlordane, toxaphene, heptachlor, endrin, and 
methoxychlor, all chlorinated hydrocarbons. FDA representatives would track serious insect 
infestations, go to that area to find out what insecticides were being used, and conduct tests 
on products from that area to determine if there was any evidence of chemical residue in 
excess of the federal limits. The FDA would confiscate butter from creameries where they 
found any trace of DDT.22 
After the USD A and FDA issued new guidelines restricting the use of DDT on dairy 
animals, sanitation received renewed emphasis in fly control programs. As early as 1949, 
writers for Wallaces ' Farmer noted that while most farmers were familiar with DDT, it 
should never be used on dairy cows, dairy barns, rooms for separating cream or storing milk. 
For the next several years, most fly control articles began with a statement stressing the 
importance of sanitation as the first step in fly control. "Chemicals won't do the job alone," 
one writer opined, "You have to get rid of fly breeding places. That can mean some extra 
work." Farmers who failed to clean out barn lots, cattle sheds, and hog pens could not expect 
any significant success from the use of chemicals. Manure piles that had been growing 
outside the barn door all winter should be hauled to the field, since these were places where 
flies reproduced. In response to a letter from a Bremer County farmer about chemical 
control, the editor noted that the farmer did not mention that "the best fly control measure" 
was ".. .sanitation—[the] destruction of places where flies can breed." While chemicals were 
22 Two good examples of the warnings about DDT are J. J. Davis, "A Word on DDT," Successful Farming, 
April 1946 and Jim Roe, The Latest on DDT," Successful Farming, June 1946. "Declare War on Flies," 
Wallaces Farmer, 15 March 1947; Earle S. Raun, "Flies on Livestock," Agricultural Extension Service, Iowa 
State College, Ames, Iowa, Pamphlet 200, May 1953; "FDA to bear down on chemical misuse," Wallaces 
Farmer, 7 May 1960. 
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an important part of the program, sanitation had to be the first step. Otherwise, fly 
populations would rebound and continue to plague livestock.23 
The sanitation message was slow to take hold, however, since farmers had such high 
expectations of chemicals. In 1952, Val Racek of Story County had trouble getting rid of 
flies around his hog house, even though he had used DDT, chlordane, lindane, and other 
chlorinated hydrocarbon chemicals to kill flies. On the suggestion of Earl Raun, an extension 
entomologist at Iowa State College, Racek began to remove manure every three of four days, 
which brought a significant reduction in the fly population. Racek's impulse to rely on 
chemicals to completely control flies made sense in the context of the heavy attention 
experts, journalists, and farmers gave to the killing power of chemicals. Sanitation practices 
required more work than chemical control, a fact that made chemical control appealing and 
made the sanitation message so difficult to sell to farmers who had experienced any degree of 
success with chemicals.24 
For all the setbacks of chemical fly control, it was much more popular than chemical 
corn borer control, especially for farmers who specialized. The extent to which dairy farmers 
began to rely on chemicals was apparent in a February, 1951 Wallaces ' Farmer survey of 
dairy breed association members. Over 90 percent of the respondents reported that they 
believed it was profitable to use fly spray on dairy cows and barns, even though only three 
out of four were satisfied with the particular products they used to spray animals and 
buildings. Most farmers used DDT to spray their cow barns, and 21 percent used DDT to 
23 
"Iowa Farms Can Be Made Fly-Free"; "Clean Up to Get Rid of Flies," Wallaces Farmer, 15 April 1950; "Get 
Early Start on Fly Control," Wallaces Farmer, 17 March 1951 ; "No Need to Live with Flies," Wallaces 
Farmer, 3 May 1952; "You Can't Afford To Feed Flies," Wallaces Farmer, 20 June 1953; "Does fly control 
work for you?," Wallaces Farmer, 19 June 1954. 
24 
"You Can't Afford to Feed Flies." 
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spray their cows, with 32 percent using methoxychlor and 27 percent using lindane, even 
though DDT and lindane had not been cleared for use directly on dairy cows since 1949. 
When asked, "Did you ever hear that methoxychlor was the only residual (long-lasting) fly 
spray that was safe to spray on dairy cows," only 43 percent of the farmers surveyed 
responded yes, suggesting that many farmers were unaware of the guidelines for chemical 
use. It is also possible that farmers failed to appreciate the risks of chemical use. In 1954 a 
farmer from Taylor County wrote to the editor of a Wallaces ' Farmer stating that he had 
purchased some lindane concentrate labeled not for use on cattle. "But flies were bad," he 
stated, "and I sprayed the cows anyway," asking what harm the spray would do to the cows. 
This shoot first and ask questions later attitude indicates that farmers wanted the quick and 
easy way to relieve animals plagued by pests and to get the remarkable gains that chemical 
promoters promised.25 
New products were on the market by the early 1950s to provide a degree of balance in 
chemical fly control programs, in part to get around real and perceived issues of resistance as 
well as the problem of chemical residues in dairy and meat products. Methoxychlor, as 
noted, was approved for direct application on dairy animals until the mid 1950s, when it, too, 
was restricted for use only on beef cattle and by 1959 only for use on walls and ceilings of 
livestock shelters. In 1955, manufacturers introduced malathion and diazinon, 
organophosphate insecticides that experts touted as safe and easy to use chemicals that killed 
DDT resistant flies. Malathion and diazinon could be used in places that DDT could not, 
such as dairy barns. It was not, however, approved for use on dairy cows. Farmers had to 
25 
"Fly Spray Survey," Annual Report, Entomology, 1951; "Sprayed Cows with Lindane," Wallaces Farmer, 17 
July 1954. 
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use methoxychlor on dairy and beef cattle, although they could still use DDT or malathion on 
beef cattle if they were on pasture. Fly repellants such as pyrethrin were the only chemicals 
that could be used on dairy cattle by the late 1950s. Gunderson acknowledged that these 
repellants only lasted about twenty-four hours, but he also stated that "there isn't anything 
available now that will do the job safely and last longer under Iowa conditions." These 
chemicals gave farmers more flexibility in controlling flies, allowing them to continue 
chemical fly control which was easier than sanitation and solved the problem of resistance.26 
Throughout the 1950s the number of farmers practicing fly control steadily gained 
momentum after the initial surge of the late 1940s. In 1952 extension entomologists reported 
that Iowa farmers treated approximately 45 percent of dairy cattle with insecticide for flies. 
That number steadily increased throughout the decade, with 50 percent in 1954 and 94 
percent by 1960, surpassing the previous high levels of 1948. Similarly, the percentage of 
farmers using insecticide on beef cattle increased from 7 percent in 1952 to 61 percent in 
1960. Farmers with beef herds were aided by the development of a back rubber type 
applicator that farmers could build which allowed cattle to treat themselves. There was a 
strong economic incentive to continue with fly control on the farm that was lacking for many 
city residents and business owners. The early messages from experts about the potential of 
DDT and their own experiences using it to kill flies made a big impression on many 
farmers.27 
26 Earle S. Raun, "Kill flies this summer," Successful Farming, July 1959; Midwest Farm Handbook, 5th ed. 
(Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1960), 308-310; "Insect experts talk it over," Wallaces Farmer, 16 April 
1955; "New chemical for FLIES," Wallaces Farmer, 20 March 1954; "Insecticides aid in controlling flies," 
Wallaces Farmer, 7 June 1958. 
27 Extension entomologists provided estimates in each year's Annual Report of the number of farmers using 
chemicals based on county agent reports. Specific fly control strategies are detailed in "Flies on Livestock," 
Agricultural Extension Service, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, Pamphlet 200, May 1953. 
Farm records show the high level of interest farmers had in chemical fly control. 
Rudolf Schipull purchased a variety of fly control chemicals in the 1940s and 1950s. He 
bought his first DDT for spraying cattle and buildings in 1948, an unidentified fly spray in 
1950, and bought a few dollars worth of lindane in 1953 and 1954. He bought other fly 
control products in small quantities in 1955 and spent $29.41 on five gallons of toxaphene, 
an unidentified spray, and dry dip in 1958. Joseph Ludwig bought one dollar's worth of 
DDT in 1947 and purchased a product called Dustone for cattle in 1954, 1955, and 1956. 
William Adams bought some DDT in 1948 and, as noted earlier, eighty-three gallons of DDT 
in 1950, although it is unclear how he intended to use it. It is possible to infer what he 
planned to do with it, however, since he made his DDT purchases on June 23 in 1948 and on 
June 24 in 1950, which match the dates that he bought other kinds of fly spray in 1951 and 
1957. Schipull and Ludwig also typically bought fly control chemicals in late June, although 
they also made purchases at other times of the year. These three farmers all experimented 
with DDT before moving on to other products by the end of the 1950s, although it is 
impossible to know if they quit using DDT because of the messages from experts or for some 
other reason. Regardless of the chemical they used, these men were all interested in 
improving fly control by using chemicals.28 
Farmers hesitated to give up their tried and proven tactics, especially DDT and other 
chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticides, even after more than a decade of warnings to about the 
risks. Although the farm record books show that some farmers modified their chemical use 
as regulations changed, other farmers did not. In 1960 Harold Gunderson wrote an 
impassioned and confidential appeal to county extension agents urging them to redouble their 
28 Schipull papers; Ludwig papers; Adams papers. 
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efforts to educate farmers about the proper uses of fly control chemicals. Gunderson was 
appalled after he examined a survey of Iowa farmers' chemical use which showed that 64 
percent of Iowa farmers used restricted residual chemicals on dairy cows that had not been 
recommended for years. Twenty-three percent used DDT on dairy cows while 33 percent 
used lindane, chemicals that had not been cleared for use on dairy cattle since 1948. "The 
worst shock," Gunderson noted, "came when I read that nearly 24% of Iowa dairy farmers 
were slapping a chemical on their cows whose ingredients they didn't know." Gunderson 
recognized the gravity of this situation, warning that the FDA could shut down local 
creameries and dairies that were the sources of poisoned dairy products. The next year the 
Clinton County extension director reported that many dairy farmers did not know what 
precautions to take when spraying their cows and did not know which products were 
approved for use on dairy cattle. In 1965 two farms in Fayette County were quarantined after 
inspectors found dieldrin residues in milk from those farms. Milk samples from each of the 
thirty-three cows from those farms tested positive for dieldrin contamination. That year 
thirteen Iowa dairy farmers had to dump their milk, in one case for 150 days, because of 
residual insecticides in their milk. The campaign to educate farmers about the merits of 
chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticide and to promote its use had worked too well. Farmers 
had adopted these insecticides and used them liberally, achieving good fly control but 
potentially undermining their own livelihood.29 
Efforts to control soil insects such as the corn rootworm resembled the widespread 
adoption of insecticide for fly control, although chemical treatments for the soil insect 
29 
"To All County Extension Personnel," Annual Report, Entomology, 1960; Annual Report, County Extension 
Activities, Clinton County, 1961, 19 (hereafter cited as Annual Report, followed by the county name and page 
number); Annual Report, Fayette County, 1965, 6; Bob Dunaway, "Keep insecticides out of milk," Wallaces 
Farmer, 13 August 1966. 
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complex did not get underway until the 1950s. The opening phase of the campaign began in 
1951, with demonstration plots set up in cooperation between farmers, extension 
entomologists, and experiment station entomologists in Dubuque, Butler, Wright, and Boone 
Counties. Cooperators tested five chlorinated hydrocarbon soil insecticides, including aldrin, 
chlordane, dieldrin, heptachlor, and lindane, showing that farmers could control rootworms 
and gain up to 13 bushels more corn per acre. The success of these tests encouraged 
extension staff to set up more demonstration plots in 1952. Manufacturers began to sell 
fertilizers mixed with insecticide in the mid 1950s, which likely accelerated the rate of 
adoption, since applying fertilizer and insecticide together reduced the number of trips across 
the field. In 1959 farmers purchased insecticide granules, which could be applied broadcast 
30 or in rows. 
Farmers readily took up soil insecticide for rootworm control. In 1953, twenty-six 
county extension directors reported that farmers were using soil insecticides before planting 
85,433 acres to control soil insects, primarily corn rootworms. Extension professionals 
encouraged farmers to practice crop rotation to control rootworms, but insecticides were the 
popular control solution. More farmers used more insecticide to treat for soil pests almost 
every year of the 1950s, growing from over one million acres in 1954, to almost 2.2 million 
in 1958 to 5.4 million in 1960. In a survey of farmer attitudes about chemicals published in 
1958, 93 percent of farmers indicated that they were satisfied with their soil insecticides. 
These farmers found that treating for soil insects was relatively easy, since it could be done 
before planting or at planting time. As one farm journalist stated, "Effective control [of soil 
30 Annual Report, Entomology, 1952, 16; Scotty Woods, "Now-granules control soil insects," Successful 
Farming, April 1959. 
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insects] depends on applying chemicals before damage is done." Farmers liked the idea of 
using insecticide on second or third year com fields which were more vulnerable a build up 
of soil insects than fields in the first year of the corn rotation. Two Dallas County farmers 
found that their pre-plant broadcast applications in 1953 helped boost their com by ten 
bushels in comparison to their untreated crop. Rudolf Schipull and Joseph Ludwig purchased 
starter fertilizer with insecticide in the late 1950s and into the 1960s. Schipull began 
purchasing fertilizer with aldrin in 1959, spending an average of $92 per year in 1959, 1960, 
and 1961. From 1965 to 1967 he bought both insecticide fertilizer combinations and soil 
insecticide, including aldrin and Aldrex, spending an average of $254 per year. Joseph 
Ludwig bought $477 worth of fertilizer with aldrin in 1965 and began to use soil insecticide 
on a regular basis in 1973.31 
Soil insecticides, when used with herbicide and chemical fertilizers, spurred a trend 
toward abandoning traditional crop rotations of corn, oats, and hay during the 1950s. Iowa 
farmers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries used rotations to keep crop 
production high, since rotating crops prevented the buildup of soil pathogens, insects and 
weed populations while incorporating nitrogen fixing plants such as clover to help com 
plants. But chemical farming meant that farmers could now manage this balance through 
chemical treatments, allowing them to grow com year after year in the same ground. Harold 
Gunderson urged farmers to not plant corn more than two years in the same field. But his 
protest indicated that farmers were abandoning rotations that included two years of legumes 
31 Annual Report, Entomology, 1953, 9; J. H. Lilly and Harold Gunderson, "Fighting the Corn Rootworm," 
Iowa Farm Science 6 (February 1952); "Feed insects or fight 'em," Wallaces Farmer, 5 March 1955; Bohlen, 
Beal, and Hobbs, "The Iowa Farmer and Farm Chemicals," 12; "Get the jump of rootworms!," Wallaces 
Farmer, 2 April 1955; Schipull papers; Ludwig papers. 
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or grasses. This environmental shift toward continuous corn cultivation resulted in changes 
in the insect populations, especially resistance in soil insects.32 
Iowa farmers faced a resistance problem beginning in 1961. That year the western 
corn rootworm, a species resistant to chlorinated hydrocarbons, entered Iowa from Nebraska. 
Unlike the northern corn rootworm, the dominant rootworm rootworm species, the western 
corn rootworm was resistant to the chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticides such as aldrin, 
dieldrin, or heptachlor. The western corn rootworm was a minority in 1962, comprising an 
estimated 10 percent of the total rootworm population. As a result, extension experts did not 
recommend a change in chemical tactics, urging farmers to continue using aldrin and 
heptachlor, applied at different rates depending on whether the farmer only treated the row or 
broadcast the insecticide across the entire field. For row treatment, experts recommended 
applying both insecticides at the rate of one half pound per acre, while the rate for broadcast 
treatment was two pounds per acre for first year com and only one pound for land in 
continuous com, presumably because there was some carryover effect from the first year. By 
1963, however, the problem had grown from "only four or five fields" in western Iowa to a 
third or more of the state. Even the northern com rootworm, a pest that had been controlled 
by aldrin and heptachlor, was also developing resistance by 1963. In 1966 resistant com 
rootworms were present in all Iowa counties. Farmers now faced another resistance problem, 
much like the one they confronted in fly control during the 1950s.33 
32 Harold Gunderson and J. H. Lilly, "Control Com Rootworms," Agricultural Extension Service, Iowa State 
College, Ames, Iowa, Pamphlet 178 (Revised), April 1953. 
33 
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A new and more expensive family of insecticides, the organophosphates, was the 
solution to the problem of resistance. Diazinon and Thimet, two organophosphate chemicals, 
were the new killers to handle the resistant rootworms. Farmers learned about the spread of 
resistant insects in late 1963, when Harold Gunderson announced that the western corn 
rootworm had been present in most of western half of Iowa, with "severe problems" in the 
western third of the state. Jeff O'Hara of Page County expressed his interest in the new 
chemicals in 1964. "I'm going to use an organo-phosphate at planting time on all my corn, 
first year as well as second year," adding, "I don't think I can afford to take the risk [of not 
using it]." An advertisement for the American Cyanamid Company featured fear a scare 
tactic strategy. Farmer Neal Van Beek of Sioux Center, shown pictured with a bag of Thimet 
10-G, stated, "We can't expect a crop in 1965 unless we rely on THIMET." Gunderson 
advised that there were several alternatives for rootworm control including rotation, although 
a 1964 article in Wallaces Farmer only included chemical options as realistic choices. Using 
aldrin and heptachlor was the least expensive choice, costing approximately $1.50 per acre. 
The new chemicals, diazinon and thimet, cost approximately $2 to $3 per acre. Farmers 
could justify this extra expense if they lived in the higher risk western part of the state or if 
their chlorinated hydrocarbon treatment failed in 1963.34 
The new chemicals were more toxic than the chlorinated hydrocarbons, requiring 
special handling procedures and inspiring regulation. While handling DDT and other 
insecticides was dangerous, years of experience showed that most farmers were not at 
34 
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immediate risk from incidental exposure to chlorinated hydrocarbons. They faced bigger 
risks in the long term, since chlorinated hydrocarbons were stored in fat cells and continued 
to build up over the years. By contrast, exposure to organophosphate insecticides could kill 
a person almost immediately. They are nerve agents which inhibit the proper functioning of 
nerves, preventing the body from transmitting nerve impulses to vital organs. 
Over the next few years, insecticide safety became a much more prominent feature of 
the coverage of farm chemicals, in part because of some serious incidents involving animals 
and people. At the beginning of the 1965 planting season, Harold Gunderson reported that a 
farmer had been poisoned while he was applying organophosphate chemicals in a tailwind. 
The farmer's symptoms included constricted pupils, severe internal cramps, excessive 
respiratory tract secretion, headache, and weakness before he began to recover. From 1967 
through 1970 there was one reported case of livestock poisoning every two weeks, although 
not all of the incidents could be blamed on the farmers. One Iowa farmer accidentally killed 
thirty-six steers when he fed his animals feed from an elevator that contained corncobs 
contaminated with aldrin. When the worker at the elevator loaded the cobs, he accidentally 
broke some nearby bags of the chemical and it became mixed in with the cobs. Urging 
farmers to "Play it safe with rootworm chemicals," farm journalists and extension safety 
experts prescribed a long list of safety procedures, including wearing a respirator, covering 
skin completely with clothing, wearing goggles, frequent bathing and washing of clothes, and 
making sure to only apply when there was not wind. A study of pesticide accidents from the 
late 1960s indicated that almost three fourths of accidents resulted from three causes; failure 
46 
to follow directions, improper storage, and chemicals placed in improperly marked 
containers.35 
In spite of educational attempts by extension staff and farm journalists, people were 
still confused about the new safety equipment. Gunderson confessed that even he did not 
understand what kind of equipment should be used, notifying extension cooperators of these 
problems at the beginning of the 1964 planting season. He claimed that "no one seems to 
understand the difference between an effective dust respirator with a plain filter.. .and a true 
chemical respirator" that was necessary for use with organophosphate insecticides. Farmers 
and custom applicators that purchased the dust respirators needed to "TAKE THEM BACK!" 
he urged. The dust respirators merely captured the insecticide particles in the mask, forcing 
the wearer to breath vapors continuously, which "may be even more hazardous than no 
respirator at all," while the respirator inactivated chemical vapors. The costs of this 
confusion were severe, since farmers, agribusiness, and the university extension system were 
all under closer scrutiny after the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring.36 
The Iowa Pesticide Act of 1964 was the first major fallout of the post-Silent Spring 
years, referred to by one Iowa State extension expert as the After Carson, or AC era. The 
Pesticide Act, written in consultation with extension entomologists, became law on January 
1, 1964. Provisions of the law included a requirement that all pesticides sold in Iowa be 
registered with the secretary of agriculture and state licensing for everyone who performed 
custom pesticide application. The state pesticide lab conducted testing on pesticides as well 
35 
"Insect Information Letter No. 5, 17 May 1965," Annual Report, Entomology, 1965; Ron Lutz, "Careless 
pesticide handling causing livestock death losses," Wallaces Farmer, 14 March 1970; Ken Hofmeyer, "Play it 
safe with rootworm chemicals," Wallaces Farmer, 27 April 1968; "Protect yourself from chemicals," Wallaces 
Farmer, 26 April 1969; Monte Sesker, "Use chemicals safely!," Wallaces Farmer, 11 April 1970; "Pesticide 
accidents," Wallaces Farmer, 13 January 1968. 
36 
"Insect Information Letter #4, 4 May 1964," Annual Report, Entomology, 1964. 
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as agricultural products to determine residue levels. The pesticide act was relatively lenient, 
since it did not require any training or regulation for farmers who applied their own 
chemicals, but it was recognition that some degree of oversight of farm chemicals was 
necessary, if for no other reason than to quiet public concerns about the impact of pesticide 
use. For most Iowa farmers it was business as usual, since they were not required to get 
special training to use chemicals.37 
A plurality of Iowa farmers favored a more stringent policy of licensure in 1971. 
When asked how they felt about only allowing licensed operators to apply chemicals that 
persistent chemicals such as most insecticides, 42 percent indicated that they would favor 
such a measure. Thirty-eight percent opposed a licensure requirement, while 20 percent 
claimed to be undecided on the issue, indicating that farmers were divided over the issue of 
safety. Younger men, those with some college education, and women reported more support 
for more stringent pesticide rules. A Poweshiek County woman wanted "someone other than 
my husband responsible for putting on pesticides. I worry every time he uses it." Other 
farmers reported a fear of greater government involvement in farming, while some were 
pragmatic. One older farmer stated, "I'm afraid the bugs and weeds would take over. How 
do you get licensed applicators out to do the job when it ought to be done?" Many farmers 
recognized that there were hazards associated with chemical use, but the issue of government 
regulation divided Iowa farmers.38 
As farmers considered the possibility of regulation, the issue of insecticide residue in 
Iowa's surface and groundwater gained attention. Over the course of the 1960s stream and 
37 
"Pesticide Residue Discussion," 2 November 1965, Annual Report, Entomology, 1965\ Seventh Biennial 
Report of Iowa Book of Agriculture, 1964-1965 (Des Moines: State of Iowa, 1966), 71-72. 
38 
"License applicators of persistent pesticides," Wallaces Farmer, 11 September 1971. 
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well monitoring conducted by Iowa Water Pollution Commission indicated that pesticides 
were present in Iowa's surface and ground waters. From 1966 to 1969 several private wells 
tested positive for the soil insecticides aldrin and dieldrin as well as the herbicides atrazine, 
2,4-D, and treflan. Water on the Mississippi, Missouri, Raccoon, Cedar, and Iowa Rivers in 
1968 showed that chlorinated hydrocarbon insectides such as dieldrin and DDT were present 
at various times through the year. Problems with insecticides in Iowa and the rest of the 
United States focused attention on the issue and made it an issue for everyone, not just 
farmers.39 
In 1970, just twenty-five years after the most widely used chlorinated hydrocarbon 
insecticide was first used on fields and livestock in Iowa, the federal and state governments 
banned the use of DDT. In early 1970 the USD A cancelled the registration of DDT, in effect 
prohibiting its use. That year the Iowa state legislature formed the Chemical Technology 
Review Board, a group dedicated to coordinating information about agricultural chemicals 
among all state agencies. The Board included members of state agencies, representatives of 
the chemical industry and one farmer, but the advisory committee was responsible for 
making recommendations to the board for approval. Advisory committee members included 
representatives from state commissions, Iowa State University faculty, a doctor of veterinary 
medicine, a medical doctor, and two ecologists appointed by the presidents of the University 
of Iowa and Iowa State University. At an organizational meeting in July, the board 
considered, among other topics, the role of chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticides in 
agriculture. Later that year, the committee recommended that the state secretary of 
39 Robert L. Morris and Lauren G. Johnson, "Pollution Problems in Iowa," in Water Resources oflowa, ed. Paul 
J. Horick (Iowa City: University Printing Service, 1970), 98, 100, 107. 
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agriculture develop regulations to ban the use of heptachlor, DDT, ODD, as well as lindane 
vaporizers in the state, except to control pests menacing public health or to carry out state 
and federal quarantines. Federal and state regulation was not a new feature to farm chemical 
use, but the complete ban on a chemical put farmers who continued to use one of the most 
important chemicals they had employed since the end of World War II on the wrong side of 
the law. The experts who had generated the hype about DDT, then urged caution as farmers 
used the chemicals in ways they wanted to use them rather than ways in which they were 
proscribed, now had the force of law.40 
In the years up to 1972 Iowa farmers had been leaders in shaping the use of chemicals 
for insect control. While extension experts, manufacturers, and farm journalists promoted 
chemical control as a solution to various insect problems on the farm, the farmers themselves 
gave some of the most valuable testimony about the ways in which chemicals could be useful 
for increasing profits. For corn borers, farmers determined that mid-season rescue 
applications were not the best way for farmers to use their time or money, especially since 
they could use a preventative approach by selecting resistant hybrids. Still, farmers used 
more chemicals on more pests throughout the period. For fly control, farmers climbed a 
steep learning curve, with important challenges such as resistance and regulation emerging 
along the way. They continued to use the chemicals they believed would do the job, 
regardless of the advice from entomologists, manufacturers, and journalists and government 
restrictions. In the case of soil insecticides, the ability to apply the chemicals either before 
planting or at the same time as planting made it an efficient use of the farmer's time and 
money. Farmers made decisions about using chemicals based on local conditions and their 
40 Tenth Biennial Report oflowa Book of Agriculture, 1970-1971 (Des Moines: State of Iowa, 1972), 81-83 
perceptions of their needs, not necessarily based on the advice and guidelines they received 
from other sources. 
In 1972 those days were passing. The 1964 Iowa Pesticide Act that provided for 
licensing of commercial applicators required at least a degree of specialized training and 
expertise. The extreme and immediate hazard from the new organophosphate chemicals was 
different from the chlorinated hydrocarbons. Farmers who exercised routine caution with the 
latter could expect to be around the next year, while those who failed to use the specialized 
respirators and protective clothing while using organophosphates risked dying in their fields. 
As historian Thomas Dunlap has shown, the outright ban on DDT was based on its residual 
effects, not immediate ones. This new, long term approach to risk assessment of chemical 
use, coupled with the immediate danger of applying chemicals, meant that farmers were 
likely to face more regulation in the future. Furthermore, there was new pressure from 
consumers, environmental activists, and government officials for tighter control of 
chemicals. As Harold Gunderson observed, the Environmental Protection Agency could 
become a focal point for pressure groups to attack farmers. In his view, most of the critics of 
chemical policy were "ignorant." The ban on DDT and the regulatory mission of the EPA 
marked an important turning point in the relationship Iowa farmers had developed with 
chemical technology. The use of insecticides by Iowa farmers in the postwar period showed 
that farmers not only used new technology to solve their problems, but they played a leading 
role in determining how they used it.41 
41 Charlie Nettles, "More Confusion Over Pesticides," Des Moines Sunday Register, 29 November 1970. 
Gunderson's resentment toward non-experts can be attributed to the breakdown in the consensus over scientific 
authority Alan Marcus detailed in his study of diethylstilbestrol, Cancer From Beef: DES, Federal Food 
Regulation, and Consumer Confidence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Herbicide: War on Weeds 
Father Time: Why you young villain—you young whipper snapper. I'll mow you 
down, so help me—I'll mow you down. 
Weedy The Thief: Save your breath, Grampa. I'll fill your fence rows and your 
lawns and your parks and your golf courses with my Weedy Family. Wait and see. 
Miss Verda Land: Father Time—do something. 
Weedy The Thief: "Do something," she says! ! Do something! ! I've got you just 
where I want you. We'll rob your soil and kill your grass and choke your gardens. 
We'll fill the world with weeds—weeds victorious! ! ! ! Nothing can stop us. 
The Hero 2,4-D: (Bounds in) I can stop you. 
2,4-D Skit By Pearl E. Converse and E. P. Sylwester, ca. 1945-19471 
The new weed-killing chemical, 2,4-D (2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid), had been on 
the market for less than a year when Iowa State College extension botanist E. P. "Dutch" 
Sylwester collaborated with extension drama specialist Pearl Converse to write this 
informational and promotional melodrama. The story began as an old and tired Father Time, 
armed with a scythe, tried to defend Miss Verda Land, dressed in green and carrying a basket 
representing fertility. The enemy, Weedy The Thief, threatened to dominate Verda Land 
until The Hero 2,4-D arrived and destroyed Weedy with his knapsack-type sprayer. The skit 
concluded with a marriage between Verda Land and The Hero 2,4-D, signaling a union 
between landscape and chemicals in postwar America and confirming the optimism 
Americans shared about the potential of technology to solve problems. 
1 Dr. Bob Hartzler, Iowa State University Extension Weed Management Specialist, found a copy of the skit in 
some files in his office and posted it on his website, although the link is no longer present. Although the script 
is undated, it is probable that Pearl Converse wrote it between 1945 and 1947, since 2,4-D was released 
commercially in 1945 and Converse died on 4 May 1947. Ames Daily Tribune, 5 May 1947. 
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While herbicides were not new, this one was different. It was a synthetic hormone, 
called a growth regulator, which mimicked the plant's own hormones present in the growing 
tips of plants above and below ground. By stimulating growth, the herbicide caused the plant 
to literally grow itself to death. Unlike older herbicides that killed everything they touched, 
growth regulators were selective. They killed targeted weed species and did not damage crop 
plants. Weeds competed with crop plants for moisture, soil nutrients, and sunlight. Farmers 
who were careless about controlling weeds had smaller crops at harvest time than their more 
vigilant neighbors. Farmers across the United States recognized the potential use this kind of 
weed control technique.2 
From 1945 to 1970 and beyond, herbicide manufacturers and advertisers promised 
remarkable weed control for farmers who purchased their products. Advertisements 
suggested the possibility of weed-free farms, an unheard of notion as long as farmers relied 
on cultural weed control techniques. These cultural techniques varied by crop in the 
Midwest, but typically included planting seed that had been cleaned of weed seeds, spring 
and fall plowing to bury weeds, regular cultivation during the growing season to check the 
growth of weeds, and mowing pastures and along fence lines to prevent weeds from 
2 Few historians have examined stories of growth regulator herbicides, and even fewer have studied the ways in 
which people who used herbicide in pastures, fencerows, ditches, and fields. Most recently, Nicolas Rasmussen 
has provided an excellent review of the way in which phenoxy acids came to be seen as herbicides. See "Plant 
Hormones in War and Peace: Science, Industry, and Government in the Development of Herbicides in 1940s 
America," his 92 (June 2001): 291-316. Gale Peterson's "The Discovery and Development of 2,4-D," 
Agricultural History 41 (July 1967): 243-253 is also a valuable overview. Pete Daniel offered the most 
extensive treatment of the use of herbicide in Lost Revolutions, chapter four. Many historians of agriculture and 
rural life have noted the importance of herbicide to postwar agriculture, including Hurt, "Ohio Agriculture 
Since World War II"; Jack Temple Kirby, Rural Worlds Lost: The American South, 1920-1960 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1987); Gilbert Fite, Cotton Fields No More: Southern Agriculture, 1865-1980 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1984), 180-187; John T. Schlebecker, Whereby We Thrive: A History 
of American Farming, 1607-1972 (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1975), 271; and Donald Winters, 
"Agriculture in the Post World War II South" in The Rural South Since World War II, ed. R. Douglas Hurt 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998). 
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spreading. Cultural weed control was time consuming, however. Iowa farmers spent many 
hours on tractors and even horses cultivating their corn crops, mowing fence lines and 
ditches, and even chopping weeds by hand. Most of this work occurred at a time when 
farmers were pressed by other work such as making hay or silage, putting farmers in a 
position of having to choose which jobs would get done first, if at all. Chemical 
manufacturers offered a product that would relieve farmers of the tedious and time 
consuming tasks of cultural weed control techniques.3 
But it was farmers, not manufacturers, who gave herbicide its prominence. In Iowa, 
farmers eagerly purchased growth regulator herbicide in the postwar years, enticed by the 
prospect of weed-free farms. Rather than passively accepting manufacturers' specifications 
and extension service guidelines, farmers made herbicide their own. They did this by 
determining how much to apply and how often to apply it, as well as by relying on herbicides 
at the expense of cultural techniques. Yet for all the success farmers experienced in using 
growth regulator herbicides to suppress weed populations, there were unanticipated 
consequences. The miracle product 2,4-D did not control all weeds, most notably grassy 
weeds such as giant foxtail and quackgrass. As Iowa farmers controlled broad leaf weeds, 
3 Frieda Knobloch observed that the division between useful plants and weeds is a cultural distinction and not 
one inherent in pre-human environments. In this sense, agriculture created weeds by giving certain species an 
opportunity to thrive that they did not previously have. See The Culture of Wilderness: Agriculture as 
Colonization in the American West (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), chapter four. The 
commercial introduction of 2,4-D occurred during a period of optimism about technology. This concept is 
developed in Alan I Marcus and Howard P. Segal, Technology in America: A Brief History (San Diego: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1989), chapter seven; and also in Edmund Russell, War and Nature, 
chapter nine. An excellent example of faith in chemical technology for solving pest problems can be seen in 
Joshua Blu Buhs, "The Fire Ant Wars." There are several excellent contributions to the history of technology in 
postwar agribusiness, although historians tend to focus on the institutional and scientific contexts for technology 
rather than the perspectives of the consumers of technology. Notable examples include Sheldon Krimsky and 
Roger P. Wrubel, Agricultural Biotechnology and the Environment: Science, Policy, and Social Issues (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1996); and Jack Ralph Kloppenberg, jr., First the Seed: The Political Economy of 
Plant Biotechnology, 1492-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Thomas Dunlap not only 
studied the debate over DDT use, but he also discussed the ways in which interest groups responded to the issue 
of pesticides before and after World War II. See Dunlap, DDT: Scientists, Citizens, and Public Policy. 
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grassy species proliferated, compelling farmers to use new and more expensive herbicides, 
sometimes even mixing them or applying herbicide in the soil. By 1970, farmers used a new, 
complicated, and expensive weed control strategy, although their farms were not free from 
weeds. The mixed performance record of growth regulator herbicides did not compel 
farmers to lose faith in their chemical strategy. Just like the generations that preceded them, 
Iowa farmers engaged in an annual struggle to keep ahead of weeds, using herbicide in 
record quantities and on record acreages. 
In 1945, three chemical companies, Dow Chemical, Sherwin-Williams, and the 
American Chemical Paint Company began to sell 2,4-D. Fruit growers used growth 
regulators in the 1930s to stimulate growth to promote uniform ripening of some fruits, but 
their use in deliberate lethal doses did not come until 1941 under the direction of E. J. Kraus 
of the University of Chicago. The United States government experimented with 2,4-D as a 
tool for biological warfare throughout World War II. Although the war ended before 2,4-D 
could be used for military purposes, promoters believed it could play an important part in 
agriculture.4 
At the end of World War II, farmers, extension professionals, journalists, and county 
supervisors from across Iowa argued that the weed problem was worse than it had been 
before the war. Weeds that cut yields or were toxic to livestock caused farmers to lose 
money, but controlling weed populations was labor intensive work. Citing wartime labor 
4 Rasmussen "Plant Hormones in War and Peace," 309-311. See also Peterson, "The Discovery and 
Development of 2,4-D," 244-247; Orvin C. Burnside, "The History of 2,4-D and Its Impact on Development of 
the Discipline of Weed Science in the United States," in Orvin C. Burnside, ed., Biologic and Economic 
Assessment of Benefits from Use of Phenoxy Herbicides in the United States, Special NAPIAP Report Number 
l-PA-96, November 1996, 5-11; L. W. Kephart, "Weed Control With Chemicals," Agricultural Engineering, 
November 1946, 506-511; John W. Mitchell, "Plant Growth Regulators," in Science in Farming: The Yearbook 
of Agriculture, 1943-1947 (Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947): 256-266; "Trying New 
Kind of Weed-Killer," Wallaces Farmer, 3 March 1945; "New Weed Sprays," Wallaces Farmer, 17 November 
1945. 
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shortages and the burden of increased production goals, county officials and farm journalists 
highlighted how "Weeds Won in War Years," as a writer for Wallaces ' Farmer wrote in 
early 1947. County extension directors reported on the deterioration oflowa farms. While 
farmers attacked weeds in fields, they were lax in controlling weeds in fencerows and 
ditches, which allowed weeds to propagate and proliferate. The Hamilton County director 
reported that due to manpower shortages, "we have many farms now that are fairly well 
covered with noxious weeds that were fairly clean a few years ago." In Humboldt County 
Canada thistle was a particular problem, gaining a presence on as much as 95 percent of 
farms there. When Bert and Vesta Sams moved from Clarke County to Marshall County in 
1946, they purchased a farm that had been neglected for years and was choked with weeds. 
Clifford Sams, who was twenty-five at the time and had just returned from military service in 
late 1945, recalled that "This place was so infested with weeds of every kind; burdock, 
sourdock, Canada thistle. It really took a lot of serious work to get control of it." Not all 
farmers, however, were as aggressive about weed control as Bert Sams, and the state 
legislature passed a stringent new noxious weed law in 1947.5 
Legislators hoped the 1947 noxious weed law would pressure farmers to control 
neglected weeds in fields, fencerows, and roadside ditches, thereby saving the state's farmers 
millions of dollars in lost profits due to weed infestations. Declaring war on weeds, 
lawmakers allowed county commissioners to levy taxes to pay for a weed control employee 
as well as equipment, and materials. County commissioners could notify farm owners or 
tenants of a weed problem and give them five days to cut or spray the noxious weeds. If 
5 
"Weeds Won in War Years," Wallaces Farmer, 18 January 1947; Annual Report, Hamilton County, 1946, 7; 
Annual Report, Humboldt County, 1945, 10; Clifford Sams, interview by author, 13 September 2002, Conrad, 
Iowa, tape recording. 
farmers did not handle the problem, the county "weed man" could come out and do it, 
charging owners for costs plus a penalty fee of 25 percent of costs. Similarly, farmers with 
property adjacent to county roads had to cut ordinary weeds within thirty days of notification 
or suffer the same penalty. Over a year later farmers reported that the weed law was helping 
to control the problem, but all the farmers surveyed in a Wallaces ' Farmer poll noted that lax 
or spotty enforcement compromised the effectiveness of the law. Some commissioners 
reported progress in the fight against weeds in 1949, claiming that education and gentle 
pressure were effective tools in getting cooperation.6 
State and county extension staff members were active in spreading the news about 
weed control techniques, promoting 2,4-D as well as cultural weed control practices to 
reduce their threat. Extension botanist Dutch Sylwester and extension pest control specialist 
Harold "Tiny" Gunderson conducted weed and pest clinics for groups of a few dozen to over 
two hundred farmers around the state throughout the winter months. From the fall of 1947 
through the following autumn, Sylwester conducted 193 meetings with estimated attendance 
at approximately 133,000 people. At the 1945 Humboldt County Fair Sylwester assisted 
with a special weed day where farmers could examine a demonstration plot to see the 
effectiveness of chemical weed killers. During the growing season, Iowa State College 
hosted field tests at different locations around the state. County extension directors also 
played a vital role in promoting the use of herbicide by setting up demonstration plots, 
hosting Sylwester for weed meetings, and answering questions from area farmers about 
herbicide. The Kanawha Experimental Farm in Hancock County was open for touring on 6 
6 
"Weed Law Has Teeth," Wallaces Farmer, 1 June 1947; "New Law Helping in Weed Control," Wallaces 
Farmer, 6 November 1948; "Winning Weed Fight," Wallaces Farmer, 18 June 1949. 
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July 1948 for farmers to see "what happens to weeds when 2,4-D and other weed killers are 
used in crops." Implement dealers displayed various types of weed control tools, reflecting 
the integrated cultural and chemical weed control approach that extension staff favored.7 
Extension staff members continued to stress the importance of cultural techniques for 
weed control even as they advocated the use of chemical herbicide. During the 1940s and 
1950s state and county extension staff emphasized the value of chemical control for the 
problem weed patch or the wet year when cultivation was difficult, but they did not advocate 
chemical control as a panacea. Extension experts believed that chemicals were the "ace in 
the hole," not a replacement for cultural techniques. Wallaces ' Farmer writers echoed the 
experts, noting, "Chemical weed killers are vital to efficient weed control. But they are not a 
substitute for a number of good farming practices." Sylwester argued that planting clean, 
weed free seed for oats and pastures was a "cornerstone" of good weed control. Practicing 
proper rotation, good seed bed preparation, cultivating, and mowing weeds in pastures and 
fence lines were regular admonitions in the farm press and in the talks Dutch Sylwester gave 
across Iowa. Furthermore, experts noted that many plant species such as grasses were 
resistant to 2,4-D and could be best controlled through cultivation.8 
7 Annual Report, Humboldt County, 1945, 10; Annual Report, Hardin County, 1945, 6; Annual Report 
Summary-Weed Control, October 1, 1947-September 30, 1948, E. P. Sylwester Papers, Special Collections, 
Parks Library, Iowa State University; Fiftieth Annual Iowa Year Book of Agriculture (Des Moines, Iowa: State 
oflowa, 1949), 451; "Coming Events," Wallaces Farmer, 1 January 1949; "College Sets Field Days," Wallaces 
Farmer, 19 June 1948; "Four Iowa State College Farm Clinics," Wallaces Farmer, 2 February 1950. 
8 E. P. Sylwester, A. L. Bakke, and D. W. Staniforth, "Recommendations for Chemical Weed Control," 
Agricultural Extension Service, Iowa State College, Pamphlet 140, March 1949; "Here's How to Kill Weeds," 
Wallaces Farmer, 19 March 1949; "Don't Plant Weed Seeds in 1950," Wallaces Farmer, 3 March 1950; "Don't 
Let Weeds Whip You," Wallaces Farmer, 2 February 1952; "Time Cultivation to Kill Weeds," Wallaces 
Farmer, 7 June 1952; "Get Corn Weeds With First Cultivation," Wallaces Farmer, 16 May 1953; "Don't 
Throw Away Your Cultivator," Wallaces Farmer, 7 May 1960; Gene Neven, interview by author, 12 October 
2002, Marshalltown, Iowa, tape recording; "Weeds 2,4-D Will Kill," Wallaces Farmer, 1 January 1949; L. W. 
Kephart, "2,4-D, New Killer for Weeds," Successful Farming, March 1946. 
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Extension staff and farm journalists continued to recommend cultivation for weed 
control in row crops such as corn and soybeans throughout the 1960s. Extension pamphlets 
on weed control in com and soybeans began with obligatory statements about the primacy of 
cultural control. The rotary hoe, a tool with spiked wheels, was the tool of choice for killing 
grassy weeds in com that was less than six inches tall. Shallow cultivation was also an 
important technique. Experts advocated setting cultivator sweeps or shovels as shallow as 
possible, since cultivating too deep could damage the crop roots. Experts and journalists on 
the farm beat were consistent and insistent in their message of integrated weed control.9 
Exciting stories about the success of 2,4-D, however, overshadowed the frequent 
warnings to balance chemical and cultural practices. Reporting on the trend to use 2,4-D on 
cornfields in 1949, Jim Roe of Successful Farming claimed "practically every man who used 
2,4-D thinks it put more com in his crib." A 1949 Wallaces ' Farmer article titled "Bad 
News for Weeds" detailed the successful experiences of three Warren County farmers who 
used 2,4-D in cornfields during the 1948 growing season. Bottomland farmers who regularly 
dealt with wet conditions found that using herbicide allowed them to catch up to weeds when 
wet weather delayed cultivation. One farmer reported that some of the Des Moines River 
bottomland he farmed was so infested with weeds that it was impossible to distinguish the 
rows. "Three or four days later [after spraying], you could see the rows. Those fields ended 
up fairly free of weeds. Without spraying," he added, "it might not have made any corn." 
Adolph Erickson of Monona County explained that in 1948 he used 2,4-D on cockleburs and 
Canada thistles in his cornfield. In 1949 he sprayed again, claiming "It really gets 'em. I 
9 
"Weed Control in Corn," Iowa State University Extension, Pamphlet 269, March 1964; "Weed Control in 
Soybeans," Iowa State University Extension, Pamphlet 270, April 1969; Monte Sesker, "Chemicals and 
Cultivation Control Weeds in Corn," Wallaces Farmer, 27 May 1967; Monte Sesker, "Stop Those Weeds in 
Your Cornfield," Wallaces Farmer, 10 May 1969. 
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sprayed just before the corn got too tall to drive thru [sic], and kept the spray off the com. 
Another year or two and I'll have them cleaned up." Optimistic testimonials such as these 
made compelling reading for farmers who understood the costs of getting rained out of field 
work and watching weeds overtake their crops.10 
Farmers readily accepted chemicals as part of their weed control system. They grew 
up using scythes in their fence rows, enduring weed infested stands of flax and oats that cut 
yields, slowed the harvest, and forced them to cultivate their corn crop three times each 
summer at the mercy of the weather. These experiences made them eager converts to new 
chemical techniques. Furthermore, there were fewer hired men available to do these labor-
intensive tasks. In 1949, county directors estimated that approximately 41 percent oflowa 
farmers used herbicides. More farmers used herbicide in the northern and western portions 
of the state where cash-grain and livestock feeding operations dominated. In the extreme 
northwestern counties usage was as high as 60.1 percent while in the extreme southeastern 
counties it was as low as 26.7 percent. Farmers tended to use herbicide first on fencerows 
and roadsides, followed by use on pastures, then corn, oat, wheat and flax fields, in that 
order. By 1954, more farmers expressed interest in using 2,4-D on cornfields while in 1963 
farmers used herbicide in cornfields as often as they did in fencerows and along field borders. 
The true test of farmers' acceptance of herbicide was the degree to which they believed 
chemicals helped them increase income. In 1958 half of farmers surveyed believed that 
chemicals were very important to their income, while 43 percent stated that chemicals were 
"of some importance." Only 2 percent of farmers in the survey believed that chemicals were 
10 Jim Roe, "We Used 2,4-D On Corn," Successful Farming, May 1949; "Bad News for Weeds" Wallaces 
Farmer, 1 January 1949; Wally Inman, "Cheaper Weed Kills," Wallaces Farmer, 20 August 1949. 
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unimportant to their income. Farmers' experiences during the 1950s convinced them that 
they could benefit from new farm techniques.11 
Even farmers who had resisted herbicide use found that it could be beneficial. Bert 
Sams of Marshall County was a firm believer in cultural weed control practices, but his son 
Clifford began using herbicide in 1954 after signing a contract to grow seed corn for Pioneer 
Hi-Bred. The terms of the contract stipulated that Sams use herbicide, linking him to 
agribusiness in a new way. After the first year of growing for Pioneer, he justified using it 
because he made higher profits on seed com than other farmers made for cash grain. Clifford 
recalled that his father dropped his opposition to herbicide because of the potential profit that 
could be gained by spraying. According to Clifford, "We felt if everyone else is doing it and 
you don't you're going to fall behind." Using herbicide did not match Bert's traditional 
perceptions of good farming techniques, but he recognized that good farming also maximized 
yields and profits as well as the fact that businesses such as Pioneer could help them succeed 
in farming.12 
The growing willingness to use herbicide is apparent in the numbers of custom 
applicators and those who built or purchased sprayers. A 1951 report by Dutch Sylwester 
and Tiny Gunderson titled "Spraying—Babyhood to Manhood in 5 Years" emphasized the 
rapid nature of the change. While there were only eighty-five commercial spray operators in 
Iowa in 1946, the next year there were 375, with 800 in 1949. That number dropped to 688 
in 1950, but the growth in the number of farmers with sprayers suggests that they obtained 
11 
"Poor Future For Weeds," Wallaces Farmer, 3 June 1950; "Farmers Kill Weeds With Chemicals," Wallaces 
Farmer, 5 March 1949; "Kill Corn Weeds With 2,4-D?," Wallaces Farmer, 17 April 1954; "Control Iowa's 
Problem Weeds," Wallaces Farmer, 18 May 1963; Joe M. Bohlen, George M. Beal, and Daryl Hobbs, "The 
Iowa Farmer and Farm Chemicals: Attitudes, Level of Knowledge and Patterns of Use," Rural Sociology 
Report No. 3 (Ames: Department of Economics and Sociology, November, 1958), 9. 
12 Clifford Sams interview. 
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their own sprayers so rapidly that not all of the custom operators could stay in business. Just 
one year after 2,4-D was on the market 5,000 Iowa farmers owned sprayers, while in 1948 an 
estimated 22,407 farmers had their own equipment. In 1949 30,000 farmers owned sprayers 
and in 1950 just under 42,000 farmers could spray their own fields and fencerows. As a 
1949 survey indicated, farmers who sprayed tended to purchase their own equipment. In 
1948 only 33 percent of farmers who sprayed owned their own sprayers, but 76 percent 
owned equipment in 1949, with ground equipment such as tractor-mounted or tractor-drawn 
sprayers accounting for as much as 90 percent of the total.13 
Although more farmers used 2,4-D and sprayers on Iowa farms, herbicide users found 
that it did not always control weeds in ways they expected. In 1950 county extension 
directors reported that 67.3 percent of farmers were satisfied with their spraying and that 
farmers in most counties would increase the use of the chemical, yet some directors expected 
a decline in use by as much as 10 percent. In 1954 Wallaces ' Farmer conducted a poll of 
Iowa farmers to assess how farmers felt about their chemical weed control efforts. The 
Wallace-Homestead pollsters asked "If you sprayed the following weeds [buttonweed, 
cocklebur, and smartweed] in 1954, what kind of results did you get?" Only 3 or 4 percent of 
farmers reported "no kill" on the listed weeds, between 57 and 65 percent responded that 
they had "good kill." That left between 32 and 39 percent of farmers who sprayed reporting 
only "partial kill," a significant minority. In the late 1950s 80 percent of farmers surveyed 
13 Gunderson and Sylwester, "Spraying—Babyhood to Manhood in 5 Years," E. P. Sylwester Papers; "Sprayer 
Market in '50 Looks Good." 
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were satisfied with their chemical weed killer and 71 percent were satisfied with their grass 
killer.14 
A variety of conditions and circumstances explain the mixed performance record for 
herbicides and limits of chemical control up through the mid-1950s. Extension directors 
claimed that the most common problem was operator error. Crop injury such as brittleness in 
corn occurred when applicators used too high of a rate or sprayed at the wrong crop growth 
stage. Brittleness was a serious problem because farmers who cultivated could break brittle 
stalks with their equipment. Regular reports of crop injury due to "too much" chemical, 
"overdose," or "too high concentration" came from across the state during the period from 
1948 to 1953 when extension directors filed special weed reports. A custom applicator from 
Illinois advised farmers that weeds in com fields needed to be sprayed when the corn was 
between two inches and eight inches tall, although county agents frequently noted that 
farmers applied 2,4-D at the wrong time. The speed of the tractor, getting too much spray on 
the corn and not on the weeds, and spray pressure were also frequent problems that could 
affect the quality of the weed control or even damage the crop.15 
Environmental conditions such as temperature, wind, and rainfall also accounted for 
mediocre herbicide performance. The Hancock County extension director observed that 2,4-
D was not very effective on thistles in 1951 due to cold, wet conditions during spraying. An 
experiment in Grundy County during the 1957 season illustrates the environmental and 
human variables farmers struggled with in their efforts to achieve weed control. Extension 
Botanist Dutch Sylwester recommended spraying 2,4-D in one sixty-acre field that was 
14 
"Poor Future For Weeds," Wallaces Farmer, 3 June 1950; "How Does 2,4-D Work For You?," Wallaces 
Farmer, 18 June 1955; Bohlen, Beal, and Hobbs, "The Iowa Farmer and Farm Chemicals," 11. 
15 Dana Stewart, "What 10,000 Acres of Weed Spraying Taught Me," Successful Farming, June 1954; Annual 
Report, Grundy County, 1948, "Information on Weed Control Program," 12. 
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infested with sunflowers before the farmer planted soybeans. Later that year the extension 
director reported that one half of the field showed 100 percent weed kill while the other half 
showed only 40 percent kill. He stated "This suggests that methods of mixing, temperature 
of the solution, etc. still has a lot to do with the effectiveness of chemicals in controlling 
weeds." These considerations could all be present or absent in a given year, making herbicide 
application a gamble.16 
Furthermore, farmers did not always know what they were seeing when dealing with 
this new technology, even when it worked. A Hamilton County farmer used 2,4-D on part of 
his oat field, only to observe that the oats in the portion of the field he sprayed appeared to be 
damaged by the spray while the part that had not been sprayed was green. The farmer 
contacted his local extension director, who brought Dutch Sylwester to the farm. When they 
went into the field, they noted that the green they saw from the edge of the field was actually 
weeds, not oats. Sylwester concluded that the oats were damaged, but not by the spray. The 
oat damage was due to blight, although the county extension director noted that the farmer 
was reluctant to admit it at first. In this case, the experts concluded that the herbicide worked 
even though it appeared to have failed, but it took expert interpretation to prevent the farmer 
from blaming the herbicide for his crop failure.17 
While the Hamilton County incident was a case of mistaken identity, other crop 
failures could be attributed to inherent qualities of the chemical and the ways farmers applied 
it. Farmers with specialty crops found that spray "drift" from herbicide application could 
cause unintended damage. In 1952 the assistant manager of the Council Bluffs Grape 
16 Annual Report, Hancock County, 1952, 5; Annual Report, Grundy County, 1957, 4. 
17 Annual Report, Hamilton County, 1947, 6-7. 
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Growers Association notified Dutch Sylwester that there was "considerable weed spray 
damage to our grape vineyards," a fact reflected in the county reports from Pottawatomie 
County as early as 1950. Growers blamed the railroads. To prevent weeds from spreading 
across the state along railroad right-of-way, railroad administrators hired aerial sprayers to 
control weeds that grew in ditches along the tracks, but aerial spraying was especially prone 
to drifting on air currents beyond target areas. While Sylwester visited Pottawatomie County 
every year up to 1953, the county director only reported on the problem, with little comment 
on any proposed solutions aside from urging the railroads to use a formulation of 2,4-D that 
was less prone to drift.18 
In early 1954 the board of directors of the Council Bluffs growers association, the 
county extension director and extension weed control and horticulture experts attended a 
meeting to develop guidelines for minimizing drift. The recommendations included 
notifying neighbors of grape growers about potential risks, mapping the locations of growers 
so sprayers working for railroads and power companies could use cultural practices in areas 
near vineyards, using a formulation of 2,4-D with larger particles that were less likely to 
drift, and holding meetings to educate people who spray about the potential for damage from 
drift. There were techniques to reduce drift, such as basal spraying rather than applying the 
chemical to the foliage, but airplane spraying was indiscriminate and, from the user's 
perspective, inexpensive.19 
18 Annual Report, West Pottawattamie County, 1950, 6, "Information on Weed Control Program," 13; Annual 
Report, West Pottawattamie County, 1951, 8-9, "Information on Weed Control Program," 12; Annual Report, 
West Pottawattamie County, 1952, 5, "Information on Weed Control Program," 11 ; Annual Report, West 
Pottawattamie County, 1953, 4, "Information on Weed Control Program," 11. 
19 J. Clifford Johnson, interview by author, 14 December, 2002, Council Bluffs, Iowa, tape recording. A. F. 
Martin to Dr. E. P. Sylwester, 19 September 1952; "Procedures to Help Minimize Danger From Spray "Fumes" 
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In spite of the 1954 meeting and procedures, there is no evidence that these efforts 
resulted in less drift damage. In 1955 C. E. White of Council Bluffs detailed similar 
concerns expressed by the grape growers, suggesting the problems had not been resolved. 
The extension director's report for 1954 recorded the meeting that year but subsequent 
reports make no mention of any degree of success or failure of the information program. 
Cecil J. Baxter, a fruit grower from eastern Iowa, also expressed concern to Sylwester, 
informing him that at least 500 grape vines were killed by drift and many other vines were 
injured. Baxter noted that weed specialists wholeheartedly endorsed 2,4-D and farmers 
heeded them, although in truth the issue was more complicated. Extension professionals 
recommended a balance of spray and cultural techniques, not strictly spray solutions. 
Farmers frequently did not heed experts and chose to spray rather than practice mechanical 
control. Baxter did report cooperation he obtained from the Lee County Engineer, who did 
not allow spraying within three miles of Baxter's vineyard and controlled his sprayers by 
using the amine form, spraying with low pressure with a larger nozzle to prevent small 
particles and only spraying when the wind was from the opposite direction. The issue 
remained contentious into the mid 1960s, when officials in Muscatine, Lee, Mills, Harrison, 
and the rural portions of Pottawattamie County counties banned the use of the ester form of 
2,4-D in 1964. The Iowa Fruit Growers Association called for a statewide ban on this high-
volatile form of 2,4-D, arguing that damage in 1964 was as bad as in any previous year. 
Unfortunately for the fruit growers, the needs of the majority of farmers who raised grain for 
and Spray "Drift" in the Council Bluffs Area," Sylwester papers; Fred Slife, "The Most Asked Questions about 
Basal Spray," Successful Farming, February 1954. 
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sale or for livestock feeding prevailed, and the state legislature, dominated by rural 
legislators, did not enact a ban.20 
There was even evidence that 2,4-D was more toxic to humans and animals than 
promoters claimed. In the 1940s and 1950s, extension experts and farm journalists urged 
caution in using herbicides, but they steadfastly maintained that there was little or no risk of 
injury to livestock or people. Still, they had to remind farmers not to confuse the relatively 
benign herbicide 2,4-D and the highly toxic insecticide, DDT. The farm press reported on 
tests where scientists fed 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T directly to animals, applied it to feed and forage, 
and treated their skin. Scientists concluded that there was no permanent injury to livestock. 
However, the tests did show that 2,4-D could cause at least temporary harm to both livestock 
and people. In some cases, the chemical changed the starches in plants to sugars, making 
some plants that were toxic and distasteful to livestock more appealing but no less toxic. 
One Audubon County farmer recalled that he was listless and fatigued after a day or two of 
spraying 2,4-D. In 1962 a railroad switchman from Davenport became soaked with 2,4-D 
after he walked through treated weeds while working in Illinois. In addition to developing a 
severe rash, the chemical aggravated the worker's preexisting condition of peripheral neuritis 
(loss of nerve function in the extremities).21 
20 Iowa fruit growers were also dealing with other problems that were possibly even more lethal for their 
business than herbicide. From 1943 until 1964 the Bracero program provided a government subsidized labor 
force for Pacific Coast growers which allowed them to reduce or hold the line on labor costs. This was a luxury 
Iowa farmers did not enjoy. C. E. White to H. E. Rea, 6 February 1955, Sylwester Papers, box 9, folder 4; 
Annual Report, West Pottawattamie County, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957; Cecil J. Baxter to E. P. Sylwester, 10 June 
1961, Sylwester papers; Ed Heins, "Urge State Ban on 2,4-D to Save Fruit," Des Moines Register, no date, 
Sylwester papers; Gene Neven interview. 
21 
"Workday Pointers," Wallaces Farmer, 1 June 1946; "Workday Pointers," Wallaces Farmer, 5 October 1946; 
"2-4-D Not Harmful to Livestock," Wallaces Farmer, 1 June 1947; "Confused on Uses of 2,4-D and DDT," 
Wallaces Farmer, 21 June 1947; "Workday Pointers," Wallaces Farmer, 20 August 1949; "2,4-D Kills Weeds, 
NOT Livestock," Successful Farming, June 1959. The authors of a 1996 review of health risks associated with 
phenoxy herbicides such as 2,4-D concluded that the public is not at risk of any health problems from 2,4-D, but 
The uneven performance record of growth regulator herbicide, including evidence of 
injury to people and livestock, and reports of crop injury did not overshadow the optimism 
most farmers, journalists, and extension observers shared about its potential. Success stories 
abounded to offset the reports of failures. In general, the complaints about growth regulator 
herbicides came from minorities such as the grape growers, horticulturists and an occasional 
livestock producer. The value of herbicide in the field apparently outweighed the problems 
such as damage to farm gardens from spray drift. Farmers found that herbicide offered them 
at least some degree of improved weed control at reduced cost, making the limited risk of 
injury worth the potential payoff in higher yield. 
The low cost of 2,4-D and the equipment to apply it was an important reason why 
farmers began to use it in the 1940s and 1950s. Aside from the advantages of saving time in 
cultivating, catching up when bad weather prevented cultivating, and controlling weed 
infested areas, farmers found that chemicals were inexpensive. In June 1948 Joseph Ludwig 
of Winneshiek County paid $49.22 for five gallons of 2,4-D at a local implement dealership. 
In July he purchased two more gallons for $19.49 from the same vendor. In 1950, however, 
he used the same vendor and paid $4.43 per gallon for eight gallons, with the price varying 
between $4 and $5.50 per gallon over the next few years. William Adams of Fayette paid 
slightly more for his 2,4-D in the late 1940s and early 1950s, spending $8.39 per gallon in 
1949, $6.63 in 1952, but only $3.29 per gallon in 1957. He spent an average of $68 per year 
people who work with the chemical are exposed to potentially harmful doses and should wear protective 
equipment to minimize risk. See Rebecca A. Johnson and Elizabeth V. Wattenberg, "Risk Assessment of 
Phenoxy Herbicides: An Overview of the Epidemiology and Toxicology Data" in Biologic and Economic 
Assessment of Benefits from Use of Phenoxy Herbicides in the United States, Orvin C. Burnside, ed., Special 
NAPIAP Report Number l-PA-96, November, 1996; "2,4-D Won't Kill Cows," Wallaces Farmer, 19 August 
1950; Bob Nymand interview; Holladay v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, 255 F. Supp. 879 
(U. S. Dist. 1966). 
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for herbicide, but this expense only amounted to an average of 5 percent of the total crop 
expense per year between 1949 and 1958.22 
Sprayers were also relatively inexpensive, especially considering they could be used 
for insecticides, too. In 1949 advertised costs ranged from $219 for the Essick tractor 
mounted model with a fourteen-foot boom to $230 for the Speedy Sprayer with a thirty-foot 
boom. Tractor-drawn trailer sprayers were even less expensive. In 1958, Kim's Fast-O-
Matic trailer model was advertised at $208.95 with the Century trailer sprayer at $186.25. 
William Adams bought a sprayer in 1949 for $276.11. Charles Havran of Benton County 
bought a thirty-gallon drum, pump, nozzles and boom and built a sprayer on his farm. The 
sprayer Ferd Jarrott of Osceola County built in 1950 cost $123.41. Many farmers chose to 
make their own equipment, hoping to cut costs by investing their own labor.23 
Even farmers who purchased sprayers spent very little compared to the cost of other 
farm implements. When the Iowa State Extension Service published a pamphlet with 
instructions on making homemade sprayers in 1949, the weed control experts contended 
"Tractor units can now be bought about as cheaply as they can be made at home." Joseph 
Ludwig bought a granular herbicide attachment for his planter in 1961 for $84, while the year 
before he purchased a sprayer, possibly a used one, for $70. These items constituted a small 
part of Ludwig's total investment in machinery and implements. For example, in 1966, the 
depreciated value of both herbicide tools was $75 out of a machinery inventory of $30,680 at 
year's end. These expenses were nominal for farmers, making equipment cost a non-issue 
22 Ludwig papers; Adams papers. 
23 Essick and Speedy Sprayer advertisements, Wallaces Farmer, 19 March 1949; Kim's Fast-O-Matic 
advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, 15 March 1958; Century advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, 3 May 1958; 
Adams papers; Dennis Havran interview; Flora and Ferd Jarrott papers, State Historical Society oflowa, Iowa 
City. 
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when deciding whether or not to use chemical weed killers. The degree of weed control was 
what really mattered to Iowa farmers.24 
Farmers and experts who believed in the value of 2,4-D began experimenting with 
pre-emergent application (applying herbicide after planting but before the crop emerged from 
the ground) to get a head start on weed control early in the growing season. They endured 
numerous failures before they could count on pre-emergent application as a reliable method 
of control. Tests in cornfields in 1948 were generally poor, although tests at the Iowa State 
College agronomy farm showed that pre-emergent spraying in soybean fields could be 
successful. In 1950 and 1951 farm writers were more upbeat about the prospects for pre-
emergent application, but they were careful not to issue a blanket endorsement, having 
received mixed reports from the field. Journalist Wally Inman used cautionary language 
when describing the chances for success of pre-emergent application in 1951. "If you care to 
spend the money, or are sure the right kind of shower is coming [to insure absorption], you 
can do a pre-emergence job to be proud of. Otherwise? It's your money!" Heavy rains could 
wash away the chemical before it had a chance to interact with the weeds, while dry 
conditions prevented the chemical from being absorbed by the weeds. There were too many 
variables to make pre-emergent application a reliable practice.25 
New products were on the market that promised improved pre-emergent control in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. One Humboldt County farmer planted an experimental plot to 
show the effect of 2,4-D and two new products, Randox and Sinazon, when applied as a pre-
24 
"Recommendations for Chemical Weed Control," Pamphlet 140, March 1949; Ludwig papers. 
25 
"Poor Year for 2,4-D Weed Test," Wallaces Farmer, 17 July 1948; Wally Inman, "2,4-D Rules for '49," 
Wallaces Farmer, 15 January 1949; "Approve Only Three Bean Varieties," Wallaces Farmer, 2 October 1948; 
"Seedbed Preparation Helps Kill Weeds," Wallaces Farmer, 1 April 1950; Wally Inman, "Kill Weeds in '51," 
Wallaces Farmer, 6 January 1951; "Kill Weeds with Pre-Emergence?," Wallaces Farmer, 17 March 1953. 
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emergent. The extension director concluded that there was some improvement in weed 
control in the sprayed areas, but that the results were "not particularly good." He concluded 
that where the seed-bed had been well prepared with harrowing "there was just as much or 
more weed control as where the proper amount of pre-emergence spray had been applied." 
Wallaces ' Farmer reported excellent results with pre-emergence weed control in 1960. A 
1961 survey indicated that only 3 percent oflowa farmers used pre-emergent application, but 
that number increased throughout the 1960s. Reports on the performance of Randox and 
another new chemical, Atrazine, were generally positive. In 1961 the Audubon County 
extension director reported that "Atrazine is showing generally good results" as a pre-
emergent. Success stories from neighbors and farm journalists encouraged farmers to 
experiment with this new type of application.26 
The experiences of farmers from across the state demonstrate this new trend of 
minimizing cultivation, even before pre-emergent application was common. In 1951 a 
farmer from Mills County sprayed corn and followed it with only two cultivations. In 1953 
several farmers discussed their modified weed control strategies, emphasizing the importance 
of herbicide as a labor saving technology. William A. Fridley of Warren County noted "I 
usually cultivate corn three times. But I want to try one or two cultivations this year—that is, 
if the weather and weeds will let me." An Ida County farmer reported that he substituted 
spraying for one pass of the cultivator through his corn fields. A custom applicator from 
Illinois shared his experiences with readers of Successful Farming. He believed that 
cultivation had its place, but that a well-timed application of herbicide could save time and 
26 Annual Report, Humboldt County, 1958, 13; "How Pre-Emergence Herbicides Work," Wallaces Farmer, 1 
July 1961; Richard Hagen, "Iowa Farm Report on Pre-Emergence Herbicides," Wallaces Farmer, 1 July 1961. 
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expense over cultivating. While herbicide had financial costs, pre-emergent spray and 
granules or post-emergent spray was cheaper than cultivating, since a tractor with a trailer or 
mounted sprayer used less fuel than a tractor with a cultivator. Operating speeds were higher 
with a sprayer than a cultivator and the effective width of equipment was greater, saving 
labor. This degree of flexibility in cultivation would have been unthinkable to farmers before 
1945, but it was possible and attractive to a growing number of farmers in the 1950s.27 
The shift to less cultivating was disconcerting to some observers, especially experts. 
Extension directors who preached balancing cultural and chemical techniques were also 
concerned about an over-reliance on chemicals. They recalled applications that had gone 
awry and knew that herbicide was not always effective. In 1953 the Clay County extension 
director recognized the value of weed killers, but feared that "There may also be the other 
effect of relying to [sic] heavily on chemicals and lowering our diligence in other cultural 
methods of weed control." In 1958 Dutch Sylwester, an advocate of an integrated strategy 
complained "too many folks are expecting chemical weed killers to perform the entire 
control job." The Hardin County extension director observed that some farmers were only 
vigilant about weeds when they could control them easily by spraying. These caveats were 
rare, however. Sylwester continued to promote weed-killing chemicals and he very likely 
understood that farmers wanted weed control that would either save them money or time that 
they could use to devote to other endeavors such as specializing in livestock feeding, 
dairying, or farming more acres.28 
27 
"Need Weed-Killing Help?," Wallaces Farmer, 19 May 1951; "Cultivate Corn and Beans," Wallaces 
Farmer, 6 June 1953; "Cultivate or Spray?," Wallaces Farmer, 19 May 1956; Dana Stewart, "What 10,000 
Acres of Spraying Taught Me," Successful Farming, June 1954. 
28 Annual Report, Clay County, 1953, 4; "Clean Seedbed Will Help Control Weeds," Wallaces Farmer, 3 May 
1958; Annual Report, Hardin County, 1961,25. 
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By 1960 farmers relied on chemicals for weed control, either supplementing cultural 
practices or replacing one or more cultivations with spraying. But there were significant 
ecological implications of the proliferating use of and reliance on growth regulator 
herbicides. The very success farmers enjoyed by using 2,4-D to control broadleaf weeds 
created an ecological vacuum. Species that coexisted with broadleaf weeds had faced less 
competition as farmers used 2,4-D to reduce broadleaf populations, allowing species that 
were tolerant of 2,4-D to thrive. As historians of the environment as well as contemporary 
observers noted, nature responds to human activity in ways that users of technology do not 
predict. As early as 1951 observers noticed that a new weed was moving into the Corn Belt. 
In a Wallaces ' Farmer report on the discussions at the North Central Weed Control 
Conference, the author observed that "The threat of grassy weeds to Corn Belt crops is 
increasing as competition from broadleafed weeds is reduced thru [sic] the use of 2,4-D." 
The following year the same magazine echoed that fact, noting that giant foxtail was present 
only in southern Iowa around 1950 but had spread to every section of the state in just a few 
years. The range for giant foxtail was halfway up the state in Greene County in 1956 and 
had become a leading weed in Iowa by 1965. Robert Nymand of Audubon County captured 
the essence of the problem when he stated, "The 2,4-D seemed to feed the grasses." While it 
was common knowledge that 2,4-D did not control grasses, the rapid advance of grassy weed 
species surprised most farmers and threatened to undermine the success of chemical 
control.29 
29 Numerous scholars have explored the concept of the ecological vacuum. James A. Young described the 
invasion of the weed species halogeton in the mountain west in the wake of overgrazing in the early to mid 
twentieth century. "The Public Response to the Catastrophic Spread of Russian Thistle (1880) and Halogeton 
(1945)," in Publicly Sponsored Agricultural Research in the United States: Past, Present and Future, David B. 
Danbom, ed. (Washington, DC: The Agricultural History Society, 1988): 122-130. More recently, Mark 
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Chemical manufacturers and weed control experts responded quickly, introducing 
new types of chemicals, including new growth regulators as well as new contact herbicides 
that killed everything they touched. Wallaces ' Farmer announced "New Weed Control 
Chemicals for 1961," specifically two growth regulators, Amiben for soybeans and Atrazine 
for corn, as well as a new formulation of the contact herbicide amino triazole, called Amitrol. 
Experts recommended Randox and Atrazine for foxtail control in corn for the 1961 growing 
season while soybean growers could use Alanap, Randox and Amiben. Still, 2,4-D 
continued to be a mainstay for Iowa farmers, since broadleaf weeds remained in fields, 
pastures, and fencerows.30 
The new chemicals helped control the grasses, but they were more expensive than 
2,4-D, requiring farmers to spend more money on herbicide in the 1960s than they had in the 
1940s and 1950s. Rudolf Schipull, who began using 2,4-D in 1952, spent an average of 
$11.36 per year from 1952 to 1958, not including 1957 when he recorded no herbicide or 
spraying expense. After spending an average of $107.38 per year from 1959 to 1967 (mostly 
for 2,4-D and custom spraying), Schipull's herbicide expense changed dramatically the next 
year. In 1968 he purchased $380.51 worth of Randox, Treflan, Atrazine and crop oil, and 
Fiege's work on the irrigated landscape of Idaho demonstrates the futility of attempting to eliminate nature. 
According to Fiege, "nature changes what humans build, often in unanticipated ways; sometimes nature comes 
back more powerful than before," an insight that informs the story of Iowa farmers' efforts to control nature 
through chemicals. Irrigated Eden: The Making of an Agricultural Landscape in the American West (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1999), 9. Similarly, William Boyd claimed that "the history of industrial 
agriculture contains numerous examples of unforeseen and often disruptive effects of technological 
development" in "Making Meat: Science, Technology, and American Poultry Production," Technology and 
Culture 42 (October 2001): 662-663. Hadley Read, "New weed threatens Combelt," Successful Farming, June 
1951; "Grassy Weeds Threaten," Wallaces Farmer, 2 January 1954; "Learn More About Weed Control," 
Wallaces Farmer, 1 January 1955; Annual Report, Greene County, 1956, 1-2; Fred W. Slife and Lloyd E. 
Zeman, "1965 Weed and Insect Control Guide," Successful Farming, March 1965; "Grassy Weeds Threaten 
Iowa Cornfields," Wallaces Farmer, 26 April 1969; "Chemical Control for Smartweed in Beans," Wallaces 
Farmer, 25 April 1970; Bob Nymand interview. 
30 
"What Can You Do About Foxtail?," Wallaces Farmer, 18 February 1961. 
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Weedout. In 1969 the only herbicide he listed by name was 2,4-D, but he spent almost $300 
for it, while in 1970 he spent $473 for seven different herbicides and custom application. It 
is impossible to know the particular weed conditions Schipull faced, but it is clear that he 
believed that the increasingly expensive chemicals could help control weeds in his fields.31 
In addition to costing more money, herbicide represented a larger percentage of crop 
expenses in the 1960s than it had in previous decades. Joseph Ludwig's nominal herbicide 
expense for 2,4-D and the occasional supplement amounted to an average of 1.5 percent of 
total crop expenses from 1946 through 1960. During those years, that percentage ranged 
from a high of 7 percent in 1950 with no herbicide expenses recorded in 1949, 1957, 1958 
and 1960. In 1961, Ludwig altered his operation significantly, recording 38 percent of crop 
expense devoted to herbicide. From 1961 to 1970, Ludwig's herbicide expenses averaged 29 
percent of his total crop expense. Significantly, the average total crop expense for his farm 
during both periods was similar, with $1,698 from 1946 to 1960 and $1,683 from 1961 to 
1970, indicating the extent to which herbicide became a major part of Ludwig's farm 
operation. Although the William Adams records ceased in 1958, his herbicide expenses were 
slightly higher from 1949 to 1958, averaging 7 percent per year, still a small commitment 
when compared to the post-1960 herbicide expenses.32 
Farmers like Ludwig who learned how to use herbicide by experimenting with 2,4-D 
faced an increasingly complicated lineup of herbicides to choose from during the late 1960s. 
Changing weed populations meant changes in herbicide tactics. As a farm journalist noted in 
1969, "So many brands, so many different formulations with different rates of application 
31 Schipull papers. 
32 Ludwig papers. 
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and different costs, make selection of a weed killer a pretty tough job." With nineteen 
herbicides for corn and twenty for soybeans available in 1969, the days of using just 2,4-D or 
a perhaps a contact, non-selective herbicide such as amino triazole were gone. The 
proliferation of new herbicide varieties and names could be confusing, with some chemicals 
such as Ramrod or Randox appropriate for com and soybean fields, but Randox T and 
Londax only cleared for use in cornfields. A Hardin County extension director remarked in 
1960 that farmers generally wanted to know what chemical to use on a particular type of 
weed, a contrast to earlier reports when farmers wanted to learn about the handful of 
chemical treatments on the market. In addition to offering information on the proper use of 
2,4-D, he observed, "Many requests are for information on use and hazards of new weed 
chemicals," suggesting sensitivity on the part of some farmers about finding the right 
herbicide for a particular weed problem and their concern about crop damage from 
misapplication, improper mixing, or carryover. Furthermore, dosages changed over time as 
weed problems changed and manufacturers modified product formulas.33 
Demonstration projects and the specifics of recommended dosages illustrate the 
complexity of selecting one or more herbicides. In 1967 Hamilton County extension staff 
cooperated with the Stanhope Co-op Elevator and a local farmer to manage a demonstration 
plot with ten different herbicides on beans and seven herbicides on corn. Henry County 
farmers saw a variety of chemicals in operation in 1966, when a demonstrator near Winfield 
compared broadcast pre-emergence application of three chemicals, Atrazine, Ramrod and 
Randox-T with post-emergence application of Atrazine combined with mechanical 
33 Charles E. Sommers and Ellery L. Knake, "1969 Corn-Soybean Herbicide Selection Guide," Successful 
Farming, February 1969; Annual Report, Hardin County, 1960, 25; Richard Krumme, Phil Jones, and Charles 
E. Sommers, "Your Nine Big Corn Decisions," Successful Farming, November 1970. 
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techniques. Dutch Sylwester recommended nine different chemicals that could be used for 
foxtail control in planted corn that had not emerged in 1967, with each chemical applied at a 
different rate. Yields varied widely, depending upon which chemical a farmer used, making 
herbicide use a trickier proposition than it had been in the 1950s.34 
The stakes were high in this complex weed control fight. Manufacturers contended 
that every dollar farmers invested in herbicide gave better returns from the same dollar 
invested in fuel, labor, and machinery costs of cultivating. In 1968 the Geigy Chemical 
Corporation argued that for every dollar's worth of Atrazine farmers could expect to gain up 
to $4 through increased yield. Of course, farmers always understood that weeds robbed 
yields, but since the new generation of herbicide was more costly it made cost-benefit 
information a key point of advertising. Researchers at experiment stations proved that just a 
few weeds could decrease yields, confirming the advertisers' claims. One giant foxtail plant 
per foot of corn row cut yields from 93.5 bushels to the acre to approximately 86.5 bushels. 
Leland Bentley of Grundy County provided a dramatic example of the yield increasing 
potential of the new chemicals with an atrazine test he conducted in 1965. Bentley applied 
atrazine on a cornfield where the nut grass practically covered his four-inch high corn. At 
harvest time, the section where he applied the Atrazine yield nineteen bushels per acre higher 
than the control plot.35 
Application techniques were also in transition. Farmers used pre- and post-emergent 
spray herbicides and granules in the 1950s, but instructions varied from chemical to 
chemical. In the 1950s, most pre-emergent herbicides could be applied anytime after planting 
34 Annual Report, Hamilton County, 1967, 9; Annual Report, Henry County, 1966, 16-17. 
35 Geigy/Atrazine advertisement, Successful Farming, March 1968; "Know More About Your Corn Crop," 
Wallaces Farmer, 11 March 1967; Annual Report, Grundy County, 1965, 3. 
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and before the crop emerged, but newer chemicals required more sensitivity. The Amchem 
Company noted that there were numerous complaints about their product, Amiben, a 
herbicide labeled for soybean fields. According to a company representative, "it seems to me 
that the farmer still doesn't fully understand how to use AMIBEN for most consistent 
results," observing that farmers needed to apply it at the same time they planted for best 
results and implying that farmers need to relearn application practices to match the new 
chemicals.36 
Other techniques also required training, such as incorporating spray herbicide into the 
ground. Eli Lilly Company's herbicide for soybean fields, Treflan, required mixing into the 
top layer of soil to get maximum contact with the delicate roots of emerging grassy weeds. 
Elanco worked to ensure success for the product, issuing a question and answer circular letter 
to county extension staff about proper techniques for using Treflan. The circular stressed the 
need to use a tandem disc and harrow to get the chemical mixed with soil properly. That 
year Elanco also published an extensive brochure, "New Dimension in Weed Control," 
emphasizing "three-dimensional protection against weeds rather than just a thin veneer on the 
surface." Incorporation was not a blanket approach, since not all herbicides were effective 
when incorporated and some could actually damage the crop. Chemicals that dissipated in 
air were good candidates for incorporation, while some, such as Treflan, decomposed faster 
in sunlight. Incorporation, like all the new techniques, required a higher degree of 
36 R. H. Beatty to D. W. Staniforth, 23 May 1966, enclosure, M. B. Turner to R. H. Beatty, 17 May 1966, D. W. 
Staniforth papers, Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State University. 
sophistication in application. Mixing too deep diluted the chemical, while mixing too deep 
or too shallow meant that the chemical could miss the roots of the weeds.37 
Mixing herbicide varieties and using more than one kind in the same field also 
became a common practice during the 1960s. With the proliferation of herbicides designed 
to combat different types of weeds, it did not take long before farmers and researchers began 
combining herbicides to achieve broad-spectrum weed control. As one writer noted in 1966, 
"Combinations offer the possibility that someday, by mixing two, or perhaps several 
chemicals, you can tailor a prescription herbicide to your specific weed problem." Farmers 
who mixed herbicides could not only get broad-spectrum weed control, but they could also 
match local soil or weather conditions, reduce the risk of carryover of one full strength 
chemical, and potentially cut the risk of crop injury and costs. In 1967 and 1968 the USD A 
approved several chemicals for mixing, including Atrazine and Lorox, Atrazine and Ramrod, 
and Ramrod and Lorox. Manufacturers registered more chemicals for mixing in 1969, 
prompting Dutch Sylwester to comment "contrary to what some folks believe, these 
combinations are not being made to confuse you." Experts cautioned that farmers who did 
not purchase premixed herbicides needed to exercise caution when they mixed the chemicals 
in the tank to make sure that the herbicides were in the proper proportions. Farmers who 
found that one kind of chemical did not provide the degree of control they desired could 
apply another round of herbicide. Leroy Aswegan of Hardin County applied Treflan before 
37 
"Dear County Agent" circular, 7 April 1965, Staniforth papers; "New Dimension in Weed Control," Elanco 
Products Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, brochure EA 5065; Keith Remy, "Which Herbicides Should Be 
Incorporated Into The Soil?," Wallaces Farmer,9 April 1966; "Work Herbicides Into The Soil?," Wallaces 
Farmer, 8 April 1967; "Incorporating Herbicides—Helpful With Some," Successful Farming, March 1968; 
"Incorporating Chemicals," Wallaces Farmer, 9 May 1970. 
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planting and then planned to apply a preemergent treatment of Lorox in 1971. Aswegan 
explained, "I think I need a second layer of chemical weed control."38 
Mixing and making multiple applications were not the only way that herbicide 
formulations became more complicated. Surfactants, or surface-active agents, helped the 
dispersing, spreading, wetting, sticking and other surface-changing properties of the plants. 
Using surfactants became popular in the 1960s as a way of getting the most out of the 
herbicide. Some farmers used Atrazine with crop oil as a post-emergence spray to increase 
absorption into the weeds. The oil not only helped the herbicide penetrate the leaf, but, 
unlike a straight water mix that would evaporate quickly, the oil kept the unabsorbed 
chemical on the plant, gradually moving it to the base where it could be taken at ground 
level. Using surfactants gave farmers another way to get the most weed control from their 
increasing herbicide expense.39 
The variety of herbicides and the combinations brought new risks, too. The new 
herbicide residues persisted longer in the soil and could carry over into the next year and 
affect non-tolerant crops. As early as 1949, weed scientists assured farmers that 2,4-D 
dissipated from the soil from thirty to ninety days, quieting any fears of the new technology. 
By the late 1960s farmers had good reason to worry about carryover. As Dutch Sylwester 
noted in early 1969, the 1968 crop suffered damage from 1967 Atrazine carryover due to late 
season "rescue" applications, compounded by dry conditions throughout the growing season 
and into the following spring, which prevented chemical breakdown. Studies indicated that 
38 
"Are Two Herbicides Better Than One?," Wallaces Farmer, 5 March 1966; "Herbicide Mixtures for Weed 
Control," Wallaces Farmer, 8 April 1967; "Herbicide Mixtures Offer Some Benefits," Wallaces Farmer, 12 
April 1969; "Piggyback sprays: new way to clean out weeds in soybeans," Farm Journal, April 1971. 
39 An excellent resource for the terminology and technology of herbicides is Robert King, editor, Farmers Weed 
Control Handbook {St. Louis: Doane Publishing, 1985). "How Surfactants Improve Weed Killers," Wallaces 
Farmer, 9 March 1968; "Timing Critical When Applying Atrazine-Oil," Wallaces Farmer, 10 May 1969. 
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Atrazine, unlike 2,4-D, could remain active in the soil from four to twelve months, depending 
on the amount applied per acre. As noted, farmers could mix herbicides to reduce the risk of 
carry over, but it required careful planning to ensure that the next year's crop was tolerant to 
the selected herbicides. It was possible to mix two chemicals at a slightly lower application 
rate to lessen the chance that one of the herbicides would leave damaging residue for the next 
year's rotation.40 
While some farmers used herbicide to reduce their cultivation efforts in the 1950s, a 
few hoped to eliminate cultivation altogether in the 1960s. In 1949 an optimistic USD A 
weed scientist prophesied that farmers could eliminate cultivation with the aid of chemical 
weed killers. In the mid-1960s some experts, farmers, and journalists began to consider 
minimizing their summer fieldwork, actually substituting chemicals for cultivation along 
with narrowing the rows in their fields. John Engelkes of Franklin County applied a heavy 
dose of incorporated Atrazine in 1965 on a germinating corn crop, noting that he did not need 
to cultivate that season. He did cultivate twelve acres as a control plot, noting that there was 
no visible difference in the quality of the crop between the herbicide treated fields and the 
twelve acre control plot. Although he did not weigh samples to get an accurate yield test, he 
was encouraged enough to try it again in 1966. Bob Gabeline of Louisa County found that 
with granule application of Randox, he avoided cultivating on a portion of his acres. 
Gabeline cultivated three fourths of his corn one time, with the balance of his fields receiving 
only two passes with the cultivator. Herbicide costs were higher for this sort of replacement 
40 Wally Inman, "2,4-D Rules for '49," Wallaces Farmer, 15 January 1949; "Weed Control for Corn and 
Soybeans," Successful Farming, February 1969; "Fit Chemical to Crop Rotation," Wallaces Farmer, 8 March 
1969; EPA Hazardous Materials Advisory Committee, Herbicide Report: Chemistry and Analysis, 
Environmental Effects, Agricultural and Other Applied Uses (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing 
Office, May 1974), 58. 
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operation, but a Lucas County farmer noted that the cost difference was "more than paid for 
from yield increases and timeliness." He explained, "We have livestock and a considerable 
amount of hay. By not having to spend time cultivating beans, we gained extra time to take 
care of our corn, hay, and livestock." Farmers who used herbicide to gain time for other farm 
operations recognized that their labor could be more profitably employed elsewhere on the 
farm.41 
From 1945 to 1970, farmers who used growth regulator herbicides only realized part 
of the optimistic promise of cheap and easy chemical control. Chemicals became a critical 
element of Corn Belt agriculture although cultural control was still important. Farmers 
experienced problems in using growth regulator herbicides, most notably frequent crop 
damage through misapplication, but chemicals were reliable enough to inspire confidence in 
most farmers. They found that it helped them control problem weed areas, catch up with 
weed control when it was too wet to cultivate, gave them a head start on cultivating when 
they applied pre-emergent herbicides, and even let them replace cultivation. Farmers 
welcomed the new chemical technology, but they played a critical role in shaping its use, as 
well as altering ecosystems. Their very reliance on 2,4-D compounded an inherent problem 
of that chemical, since it only controlled broadleaf weeds and not grasses. 
As farmers grappled with the changing weed profile on their land, they found new 
ways to manage an old problem. A host of new chemicals and new techniques allowed 
farmers to maintain a degree of control over the grasses, but at a dramatically higher cost and 
degree of complexity. Growth regulator herbicide was a practical and inexpensive solution 
41 Untitled Editorial, Wallaces Farmer, 21 May 1949; Roy J. Reiman and Lloyd E. Zeman, "These Farmers 
Shoot the Works on Corn," Successful Farming, March 1965; Ken Hofmeyer, "Growing Row Crops Without 
Cultivation," Wallaces Farmer, 23 April 23 1966. 
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to the postwar weed problem when farmers began using it on a trial basis in 1945, but the 
relationship between farmers, growth regulator herbicide, and Iowa's farmland was 
constantly changing as farmers attempted to maximize production and deal with the 
unintended consequences of the new technology. By 1972, however, few Iowa farmers 
debated whether or not to use herbicide. Instead, they debated what kind to use and how to 
apply it. It was as important for farmers to know about herbicide as it was to know about 
tractors and corn. Increased yields and reduced field labor were powerful incentives for 
farmers to make the transition to chemical weed control. As Iowa farmers accepted herbicide 
and asserted initiative in using it, they combined it with chemical fertilizer and insecticide, 
increasing their commitment to corn and soybeans and livestock, reshaping the postwar farm 
landscape. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Fertilizer Gives the Land a Kick 
In early 1944 a farmer from Poweshiek County noted that over the previous seven 
years commercial fertilizer helped him get better yields on his pasture. "It gives the land a 
kick," he explained. The small number of Iowa farmers who used commercial fertilizer on 
their crops of corn, small grains, hay, and pasture reported that they had significant gains in 
yield, a fact confirmed by Iowa State College Extension experts. These scientists and county 
extension directors told farmers that in addition to pasture, hay, and small grain acres, as 
much as half of the corn acres in the state could benefit from commercially manufactured 
nitrogen, phosphorous, or potassium to boost yields, depending on soil type. Experiments 
from around the state showed that fertilizer stimulated root, leaf, stalk, and ear growth on 
corn plants and increased production on legumes such as alfalfa, too. At the end of World 
War II, farmers all over Iowa confronted the possibilities of commercial fertilizer.1 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, only a minority of Iowa farmers purchased 
fertilizer. Less than 5 percent of Iowa farmers in 1929 and 3 percent in 1939 used fertilizer, a 
stark contrast to the practices of farmers in Corn Belt states to the east. In Ohio and Indiana 
farmers used it extensively, with 62 and 49 percent of farmers in those states, respectively, 
using fertilizer at mid-century. Most farmers in Iowa eschewed purchasing fertilizers 
because they were successful in maintaining productivity with regular applications of manure 
and crop rotations of corn, small grain, and hay. For decades, the majority of farmers who 
used fertilizer were those who specialized in crops that had high labor requirements and had 
high returns such as truck crops or vegetables. One writer, discussing the rapid spread of 
1 
"Dollar Corn Makes Fertilizer Pay," Wallaces Farmer, 15 January 1944; "Farmers Talk About Fertilizer Use," 
Wallaces Farmer, 20 January 1945. 
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commercially purchased chemical fertilizer, claimed that in his boyhood people looked down 
on fertilizer as a "whip to the tired horse." The allusion to the whip and tired horse implied 
that only farmers who failed to care for their land needed to fertilize, just as only careless or 
cruel farmers lashed their horses. A successful crop rotation strategy also limited populations 
of yield robbing weeds and insects. But after World War II farmers in Iowa and across the 
Corn Belt used commercial fertilizer as a regular part of their land and crop management 
routines for all their crops, especially corn and soybeans.2 
Iowa farmers participated in a national trend toward chemical fertilizer use. From 
1945 to 1970 the use of nitrogen on American farms increased from 419 million tons to 
7,459 million tons while the use of potash increased from 435 million tons to 4,035 million 
tons. Iowa farmers increased their total fertilizer use from 332,661 tons in 1950 to 2,333,411 
in 1969 without significantly altering their total crop acreage. By 1972, farmers used 
increasing amounts of fertilizer on their corn crop in the pursuit of larger yields. They also 
successfully pioneered the use of nitrogen fertilizer for the soybean crop, helping to increase 
the importance of soybeans in Iowa agriculture.3 
The most important question that occupied journalists, extension professionals, and 
farmers was whether or not fertilizers helped increase yields enough to make them 
economical. Some Iowa farmers used fertilizers to compensate for deficiencies of their soil 
2 
"Says Use More Fertilizer," Wallaces Farmer, 19 January 1946; Zenas H. Beers, "Development of the 
Fertilizer Industry in the Middle Western States," Fertilizer Review, 26 (April-May-June 1951), 5; Bogue, 
From Prairie to Com Belt, 285-286; "Fertilizers and Lime In the United States: Resources, Production, 
Marketing, and Use," USD A Miscellaneous Publication No. 586 (Washington, DC.: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, May 1946), 26, 28, 85; "More Farmers Use Fertilizer," Wallaces Farmer, 19 April 1952. 
3 Willard Cochrane, The Development of American Agriculture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1979), 127-128; USD A Crop Reporting Board, Statistical Reporting Service, "Consumption of Commercial 
Fertilizers, Primary Plant Nutrients, and Micronutrients," Statistical Bulletin No. 472, (Washington, D C.:, U. 
S. Government Printing Office, 1971). For a survey of the fertilizer business, see Lewis B. Nelson, History of 
the U.S. Fertilizer Industry (Muscle Shoals: Tennessee Valley Authority, 1990. 
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type, such as William Adams of Fayette County, who bought one or two tons of phosphate 
each spring throughout much of the 1930s. But the low commodity prices and subsequent 
low farm income of the 1930s made purchasing fertilizer a difficult or losing proposition for 
the majority of farmers, especially those who did not have any experience with commercial 
chemicals. High wartime prices for almost all farm products prompted farmers who had not 
used fertilizer during the depression years to consider it. Subscribers to Wallaces ' Farmer 
read about peers who used high analysis fertilizer, a blend of nitrogen, phosphorous, and 
potassium represented by three numbers that indicated the percent of plant food per 100 
pounds. For example, 0-9-27 fertilizer was a mix of 0 percent nitrogen, 9 percent 
phosphorous, and 27 percent potassium, with the rest of the blend as carrier. The magazine's 
editors proclaimed that "Fertilizers Get Results," "Fertilized Com Does Better," and "Grass 
and Fertilizer Work Together," citing studies that proved the tremendous yield-boosting 
potential of commercial fertilizer.4 
Promoters' claims of the value of purchased fertilizer were compelling reading. 
Check plots on pastures showed that animals gained more weight grazing on fertilized 
pastures. One study showed that steers on a pasture with phosphate applied at 155 pounds 
per acre gained 155 pounds per acre, while the steers on the check plots only gained 105 
pounds per acre. Similarly, rotated corn fields treated with animal manure, limed, and 
fertilized with 150 pounds of 0-20-0 per acre yielded seventy-eight bushels to the acre, while 
fields treated with 200 pounds of 2-12-12 yielded eighty-five bushels of com to the acre. 
These yields were remarkable considering the average yield during the 1950s varied from the 
4 Adams papers; "Fertilizers Get Results," Wallaces Farmer, 5 October 1946; "Fertilized Corn Does Better," 
Wallaces Farmer, 6 April 1946; "Grass and Fertilizer Work Together," Wallaces Farmer, 2 March 1946. 
86 
forties to a high of sixty-six in 1958. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, farmers and 
experiment station researchers regularly reported gains of ten or more bushels to the acre on 
fertilized fields.5 
While most farmers chose to apply fertilizer over the course of the postwar years, 
more prosperous and younger farmers did so faster than others. In a survey of over 500 
farmers statewide conducted by the state experiment station and Iowa State college statistical 
laboratory in the early 1950s, the wealthiest farmers used the most fertilizer, while over half 
of the farmers surveyed would have used more if they could afford it. Another survey 
suggested the ways in which age played a part in farmers' decisions to use fertilizer. In 
1952, 56 percent of farmers under thirty-five years of age planned to use starter fertilizer on 
corn fields applied at planting time, followed by 50 percent of farmers aged thirty-five to 
fifty, and only 40 percent of farmers older than fifty. Older farmers relied on a system of 
crop rotation to balance nutrient use and used animal manure to put organic matter back into 
the soil. The Jefferson County extension director reported that older farmers there would 
"probably never give in to fertilizer use, but the younger ones are showing increased 
interest." This generation gap continued into the 1960s, when another poll indicated that 71 
percent of farmers aged thirty-five to fifty planned to use starter fertilizer on their 1963 corn 
crop and 66 percent of the group aged fifty through sixty-four would do so. Only 31 percent 
of farmers over age sixty-five planned to use starter fertilizer, with the youngest farmers 
trailing slightly behind the middle-aged leaders.6 
5 
"Farmers Get Results:" Annual Report, Jefferson County, 1958, 11. 
6 
"More fertilizer every year," Wallaces Farmer, 7 August 1954; "More Farmers Use Fertilizer," Wallaces 
Farmer, 19 April 1952; Annual Report, Jefferson County, 1957, 6; Newt Hawkinson, "Starter Fertilizer," 
Wallaces Farmer, 20 April 1963. 
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Older farmers were not the only ones who were slower to take up chemical fertilizer. 
Farmers with smaller acreages also lagged behind those with large areas under cultivation. 
As farmers employed herbicide to reduce labor demands at cultivating time, insecticide to 
limit yield losses due to insect infestation, and spread the cost of their machines over more 
acres, they wanted to ensure high yields by using fertilizer. Eight of ten farmers with more 
than 150 acres of com planned to use starter fertilizer on their com in 1963 while only 50 
percent of those with less than twenty-five acres planned to use it. These farmers with small 
acreages might have had more livestock, enabling them to put more manure on their land per 
acre than those with extensive farms. Perhaps the farms with small com acreages were 
farmed by older farmers who were slower to use the new technology. But it is also possible 
to see 50 percent of farmers with less than twenty-five acres of corn who used fertilizer as a 
high number, indicating that they agreed with larger operators that fertilizer was a good 
technique.7 
Regardless of their age group, farmers of the 1940s and 1950s had good reasons for 
using commercial fertilizer. The most compelling reason is that returns from fertilizer 
generally exceeded costs. Of the 69 percent of Iowa farmers who used commercial fertilizer 
in 1953, 87 percent of them believed that their crops benefited from the application. They 
believed it worked because they saw it on their neighbors fields and heard them talking about 
it. Over half of farmers surveyed reported that it was the experiences of other farmers that 
convinced them to try fertilizing. By contrast, only 20 percent of farmers began to use 
7 Hawkinson, "Starter fertilizer." 
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fertilizer because of the efforts of the Extension service or farm magazines. If there was ever 
a product that "sold itself' to farmers, it was commercial fertilizer.8 
Farmers accepted commercial fertilizer so quickly because of the experiences with 
hybrid com, a technological development they adopted in the 1930s and 1940s. They learned 
that they needed to fertilize the new hybrids to obtain maximum yields. As farmers retired 
com acres after 1933 as part of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration's com-hog 
program they offset declining production by using higher yielding hybrid corn on their 
remaining com acres. When the US government lifted production controls during World 
War II, hybrid seed continued to be important, since government leaders wanted maximum 
production for the war effort and commodity prices soared. By 1942 all Iowa com acres, 
regardless of farm size, were planted with hybrid seed corn. Higher yielding hybrid corn 
crops utilized more of the available soil nutrients, drawing down supplies of nitrogen, 
phosphorous, and potassium at a faster rate than with open-pollinated varieties.9 
Just as using hybrid seed increased the pressure on soil nutrients, so too did the trend 
to plant thicker stands of corn. The mechanical and chemical farming techniques of the 
postwar period allowed more intensive farming as well as more extensive farming. With 
new pesticides (see chapters one and two) and fertilizers to help keep fertility high, farmers 
abandoned the old check-row planting grid system that facilitated cultivation. Their new 
strategy was to plant narrow corn rows and plant more plants per acre. Both of these 
8 M. A. Anderson and E. L. Baum, "How Your Neighbors Use Fertilizer," Iowa Farm Science 11 (April 1957): 
26-28. For a full report on farm fertilizer use in 1953, see M. A. Anderson, L. E. Cairns, Earl O. Heady, and E. 
L. Baum, "An Appraisal of Factors Affecting the Acceptance and Use of Fertilizer in Iowa, 1953," Agricultural 
Experiment Station, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, Special Report No. 16, June 1956. 
9 Hudson, Making the Corn Belt, 171; Firman E. Bear, Soils and Fertilizers, 4th ed. (New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, Inc., 1951), xi; "What big yields do to soil fertility," Wallaces Farmer, 2 November 1963; G. F. Sprague 
and J. C. Cunningham, "Growing the Bumper Corn Crop," in A Century of Farming In Iowa, 1846-1946 
(Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1946), 41. 
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developments made fertilizer an important part of Corn Belt farming. As a result, 
perspectives on what constituted good farming changed as older farmers and those with 
smaller and moderate sized farms moved out of agriculture. Fertilizer, previously viewed as 
the whip to the tired horse used by inferior farmers, was now perceived as a legitimate 
technology. Families who continued to farm considered the purchase and use of 
commercially manufactured chemical fertilizer an essential part of good farming.10 
Farmers accepted fertilizer as a valuable tool that could help boost yields and farm 
profits by raising more crops per acre, but it was another matter to determine what kind of 
fertilizer matched local soil types how and when to apply fertilizers, and even what crops 
responded best to chemical treatment. Fertilizer application could take place at various times 
throughout the year, and the popularity of each application technique varied. Some farmers 
submitted soil samples to the laboratory at Iowa State for testing, but as late as 1962 farmers 
only tested soil on 20 percent of Iowa's corn fields. Farmers found that expert advice was 
frequently helpful, but not always. Many farmers experimented on their own to find out 
what worked best for their conditions or type of operation. Much of the discussion about 
fertilizers in the years up to 1972 involved the timing and method of application.11 
Farmers and experts agreed that applying fertilizer at corn planting time, known as 
starter fertilizer, allowed the plant to get off to a fast start to maximize the chances for high 
yields. A farmer from Lyon County explained that he plowed under nitrogen and phosphate 
on his corn fields but also applied starter fertilizer. He noted that getting corn growing 
10 The process of balancing the draw down of soil nutrients and the application of fertilizer has been labeled the 
"mechanization of the nitrogen cycle" and, in combination with hybrid technology, accounted for the increase 
in corn yields in the postwar period. James O. Bray and Patricia Watkins, "Technical Change in Corn 
Production in the United States, 1870-1960" Journal of Farm Economics 46 (November 1964): 762-763. 
11 
"Are you using enough fertilizer?," Wallaces Farmer, 3 February 1962. 
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quickly put it ahead of weeds, which allowed earlier cultivation or herbicide spraying. 
Garland Byrnes of Allamakee County recounted that "One year I ran out [of fertilizer] and 
left two rows without hill [starter] fertilizer. You could see a real difference in size of 
plants." In 1953 Ray Griffieon of Polk County claimed that using starter fertilizer increased 
his corn yield by ten bushels per acre, pushing his yield to 100 bushels per acre, well above 
average corn yields in the state.12 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, both farmers and extension professionals insisted 
that starter fertilizer made a substantial difference in yields. Even in the dry years of the mid-
1950s when many farmers cut back on fertilizer purchases, some farmers maintained that it 
was a good gamble. In 1956, in the midst of a state-wide drought, Oliver Hansen of Franklin 
County explained that starter fertilizer "pays well at least four years out of five. Sometimes, 
I get as much of 15 to 20 bushels of corn for only four dollars worth of fertilizer." According 
to this logic, not using commercial fertilizer was the real gamble.13 
A key component of successfully applying starter fertilizer was the location of the 
chemical in the seed bed in relation to the seed. Early starter fertilizer applicators placed the 
granule of fertilizer next to the seed. According to a 1953 guide to fertilizer use, corn 
fertilizer needed to be at the same level as the seed and about two inches away from it. Later 
in the decade experts urged farmers to place the fertilizer lower in seedbed and to the side. 
This would prevent direct contact of the seed and fertilizer at germination time, which would 
delay germination. Instead, the fertilizer would be in position so that the first downward root 
shoots would reach the fertilizer. As one Webster County farmer put it, "We used to limit 
12 
"Apply fertilizer with planter," Wallaces Farmer, 16 April 1955; "Fertilizer Keeps Corn Yields High," 
Wallaces Farmer, 7 November 1953. 
13 A1 Bull, "Cut down on fertilizer?," Wallaces Farmer, 3 March 1956. 
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what we put on as starter.. .But now with placement away from the seed we'll be using 
more." The use of starter fertilizer did not preclude using other techniques such as spring or 
fall plow down, as Lloyd Fosseen of Hardin County noted. I think plow down followed with 
starter is the best, he noted. "It gets the com started and keeps it going." This type of 
combination was especially popular with fertilizer applied during the growing season.14 
Starter fertilizer was the most popular method of fertilizer use in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. In 1951 only 38 percent of farmers reported that they used starter fertilizer, 
while 62 percent stated that they did not use it. By contrast, in 1952, 48 percent of farmers 
planned to use starter fertilizer while 47 percent did not, representing a significant gain over 
the previous year. Just as striking was the conversion of the undecided farmers, who 
comprised 5 percent in 1951 but likely moved into the ranks of those who planned to use 
fertilizer, since there were no undecided farmers in the 1952 poll. By 1963 65 percent of 
farmers surveyed planned to use starter fertilizer. This trend toward starter fertilizer matched 
the recommendations of agronomists and farm journalists, who argued that tests on 
experiment station farms indicated that broadcasting fertilizer required almost twice as much 
fertilizer as using a planter attachment to get the same results in yields.15 
Once the corn crop was above the ground, boosted by starter fertilizer, many farmers 
applied nitrogen to the growing stand. In the 1950s experts discussed the need for nitrogen 
during the growing season. As one journalist explained in a 1950 article, "Nitrogen is a 
growth-producing plant food something like protein for animals." Farmers liked to see dark 
14 
"Guide to Fertilizer Use," Iowa State College Agricultural Extension Service, Ames, Iowa, Pamphlet 193, 
March 1953; "Put starter in the right place," Wallaces Farmer, 20 April 1957; "Early boost from starter," 
Wallaces Farmer, 5 April 1958; "Use both starter and plow-down fertilizer," Wallaces Farmer, 1 March 1961. 
15 
"More Farmers Use Fertilizer," Wallaces Farmer, 19 April 1952; Hawkinson, "Starter fertilizer"; "Fertilizer 
For Late Corn," Wallaces Farmer, 17 May 1947. 
green corn fields, which indicated that the crop was healthy and had a good supply of 
nitrogen. While they traditionally used crop rotations to make sure that the nitrogen content 
in their soil stayed high, there was also the new possibility of performing a mid-season 
operation called side-dressing to get nitrogen to the plants in June or July. Farmers could 
side-dress nitrogen as they cultivated, mounting fertilizer applicators on their cultivators to 
get the fertilizer beside the corn row, making it available to the growing corn root systems. 
Iowa State College experiments in 1948 and 1949 showed that side-dressing forty pounds of 
nitrogen per acre gave an average of thirteen and a half bushels per acre yield increase. From 
the perspective of farmers such as Bill Wilson of Keokuk County, "It really pays off. I get 
three dollars for each one that I spend that way [side-dressing corn]." Side-dressing was a 
good way to ensure that a growing crop had a chance to mature.16 
Side dress application of nitrogen was especially important on second year corn, the 
year before it was scheduled to go back into small grains followed by hay for the next year. 
Agronomists did not consider it necessary to fertilize corn that followed a legume crop in the 
rotation, but they estimated that as much as 90 percent of Iowa's second year corn would 
benefit from side dressed nitrogen. However, experts cautioned that this mid-season 
application was not a replacement for proper rotation. Planting com on land more than two 
years in a row was bad farming, which risked depleting soil nitrogen to a degree that 
following crops of nitrogen-fixing legumes could not replace. But in remarkably short 
period, farmers found that using nitrogen in combination with herbicide and insecticide 
allowed them to raise corn for three or more years, with some farmers even planting 
16 Homer Hush, "Yellow Corn Short of Nitrogen," Wallaces Farmer, 17 June 1950; "For more corn add 
nitrogen," Wallaces Farmer, 21 May 1955. 
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"continuous corn" in the same ground year after year. The key ingredient of continuous com 
was a heavy dose of fertilizer with nitrogen rate of up to 200 pounds per acre. More 
commonly, farmers used fertilizer in combination with pesticides to rotate com and 
soybeans.17 
Anhydrous ammonia quickly became the leading fertilizer for side-dress operations 
on Iowa corn fields. At 82 percent nitrogen, it was the purest form of fertilizer available. 
Anhydrous ammonia is a gaseous form of nitrogen stored under pressure and injected into the 
soil at cultivating time, just as the solid or liquid forms of nitrogen, except anhydrous 
ammonia dissipated when it came in contact with air. In 1950 Elmer Carlson of Audubon 
County was one of the first farmers in the state to use anhydrous ammonia, but he was not 
alone for long. Farmers quickly adopted the gaseous form, which required less handling than 
the bags of solid fertilizer. Harold Whittlesey began farming in the northern part of the state 
in 1961, and by 1965 he applied anhydrous ammonia in late May. By 1968 Whittlesey only 
applied anhydrous ammonia, having phased out his other fertilizer products. Whittlesey, like 
so many Iowa farmers, found that it was easier to hire a commercial applicator for this task, 
which represented a time savings that allowed farmers to get on with other work during the 
busy month of June when they could make hay or take care of livestock. As a writer for 
Wallaces Farmer noted, "Frequently, custom applied nitrogen is cheaper than you can buy 
17 
"Plan To Side-Dress Your Corn?," Wallaces Farmer, 2 February 1952; Hush, Yellow Corn Short of 
Nitrogen"; "Good year to side dress corn," Wallaces Farmer, 20 May 1960; Roswell Garst, "'Bob' Garst's 
Latest 'Crusade,"' Successful Farming, July 1962; Rex Gogerty, "Corn after corn after corn," The Farmer's 
Digest, 34 (February 1971): 20-22. 
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and put on yourself." Extant farm record books indicate that by the 1960s almost all farmers 
used anhydrous ammonia at some point in the year, often as side dressing.18 
While starter fertilizer and side dressing with anhydrous ammonia gained popularity 
in the 1950s, many farmers found that spring plow down application was advantageous. 
Plowing down fertilizer meant broadcasting fertilizer on the surface of the field followed by 
plowing the field, which put the fertilizer deep in the seed bed. In the late 1940s, extension 
professionals hesitated to recommend plow down application unless the farmer could use 
large amounts of nitrogen, since the principal advantage of plowing down fertilizer was 
getting plant food where it could be absorbed by the roots throughout the growing season. 
Ray Gribben, a farmer from Dallas County, noted in his diary that he was very satisfied with 
his 1947 corn yields on the land he had fertilized in the spring of the previous year. Carl and 
Bertha Peterson, who farmed 110 acres in Palo Alto County, performed March or April 
application and plow down throughout the years up to 1970.19 
Spring plow down was especially valuable to those families with larger farms or with 
demands on their time from extensive livestock operations. Farmers in the 1950s extolled 
the virtues of plowing down fertilizer for corn, especially the benefit of cutting the work load 
at planting time. One Hamilton County farmer explained that his method of applying 
phosphorous and potash in February and nitrogen in March, just ahead of plowing on second 
year corn ground, was "a plain case of now or not at all." Without extra labor to help at 
planting time to haul fertilizer and fill planter attachments, he was able to use more of his 
18 
"Give Corn Fields Gas," Wallaces Farmer, 15 July 1950; Haight/Whittlesey Papers, State Historical Society 
of Iowa, Des Moines; "Use nitrogen for more corn," Wallaces Farmer, 15 May 1954; "Side dress nitrogen for 
your corn," Wallaces Farmer, 5 May 1962. 
19 
"Figure Plant Food In Fertilizer," Wallaces Farmer, 4 January 1947; Gribben diary, 30 November 1947, State 
Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City; Carl and Bertha Peterson papers, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des 
Moines. 
daylight hours actually getting the corn crop in the ground in May. Iowa State College's 
agronomist H. R. Meldrum gave this technique a qualified endorsement, recognizing the 
labor shortage and noting that it was better than no fertilizer at all. However, he cautioned 
that some of the fertilizer could wash away before it could be plowed under and that plow 
down fertilizer was too deep to help get the young plants growing the way starter fertilizer 
did?" 
Farmers cited other advantages of plow down application. Bill Patterson of Madison 
County planned on plowing under fertilizer for the first time in the spring of 1953, citing the 
hectic demands of June that kept him from getting into the field to side-dress corn with 
nitrogen. "Side dressing nitrogen on corn comes at the wrong time for me," he explained. 
"Corn, beans, hay and hogs all need attention at the same time. If I can broadcast nitrogen in 
April, it will save a lot of time during the busiest season." Plow down application offered 
another perceived advantage, since the fertilizer was lower in the seedbed than it was with 
side dressing. According to Walter Krauter of Lee County, plow under fertilizer was "deep 
enough that corn roots get to it before the weeds. Some weeds never do get much of it 
[fertilizer] that way." Farmers such as Krauter turned the experts' advice of starter fertilizer 
upside down, arguing that shallow-placed starter fertilizer was available for the weeds, too. 
Proponents of plow down fertilizer believed that it was the best solution for the entire 
growing season and helped solve farm labor problems.21 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s agronomists began to advise applying fertilizer in 
the fall as an alternative to spring plow down application. They argued that just as much of 
20 
"What Time For Fertilizer?," Wallaces Farmer, 15 March 1952. 
21 
"Plow Under Corn Fertilizer," Wallaces Farmer, 7 June 1953; "Boost your fertilizer profits," Wallaces 
Farmer, 16 April 1955. 
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the nutrients would be available the following spring as fertilizer applied just before planting. 
Extension agronomists initially promoted fall application of phosphate and potash for winter 
wheat and second year pastures or hay ground in 1949 through 1951. But in 1952 they began 
to promote fall fertilizing with high analysis chemical for corn ground. Extension 
agronomist Lloyd Dumenil explained that applying fertilizer before fall plowing made sense. 
He argued that there was little chemical leaching or runoff of the fertilizer over the winter 
because fall precipitation was generally lighter than that of the summer months. The biggest 
opportunity for runoff was in the spring, but since that was when most farmers applied 
fertilizer there was little additional risk associated with fall application.22 
Fall application could also save time in the spring when farmers were traditionally 
busy with seedbed preparation, hauling manure, and planting crops. This was especially true 
for farmers who were expanding their acreage or dedicating a larger portion of their acreage 
to corn. In 1955 Weldon Franzeen of Greene County testified about his experiences with fall 
fertilizing over the past two seasons. "Fall application does just as well as spring for me. I 
save a lot of work by having the fertilizer bulk spread." Franzeen explained that it was more 
economical to hire a commercial bulk spreader to do the job faster than he could do it 
himself. Gene Casey of Johnson County explained that fall application of nitrogen at 
plowing time saved a trip over the field in the spring, which also saved costs for fuel. This 
preemptive work it the fall "hurries field work when time is critical" in the spring. "If you 
wait until spring," another Johnson County farmer cautioned, "you run the risk of weather, a 
shortage of time, and not getting the fertilizer when you need it." These farmers used fall 
22 
"Use Fertilizer This Fall," Wallaces Farmer, 17 September 1949; "Spread Fertilizer In The Fall?," Wallaces 
Farmer, 15 September 1951; "Fertilize This Fall For 1953 Crop," Wallaces Farmer, 20 September 1952; Lloyd 
Dumenil, "It's smart to fall fertilize," Successful Farming, October 1953; Lloyd Dumenil, H. R. Meldrum, and 
John Pesek, "When to fertilizer? Fall or Spring," Iowa Farm Science, 9 (September 1954): 3-6. 
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application of nitrogen as a means of hedging against weather delays, the most volatile 
variable of farming.23 
Farmers' testimony about the benefits of applying fertilizer in the fall rather than 
plowing down fertilizer in the spring also included an appeal to the pocketbook that was hard 
to resist. Fertilizer distributors offered lower prices in the fall than they did in the spring, 
providing an additional incentive to get fertilizer in the ground in the fall. A Humboldt 
County farmer found that "Buying it in the fall saves me about $9 a ton when I shop around a 
little." Not all farmers agreed, of course. Carroll Swanson of Webster County stated that he 
preferred having the money in the bank rather than "in the ground." Yet the chance to buy at 
a discount and avoid incurring storage costs over the winter was attractive during times of 
rising costs and stagnant or falling prices.24 
A minority of farmers seized the potential cost and labor savings of fall fertilizing in 
the 1950s. In 1953, just one year after farm journalists and agronomists began to actively 
promote fall fertilizing; 17 percent of farmers surveyed in a Wallace-Homestead Poll 
responded that they planned on spreading fertilizer in the fall for their 1954 crops. More 
farmers would have used fertilizer had the autumn not been so dry, since fewer farmers chose 
to plow in a dry year for fear of moisture loss. By 1959 18 percent of farmers applied 
fertilizer in the fall and spring, while 78 percent only applied it in the spring. The potential 
23 
"More Fertilizer Applied in Fall," Wallaces Farmer, 16 January 1954; "Fall application of fertilizer," 
Wallaces Farmer, 20 August 1955; Bob Dunaway, "Fall soil fertility program," Wallaces Farmer, 28 October 
1967. 
24 Jim Johnson, interview by author, 21 June 2004, Eldora, Iowa, tape recording; "Apply fertilizer in the fall," 
Wallaces Farmer, 17 August 1957. 
98 
for increased yields as well as labor and cost savings motivated a small group to pursue fall 
application.25 
In the 1960s extension professionals urged farmers to use caution with when applying 
nitrogen fertilizer in the fall. They offered new technical advice and qualifications regarding 
fall application, including warnings of possible nitrogen loss. There had been little concern 
among agronomists about phosphorous and potassium loss, but as fall application of nitrogen 
became more common, their concern heightened. Agronomists issued their first admonitions 
about fall application regarding anhydrous ammonia in 1955. Since anhydrous ammonia was 
a gas that needed to be put into the soil lest it dissipate, it was critical to inject it into the soil 
at least four inches deep. Injecting the gas at the proper depth allowed the nitrogen to bond 
with the soil.26 
Controlling the depth of application was simple compared to the other guidelines of 
the 1960s. In 1962 and again in 1964 extension agronomists backed away from a blanket 
endorsement of fall nitrogen applications. Agronomist John Pesek cautioned that "Fall 
applications of nitrogen are inferior to early summer applications, but we can't tell how much 
inferior they are." To avoid losses, he counseled waiting until two to three weeks before the 
nitrogen was actually needed. Cooler soil temperatures prevented ammonium nitrogen from 
becoming a soluble nitrate that was more likely to run off, a process called denitrification. 
Specialists urged farmers who applied fall nitrogen to wait until the soil temperature reached 
fifty-five to fifty-seven degrees for the 1962 season, revising those figures downward to fifty 
to fifty-five degrees by 1964. In 1965 the recommended soil temperature was no more than 
25 
"More Fertilizer Applied in Fall," Wallaces Farmer, 16 January 1954; "Iowa soil gets more fertilizer," 
Wallaces Farmer, 17 January 1959. 
26 
"Apply nitrogen in the fall?," Wallaces Farmer, 1 October 1955. 
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fifty degrees. Extension professionals expected farmers to revise their techniques each year 
according to new research and guidelines.27 
Denitrification, the conversion of nitrogen to a soluble form, became a significant 
subject of warnings to farmers in the late 1960s. As one journalist informed his readers, the 
"risk of loss from fall application is smaller than once thought" because fall soil moisture 
was generally low. While he conceded that some nitrogen loss was possible, he emphasized 
that a gain of even one bushel per acre would offset a loss of up to one fourth of the total 
nitrogen applied per acre. As one farm journalist minimized the risk, another contended that 
fall application of nitrogen "got something of a black eye" in the 1967 growing season. Wet 
conditions in 1967 and 1969 highlighted the risks. Without naming sources, a writer for 
Wallaces Farmer stated that "concern" had been voiced that a hard winter in 1968-1969 
depleted fall applied nitrogen through denitrification. Extension agronomists hesitated to 
state exactly why farmers had unsatisfactory results with their fall applied nitrogen. They 
insisted that fall nitrogen application could be accomplished successfully as long as the soil 
temperature was below fifty degrees Fahrenheit at a depth of four inches. Regis Voss, 
extension agronomist, maintained that anhydrous ammonia applied in the fall "stays pretty 
much in place."28 
Neither experts nor farmers advocated abandoning fall fertilizing, but publicity of the 
risks during the late 1960s and raised awareness of the complexity of fertilizer use. The 
changing recommendations showed that expert advice as, much like the skill and knowledge 
27 
"When should you apply your fertilizer?," Wallaces Farmer, 6 October 1962; "Fall fertilizer application can 
boost 1965 yields," Wallaces Farmer, 19 September 1964. 
28 A1 Bull, "Apply nitrogen in the fall," Wallaces Farmer, 10 September 1966; "Apply nitrogen this fall," 
Wallaces Farmer, 14 October 1967; "Fall nitrogen program still safe, practical," Wallaces Farmer, 11 October 
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of the farmer, was subject to change as experiments and experience revealed new 
information. By the end of the decade, fall fertilizing had become an established practice, 
but one that required more precision and knowledge to ensure that as much of the fertilizer as 
possible stayed in the ground to begin the next growing season.29 
The idea that fertilizer remained in the ground from one year to the next was an 
important one throughout the postwar period. Regardless of the application method, farmers 
and experts wanted to know how much chemical would remain in the ground available for 
the next crop year. The concept of carryover effects from fertilizer became public in 1952, 
when journalists cited an Iowa State College study of nitrogen fertilizer from test plots across 
the state. Heavy applications of plowed under nitrogen on corn ground (180 pounds per acre 
of 33.5-0-0) yielded increases from between two to thirty-nine bushels to the acre, reflecting 
differences in soil type and moisture. The virtues of carryover became a constant refrain as 
experts and farmers discussed fertilizer use. Iowa State College tests indicated that nitrogen 
carryover ranged from 5 to 50 percent of the previous year's application. In the early 1950s, 
experts calculated the carryover as the difference between the pounds of nitrogen applied per 
acre and the yield. For example, a farmer who applied 120 pounds of nitrogen per acre and 
had a corn yield of eighty bushels per acre could expect forty pounds of unused nitrogen per 
acre left behind.30 
29 Norman West and Monte Sesker, "Special plowing and fertilizer considerations for this fall," Wallaces 
Farmer, 10 October 1970. 
30 A study of farmers in southern Iowa indicated that farmers who fertilized expected residual effects in the 
following year. Donald R. Kaldor and Earl O. Heady, "An Exploratory Study of Expectations, Uncertainty and 
Farm Plans in Southern Iowa Agriculture" Agricultural Experiment Station, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, 
Research Bulletin 408, April 1954, 877; "Nitrogen Helps Second Year," Wallaces Farmer, 15 March 1952; 
"Fertilizer Helps in Second Year," Wallaces Farmer, 5 December 1953. 
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By the early 1960s estimates of carryover were more sophisticated. Carryover was 
less linked to crop yield and more determined by soil type and rainfall. New calculations 
showed that farmers who used less than forty pounds of nitrogen per acre would not see 
much carryover, while those who used eighty to one hundred pounds of nitrogen per acre 
could expect to carryover twenty-five to thirty-five percent of the nitrogen, with higher levels 
of application resulting in a greater percentage of carryover. No one doubted that carryover 
could be an asset, but it was unclear just how valuable it would be.31 
The idea of fertilizer carryover was especially significant in the mid 1950s as Iowa 
farmers struggled with drought across much of the state. When 1954 began with a dry 
spring, experts began to make the case for fertilizer. Lloyd Dumenil, Iowa State College 
fertilizer specialist, urged farmers to go ahead with their plans to use fertilizer, even if subsoil 
moisture was low. According to Dumenil, plants would run out of nitrogen in dry conditions. 
Extra nitrogen would allow those plants to survive a few days longer, which could be long 
enough to get rain. In extreme drought, plants would only utilize a little of the available 
nitrogen fertilizer leaving more in the ground to carryover for the next growing season. As a 
writer for Wallaces ' Farmer put it, "If plants don't use the fertilizer this year, most of it will 
stay in the soil for the next crop." Fertilizer promoters emphasized that it was still 
economically worthwhile to fertilize, even though the gains might come in the next year.32 
In spite of the encouragement by fertilizer experts that applying fertilizer in dry years 
was profitable, Iowa farmers had their own ideas. After using a record 563,000 tons of 
commercial fertilizer in the state in 1954, farmers cut their usage in the dry years of 1954 and 
31 
"Fertilizer Use For Efficient Crop Production," Cooperative Extension Service, Iowa State University, Ames, 
Iowa, Pamphlet 227 (Revised), March 1962; "Extra profit from fertilizer carryover," Wallaces Farmer, 15 
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1955. In 1955 farmers reduced their fertilizer use by 55,000 tons. With fears of continued 
dry weather in 1956 and 1957 farmers adjusted fertilizer consumption accordingly, using just 
under 400,000 tons both years, representing a 20 percent drop from the 1954 high. One Clay 
County farmer reported using starter fertilizer and seventy-five pounds of anhydrous 
ammonia per acre on a dry portion of his farm in 1957. He found that his corn yielded only 
sixty bushels to the acre that year when it normally yielded eighty bushels. "I couldn't see 
much return from fertilizer," he observed. A county extension director concluded that the 
fertilizer cause "suffered a serious setback" during the drought of 1954 through 1956. Carl 
Peterson of Palo Alto County boosted his fertilizer use in 1955 over his 1953 and 1954 
levels, perhaps following the lead of experts who said that fertilizer in dry years could pay. 
However, like many Iowa farmers, he scaled back in 1956. The next year he did not use any 
fertilizer for the first time since 1944. While it is unclear why he did so, his actions reflect 
the retreat from fertilizers from 1955 to 1957. Only the return of normal rainfall in 1958 
prompted farmers to resume an aggressive program of fertilizer use. That year, farmers used 
almost as much commercial product as they did in 1954.33 
Fertilizer experts failed to convince Iowa farmers that fertilizer and carryover paid in 
drought years, but that did not stop them from mounting a rearguard defense of fertilizer use 
in dry years. In 1958 A1 Bull of Wallaces ' Farmer wrote about farmers who had good results 
from using fertilizer in the midst of drought. The story of Gerald Pederson from Clarke 
County indicates the tension over fertilizer use as well as the potential for profit. In 1957 
Pedersen rented some land in addition to what he owned. The landlord did not want to 
33 Second Biennial Report of Iowa Year Book of Agriculture (Des Moines, State of Iowa, 1956); Third Biennial 
Report of Iowa Year Book of Agriculture (Des Moines, State of Iowa, 1956); "Iowa soil gets more fertilizer," 
Wallaces Farmer, 17 January 1959; "Use carryover to build up fertility," Wallaces Farmer, 1 March 1958. 
There is no farm record for Peterson in 1950. Peterson papers. 
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fertilize, but agreed that Pedersen could fertilize his half of the rented ground, presumably on 
the condition that the tenant would incur all expenses and reap all the benefit from any 
increased yield. Pederson applied starter fertilizer and side dressed with nitrogen. "All 
summer," Pedersen noted, "you could see to the row where fertilizer had been applied. The 
landlord's corn without fertilizer made forty-five to fifty bushels per acre. My corn went 
seventy to seventy-five bushels." In Bull's telling of the story, the parsimonious landlord lost 
and the innovative renter gained one third higher yields, suggesting that the farmer who 
stayed the chemical course would prevail. Most farmers disagreed, choosing to save their 
money for a year when the fertilizer might provide maximum return for the investment.34 
Drought was not the only circumstance which caused farmers to limit their fertilizer 
use. Up until the 1960s most experts and farmers considered applying nitrogen fertilizer to 
soybean fields as wasteful, in part because they believed that soybeans might benefit from 
any carryover fertilizer. The experts' consensus was that soybeans did not respond to 
fertilizer as well as corn unless the land was especially low in potassium or phosphorous. 
Since fertilizer was one of the biggest expenses in making a crop, extension advisors 
counseled putting fertilizer first "on the high-value crop," recognizing that on most Iowa 
farms corn was the most valuable crop. D. L. Armann, a farmer from Polk County, planted 
his soybean crop on land that had been in grass or legume hay. He reflected that he could 
"profitably fertilize corn but not beans so I let beans harvest sod nutrients." Extension 
professionals and farm journalists discouraged farmers from fertilizing the bean crop into 
1965, noting that the benefits of using fertilizer on soybeans did not outweigh the costs.35 
34 A1 Bull, "Fertilizer Keeps Corn Yields High," Wallaces Farmer, 7 November 1958. 
35 
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Farmers who fertilized soybeans challenged the experts' wisdom. Some farmers 
claimed that it was not worthwhile to fertilize soybeans but others disagreed. Alfred Accola 
of Polk County began using fertilizer on his soybeans in 1962 and obtained over sixty-three 
bushels per acre in a test plot. In 1966 growers who used fertilizer to obtain top soybean 
yields gained attention in the farm press. Furthermore, a 1967 survey of Iowa farmers who 
had grown high yielding soybean crops conducted by the National Soybean Improvement 
Council showed that fertilizer was an important part of successful soybean growers' 
techniques. Testimony from farmers proved the point. Roger Harms, a farmer from Butler 
County, entered a 1967 yield contest sponsored by American Cyanamid Company and 
applied 600 pounds of fertilizer per acre and produced eighty-five bushels to the acre on a 
five acre check plot, with seventy bushels to the acre on a fifteen acre field. Harms noted 
that he fertilized beans for the past five years and gradually increased the amount each year. 
While the fertilizer bill for 600 pounds per acre was high, the increased yields allowed him to 
net $150 per acre on the five acre plot, more than offsetting his expenses for seed, fertilizer, 
herbicide, machinery, and labor.36 
The experts belatedly agreed that fertilizer could make a difference on the soybean 
crop, although none of them endorsed using the high levels of fertilizer that Harms did. One 
Iowa State University agronomist contended that fifty bushel to the acre soybean yields "are 
Higher Soybean Yields," Agricultural Extension Service, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, Pamphlet 202, May 
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common enough to indicate this may be a good goal to shoot for" and that fertilizer could 
help farmers reach that goal. The same type of crop management as farmers used for the 
corn crop could work for soybeans, too. In addition to planting soybeans in narrower rows, 
increasing the plant population per acre, fertilizer could play an important part of soybean 
management. While the Iowa State agronomist cautioned that soybeans would not show the 
same type of dramatic increases that com showed, he recognized that not fertilizing beans 
"has been holding back yields." In 1968 Iowa State soybean fertility specialist C. J. De 
Mooy noted that contrary to earlier beliefs, soybeans were a deep rooted plant, which meant 
that deep application of fertilizer could be useful to the plant later in the growing season 
when the root system was more fully developed. Other experts echoed this, arguing that 
fertilizer could increase yields enough to be profitable.37 
While it is difficult to know the degree to which farmers profited from using fertilizer 
on their corn, soybean, and forage crops, it is clear that they believed it helped. Farmers 
made it a regular part of their program within just a few years after the war. A poll of Iowa 
farmers from 1949 indicated that approximately 43 percent of farmers used fertilizer, most of 
them applying it to corn fields. In 1959 approximately 68 percent of farmers used fertilizer, 
even though less than half of farmers surveyed conducted soil tests to determine what kind of 
fertilizer they needed and how much to apply. A 1969 survey showed that 96 percent of 
Iowa farmers used fertilizer. Those who purchased and used commercial fertilizer were 
pleased with the results, with the exception of the 9 to 14 percent of farmers who reported no 
37 
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effect from their fertilizer during the drought years of 1954 and 1955. This short period of 
drought was only a temporary reverse for fertilizer use.38 
Farm records from the time period provide a closer look at the general pattern of 
commercial fertilizer consumption. Farmers who began farming in the 1930s were less 
aggressive about their fertilizer use. Carl and Bertha Peterson of Palo Alto County began 
purchasing phosphate in 1945 and continued to buy one or two tons per year, spending an 
average of $64 per year from 1945 to 1951. The Peterson's made a major commitment to 
fertilizer in the years from 1952 to 1956. They purchased high analysis fertilizer with a high 
phosphorous content almost every spring, starter fertilizer for corn containing the insecticide 
aldrin, and occasionally applied fertilizer in the fall. They used approximately the same type 
and amount of commercial product every year, applying 5-20-20 and 5-20-10 starter fertilizer 
every year from 1954 to 1966. In the following years the records are less precise in terms of 
what kind of product they used. At the end of the 1960s, however, they purchased 
approximately the same amount of product as they previously did with some variations in 
timing and composition, although the fertilizer was more expensive than it had been in the 
earlier years. In 1967, 1969 and 1970 their fertilizer bill totaled over $300 each year. The 
increasing costs the Peterson's paid were not due to increasing use, but to cost increases.39 
The Peterson's were the exception to the rule of increasing fertilizer use. Most Iowa 
farmers used more commercial fertilizer in hopes of obtaining bigger yields. In the 1960s 
Iowa farmers doubled the amount of nitrogen they used per acre, from forty-five pounds per 
38 
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acre in 1964 to 104.3 per acre in 1969. This type of growth was in line with the increases in 
application rates in other Midwestern states. Minnesota farmers nearly tripled their 
application and Illinois farmers increased their rate by over one third. Farmers who 
harvested the largest corn crops used the most fertilizer. A farmer from Northeast Iowa who 
had a 125 bushel per acre crop stated that his neighbors could have obtained similar yields "if 
they'd use enough fertilizer." Extension professionals urged farmers who wanted to raise 
corn that yielded from 100 to 120 bushels to the acre to use from 120 to 150 pounds of 
nitrogen and a maximum of thirty-seven pounds of phosphorous and sixty-five pounds of 
potassium on each acre. Rudolf Schipull of Wright County increased his fertilizer use in the 
late 1960s. From 1963 to 1965 he applied an average of seventeen tons of fertilizer each year 
on the two farms he operated. From 1966 to 1970, however, he applied an average of 
twenty-nine tons per year on those two farms. As farmers used more fertilizer per acre over 
the course of the 1950s and 1960s, fertilizer became the leading crop expense, accounting for 
24 percent of total costs of raising the corn crop calculated on a per acre basis in 1958 and 39 
percent in 1967.40 
40 
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costs as a percent of raising the corn crop see "Corn growing costs run high!," Wallaces Farmer, 19 April 1958 
and Ken Hofmeyer, "What does it cost to grow good corn?," Wallaces Farmer, 9 September 1967. 
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Critics outside of agriculture pointed out that there were costs associated with 
fertilizers other than just financial ones. Just as public concern mounted over the 
consequences of DDT use, the idea that fertilizers could be harmful gained momentum in the 
1960s. While Rachel Carson's Silent Spring was an attack on the indiscriminate use of 
pesticides, the implications for discussions of water quality were clear. In Carson's view, 
farmers, led by the USD A and chemical manufacturers, used chemicals in such a way as to 
threaten the survival of wildlife and people. Carson attacked those who would control or 
subjugate nature with chemicals, singling out scientists and bureaucrats at the USD A's 
Agricultural Research Service for special criticism. As historians have noted, Carson's 
indictment found a receptive audience in the middle class during an era when people 
perceived many parts of the environment toxic, from nuclear fallout to septic tanks in 
housing developments to pesticides on suburban lawns. In 1965 Congress passed the Water 
Quality Act, which authorized the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to formulate 
water quality standards for states in the absence of state action. The 1965 Act, more so than 
previous federal legislation, put water quality was on the national agenda by giving the 
federal government authority to act on behalf of the states.41 
In Iowa, there were signs that fertilizer runoff was becoming a problem for public 
health in the 1960s. Water samples submitted to the state hygienic laboratory from private 
and rural water supplies showed high levels of nitrate ion concentrations. High levels of 
41 Hal Rothman, Saving the Planet: The American Response to the Environment in the Twentieth Century 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 2000), 113, 126. Samuel P. Hays provided an in-depth look at the many threats to 
the environment people perceived in the 1960s and 1970s. Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental 
Politics in the United States, 1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 162-164. For specific 
information on the federal water quality legislation of the 1950s and 1960s see N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop 
to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality (Iowa City, Iowa: Agricultural Law Center, College of Law, 
University of Iowa, September, 1967), 799-859. 
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nitrates in the water were new in the 1960s, but there was a difference in the type of wells 
sampled. By the 1960s, there were fewer shallow, hand dug wells in use as Iowans had 
invested in new, deep wells. Many of these deep wells, however, had the same high levels of 
nitrates as the old style wells, suggesting that the contamination problem was severe. While 
experts were cautious not to attribute high nitrate levels to the increasing use of nitrogen 
fertilizer since 1945, fertilizer was likely the principal reason for current levels of nitrates in 
well water.42 
Few Iowa farmers expressed much concern about risks of fertilizer runoff and the 
environmental costs of fertilizer use, but there was a sense among farmers, journalists, and 
agricultural scientists that public criticism and pressure could potentially force Congress or 
state legislatures to act in ways that would impede farmers' ability to make a living. Seeley 
Lodwick of Lee County was one of the few farmers who publicly expressed concern about 
the effects of pollution on farm practices. In 1968 Lodwick, president of the American 
Soybean Association, editorialized that "Even tho [sic] these pollution control laws are not 
fully enforced today, we have every reason to expect mounting pressure for clean, fresh 
water from the eighty percent of our population who live in the cities of Iowa. These laws," 
he argued, "will someday—soon—be enforced." In 1970 A1 Bull of Wallaces Farmer asked 
"Are fertilizers polluting our streams?" His answer was equivocal, reflecting the recognition 
by agricultural scientists that too much nitrogen runoff could be a problem and that there was 
evidence of nitrate contamination of water supplies. Bull quoted Regis Voss of Iowa State 
University, who conceded "I'd certainly not say that fertilizer isn't contributing to nitrate 
42 Robert L. Morris and Lauren G. Johnson, "Pollution Problems in Iowa" in Water Resources of Iowa, ed. Paul 
J. Horick (Iowa City, Iowa: University Printing Service, January, 1970), 92-97. 
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content of surface waters." Voss and the other scientists refused to blame farmers who used 
nitrogen fertilizer according to recommendations, but acknowledged that farmers who 
applied nitrogen improperly or excessively contributed to pollution problems. Experts 
argued that fertilizer actually helped reduce pollution by preserving organic matter in soils 
and preventing erosion. While Bull and the experts understood that nitrogen fertilizers could 
be pollutants, Bull believed that the real problem was "unrealistic ecologists" who had 
"visions of crystal clear streams" that he argued were never part of prairie ecosystems. If 
ignorant outsiders placed restrictions on farm fertilizer based on unrealistic assumptions then 
farm profits would be threatened. The best result farmers could hope for was to keep 
idealistic scientists and the public from pressuring lawmakers into enacting "unreasonable 
restrictions" on nitrogen use.43 
In the early 1970s ecologists and concerned citizens, however, had the clout to 
change the nation's laws regarding water quality. As noted, many middle class people in and 
out of government saw the environment as toxic and blamed technological progress. 
Activists such as Barry Commoner testified about the nitrate levels in neighboring Illinois 
streams while state pollution control boards across the nation focused attention on nitrates, 
soil erosion, and threats to wildlife through loss of habitat and chemical poisoning. In 1972 
Congress followed the 1965 Water Quality Act with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
known as the Clean Water Act, in an effort to preserve the "chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the nation's waters." The authors of the Clean Water Act focused on 
pollution from point sources such as factories and had little effect on farmers, but the rules 
43 Seeley Lodwick, "Farmers must control water pollution," Wallaces Farmer, 27 July 1968; AI Bull, "Are 
fertilizers polluting our streams?," Wallaces Farmer, 23 May 1970; Ralph Sanders, "Pollution—Your Problem, 
Too," Successful Farming, 1971 Crop Planning Issue, November 1970. 
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for chemical fertilizer use were under scrutiny from outsiders and non-farm related interest 
groups for the first time. The state of Iowa's Chemical Technology Review Board (created 
in 1970) considered it important to study the movement of agricultural chemicals into surface 
or ground waters but did not recommend any legislative action in 1970. Farmers would not 
have to change their practices in 1970, but the Iowa legislature and Congress recognized the 
legitimacy of the concept of ecosystems which would change the approach of scientists, 
policy makers, and farmers in the coming years.44 
In the years up to 1972, most Iowa farmers who discussed fertilizer talked about 
potential yield gains, expenses, and methods or timing of application, not ecological costs or 
environmental damage. There is little public record of any farmers expressing concern about 
fertilizer runoff and pollution of ground or surface water. For most farmers, chemical 
fertilizers, especially nitrogen in the form of anhydrous ammonia, helped them boost profits. 
While there were farmers who recognized that fertilizers could be harmful to themselves and 
others, they had little evidence that fertilizer technology was bad for them or their land. They 
understood that experts and innovative farmers told the truth when they claimed that 
fertilizers increased yields and offset any financial costs. Fertilizer gave the land a kick to 
increase production. The change in commercial fertilizer use from 182,651 tons in 1946 to 
2,648,196 tons in 1970 was a demonstration of the confidence the majority of farmers had in 
fertilizer technology. In 1971 Iowa farmers used fertilizer on 95 percent of all corn acres in 
the state. They timed applications on crops, especially cornfields, according to their other 
44 Adam Rome described the rise of American environmental consciousness as it related to urban issues in The 
Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). C. Robert Taylor, "An Analysis of Nitrate Concentrations in Illinois 
Streams" Illinois Agricultural Economics, 13 (January 1973): 12; Tenth Biennial Report of Iowa Book of 
Agriculture, 1970-1971, 84-86. 
labor demands, cut their fertilizer use during drought conditions in spite of expert advice to 
the contrary, and rejected expert advice that using fertilizer on soybean fields did not pay. As 
the 1960s ended, it was becoming clear that fertilizer could also give the land and even 
Iowa's water a kick in a negative sense. In the years to come, farmers and agricultural 
experts would be aware that fertilizer use required just as much caution as pesticides.45 
45 
"Iowa fertilizer use climbs," Wallaces Farmer, 27 February 1971. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Feeding Chemicals 
Two new kinds of powerful drugs came into use on farms in Iowa and across the 
United States after World War II: antibiotics and growth hormones. Farmers could use 
antibiotics to control outbreaks of disease, but they also had another application. Animals 
that consumed feed mixed with antibiotics or hormones reached market weight with less 
feed. Since feed costs represented a large portion of the total cost of raising an animal from 
birth to market, any innovation that could maximize production while cutting costs very 
attractive to farmers who lived through the years of the cost-price squeeze and increasing 
labor costs. 
The story of the scientific development of antibiotics and growth hormones is a 
familiar one. In the 1940s, scientists recognized that B12 had growth stimulating properties 
when used in livestock feed. They called the new vitamin mix Animal Protein Factor, or 
A.P.F. Farmers who used A.P.F. not only found that their hogs gained weight 10 to 20 
percent faster than animals without it, the substance also prevented a common disease called 
swine dysentery, also known as bloody scours. In 1949, however, E. L. R. Stokstad and T. 
H. Jukes discovered that only B12 that had been produced as a byproduct of antibiotic 
manufacturing possessed this quality. The residue, they concluded, not the vitamin itself, 
was the ingredient in A.P.F. that actually stimulated growth. In 1950, feed manufacturers 
began adding several kinds of antibiotics to feed, including Aureomycin and streptomycin.1 
1 For an overview of the development of feed additives, see Terry G. Summons, "Animal Feed Additives, 1940-
1966," Agricultural History 42 (October 1968): 305-313. Sidney W. Fox, "What are antibiotics?," Iowa Farm 
Science 7 (October 1952); J. S. Russell, "Credits I.S.C. Discovery on Growth Drug," Des Moines Sunday 
Register, 14 May 1950; Wally Inman, "Help Spring Pigs To Catch Up," Wallaces Farmer, 5 May 1951; "Pigs 
to Market Weeks Sooner," Wallaces Farmer, 20 October 1951. 
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Researchers used the growth hormone diethylstilbestrol (hereafter DES or stilbestrol), 
a synthetic form of estrogen, in dairy research during World War II to return dry milk cows 
to production to meet high wartime demands for dairy products. In 1951 Wise Burroughs, a 
scientist at Iowa State College, observed that lambs fed with hormone-laced feed gained 
weight faster than those on a normal ration. In 1954, based on research by Burroughs and 
others at Iowa State, feed manufacturers incorporated stilbestrol into feeds for cattle. Cattle 
were a natural choice for the commercial introduction of this substance, since Americans 
consumed far more beef than mutton. In the heart of the Corn Belt, where sales of hogs and 
cattle accounted for the largest share of farm income, antibiotics and growth hormones were 
big news.2 
Although the stories of scientific research and development of antibiotics and 
hormones are familiar, the story of how farmers came to use these chemicals for livestock is 
more obscure. Farmers were interested in the new drugs, although they were unavailable in 
the 1940s. In 1946 farmers learned that penicillin had the potential to "save" cows by 
allowing animals that suffered from mastitis, an infection of the udder that slowed or stopped 
milk production, to return to full production. Farm journalists observed that when the news 
of hormone feeding became public, there was excitement that a little supplement would 
enable farmers to increase production, but as of 1946 hormones were not commercially 
available. Tests conducted at Purdue University in 1947 and 1948 indicated that a pellet of 
stilbestrol could be injected under the skin of a heifer to promote rapid weight gain. Before 
2 Truman Henley, "New Drug—Big Future," Successful Farming, March 1944. 
115 
growth hormones for cattle were on the market, feed manufacturers introduced the new, post 
A.P.F. antibiotic feeds.3 
Journalists and scientists labeled antibiotics "wonder drugs," capable of solving the 
problem of high infant mortality among hogs and also speeding the growth of feeder pigs 
destined for market. Tests conducted at Experiment Stations and labs around the country 
indicated that hogs and other animals benefited from ration laced with antibiotics. A writer 
for Wallaces ' Farmer reported that tests at the Hormel Institute farms in Minnesota indicated 
that runty pigs fed with Aureomycin mixed into the feed could catch-up with healthy pigs. 
Furthermore, healthy pigs that received feed with antibiotics would grow twice as fast as pigs 
on a normal ration. Damon Catron and his Iowa State College colleague claimed that this 
was "New Hope for 20 million runts" across the United States, since one pig out of every 
litter was abnormally small or unhealthy. They explained that farmers who used antibiotics 
could expect "faster gains, more pork from 100 pounds of feed, and less trouble from 
scours." By feeding five milligrams of Aureomycin per pound of feed farmers could produce 
one hundred pounds of pork with 349 pounds of feed instead of 369 pounds.4 
Advertisers promptly featured the growth enhancing properties of antibiotics with 
testimonials from farmers. In 1952 the Pfizer Company touted the remarkable gains a farmer 
from eastern Iowa obtained by adding Terramycin to his hog rations. He marketed 206 
pound hogs when they were 139 days old. These animals consumed 3.4 pounds of feed for 
3 R. Allen Packer, "Penicillin is saving cows," Successful Farming, November 1946; C. E. Hughes, "Latest 
Roundup on Hormone Feeding," Successful Farming, October 1946; Hormones for Milk," Wallaces Farmer, 3 
July 1948; "Sex Hormone Makes Heifers Get Fat," Wallaces Farmer, 5 March 1949. 
4 
"Antibiotics," Successful Farming, March 1951; "What's Lowdown on Aureomycin?," Wallaces Farmer, 7 
June 1950; Vernon Vine and Claude W. Gifford, "APF gives up some secrets," Farm Journal, June 1950; 
Damon Catron and Dean Wolf, "New Hope for 20 million runts," Successful Farming, March 1951 ; Wolf, 
"Latest on wonder drugs in feeds: What they do for hogs," Successful Farming, April 1951; Homer Hush, 
"Makes Hogs of Runts," Wallaces Farmer, 5 May 1951. 
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every one pound of weight gain, costing 14.8 cents per pound of pork produced. The 
following year another Pfizer advertisement provided context for those numbers. Pfizer 
claimed that fifty pound hogs with Terramycin in their ration reached market weight in 
ninety-four days, compared to 111 days for hogs without the enriched ration. Using 
antibiotics enabled farmers to reduce the number of days on feed, thereby saving at least ten 
percent of feed costs.5 
Farmers read the news and wanted the drugs. In 1950 farmers inquired about the 
mysterious A.P.F. Hundreds of farmers sent postcards and letters to Damon Catron and Iowa 
State to obtain information and even the actual medication. The following exchange was 
typical of the correspondence farmers and Catron carried on in 1950 and 1951. "Dear Sirs: I 
am a young hog raiser up hear [sic] at Iowa Falls and am interested in learning all I can about 
getting some off the new wonder drug "aureomycin." Can you inform me as to what I can 
best do to get some? Also how should I feed it." Catron responded that the wonder drug 
status was prematurely bestowed on Aureomycin. Even so, he noted that pure antibiotics 
were only available by prescription. Only certain A.P.F. concentrates contained the 
antibiotic residues, and as of mid 1950 there was no way to get the drugs.6 
The inquiries continued in 1951. The Wright County Extension Director wrote to 
Catron in April, 1951 as the news of antibiotics broke across the nation. He reported that 
area dairy farmers fed skim milk to their hogs as a supplement to grain and that they 
wondered how to get antibiotics into the milk. Catron assured him that it as possible to 
combine the commercially available antibiotic-vitamin premix with skim milk, since the 
5 Pfizer Advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, October 18, 1952; Pfizer Advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, 20 June 
1953. 
6 Max Bartlett to Damon Catron, n.d., Damon Catron to Max Bartlett, 15 June 1950, Damon Catron Papers, 
Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State University. 
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antibiotics and the vitamins were all water soluble. Several farmers who attended a local 
Wright County swine meeting also wanted the updated formula for swine rations to take 
advantage of the latest feeding developments.7 
When farmers actually used antibiotics the results were sometimes unsatisfactory. In 
1951 a farmer from Woodbury County complained that he used commercial feed that 
contained vitamin B12 and antibiotics but his herd of hogs still presented symptoms of 
bacterial infection and nutritional deficiencies such as scouring, or diarrhea. Similarly, a 
Polk County farmer who had a history of swine dysentery in his herd reflected that "I thought 
the antibiotics I've been feeding would control this." The problem for both of these farmers 
was that the antibiotic laced rations they were feeding could not overcome an inherent 
problem in farm management. Many farmers used the same hog lots year after year. This 
provided an ideal environment for parasites and bacteria that made animals die, become sick 
or, at the very least, slowed their growth.8 
Extension directors and Iowa State College faculty urged farmers not to use 
antibiotics as a substitute for good management. As the experiences of the two hog raisers 
from Woodbury and Polk Counties indicated, farmers had to do more than simply provide 
feed with antibiotics. Rotating animals through different lots from year to year was an ideal 
solution, since it prevented the build up of dangerous pathogens in the soil. Other solutions 
included cleaning and disinfecting hog houses and shelters. For those who wanted to use 
drugs, it was important to adjust the dosage to meet the specific needs of a farmer's herd. 
7 Aaron R. Bowman to Damon Catron, 23 April 1951 and Catron to Bowman, 19 May 1951, Catron Papers. 
8 
"Drugs Can't Whip Old Lots," Wallaces Farmer, 18 August 1951. 
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Damon Catron noted that different quantities of Bn and antibiotics were needed for healthy 
animals than for sickly ones.9 
Some farmers experimented with injecting antibiotic pellets into hogs. By implanting 
a pellet of Bacitracin under the skin behind the ear of pigs when they were just two days old, 
the animal would get the growth promoting benefit of the antibiotic while it was still nursing 
its mother. Victor Nicolet of Cerro Gordo County injected antibiotic pellets into his pigs in 
the fall of 1952. When he moved to a new farm in the spring of 1952, he only weaned sixty-
four of the seventy-two pigs he farrowed. This loss of over ten percent of his pigs was bad 
news, but the bad news continued. His surviving pigs gained weight slowly throughout the 
year. Nicolet learned the hard way that the hog lots on his new farm were infested with 
disease. After injecting his pigs with the pellets, Nicolet used the same rations and lots and 
had much better luck with his rate of gain and herd health. While he did not leave any pigs 
untreated as a control, he believed that the treatment made a difference. So, too, did his 
brother and father who injected their pigs in 1953 based on Victor's experiment. "The cost is 
low," he claimed, "So the treatment doesn't have to do much good to be worth more than it 
costs." Injecting antibiotic pellets , however, was more work than feeding commercially 
prepared feeds with antibiotics included in the ingredients. Feeding became the most 
common delivery system for antibiotics.10 
Antibiotics played an ever more important part in the changing nature of hog 
production in the 1950s. Experts and farmers attempted to get hogs to market faster and 
spread the marketing of hogs throughout the year rather than during the fall and winter. 
9 
"Drugs Can't Whip Old Lots." 
10 Homer Hush, "Shoot Antibiotic Into Pigs," Wallaces Farmer, 21 June 1952; "Inject Antibiotics Into Pigs?," 
Wallaces Farmer, 7 March 1953. 
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Antibiotics were valuable in making the transition to earlier weaning of pigs. Farmers who 
raised hogs had traditionally weaned pigs at approximately eight weeks of age, relying on the 
sows to provide the calories, nutrients, and antibodies while the young animals gradually 
learned to consume grain or forage. At weaning time, some farmers provided starter feed 
that often included molasses or other sweeteners to help the young pigs. In the 1950s Catron 
and other experts promoted the replacement of milk from the sow with carefully balanced 
feeds that enabled young pigs to grow faster, prevent sows from losing weight through the 
lactation period, and permitted sows to reproduce sooner. Early experiments focused on the 
use of synthetic milk that included antibiotics, but there were problems with getting the milk 
to the pigs. The liquid required careful mixing, it was easily wasted through spillage, and 
easily frozen in cold weather. 
Beginning in 1954 experts at Iowa State College introduced a new feed ration to aid 
with early weaning called a "pre-starter." It was a transition feed to get week old pigs from 
sow's milk to starter feed. Labeled I.S.C. Pre-starter "75," the formula included antibiotics 
just like the synthetic milk, but this new feed was in dry form which was easier to handle and 
feed. The promoters of pre-starter argued that it cost $6.29 to feed the one pig and the 
mother for eight weeks and only $5.47 to feed the pig for eight weeks and its mother for two 
weeks. The cost savings of $.82 multiplied by dozens or even hundreds of pigs per year 
amounted to hundreds of dollars that the farmer could realize by early weaning. Catron and 
other swine nutritionists cautioned that this practice was not for every hog producer. Farmers 
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who were committed to a high degree of management in sanitation, housing, and feeding 
were best suited to early weaning.11 
Farmers flooded Damon Catron with questions about "Pre-starter 75," subsequent 
revised formulas, and new mixes that included antibiotics such as "Plus" and "3-Nitro." 
Hundreds of inquiries arrived from across the state and from around the United States from 
individual farmers, county extension directors, and farm managers for Farmers National 
Company and Doane Agricultural Service. Catron provided copies of the ration formula for 
farmers to mix themselves or to provide to local feed millers. Catron encouraged farmers to 
purchase feed from reputable dealers such as the Carroll Swanson Company located in Des 
Moines. He stressed to all of his correspondents that specially formulated swine rations with 
antibiotics for each stage of the life cycle were the best way to produce gains for the least 
possible cost per pound.12 
Farmers who wanted to either increase hog production or to farrow and market hogs 
throughout the year were the first people interested in early weaning. Lester Heimstra of 
Cherokee County weaned 500 pigs at four weeks of age in 1954. At weaning time, Heimstra 
separated his pigs into pens of twelve to fourteen animals and kept them on a pre-starter feed 
for ten days until they were ready for starter feed. At eight weeks the pigs were ready for the 
growing-fattening ration that they would consume for the next three months until they were 
ready to market. Other farmers testified to the success of early weaning, but just like the 
11 
"Wean 'em early?," Wallaces Farmer, 5 March 1955; Vaughn Speer, Gordon Ashton, Francis Diaz, and 
Damon Catron, "New I.S.C. Pre-Starter '75'," Iowa Farm Science 8 (April 1954). 
12 Jack D. Waite to Damon Catron, April 20, 1954, Catron to Waite, May 6, 1954; Eugene Fitz to Damon 
Catron, March 27, 1955, Catron to Fitz, April 8, 1955; Wilburt H. Frye to Damon Catron, December 29, 1955, 
Catron to Frye, January 6, 1956; Don Buckley to Damon Catron, 12 January 1956, Catron to Buckley, 
February 13, 1956, Catron Papers. 
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experts, they urged farmers who were interested in trying it to practice good sanitation and to 
provide an adequate supply of clean water. Most farmers were not interested in weaning as 
early as the experts recommended, however. One farmer stated that he believed in "letting 
pigs get their milk nature's way for six weeks." A 1955 poll indicated that only 7.3 percent 
of farmers weaned pigs at four weeks or earlier, while 89.5 percent weaned at six weeks or 
later. The big change in weaning could be discerned by looking at the numbers a different 
way. Forty-two percent of farmers were weaning sooner than eight weeks, cutting the 
traditional weaning time of eight weeks. Farmers who tried early weaning found that it was 
more profitable than waiting. A Lee County farmer asserted that the pigs he weaned at three 
weeks gained better than the ones he weaned at six weeks of age. This trend in weaning was 
not possible without the presence of growth enhancing and disease fighting antibiotics.13 
As hog rations and feeding practices became more exacting and complicated in the 
mid 1950s, DES was commercially available. Experts explained that the long gap between 
the first publicity of stilbestrol and the actual introduction was so long because of time 
needed to obtain test results on the effects of hormone feeding on the animals. The United 
States FDA wanted to ensure that there was no danger to meat consumers. Since obtaining 
consistent results with hormones was difficult, even in laboratories and on experimental 
farms, one author concluded in 1952 that "we can't expect better results under farm 
conditions and in the hands of nonspecialists." While there was the potential for danger to 
consumers, the consensus among scientists was that only consuming abnormally large 
quantities of meat, especially liver, posed any risk. In 1954, over a decade after the first 
13 
"They're weaning earlier," Wallaces Farmer, 19 March 1955; "Wean pigs at what age?," Wallaces Farmer, 
18 August 1956; "When to wean the pigs," Wallaces Farmer, 1 September 1957. 
122 
publicity about DES, the FDA authorized the commercial manufacture and sale of the 
hormone.14 
The Iowa State College Cooperative Extension Service released a new pamphlet 
about adding stilbestrol to beef cattle feeds in November, 1954. The authors, Wise 
Burroughs and C. C. Culbertson of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station and William 
Zmolek, extension animal husbandry specialist, described stilbestrol and provided guidelines 
for proper use. The authors informed farmers that they could reduce feed costs from 10 to 20 
percent, or approximately $.02 to $.04 per pound of live weight. There were also several 
caveats emphasized in italics throughout the document. Stilbestrol was not to be fed to dairy 
cattle or breeding animals, feeding higher than recommended levels should not be attempted, 
and that mishandled stilbestrol could be dangerous to people. The authors emphasized that 
the bottom line for farmers considering stilbestrol use was the difference between costs and 
return on investment. Feed supplements containing stilbestrol cost between five and ten 
dollars per ton more than supplements without stilbestrol. Depending on the cost, farmers 
could expect a return of from approximately $10 to $19 for every dollar spent on stilbestrol.15 
A large number of farmers tried stilbestrol almost immediately after its introduction 
and most of them liked it. Forty days after stilbestrol was on the market, approximately 20 
percent of Iowa cattle feeders used it. The fact that only half of all farmers raised cattle for 
commercial sale did not diminish the remarkable nature of this adoption. By the summer of 
1955, 28 percent of cattle feeders used feeds prepared with stilbestrol. Ample positive 
14 A. V. Nalbandov, Hormones—what they will and won't do for livestock," Successful Farming, November 
1952; Robert G. Rupp, "'Hurry-Up' Hormone for Feeder Cattle," The Farmer's Digest 18 (June-July 1954). 
15 
"Questions and Answers About Adding Stilbestrol to Feeds for Growing and Fattening Beef Cattle," 
Agricultural Extension Service, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, Pamphlet 215, November 1954; Summons, 
"Animal Feed Additives," 310. 
publicity helped ease the way for farmers to use the hormone. 4-H leaders sponsored 
contests for young people who could raise cattle with the fastest gains. Farmers who used it 
gave favorable reports, although farm record keeping was not up to the standards of 
experiment stations or laboratories. Max Clowes of Humboldt County claimed "I think 
stilbestrol did me some good, but I can't prove it. I handled cattle a little differently this 
year—didn't use as much pasture." Without a control group, Clowes and farmers could not 
make conclusive claims about their experiences. Other farmers had better basis for making 
judgments. Ed Hibbs of Pocahontas County found that his steers gained three pounds per 
day over 163 days with stilbestrol. Hibbs quit feeding stilbestrol thirty days before 
marketing because he heard a rumor that stilbestrol-fed cattle did not dress out at the packing 
plant as well as cattle on traditional rations. He regretted this move, however, since the rate 
of gain for his cattle slowed in those last thirty days. Practical experience with stilbestrol 
convinced farmers that it was not only worth trying but incorporating into their feed 
program.16 
Nine years after the introduction stilbestrol, Zmolek and Burroughs collaborated to 
produce an updated guide to the use of stilbestrol. The most significant difference between 
the 1954 bulletin and the 1963 version was the degree of complexity, most readily apparent 
in the title of the new publication, "62 Questions About Stilbestrol Answered." 
Incorporating years of continued research and reports from farmers, the authors repeated 
some of the basics, but the new version included less cautionary language, with no warnings 
in italics. They reminded farmers not to feed stilbestrol to breeding animals and that the only 
16 
"Feed steers gain-booster," Wallaces Farmer, 19 February 1955; Cliff Johnson interview; "Feed stilbestrol," 
Wallaces Farmer, 15 October 1955; "Stilbestrol—how's it doing?," Wallaces Farmer, 5 November 1955. 
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residue was found in visceral organs, not meat or fat. As long as farmers observed a forty-
eight hour withdrawal period before slaughter, the trace amount of DES in the liver and other 
organs was no longer detectable. The "62 Questions" bulletin reflected experts' and farmers' 
optimism about the benefits of feeding stilbestrol.17 
In the late 1950s, however, there were warnings of potential trouble for farmers who 
used feeds that contained antibiotics and stilbestrol. The first was in September, 1958 when 
President Eisenhower signed into law the Food Additive Amendment to the 1938 Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetics Act. The 1958 amendment included the Delaney clause, which stated 
that no food additive could be considered safe if it was a known carcinogen in humans or 
animals. Researchers knew that DES was a cancer-causing agent when administered in large 
doses to laboratory mice, although tests on other animals, including cattle, did not indicate a 
link between DES and cancer. The FDA concluded that medicated livestock feed amounted 
to a food additive, which put authority over feed additives such as stilbestrol under FDA 
regulation. Previously approved substances such as stilbestrol remained on the market as 
part of a compromise for agriculture and the pharmaceutical industry. Stilbestrol remained 
part of the feeding program for many Iowa families that raised cattle, but it had been a scare 
for farmers who feared that increasing feed costs threatened already small profits.18 
Months after the enactment of the Delaney clause and the FDA ruling on medicated 
feeds, farmers learned of another warning about drugs in agriculture. This time the warning 
was from agricultural experts rather than Congressmen. In 1959 the Animal Health Institute 
17 
"62 Questions About Stilbestrol Answered," Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station, 
Cooperative Extension Service, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Ames, Iowa, Bulletin P-133, 
July 1963. 
18 For an extended discussion of the public debate over DES in Congress, the Courts, and the media, see 
Marcus, Cancer From Beef. 
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and the American Feed Manufacturers issued a joint statement regarding the use of 
commercial medicated feeds. These groups recognized that medicated feeds enabled farmers 
to realize significant increases in production at reduced costs, which made farm products 
more affordable for consumers. However, "these [medicated] feeds never were designed to 
be a substitute for sound management and sanitation." According to the two groups, 
everyone involved in the livestock business, from manufacturers, dealers, and salesmen to 
farmers needed to understand that good management was an essential part of the success of 
medicated feeds.19 
The significance of the threatened status of farm chemicals and the expanded role of 
the federal government was apparent in the highly publicized incident over the use of a 
pesticide in cranberry cultivation that was a suspected carcinogen. Just before Thanksgiving 
in 1959, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Arthur Flemming urged consumers to 
avoid cranberries because of the presence of that chemical on harvested fruit. In the 
aftermath of the cranberry incident, the editors of Wallaces ' Farmer noted that the federal 
government was preparing to "clamp down" on farm chemicals. According to Wallaces ' 
Farmer writers, the FDA was prepared to increase efforts to enforce the ban on antibiotic 
residues in milk. Farmers, they suggested, faced a more adversarial relationship with the 
federal government over the issue of farm chemicals. 
There was also news that the chemicals farmers depended on had problems. It 
appeared that antibiotics were less effective in promoting growth in livestock than they had 
been. Over the course of the 1950s farmers observed that flies that survived DDT attacks 
bred new generations that were les susceptible to DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbon 
19 
"Drugs Won't Replace Good Livestock Management!," Wallaces Farmer, 2 May 1959. 
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insecticides. Now they learned that their wonder drugs were losing effectiveness. Damon 
Catron suggested that there were several potential explanations for this development. It was 
possible that there was an increase in populations of organisms that were not harmed by 
antibiotics or even resistant bacteria. Catron did not specify any one as the most likely 
explanation, but he recommended that farmers use different combinations of antibiotics to 
prevent declines in effectiveness. The combination of broad spectrum antibiotics and good 
sanitation practices was the experts' ideal.20 
After the furor of 1959, no news about feed additives was good news for Iowa 
farmers. The reprieve from government action let farmers conduct their business in ways 
that suited them. They continued to rely on feeds with antibiotics for hog production and 
stilbestrol for beef production. A minority of hog farmers experimented with new strategies 
in raising hogs which made sub therapeutic antibiotics even more important. One of the new 
strategies was to confine hogs on concrete lots with specified rations rather than turning them 
out on pasture and supplementing their diet with com (see chapter five). Placing larger 
numbers of animals in close quarters created an ideal disease environment. Antibiotics in 
feed accelerated weight gain in those hogs but also helped to prevent outbreaks of disease. 
By the 1960s, farmers confined hogs inside buildings to minimize environmental stresses 
such as temperature change. Some farmers even raised hogs indoors from birth to marketing, 
known as "life cycle housing" from farrowing to finishing. Feed additives were more 
important than ever by the mid 1960s.21 
20 
"Get good results from antibiotics," Wallaces Farmer, 21 March 1959. 
21 See Finlay, "Hogs, Antibiotics, and the Industrial Environments of Postwar Agriculture." 
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The quiet over the issue of feed additives did not last. By the late 1960s feed 
additives were in the news again. On April 1, 1968, the FDA announced that several 
antibiotics of choice would be restricted for livestock production in sixty days if there were 
no "sufficient objections" raised during that time period. The list of potentially restricted 
drugs included streptomycin, selected forms of penicillin, chlortetracycline, and Bacitracin. 
A writer for Wallaces ' Farmer asserted that although the use of antibiotics as therapeutics 
and as feed additives were concerns to the FDA, it was their therapeutic use that was the 
most problematic.22 
Two groups responded with objections, the Iowa Pork Producers Association and the 
National Pork Producers Council based in Des Moines. Rolland "Pig" Paul, president of the 
National Pork Producers, wrote a letter to the FDA urging a delay on any ban. Paul wanted 
to know if the issue of antibiotic residue in meat products was significant enough to warrant a 
ban. He assured FDA officials that hog farmers wanted consumers to have safe meat, but 
asserted that the degree to which those residues actually constituted a health threat was not 
clear to producers. Similarly, a representative of the Iowa organization stated that safe meat 
was "essential for the survival of the [livestock] industry," but that any regulations had to be 
"workable." What was workable for hog farmers included maintaining antibiotics for 
therapy and for feed, which was precisely the issue for the FDA scientists and concerned 
citizens.23 
The problem of chemical residues in meats resurfaced in 1970. The USD A, charged 
with inspection of meat packing plants and meat grading, was now part of the system of 
22 Ron Lutz, "Groups cite opposition to FDA drug ban talk," Wallaces Farmer, 22 June 1968. 
23 Lutz, "Groups cite opposition." 
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reporting and oversight for chemical residue. An anonymous official at an Iowa meatpacking 
plant reported that he had a list of ten Iowa farmers who were out of compliance with 
acceptable levels of residues in animals that they marketed over the previous several weeks. 
"The next time these people market livestock," he stated, "the federal meat inspection 
division in Washington wants tissue samples from their animals to check for drug and 
pesticide residues." The federal government was prepared to hold individual farmers 
accountable for the ways in which they used chemicals.24 
Officials at the USD A and the office of the Iowa state veterinarian explained the new 
compliance program. If liver tissue samples from a packing plant indicated that drug 
residues were 20 percent under the official tolerance level, the lab would notify the packing 
plant of origin that they were at risk of violations. If the samples showed residues between 
20 percent and the stated level, animals from the farm of origin would be sampled the next 
time the farmer marketed livestock. Animals that tested above the tolerance level would be 
withheld from slaughter or destroyed. The director of the USDA program stated that there 
were several shipments of livestock from Iowa that exceeded the established tolerance levels 
by over 20 percent.25 
The problem for farmers was that some cattlemen did not follow the guidelines for 
the use of these chemicals, notably stilbestrol. As early as 1958 experts recommended 
withdrawing stilbestrol from feed forty-eight hours before marketing. This allowed DES to 
clear the animal's system before slaughter. But when the new USDA compliance program 
began in 1970, cattle showed up at packinghouses that exceeded the tolerances for residue. 
24 Ron Lutz, "Crackdown on residues in meats," Wallaces Farmer, 8 August 1970. 
25 Lutz, "Crackdown on residues." 
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The state veterinarian reported that he had contacted "about a dozen" farmers about residues 
over the previous year. Furthermore, feed additives were just one category of chemicals that 
showed up in tissue samples. Chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticides were also present, 
although the most common drug found in cattle tissue samples was stilbestrol.26 
Iowa State University experts confirmed what packers, the FDA, and USDA already 
knew: that a sizable minority of farmers did not understand feeding guidelines. An Iowa 
State University study from 1966 indicated that of farmers who raised beef cattle, 79 percent 
recognized that stilbestrol should be withdrawn from cattle rations forty-eight hours before 
marketing. Twelve percent of farmers disagreed with the forty-eight hour statement, 
although it is unclear if they believed that the rules were more or less stringent. The fact that 
the remaining 9 percent of cattle producers had no opinion on the withdrawal rule indicated 
that there was a serious problem with farmers who did not understand the rule, could not 
understand, or chose to ignore it.27 
In 1971 there were new efforts to control the farmers who misused stilbestrol. In 
January the American National Cattlemen's Association and the National Livestock Feeders 
Association announced a new voluntary program to prevent DES contamination in the meat 
supply. Beginning on March 1, feeders would sign certificates to assure packers that the 
cattle being marketed had not been fed DES for at least forty-eight hours prior to slaughter. 
Feed manufacturers and organizations such as the Animal Health Institute supported the 
program and offered pamphlets outlining the new program to farmers, farm journalists, and 
26 
"New stilbestrol research," Wallaces Farmer, 15 March 1958; Lutz, "Crackdown on residues." 
27 
"Behavior Studies Related to Pesticides," Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station, 
Cooperative Extension Service, Iowa State University, Special Report No. 49, December 1966. 
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members of farm organizations such as the Future Farmers of America in the first half of 
1971.28 
The certification program did not succeed in changing farmers' behavior regarding 
stilbestrol use. In the summer of 1971 a poll of Iowa farmers indicated that 48 percent of 
them believed that their neighbors did not follow the recommended withdrawal period for 
DES. Forty-four percent of farmers reported that they were unsure about whether or not their 
neighbors were in compliance. The most damning figure, however, was that 8 percent of 
farmers knew at least one person who did not observe the prescribed withdrawal period. If 
even a handful of producers failed to follow the guidelines, then those producers could 
jeopardize the future of DES and other medications.29 
Most farmers who wanted to continue using drugs and feed additives recognized the 
risks of failure to follow the rules. According to Don Lefebure, a hog farmer from Linn 
County, "It's better and easier to follow withdrawal recommendations than to have the FDA 
or some other government agency enforcing stringent regulations." Lefebure was not alone. 
"I don't agree with some of the withdrawal requirements," echoed an unidentified cattleman, 
"If they [government inspectors] found residues in the meat I sold, I'd be out of business." 
These farmers urged their peers to use medicated feed properly to ensure that the drugs 
would be available for all producers. Roy Kleppy, president of the National Pork Producers 
Council explained that farmers were meat consumers, too. "I don't want anything in it 
[meat] that's detrimental to my family or other consumers," Kleppy noted. Farmers were 
caught in the middle. Facing market pressure for low cost meat they used drugs to reduce 
28 Ralph Sanders, "Beef Management," Successful Farming, January 1971; "Drug withdrawal certificate 
clarified," Wallaces Farmer, 26 June 1971. 
29 
"Take animals off drugs before slaughter time," Wallaces Farmer, 14 August 1971. 
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production costs, but by using drugs they potentially alienated consumers and their 
government representatives in Congress and regulatory agencies.30 
In 1971 the USDA and FDA changed the stilbestrol withdrawal period from forty-
eight hours to seven days. Inspectors found that ten out of approximately 2,500 liver samples 
from slaughtered cattle indicated the presence of DES. Pressured by the public and 
Congressmen to ban stilbestrol, government agencies could not afford to be idle. Regulators 
wanted to prevent a ban by lengthening the withdrawal period. They hoped that recalcitrant 
producers would see the importance of compliance and change their behavior. The voluntary 
certification program continued, reflecting the new seven day period for withdrawal. FDA 
and USDA representatives affirmed that "we simply cannot have any DES residues in the 
food supply" and that producers shared a large part of the responsibility for reassuring 
consumers that the meat supply was safe. On January 8, 1972 the certification program 
became mandatory.31 
Farmers' experiences with the certification program, however, were not encouraging. 
In early 1972, one year after the voluntary certification program began and several months 
after the commencement of the mandatory program, a majority of farmers surveyed stated 
that livestock buyers had not asked them to sign any sort of drug compliance statement. 
While 12 percent of farmers reported no livestock sales in the previous year and therefore 
had not been asked to sign the statement, only 18 percent of farmers stated that buyers asked 
them to sign. The good news for farmers was that feeders that raised the largest numbers of 
animals were more likely to sign a withdrawal form. Buyers asked 55 percent of farmers 
30 Wil Groves, "Needed: a common sense approach to feed additive use," Wallaces Farmer, 14 August 1971 ; 
Gary Wall, "Feed Additives... Drug Crisis in Agriculture," Iowa Agriculturist (Spring 1972). 
31 Wil Groves and Bob Dunaway, "Stilbestrol threatened by illegal residues" Wallaces Farmer, 27 November 
1971. 
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who fed more than 200 cattle to sign and 30 percent of hog farmers who raised more than 
500 head. Yet even the good news was bad. The withdrawal statement program failed to 
accomplish what it was supposed to do. As long as 45 percent of large scale beef producers 
and 70 percent of large scale hog producers did not sign drug statements it was likely that 
animals would arrive at the packing plants with drug residue in their systems.32 
Farmers and their representatives in the United States Congress fought for the right to 
continue using feed additives. In the summer of 1972 there were several bills pending in 
Congress to ban DES. In August, the FDA announced that it would ban DES in livestock 
feed after January 8, 1973. Farmers could still use DES implants which could be placed 
behind the ear of cattle. Two members of Iowa's Congressional delegation co-sponsored a 
bill to allow the continued use of stilbestrol. They argued that the only way to get cancer 
from DES was to ingest massive quantities of it. If the FDA was not bound by the Delaney 
Amendment, they argued, the FDA would be able to guarantee a safe food supply without 
banning the drug. This effort was unsuccessful, however. The ban on DES as a feed additive 
took effect on January 8, 1973.33 
Farmers pledged to continue using DES after the ban, even though they would no 
longer be able to use it as a feed additive. In July approximately 600 cattle feeders met in 
Ames and signed a petition urging the federal government to allow "realistic" amounts of 
DES in cattle tissues at time of slaughter. They argued that trace amounts were safe, and that 
a total ban would increase farm costs so much that it would be difficult to stay in business. 
Implanting DES required more care and labor than feeding, since it was a separate task. 
32 
"Feeders not asked for drug statement," Wallaces Farmer, 8 April 1972. 
33 Clark Mollenhoff, "FDA Halts Use of DES in Livestock Feed," Des Moines Register, 3 August 1972; George 
Anthan, "Farm State Congressmen Fight DES Ban," Des Moines Register, 4 August 1972. 
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Common implanting errors included gouging ear cartilage, severing ear veins, and 
implanting the pellet between layers of skin instead of under the skin, which prevented 
proper absorption of the hormone. Robert Lewis of Mitchell County estimated that his 
production costs would increase by as much as 15 percent for his herd of 1,100 cattle. The 
more serious critique of the stilbestrol ban in feed was that implants were not removed before 
slaughter. The implant continued to release the hormone up to the time of slaughter, leaving 
farmers in the same position as they were when some farmers continued to feed stilbestrol 
laced feeds beyond the specified withdrawal period. The executive vice-president of the 
Iowa Beef Producers Association stated that the ban was less about a safe food supply and 
"more of a psychological and emotional action than anything else."34 
Meanwhile, hog producers also faced increased restrictions on feed additives. In 
January, 1972 the FDA recommended banning several popular antibiotics in hog production 
and tightening controls on other antibiotics. At a meeting of pork producers, Vaughn Speer, 
ISU swine nutritionist, explained that the FDA officials feared that the use of antibiotics in 
livestock feed could potentially cause resistance in microorganisms that were also harmful to 
humans. The swine editor for Successful Farming speculated that bans or limits on 
antibiotics could be even more serious to hog producers than a ban on DES would be to beef 
producers. As farmers raised larger herds and used more confinement systems (see chapter 
34 Don Muhm, "Cattlemen Urge Allowing 'Realistic' DES Amounts," Des Moines Register, July 14, 1972; 
"Care Needed in Implanting DES," Iowa State University Information Service, For Immediate Release, Wise 
Burroughs Papers, Iowa State University; Virgil Oakman and Jerald Heth, "Farmers: 'We'll Use DES'," Des 
Moines Tribune, 3 August 1972. 
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five) antibiotics were "the crutch that keeps them in business." Without antibiotics the new, 
modern hog business would collapse.35 
Antibiotics were just one kind of substance that turned up in the meat supply. The 
fact that other chemical residues were also present in animal tissue contributed to the 
problem farmers faced in preserving those chemicals as an important part of livestock 
husbandry. An Iowa hog farmer used an arsenic compound to control an outbreak of swine 
dysentery in his herd, but one group of hogs received an overdose. The USDA veterinarian 
took tissue samples from twenty-one of the fifty-two animals, and all the carcasses were 
frozen during the analysis. The test results showed that the levels of arsenic were within 
acceptable tolerances, and so the meat entered the food supply, although the heads and 
viscera were condemned. The practical lesson that farmers learned from this incident and 
others was that it was costly and time consuming to conduct the tests, freeze the carcasses, 
and then have part of the byproduct destroyed.36 
Farmers were on the defensive as the 1970s began. In the 1950s they were eager to 
obtain the antibiotic and hormone wonder drugs. Farmers used antibiotics and hormones to 
speed the rate of gain and to accomplish those gains with less feed. Feeding chemicals was a 
survival strategy for livestock producers, but now that strategy was troubling. The drugs that 
boosted production were now the subject of debate among people far removed from 
production agriculture. Farmers believed that the decisions about what drugs they could or 
could not use and the withdrawal periods for those drugs were based on fear, not fact. They, 
in turn, behaved without fear and fed stilbestrol in violation of the guidelines of the product 
35 Rodney J. Fee, "Will You Spend Five Minutes on This For To Save Additives?," Successful Farming, August 
1972; "Hogmen could lose some feed additives," Wallaces Farmer, 23 September, 1972. 
36 
"Farmers find drug residues are costly," Wallaces Farmer, 8 April, 1972. 
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developers at Iowa State and government bureaucrats. As a result, they lost the fight over 
stilbestrol in cattle feed. The fight over antibiotic feeding did not end in the 1970s. It was 
unclear how much, if any, antibiotic residue would be acceptable in hog tissues. Faced with 
concern from prominent members of Congress, advocate-journalists and members of the 
public, farmers defended themselves and their production choices, just as they defended the 
other decisions they made about pesticides and fertilizer. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Push Button Farming 
The farmer dozed in bed as the alarm went off on a cold February day. It was three 
o'clock in the morning. Instead of rising, pulling on several layers of clothes, boots, and 
overshoes and heading for the barn to prepare for the morning milking, the farmer stayed in 
bed. He simply stretched his leg out to a console on the bedroom wall with buttons marked 
"Chores," "Feeding Cows," "Slopping Hogs," and pushed the button marked "Milking" with 
his toe. There was no rush to get to work. A sign on the foot of the bed marked "In 
Conference Until 12:00 Noon" indicated that the farmer would not hurry to work any time 
soon. This imaginary scene was the creation of a cartoonist for Wallaces ' Farmer and Iowa 
Homestead in January, 1951. The title, "Pushbuttons By '60?" suggested that this was a 
humorous take on a serious issue, the role of mechanization on Iowa farms in the postwar 
period. Specifically, which of the time consuming jobs such as milking, hauling milk in 
cans, shoveling manure, and scooping feed for livestock would be mechanized in the years to 
come? To what extent would farmers be able to reduce the amount of physical labor required 
to operate a farm? How would farmers use push button techniques to change the way they 
farmed?1 
The idea of automated or push button technology was a graphic one for farmers who 
did the milking, feeding, and manure removal chores 365 days of the year. Labor saving 
devices had always appealed to some farmers, but the drive for labor savings in the work 
farmers performed every day accelerated in the postwar years. Push-button imagery 
suggested a modern world of comparative ease, one in which farmers could leave behind the 
1 Tony Basso, "Pushbuttons By '60?," Wallaces Farmer, 21 January 1950. 
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stoop labor of agriculture. By the 1960s, the rhetoric of push button farming gave way to the 
language of automated materials handling systems, but the appeal to farmers was the same. 
Automated materials handling replaced the scoop shovel for many jobs on Iowa farms in the 
postwar years, although the degree to which that change occurred varied from farm to farm, 
depending on the degree of specialization and size of operation. 
Pushbutton techniques represented the ultimate fulfillment of the industrial ideal in 
farming. Unlike many of the harvest tasks that farmers mechanized (described in following 
chapters), dairying, feeding livestock, and moving manure were everyday chores that took 
several hours per day on most farms. Automated materials handling systems could be used 
to specialize or expand production. Farmers with small acreages or herds as well as those 
with larger operations benefited from the economies made possible by pushbutton 
techniques. Dairy farmers were among the first to use pushbutton techniques, installing new 
milk handling systems in the 1950s. They did so in response to the widespread availability 
of electricity, rising labor costs, and changing requirements for producers of Grade A milk. 
Families who fed beef cattle quickly turned to automated choring systems, although the scale 
of automated operations varied, depending on the size of the operation. Finally, farmers used 
automated materials handling to move beyond the feedlot. They concentrated large numbers 
of animals together in confined spaces, sometimes indoors. Automated systems fed animals, 
watered them, and even removed manure. Confinement feeding of large numbers of hogs 
and cattle became a possibility during the 1960s, although farmers who practiced 
confinement feeding had to deal with a growing waste management problem as the 1960s 
ended. 
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The combination of the farm labor shortage and the spread of rural electrification 
made pushbutton techniques an option for farmers in the 1950s. In Iowa, rural electrification 
was just underway by the time World War II began. In 1940 approximately 34 percent of the 
209,737 occupied farm homes in the state claimed electric power. In the 1940s, however, the 
electrification of farmsteads proceeded quickly, and by 1951 almost all Iowa farms had 
electricity. Farmers of the 1930s only envisioned installing a few electric lights in their 
homes, barns, and outbuildings and powering a few appliances at a cost of approximately 
twenty-five kilowatt hours per month. By 1950 that situation had changed for a growing 
minority of farmers, who now used 1,000 kilowatt hours or more of electricity for many farm 
tasks. Farmers could realistically conceive of using the new technology to do much of the 
repetitive and strenuous stoop work on their farms at a time when there were fewer strong 
backs to do the work and those who remained could demand higher wages. With the decline 
in farm labor and the rise in rural electrification, an electric powered materials handling 
system could become the new "hired man" on many farms.2 
One of the first areas of farm life in which farmers began to apply push button 
techniques was dairying. Dairying was (and remains) one of the most labor intensive of all 
tasks and work cycles on the farm. Cows need to be milked twice per day, bams need to be 
cleaned every day, and milk must be stored until it can be hauled to a processor. All of the 
tools and implements that touch milk require cleaning and sanitizing before they can be used 
again. In the late 1940s several developments that would reduce some of this labor of 
dairying attracted attention: the pipeline milker, the bulk tank, and the milking parlor. With a 
2 Forty-first Annual Iowa Year Book of Agriculture, 1940, 319; Fifty-second Annual Iowa Year Booh of 
Agriculture, 1951, 349; "Lighter Chores in '60," Wallaces Farmer, 4 February 1950. 
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pipeline milker, the milk moved directly from the cow into a glass container, then through 
tubes into a bulk cooling tank. In 1950 hand milking was the norm for over half of all cows 
in Iowa by while only 45 percent of cows experienced machine milking. Both techniques, 
however, exposed the milk to contaminants, including dirt, manure, insects, and airborne 
pathogens. The person who did the milking also had to carry and pour the milk into cans and 
then move the cans to the milk house for cooling in a water bath. In 1951 Gerald Prince of 
Guthrie County carried milk cans over eighty-eight miles per year and covered a total of 375 
miles in his dairy operation. Pipeline milking systems eliminated the need for this physical 
work. The milk moved by machine, freeing the farmer to pay attention to washing udders 
and operating the machines. Milking parlors had raised stalls for the cows, so the farmer 
could clean and inspect udders and attach the milking machinery without bending over. 
Taken together, these developments could relieve farmers of stoop labor and allow them to 
milk more cows faster, but they also promised to increase costs.3 
The most significant appeal of new technology was the ability to increase the pace of 
work which cut costs. With labor expenses accounting for approximately 25 percent of the 
cost of dairy farming, any reductions helped increase profits. New style milking parlors were 
one of the most effective means of cutting labor costs. The Yoder family from rural Kalona 
reduced costs of getting milk to Iowa City from $.35 per hundredweight to $.22 using a 
milking parlor and bulk system. The layout of milking parlors varied, but one of the popular 
styles after 1957 was the herringbone type. It is easy to imagine this type of set-up if you 
3 For more information on Iowa dairying, see George W. Ladd, "Trends in the Iowa Dairy Industry," 
Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, Special Report No. 
54, November 1967. Schlebecker, Whereby We Thrive, 254, 302-303; Rueben W. Hecht, "Labor Used For 
Livestock," U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Statistical Bulletin No. 161 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1955), 9; Bill Giese and Don Muhm, "Dairying 
without carrying," Successful Farming, February 1951. 
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envision parking on a one-way street of a small town. Just as cars face the sidewalk at an 
angle with their tail lights to the street, cows in a herringbone milking parlor face their feeder 
with their tail ends angled toward the operator's pit. A gate closed behind the last cow and 
the close quarters kept the cows from moving. A pull on a rope or chain released a fixed 
amount of feed into the feed cups from overhead storage bins. The operator could see the 
udders and attached the pipeline milkers to the cows as they closed in. Pipleline milkers 
carried the milk to a bulk tank. Instead of hauling the milk from each cow to a can by hand 
which, in turn, would have to be carried to a milk house where the cans would be placed in 
cool, moving water, the bulk tank eliminated the need for physically moving the milk. This 
system allowed farmers to milk much faster than the old way of taking an individual milking 
unit to each cow in a stanchion. As soon as one group of cows finished, another group would 
be queued outside the door ready to be milked.4 
Dairy farmers commented on the welcome increased pace of milking in the new-style 
parlors. Kenneth Showalter of Franklin County found that he could milk his twenty-three 
cows by himself in one hour with his new milking parlor. Formerly, Showalter and his hired 
man each spent an hour milking with a stanchion system and portable milking machines. 
"This new set-up saves from two to two and a half man-hours per day," Showalter 
concluded. In the mid-1950s Rudolph Remmen of Winneshiek County decided to upgrade 
his facilities. His stanchion barn only had room for twenty-three cows, so he constructed a 
new milking parlor to accommodate twelve cows at a time. He expanded his herd to fifty-
two cows. With an average milking time of fifteen minutes for each group of twelve cows, 
Remmen was able to complete the entire herd in approximately one hour. Farmers with 
4 
"How They Make Dairying Pay," Iowa Farm and Home Register, 6 March 1955. 
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larger operations realized larger labor savings. The Hermanson brothers of Story County 
kept a herd of 150 Holstein cows and were one of the first operations in Iowa to use the 
herringbone style. They could milk between fifty to sixty cows per hour in their double-six 
herringbone. According to Leonard Hermanson, "It took three men all day just to milk and 
feed the cows [in stanchions]. Now, two men can handle the same work in about six hours."5 
Creature comforts were important benefits to the new style milking parlors. 
Milking parlors were easier on the operator than the old stanchion milking barns in which 
farmers had to constantly bend over to clean udders, check them for problems, and attach or 
remove milking machines. New milking parlors were also self-contained, either as separate 
buildings or enclosed spaces within barns, making it easier to control the environment by 
keeping down dust, keeping flies out, and even providing heat in the winter. On one Wright 
County farm, three boys claimed to enjoy milking in their new milking parlor. They installed 
a radio and a propane heater to make the work more pleasant. Vernon Miller of Black Hawk 
County found that the raised stalls made it easier for his father, who suffered from 
rheumatism in his knees, to assist with milking. Eldon Johnson, also of Black Hawk County, 
commented that working in the pit was comfortable, "And it eliminates the danger of being 
kicked. Also, the udder is in clear view and easy to wash." While farmers did not cite 
comfort as the most important benefit of milking parlors, they enjoyed the new ease of 
work.6 
5 
"Cut Cost of Milk Production," Wallaces Farmer, 21 February 1953; James R. Borcherding, "New parlor let 
him double herd size," Successful Farming, March 1959; "Milk more cows with less work," Wallaces Farmer, 
6 June 1959. 
6 
"Boys like to milk cows," Wallaces Farmer, 17 March 1956; "Want Push-Button" Dairy Barn?," Wallaces 
Farmer, 21 October 1950; "Iowa dairyman tries new milking parlor," Wallaces Farmer, 15 March 1958. 
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Bulk tanks were a critical part of new-style dairying. Bulk tank technology was 
initially developed in California, where some of the first large-scale dairy operations began. 
Farmers could either pour the milk from the milking units into the refrigerated tank by hand 
or they could use pipeline milking machines to automatically transfer the milk from cow to 
tank. These electric powered cooling tanks held several hundred gallons of fluid milk. Once 
the milk was in the tank, the farmer only needed to wait for a dairy tank truck to pick up the 
milk on an every-other-day basis. In addition to labor savings and reduced physical labor, 
there were other advantages of bulk handling. There was less opportunity for spillage and 
less opportunity for bacteria growth because of rapid cooling. Promoters of bulk handling 
also suggested that dairy work was more attractive to hired labor since there was less 
physical work. Bulk handling would also allow farmers to produce fluid milk that would be 
classified as Grade A: milk for drinking.7 
New standards for farmers who sold fluid milk posed a major challenge to farmers 
who wanted to produce for the market with the highest prices. The state legislature passed a 
law in 1951 with more stringent sanitation requirements for processors who marketed milk 
labeled Grade A. Milk at Grade A processing plants could not test in excess of a bacteria 
count of 400,000 per million and finished milk could not exceed 30,000 per million. The 
E.coli count of finished products could not exceed ten parts per million. Dairy processors 
wanted to ensure high standards, so they asked more of farmers. If farmers could not provide 
raw milk from disease-free herds that met these standards they would be limited to producing 
for a Grade B market, which was less profitable. Over the course of the 1950s, the issue of 
7 Dick Hanson, "Less work, more profits with milk tanks," Successful Farming, August 1952; W. H. M. Morris 
and Henry A. Homme, "What is Bulk Milk Handling?," Iowa Farm Science, 8 (June 1954). 
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making the grade in milk production was an important reason for farmers to consider new-
dairy technology.8 
Farmers found that the potential for expansion was an important consideration when 
studying merits of bulk handling. This potential for expansion was critical considering the 
cost of these tanks. A farmer who owned a cooler for milk cans claimed that his bulk tank 
was a good investment since his can cooler was too small for his production. Farmers who 
owned bulk tanks wanted to keep them full, which would allow them to pay for the system as 
soon as possible. Alex Young of North Liberty produced for the Iowa City market. He 
claimed that with his pipeline milker and 400 gallon bulk tank he could increase his herd 
from fifty cows to seventy cows without increasing his work load. Young stated that ".. .the 
only thing left for me to do is to put the milker on the cows. Of course, I have to keep the 
equipment clean. But the tank is easier to wash than milk cans, and the pipe doesn't take a 
great deal of cleaning time." In 1958 a farmer from Benton County noted that his two-year 
old 250 gallon tank was not big enough to handle milk from his expanding herd. He planned 
to trade in for a larger model in the future. In the interim he needed to have the local dairy 
processor come every day to pick up milk instead of every other day.9 
Pipeline milking and bulk tanks reduced labor and allowed farmers to expand, but 
automatic feed grinding and moving feed to the cows also reduced labor requirements. 
Scooping each pound of feed to cows was a bottleneck that limited the profit potential of the 
new parlors, pipeline milkers, and bulk tanks. Dairy farmers frequently mixed supplements 
8 Fifty-second Annual Iowa Year Book of Agriculture, 1951, 41; Henry A. Homme, Eddie Easley, and John 
Shaul, "If you're thinking of going Grade A," Iowa Farm Science 1 (November 1952). 
9 
"Dairymen find bulk tanks pay," Wallaces Farmer, 21 February, 1959; Hanson, "Less work, more profits with 
milk tanks,"; "Bulk tanks reduce costs," Wallaces Farmer, 19 October 1957; "Which bulk tank for you?," 
Wallaces Farmer, 1 March 1958. 
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with grain or silage to provide a more balanced ration for lactating cows, which was time 
consuming work. Norman Amundson of Clayton County ground, mixed, and even bagged 
his own feed before feeding it to his cows by hand. In the 1950s, however, he began to have 
feed ground and mixed in town and delivered to his farm. He installed a 100 bushel steel 
feed bin and an electric powered auger system to deliver the feed to a device that metered out 
feed to each cow in the parlor.10 
The majority of feeding for milk cows, however, took place outside the milking 
parlor. During summer, farmers traditionally grazed milk cows on pasture. During the 
colder months, farmers fed forage and silage that comprised the bulk of the dairy ration in 
outdoor lots or enclosures. In the 1950s, due in large part to changes in forage harvesting 
(see chapter six), farmers began to feed cows in lots throughout the year. This was called dry 
lot dairying. Forage choppers cut and chopped the crop into short lengths which were blown 
into a forage wagon with an automatic unloader. By feeding cows in the lot instead of 
grazing, farmers were able to maximize production from their forage acres. Simply put, each 
acre could support more cows in a lot than by grazing on pasture. A Wisconsin study 
indicated that ten acres would support seven cows with rotational grazing while those ten 
acres could support fourteen cows by harvesting the grass by machine. Jack Hansen of Black 
Hawk County installed an auger system to deliver silage from the silo to the feed bunks on 
his farm, which lessened the work needed to feed his herd of sixty cows. This type of 
dairying meant more hauling of feed, but more production per acre of grassland.11 
10 
"How to handle a bigger dairy herd," Wallaces Farmer, 2 August 1958. 
11 Dick Hagen, "Drylot dairying," Wallaces Farmer, 20 May 1961; Ken Hofmeyer, "Dairying is changing," 
Wallaces Farmer, 5 June 1965. 
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All of these tools cost money. Costs varied depending on the size of the parlor and 
milk handling system, but farmers in the 1950s could expect to pay at least $6,000 for a 
parlor that could accommodate eight cows at a time. Not surprisingly, costs were lower for 
milking systems suited for larger herds. According to a Michigan State University study, a 
herringbone system designed to milk as many as forty-five cows per hour could cost as little 
as $6,040 while a system for twenty to thirty cows per hour was estimated to cost from a low 
of $6,365. Similarly, a University of Minnesota study indicated that bulk tanks were more 
economical for larger producers than smaller producers. Bulk tanks for Iowa producers cost 
from $2,000 to $3,000, depending on tank capacity. Farmers who produced 250 pounds of 
milk per day would expect to pay $.28 per hundredweight for a 200 gallon tank versus a 
farmer who produced 650 pounds of milk per day who paid $.11 for the same sized tank. 
These costs included depreciation, and estimated taxes, repairs, insurance, and interest 
charges. In the 1950s, this was the most expensive capital investment farmers could make 
outside of land and livestock purchases. Accordingly, farmers had to assess their 
commitment to dairying before they invested in new technology.12 
One Delaware County operation shows the degree of capitalization required to set up 
a modern dairy farm. Howard Stone, his son Jim, and neighbor Don Miller formed a 
partnership to update a farmstead. Their existing facility included a stanchion barn and 
loafing shed (a shelter for cattle to get out of the weather) as well as two silos and a milk 
house for storing milk as it cooled. They invested $8,000 in a new milking parlor, milk 
handling system, a new loafing shed that doubled the size of the previous structure, a straw 
12 
"Bulk tanks reduce costs," Wallaces Farmer, 19 October 1957; "Dairymen find bulk tanks pay," Wallaces 
Farmer, 21 February 1959; "Milk more cows with less work," Wallaces Farmer, 6 June 1959. 
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storage shed, and feed bunk. They fed silage and chopped hay in the feed bunk from a self-
unloading wagon and fed cows in the milking parlor from overhead bins.13 
The high first-cost of new milking parlors, pipeline systems, and bulk tanks posed a 
dilemma for any farm families who sold fluid milk in addition to producing cream for sale 
and use at home. Should they expand their herds to realize the economies of scale? Most 
dairy producers answered negatively. They chose to engage in other farm tasks that were 
less risky and expensive than producing milk. The number of farms dedicated to dairying 
dropped quickly in the 1950s and 1960s while the average number of animals per dairy herd 
increased. Farmers who maintained a small herd of approximately half a dozen cows to 
produce for home dairy needs and to sell some cream had no use for the new dairy 
equipment. Those who did not invest in the pipeline milkers, bulk tanks, and milking parlors 
invariably left dairying or faming altogether. In survey of Iowa farmers indicated that the 
new dairy techniques were the tools of the minority rather than the majority. Only 12.5 
percent of respondents owned bulk tanks, 11 percent owned pipeline milkers, and only 6 
percent had milking parlors.14 
Dairy farmers expressed their tension over expansion. Alvin Brown of Black Hawk 
County declared, "A man is going to have to dairy in a big way—or not at all." Brown sold 
his herd of twenty cows in the winter of 1954-55 rather than invest in the new equipment. 
Another farmer who increased his herd noted that "It's to the point now where you either get 
13 Newt Hawkinson, "Dairy setup designed for efficiency," Wallaces Farmer, 8 February 1962. 
14 
"Dairy survey information," Wallaces Farmer, 1 August 1959; Jim Rutter, "Automatic choring equipment," 
Wallaces Farmer, 18 July 1959. There is some contradictory evidence on the numbers of farmers with pipeline 
milking systems. One article highlighting a survey of dairy farmers indicated that as many as eleven percent of 
farmers used pipeline milking systems, while an article from July 18 indicated that only five percent of Iowa 
farmers used pipeline systems. It is impossible to gauge the accuracy of either survey, but it does suggest that 
there were many people who continued to produce fluid milk in traditional structures. 
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in or get out." When Hardin County farmer Roy Engel's milk buyer began to take bulk milk 
Engel sold his herd of fourteen cows, explaining that "I never enjoyed dairying too much 
anyway, and I didn't want to get in so deep that I couldn't get out if I wanted to [sic]." Engel 
sold milk as part of a diversified operation as a hedge against crop failure or price declines 
for crops or livestock. But in the new world of dairying, he found that continuing to produce 
milk was not worth the expenses of expansion. In 1961, Harry Clampitt, Hardin County 
farmer and president of the American Dairy Association of Iowa, expressed his view of 
contemporary changes in dairying. Clampitt questioned "whether going into dairying on a 
10-15 cow size is going to be popular or profitable." As the 1960s began, an increasing 
number of farmers ceased dairying and the remaining number increased the scale of 
operations. Attrition out of milk production meant that the technological solutions of the 
minority became commonplace on dairy farms.15 
Farmers who chose to remain in dairy production added more cows to their herds. As 
indicated previously, the cost of the new equipment compelled farmers to maximize 
production to pay for it. Melvin Hoelscher of Hardin County was one of these farmers who 
expanded after investing over $3,000 in his new bulk tank and pipeline system. "I've got to 
get it [the investment] back somehow. And the only way to do it is to milk more cows." A 
Northeast Iowa dairyman expanded his herd dramatically. In the early 1950s he milked a 
herd of from fifteen to eighteen cows per year. By 1955 he expanded to thirty-seven cows 
and wanted to milk from forty to fifty head. "I was ready to quit," he noted, "But the wife 
and boy said they'd do the milking if I'd build 'em a new milking parlor." John and Fay 
15 Dave Bryant, "Dairy herds getting bigger—fewer," Wallaces Farmer, 15 October 1955; Richard Hagen, 
Dairying faces changing times," Wallaces Farmer, 17 June 1961. 
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Hostert of Dubuque County began to increase their herd from fifty to seventy cows in 1957. 
They reasoned that it was worth expanding because they had already invested in the new 
equipment. "And," they explained, "it's no more work to milk 70 cows than it was 50." 
These farmers found that technology solved their short term problems of high labor costs and 
gaining access to the higher priced Grade A market for milk. Expansion with new 
technology was the only farmers believed they could increase profits and remain in 
dairying.16 
The numbers of dairy cows and production figures per cow reveal the scope of the 
change wrought by farmers who used new technology. There were 1,007,444 cows and 
heifers for dairy production on Iowa farms in January, 1951, the year that the requirements 
for Grade A milk production became more stringent. By the beginning of 1962 there were 
only 769,810 dairy cattle in the state, although they produced more milk than ever before. 
There were fewer cows, the farmers who remained in the dairy business increased the size of 
their herds. The number of farmers with herds of twenty or more cows increased from 1950 
to 1955 by one third. With new equipment farmers were able to increase their production 
and expand their herds.17 
The experiences of dairy farmers in the Sioux City milk shed demonstrate the 
consolidation in dairying. The number of farms in Iowa, Nebraska, and South Dakota that 
produced fluid milk for the Sioux City market declined precipitously from 1950 to 1960. In 
1950 there were 730 dairy producers, in 1955 there were 480, and in 1960 there were just 
170 producers producing for consumers in Sioux City. However, the production for that 
16 Dave Bryant, Dairy herds getting bigger—fewer"; Ken Hofmeyer, "How many cows should you milk?," 
Wallaces Farmer, 5 October 1963. 
17 Fifty-first Annual Iowa Year Book of Agriculture, 1950, 570; Fifth Biennial Report of Iowa Year Book of 
Agriculture, 1960-1961, 351; Hagen, "Dairying faces changing times." 
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market increased, more than offsetting the loss of dairy farmers. In 1955 Sioux City 
processors handled 34 million pounds of milk from 480 producers. In 1960 they handled 76 
million pounds of milk from only 170 producers. This concentration of dairy production and 
increased productivity was testimony to the efficacy of new techniques adopted by Iowa 
dairy farmers and their families.18 
Farm families who chose dairying as their principal source of income instead of a 
sideline kept up with other new developments, in particular loose housing and free stall 
housing. In the 1950s, these two new kinds of housing for dairy cows became common in 
Iowa and the United States. The old-style stanchion barns had individual places for each cow 
to come for feeding and milking. Stanchions held cows in their place during milking. When 
the cow put its head into the stanchion for feeding the farmer moved a vertical bar into place 
that prevented the cow from backing out. In cold weather cows often remained in the 
stanchions. By contrast, a loose housing barn was simply a structure without the rigid 
organization of individual stanchions for each cow. Instead of milking in the barn, farmers 
milked the cows in the specialized parlors described previously. In the loose housing barn, 
cows moved around the barn at will. The floor was a packed earth covered with straw and 
animal manure which generated heat in the winter to keep cows warm. They were fed in a 
common feed bunk in addition to the special mixed feed they received in the milking 
parlor.19 
18 Dick Hagen, "Goodby to milk cans," Wallaces Farmer, 21 January 1961. John T. Schlebecker noted that 
production and efficiency in American dairying increased 98 percent per man hour between 1940 and 1958. A 
History of American Dairying (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967), 40. 
19 Thayer Cleaver and Robert G. Yeck, "Loose Housing for Dairy Cattle," U. S. Department of Agriculture, 
Information Bulletin No. 98 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), 2. For an updated 
version of this bulletin, see "Loose-Housing System For Dairy Cattle," U. S. Department of Agriculture, 
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Loose housing systems were as distinct as the individual farmers, reflecting tenure 
status and available capital. Land owners typically had more extensive livestock operations, 
since the buildings, lots, and equipment would remain on their own property. J. Clifford 
Grant, a farm owner from eastern Iowa, invested thousands of dollars in his system, although 
he built a barn that he did not intend to build. In 1950 Grant planned to expand his herd and 
wanted to construct a stanchion barn for seventy-two cows. The contractor who bid on the 
project encouraged Grant to consider loose housing. After viewing existing loose housing 
operations and consulting with experts he accepted their advice and built several new 
structures with trussed frames to make cleaning easier than dodging support poles. He added 
a steel silo and holding shed, too. Grant's new operation was expensive, but it was possible 
to start with a loose housing system for much less. Donald Glew, a Delaware County tenant 
farmer, converted a stanchion barn into a loose housing barn for only $387. He removed the 
stanchions on one half of the barn for loose housing for twenty-four cows and used the other 
half for his milking room and storage area.20 
Loose housing systems were much less labor intensive than stanchion milking. 
Farmers who used pail-style milking machines for a thirty cow herd in a stanchion barn 
hauled eighteen tons of material per cow, per year, including four tons of milk, two tons of 
hay, three tons of silage, one ton of straw, one and a half tons of grain and six and a half tons 
of manure. This hauling and shoveling amounted to one and a half tons per day. Given the 
amount of work involved with stanchion milking it is not surprising that some farmers 
wanted to change. Kenneth Winkel of Lyon County explained that he studied many different 
Miscellaneous Publication No. 859 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961); S. S. De 
Forest, "Loose Housing means less labor," Iowa Farm Science 6 (July 1951). 
20 J. Clifford Grant, "Why I built the barn I didn't want," Successful Farming, May 1955; Sherwood Searle, "I 
switched to loose housing for $387," Successful Farming, April 1955. 
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plans for dairy structures before he tore down his old stanchion barn and replaced it with a 
modern facility. After only one year of use he claimed "I would stop milking cows before I 
would go back to a stanchion system." Aside from labor saving, Winkel cited numerous 
advantages to loose housing, including greater comfort for cows, cleaner cows, and fewer 
bruised teats and infections such as mastitis.21 
Herd health was an important advantage farmers cited of loose housing over 
stanchion barn systems. Vernon Lyford tore out his stanchion barn and replaced it with a 
loose housing set up on his Worth County farm in 1950. During his days milking in the 
stanchion barn, Lyford's cows endured a bout of mastitis, an infection of the cow's udder 
that prevents milk production in one or more quarters of the udder. Since he had the new 
barn, with cows resting on their own without being confined in the stanchions, there were 
fewer health problems. "Right now," he stated in 1953, "I'm milking 34 cows—every one of 
them giving milk out of four quarters [of the udder]." Farmers invariably had to deal with 
some illness or health concern that cut production, so providing an environment that was 
more conducive to good health was the best way to increase production and profit.22 
Labor savings were a significant feature of loose housing. Instead of cleaning out the 
gutters behind the cows in stanchions every day, farmers cleaned the loose housing barn on 
an occasional basis. In the new system, milking took place in the parlor, which was kept 
very clean in ideal operations. With the cows resting on bedding, they were protected from 
the manure and mud that they would lay in when they were in pasture or in the barn. In the 
loose housing barn they were on a mat of bedding, which would keep them out of the animal 
21 
"Saving Labor In Dairy Operations," n.d., Dale O. Hull Papers, Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State 
University; "Cut Dairy Chores," Wallaces Farmer, 1 November 1952. 
22 
"Loose Housing For Dairy Cattle?," Wallaces Farmer, 1 March 1953. 
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waste. The alleys would be cleaned out periodically. Dick Moen of Howard County scraped 
the entire surface of the barn once per year.23 
Similarly, free stall housing was a solution for farmers concerned about cleanliness. 
The free stall system was like the loose housing except with stalls provided for cattle to use 
for rest. With individual stalls instead of open space, farmers could save on the amount of 
bedding. Gerald Ehlinger, a Dubuque County dairyman, constructed a free stall barn with 
four by eight feet stalls on either side of a twelve foot wide alley. The stalls were earth 
packed covered with straw and were slightly higher than the alley floor. Ehlinger claimed 
that his cows stayed clean all winter long with much less bedding than a loose housing 
system. Farmers experimented with bedding material, using straw, chopped corn stalks and 
even sawdust in the stalls. By the late 1960s, sawdust became the material of choice. 
"According to Harold Leazer of Cedar County, "Sawdust alone keeps the cows cleaner and 
dryer than anything I've tried." Ray Crock Jr., also of Cedar County, raved about the 
cleanliness of the cows housed in stalls with sawdust. "They're just as clean as during the 
summer and maybe even a little cleaner." Regardless of the particular bedding material, 
farmers believed that loose housing would provide a cleaner environment for their cows.24 
Families who chose to specialize in dairying were not the only people who employed 
automated materials handling and changes in architecture to reduce labor costs, expand 
operations, and ease the hard work of farming. The largest growth in automated materials 
handling systems was by farmers who raised beef cattle in feedlots, since many more Iowa 
23 
"Loose housing shows promise," Wallaces Farmer, 1 March 1958. 
24 
"Free Stalls For Dairy," Agricultural Engineers' Digest, Midwest Plan Service, (February 1963). Records of 
the Midwest Plan Service, Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State University; "Comfort' stalls for dairy 
cows," Wallaces Farmer, 7 September 1963; "Dairymen like free-stall housing," Wallaces Farmer, 10 February 
1968. 
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farm families depended on the sale of beef cattle for their livelihood than on the sale of fluid 
milk. Just as most Iowa farm families kept a herd of dairy cows for the sale of cream instead 
of fluid milk, they also kept a herd of beef animals. This kind of production enabled them to 
minimize the risks of farming by selling a variety of products. If hogs were selling low, then 
cattle might be selling high. But just as many families were liquidating their dairy herds, 
many families were increasing their commitment to feeding beef cattle. In the atmosphere of 
postwar prosperity, urban consumers wanted more beef. In contrast to dairying, expanding 
beef herd numbers was comparatively inexpensive, since feeder steers were less expensive 
than breeding stock such as heifers and cows. 
How to raise a larger herd of beef cattle was another matter. Feeding animals 
required physical labor. While cattle could be grazed on pasture or in harvested corn fields 
to feed on cornstalks and any remaining ears of corn, farmers needed to "finish" cattle before 
they could be sold. Finishing was a period in which the animals would be fed grain, silage, 
plus any number of supplements to rapidly increase their weight to command a top price. 
Farmers needed to get feed in long troughs called feed bunks at least two times every day. 
For even a small herd, this amounted to tons of feed every season that had to be moved by 
hand. 
Farmers used a variety of labor saving devices over the years to help feed livestock. 
Numerous companies manufactured track systems that could be mounted to the ceilings of 
barns. Suspended cars could be pushed along the track, allowing farmers to move feed or 
even manure from place to place without carrying it. Still, the feed and manure had to be 
shoveled into the carrier before it could be moved. Some farmers developed their own 
systems, making carts that could be moved by hand along the length of a feed bunk, with the 
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farmer shoveling feed out of the cart at intervals along the bunk. Leo Boddicker of Benton 
County installed a carrier system in 1948-1949 so that one man could feed 200 steers on a 
335 acre farm. Almost all of these innovations relied on hand power and there were physical 
limits to how much one person could move and, in turn, limits to the numbers of animals that 
could be fed.25 
Automated systems were a reasonable answer for farmers who wanted to ease the 
work of feeding a large herd of beef cattle or to expand the scale of their operations. In 1954 
the magazine Successful Farming highlighted the role of automated materials handling in a 
"Complete report on easier feeding." The information for this special feature was from a 
USD A and Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station study on the economies of labor saving 
on thirty-six Illinois farms. As the authors of the feature noted, most farmers of the early 
1950s continued to feed forage and grain the same way that it had been done for a generation 
or more. This made sense for the farm family that fattened less than 20 head of cattle, 
feeding by hand was still the most economically efficient method for small herds. By the end 
of the 1950s, the USD A recommended hand feeding was still the most profitable system for 
those who fed herds of less than fifty animals.26 
But for farmers who hoped to beat the cost-price squeeze by producing more to offset 
shrinking profit margins, hand feeding was too labor intensive. The most common solution 
for farmers who wanted to stretch their labor over larger herds was to use new self-unloading 
wagons to feed silage or grinder mixers to feed grain and other feedstuff. Farmers pulled 
these wagons with a tractor alongside feed bunks and the self-unloading wagons deposited 
25 Dick Hanson, "Work-planned cattle feeding system," Successful Farming, October, 1950. 
26 R. N. Van Arsdall and Vernon Schneider, "Faster, easier feed handling," Successful Farming, February 1954; 
Newt Hawkinson, "When does it pay to mechanize?," Wallaces Farmer, 15 October 1960. 
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feed in the bunks. In this way, it was possible to move tons of feed without leaving the 
tractor. The problem was that during the spring thaw it was often impossible to drive 
through cattle lots.27 
The remedy was fence line feeding systems. With fence line feeding, the bunks 
themselves became part of the fence. Instead of driving into a feed lot and contending with 
gates, getting stuck, and animals crowding around the bunks or escaping when gates were 
open, fence line feeding allowed farmers to avoid those inconveniences. They simply drove 
along the fence to unload into bunks and the work was done. Fence line feeding quickly 
became a popular method of automated feeding. With self-unloading wagons one person 
could haul feed for hundreds of animals. 
In order to gain this kind of economy, farmers needed to conduct careful planning for 
structures, lots, and bunks. Because the bunks were part of the permanent fence, they could 
not be moved to avoid muddy areas like portable bunks. Extension engineers helped farmers 
plan these systems. As one Pottawattamie County cattleman pointed out, "We're afraid of 
mud where the cattle stand and also where you have to drive for unloading." Of course, 
these problems could be overcome with concrete next to the bunks for the cattle to stand on 
and gravel pathways for the tractor, but these measures increased the cost of fence line 
systems.28 
Self-feeders were a less expensive alternative than fence-line feeding, since a farmer 
could fill the feeders with a large quantity of grain and let animals eat for several days before 
refilling. These devices could be designed for hogs or cattle, with wooden units for cattle 
27 Cliff Johnson interview. 
28 Cliff Johnson interview; "Make cattle feeding easier and quicker," Wallaces Farmer, 15 February 1958. 
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and galvanized metal for hogs, which tended to be harder on the feeders. A typical self-
feeder had a central storage unit and feeding areas at the bottom. This allowed gravity to pull 
feed downward as the animals ate. Farmers could use grinder-mixers to prepare their own 
rations consisting of grain, supplements, and forage crops and deliver the feed directly to 
bunks or self-feeders. Ten years of experience confirmed the value of self-feeders for Hans 
Hansen of Emmet County. He liked the fact that during busy periods he was not tied down 
to a time-consuming regimen of livestock chores.29 
Farm families who did not own their own grinding and mixing equipment could even 
have bulk feed delivered directly to their self-feeders. This allowed farmers who did not 
have large herds to avoid the expense of investing in equipment and also allowed them to 
spend their time on other farm jobs, especially during corn planting, hay and forage making, 
and corn and soybean harvesting. As Merrill Randau of Story County explained, "Home 
grinding ties up both a tractor and a man. I couldn't afford to do my own grinding, especially 
when field work is pressing." Claude Ruckman of Hardin County praised the labor saving 
qualities of self-feeders. "I take my corn to the elevator and they deliver the mixed ration 
directly to the feeder. All I have to do is feed hay and check the cattle." Commercially 
manufactured bulk feeds gained in popularity during the 1950s and 1960s as farmers relied 
more heavily on chemical feed additives (see chapter four).30 
One of the most efficient push button systems on large beef cattle operations was also 
found on dairy farms: augers. Electric powered augers could move feed through a tube, 
discharging the feed from holes in the sides of the tube. On the Wiemers farm near 
29 
"Self feeders cut choring time," Wallaces Farmer, 7 July 1962. 
30 Dick Hagen, "Grain banks save you labor," Wallaces Farmer, 3 January 1959; "Self feeders cut choring 
time," Wallaces Farmer, 1 July 1962. 
157 
Melbourne, an auger system was invaluable in feeding 135 head of Herefords in 15 minutes. 
The auger system ran from the corn crib and granary, where a home made mixer made from 
an end gate seeder combined corn and protein before conveying the feed to the silo. At the 
silo, another mixer added silage to the corn-protein mixture. Then the overhead auger carried 
the feed to two concrete feed bunks where it fell through chutes into the bunk. As each chute 
was filled, the auger carried the feed mixture farther down the line until all were filled. 
According to Orval Wiemers, farming eighty acres and feeding livestock with electric 
powered systems was preferable to the kind of farming he did during World War II. "I was 
working myself to death" while farming between 600 to 800 acres at full production. With 
the new system, Orval could handle the morning feeding and then take care of his implement 
business. His fourteen year-old son did the afternoon feeding after school. The Wiemers 
family used family labor to maintain a medium sized herd without hiring workers.31 
Silo unloaders were another tool that farmers used to cut their labor demands. Instead 
of pitching tons of silage down a chute from the top of the silo, it was possible to install an 
electric powered auger that moved around the top of the silo like the hand of a clock, shaving 
silage off the top and conveying it to a blower that discharged the silage down the chute. To 
feed silage to 100 steers by hand a farmer could expect to spend approximately one and a 
half hours per day pitching silage. With an auger unloader that job only took thirty minutes. 
If a family invested $1,200 in an unloader to feed a herd of thirty-five cattle, the cost of the 
machine averaged $1 per day, which was much less than the cost of human labor.32 
31 
"15 Minutes to Feed 135 Cattle," Iowa Farm and Home Register, 2 May 1954. 
32 
"Silo unloaders," Wallaces Farmer, 21 November 1959. 
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The potential labor saving of silo unloaders and auger conveyor systems was a 
powerful incentive for farmers who raised large herds or aspired to raise large herds. Francis 
Kenkel of Shelby County wanted to expand his beef feeding operation but was concerned 
about high labor costs. Instead of hiring labor, he installed an automated system that let him 
feed from 400 to 500 head of cattle per year on his farm. He testified that he could feed 275 
animals by himself in twenty minutes. Ovey Vaala of rural Melvin in Northwest Iowa began 
converting to an automated system in 1947 in response to his frustration with hand feeding 
from a wagon. He spent up to three hours per day to feed a herd of approximately eighty 
head. Furthermore, he incurred the expense of using a tractor for that entire time. Vaala 
installed an auger and tube system over a concrete bunk which would allow him to feed as 
many as 170 head of cattle at once. Vaala boasted that he was able to feed twice as many 
animals in twelve minutes as he used to feed in three hours. The saved labor amounted to an 
estimated $2,000 per year in 1959.33 
The labor situation only worsened for farm families in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
highlighting the importance of automated materials handling. Jim Cochran of Dallas County 
complained that "Good, dependable hired help is getting harder to find. So," he concluded, 
"the best way for me to sidestep this labor bottleneck was to mechanize my feeding." Carl 
Feucht of Lyon County acknowledged that feedlot mechanization did not always provide a 
maximum return on investment but it was preferable to depending on the vagaries of the 
labor market. Feucht maintained that mechanization "sure is more dependable than the hired 
labor situation these days." Norman Erickson of Hamilton County used an auger system to 
33 Dick Hagen, "Mechanize your feedlot?," Wallaces Farmer, 17 October 1959; Pat Kellogg, "He feeds 170 
head in 12 minutes," Successful Farming, February 1959. 
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move feed from a mill in his corn crib to an automated feed operation. "Five years ago," he 
explained in 1960, "we installed the 5-inch auger to move grain and feed fifty-three feet to 
the feeding setup." But when he had to haul feed on a temporary basis during the winter 
after years of using the automated system, it became apparent "how much work the auger had 
been saving us." Erickson's farm had a capacity of between 200 and 300 cattle, and he kept 
all of them on the dry lot. He claimed that his elaborate, electrified feeding system saved 
him the expenses of hiring an extra worker.34 
Farmers even designed their own feeding systems. Joel Middlen of Lyon County 
endured years of back trouble and decided "I had to start using my head instead of my back." 
Middlen combined a gasoline engine, parts from a manure spreader and a junked car to create 
a feed mixer-carrier that would allow him to feed eighty head of beef cattle. Middlen 
dumped grain and silage into the spreader. The manure spreader beaters mixed the feed as 
the moving bed of the spreader pushed the feed out of the machine. An old car-top over the 
beaters kept the feed from being thrown out of the cart, forcing it instead to fall into the feed 
bunks below. The mixer-carrier moved out over the feed bunks on a set of parallel tubes, or 
rails, just as train moved along tracks. The automobile wheels (without tires) kept the 
vehicle on the rails. Middlen built another similar mixer-carrier for his brother-in-law. One 
Hardin County farmer devised a ninety foot retractable bunk that moved on rails. Inventing 
these systems allowed farmers to use their own time during slower winter months to 
minimize capital investment.35 
34 Dick Hagen, "Mechanize your feedlot?" Wallaces Farmer, 18 February 1961; "Saves labor with mechanized 
feeding," Wallaces Farmer, 1 April 1961; "Let augers do the job," Wallaces Farmer, 3 September 1960; 
Successful Farming Materials Handling, Third Edition, circa 1960. Dale O. Hull Papers. 
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In some cases, farmers completely redesigned the layout of their farmsteads. Existing 
buildings were part of the reality farmers lived with, even when those buildings were not 
designed with automated feeding in mind. In 1965 Russell Frandson of Story County 
reworked his farmstead that was initially laid out in 1939. He tied the com crib and a cluster 
of three small silos together with overhead augers, allowing him to draw on any one of the 
silos for mixing silage with grain. He tied another silo into the system with a second 
overhead auger. The lines met to carry feed into two long feeder augers that ran 
perpendicular to the main line. The two long feeder augers deposited the feed into one 144 
foot bunk and one 105 foot bunk, enabling him to feed up to 500 head of cattle.36 
There were significant costs to these new systems, although for many farmers who 
already invested in silos and feedlots in the years before automation, the cost of mechanizing 
was not daunting. According to one 1959 advertisement, augers and motors cost 
approximately $700 for farmers who fed fewer than 300 head of cattle. Three years later 
Robert Peet of Jones County reported that he invested $700 for an auger system. The augers 
were the least expensive part of the operation. Costs ranged from $1.50 per foot for four inch 
diameter augers to $2.00 per foot for six inch diameter augers. Jim Cochran's 160 foot bunk 
cost about five dollars per foot, or a total of $800. This figure included the bunk, concrete 
for the cattle to stand on while they ate, and the crushed rock path to keep the tractor and 
self-unloading wagon out of the mud. In 1959 Marvin Femow of Linn County invested 
approximately $1,750 in electric motors, auger, and tubing to feed his 435 cattle in less than 
twelve minutes. Silo unloaders cost from $1,000 to $1,500 in the late 1950s. These expenses 
36 Phil B. Jones, "He built a '65 Feed Lot around a 1939 Barn," Successful Farming, September 1965. 
161 
would have been unthinkable to an earlier generation, but for farmers confronted with high 
labor costs, the expense was reasonable.37 
Costs were appreciably higher when farmers created entirely new systems. When 
farmers created an operation from the ground up rather than simply converting an existing 
feedlot they confronted the expenses of erecting new silos, feed bunks, sheds, and fenced 
lots. This was the kind of set-up that Lawrence and Gordon Hauck of Humboldt County 
installed around 1960 to fatten two herds of 350 cattle every year. The most important labor 
saving element of their operation was a circular feed bunk with an overhead swinging auger 
to carry silage and feed from the corn crib and three new concrete silos that were eighteen 
feet wide and fifty feet tall. This system cost $15,000, including concrete feed bunks and 
concrete floor to keep cattle out of the mud.38 
These kinds of expenses were not intimidating to farmers who had a high tolerance 
for risk. In 1962 Bob Anson of Marshall County invested $25,000 in an automated beef 
feeding operation for 750 head of cattle and 700 feeder pigs per year. The new farm layout 
included two, twenty foot wide by sixty foot high silos with 100 foot auger bunks. Anson 
managed these animals and farmed 700 acres all with the help of only one hired man. In 
spite of low cattle prices in the mid 1960s, Anson justified the expense of his operation by 
comparing the first cost of the feedlot and buildings to the cost of hired labor. "If I didn't 
have my beef feeding equipment, I'd need another man," he explained. "In ten years, his 
wages would match my feedlot investment which should give me at least 20 years use." 
37 Eugene S. Hahnel, Stilbosol advertisement, Successful Farming, December 1959; "Augers can speed choring 
time," Wallaces Farmer, 3 March 1962; "Let augers do the job," Wallaces Farmer, 3 September 1960; Hagen, 
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Calculated this way, Anson was able to stretch his investment in capital improvements over 
twenty years instead of spending the same amount of money on labor over ten years.39 
Even farmers who were willing to invest large sums of money into farmstead 
modernization exercised caution. The Berghoefer Livestock and Grain Company, located in 
Franklin County, was large family enterprise that expanded incrementally in the 1960s. 
The Berghoefers counseled careful planning based on observation of existing facilities and 
other operations combined with expert advice. They expanded from 400 head capacity to 
800 head capacity in three years. After planning and research, "put it up a piece at a time to 
make sure each thing pans out as you go along—missteps are easier to correct early." 
Farmers who committed to this kind of rapid growth needed to plan out every aspect of the 
operation.40 
Experts encouraged farm families to put pencil to paper and determine just how 
profitable automated feeding could be on their farms. The most variable cost, as noted, was 
labor. If farmers paid their labor low wages, then it was potentially more profitable to 
continue hand feeding. If wages were high, then pushbutton techniques were more attractive. 
Similarly, if a farmer spent a lot of time feeding animals, that labor cost would add up more 
quickly than if a farmer spent comparatively little time in feeding. In 1961 Wallaces Farmer 
published the results of a Purdue University study on the costs of labor and the profitability 
of automated feeding. The study indicated that if a farmer could save an hour per day over 
the course of two feedings and paid either himself or a hired man $.75 per hour, that farmer 
could afford to invest $1,750 in mechanized feeding. But a farmer who paid $2 per hour 
39 Wayne Messerly, "Automation lets him feed more cattle," Wallaces Farmer, 5 March 1966. 
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could afford to invest $4,800 to save an hour per day. These calculations indicated just how 
rapidly labor costs could add up over the course of a year and proved that capital investment 
could help farmers. One father-son partnership from O'Brien County made the claim that 
their automated system was more reliable than hired men. In the years since they installed 
their system they only missed one feeding. "Not many hired men can make a claim like 
that," they asserted. "Making do" or just getting by with hand feeding was not an attractive 
option for farmers who hoped to continue farming in the postwar world.41 
Automated feeding not only helped farmers deal with the cost-price squeeze by 
cutting labor costs but also by expanding production. Prices for farm products were often 
increasing, just not as rapidly as costs. This pressure made standing still in terms of farm 
practices a risky position. Expansion was one attractive solution to the problem of low 
prices. Fred Schmidt, a cattle feeder from Clinton County, made an educated guess about the 
impact of pushbutton techniques on feeding trend in the state. "If it weren't for 
mechanization in the feedlot," he asserted, "I bet there'd be one-third less cattle on feed" in 
the state. "If we had to go back to the scoop and basket, I know we'd be feeding fewer cattle 
than we are," he declared in 1961. Schmidt's analysis may have involved some guesswork, 
but it reflected an important truth about the 1950s. Automated materials handling meant 
expansion for most farmers. Dairy farmers used automated materials handling and new 
milking parlors to expand production to offset shrinking returns. Similarly, beef producers 
could automate to expand. When it took as much time to feed fifty cattle by hand is it did 
41 
"Saves labor with mechanized feeding," Wallaces Farmer, 1 April 1961; Operation Feedbunk, 8mm (Iowa 
State College Film Production Unit, 1959), Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State University. 
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300 by machine, the investment in automation was something that could pay for itself in a 
matter of years.42 
Automated feeding also made it easier for people with less skill or physical strength 
to handle routine feeding. Workers who were older, partially disabled, or teenaged were less 
expensive than workers in their prime who often had families to support. Carl H. Goeken's 
system on his Cass County farm was designed to help him do in thirty minutes what it 
previously took two men half a day to do. "I wanted to have a setup that could be operated 
by a single hired man or a 'retired' person," suggesting that he not only cut labor costs, but 
could also have someone who was less physically fit do the work. Even hired men testified 
to the relative deskilling of farm labor. Goeken's hired man claimed that the system was not 
complicated. "Main thing," he explained, "is just to push the buttons in the right order so 
that the wrong thing doesn't happen." Pushing buttons in sequence required little brawn or 
brain power. The demand for physically powerful farm workers decreased as mechanization 
of feeding increased. Ted Pellett of Cass County claimed that the ease of pushbutton was a 
welcome change from the scoop shovel. According to Pellett, "It's nice to stand inside and 
feed cattle when it's pouring down rain or a blizzard." Now farmers who fattened livestock 
could enjoy the creature-comforts that dairy families and workers began to appreciate when 
they converted to modern milking parlors.43 
Despite the attention farm journalists devoted to the benefits of mechanized feeding, 
it remained a practice of a small minority of farmers through the 1960s. In 1964 49 percent 
of farmers in Iowa reported feeding cattle, while only half of those reported feeding cattle 
42 
"Outside Stuff," Wallaces Farmer, 4 March 1961. 
43 Newt Hawkinson, "Mechanized feeding for beef cattle," Wallaces Farmer, 21 March 1964. 
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year round. This 25 percent of Iowa farmers were the only ones who could justify the 
expense of automated feeding. Of the farmers who fed cattle, 9 percent used fence-line feed 
bunks and slightly less than 7 percent used power conveyors such as augers for feeding. The 
most popular form of labor saving device in cattle feeding was the self-unloading wagon. 
One fourth of all cattle feeders used these wagons to fill feed bunks either along fence lines, 
or, more commonly, in the middle of feedlots.44 
Even though a minority of farmers fully automated their feedlots, this minority played 
an increasingly important part in Iowa agriculture. Over the course of the 1960s, the number 
of feedlots declined, but the share of statewide cattle production of the largest of those 
feedlots increased. Iowa led the nation in the total number of feedlots for cattle as well as 
numbers of cattle marketed. In 1969 there were 44,002 feedlots of all sizes in the state, down 
from 46,000 in 1968. The decline was in the number of feedlots with less than 1,000 head of 
cattle, although the remaining feedlot operators with less than 1,000 head actually marketed 
more cattle in 1969 than they did in 1968. While the number of lots with more than 1,000 
animals did not increase from 1968 to 1969, the share of total production for those lots 
increased slightly. In 1968 the largest feedlots marketed 8 percent of the total number of 
cattle marketed in the state. In 1969 the largest feedlots marketed 9 percent of Iowa cattle. 
The shift of one percent from one year to the next did not constitute a trend by itself, but the 
shrinking number of small scale producers most was a major shift in production.45 
It is almost impossible to know anything about the motivation of the 2,000 smaller-
scale operators who quit raising cattle from 1968 to 1969, but the example of dairying is 
44 
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instructive. Dairy farmers shifted operations in large numbers in the 1950s rather than invest 
in new equipment that made expansion possible. Some continued for a while, but they could 
not last long producing for a lower priced Grade B market. There were many thousands of 
small scale operators who continued to raise beef profitably, but there were also many who 
found that the capital requirements of livestock production were too steep to continue, just as 
most dairy farmers had realized. Those who stayed in farming concentrated on other tasks 
such as raising cash grain. Many may have quit agriculture due to age or to pursue 
opportunities elsewhere. But there was no escaping the fact that in a period of steady or 
declining prices, those who produced at the lowest cost were in the best position to survive. 
While automated feedlots met the needs of the growing number of farmers who 
finished large numbers of cattle, confinement feeding was the ideal image of industrialized, 
pushbutton agriculture in the late 1960s. From feeding to manure removal, almost every step 
of the process of helping animals reach market weight could be mechanized. This was a 
change from the ways farmers raised hogs up through the mid twentieth century. Although 
nineteenth century settlers frequently let their hogs roam for much of the year, fencing fields 
to keep animals out rather than constructing fences to keep animals in, by the twentieth 
century animals were frequently enclosed on Iowa farms. As population density increased 
and a handful of farmers began investing in improved breeds of livestock, communities 
passed new fence laws to keep animals in to help control breeding. Throughout most of the 
twentieth century, most farmers grazed hogs on pasture part of the year; they grazed them in 
cornfields with cattle in the fall, and kept those animals in lots adjacent to the corn crib for 
fattening before marketing. This way, farmers converted com, a low priced commodity, into 
higher priced pork and lard. Hogs did not require much work when they were on pasture or 
"hogging down" a cornfield. Farmers needed to haul drinking water but the animals 
typically thrived on the pastures and in the cornfields. When the hogs were enclosed in lots, 
they required much more work. Farmers hauled water in addition to feed. But this 
traditional system of feeding hogs would change after 1950. First with hogs and then with 
cattle, confinement feeding represented the ultimate expression of industrialization in 
livestock production.46 
In the early 1950s confinement feeding simply meant restricting hogs to a concrete 
floor. This kind of confinement was not the most popular method of raising hogs. In 1955 
only 29 percent of Iowa farmers raised hogs on cement. Most farmers did not believe it was 
practical to confine animals. There was just too much risk of disease on small, cement 
floored lots compared with feeding hogs on pasture. As one Ida County farmer stated, "It's 
healthier to have 'em out on pasture..." The lots provided a disease-rich environment, with 
hogs in close quarters much more susceptible to communicable diseases than those on more 
extensive pastures.47 
But there were two major developments that made confinement feeding more 
practical in the mid 1950s. Antibiotics were available to prevent or control the outbreak of 
disease. Furthermore, when administered in sub-clinical doses, those antibiotics stimulated 
growth, helping to speed animals to market weight faster than animals without antibiotics 
(see chapter four). The other trend was the increase in land prices. As land prices rose, in 
part due to the competition of expansion-minded farmers, farmers needed to obtain 
maximum returns from each acre. Pasture grazing hogs on large tracts was simply did not 
46 For a general discussion of changes in hog housing, see Chris Mayda, "Pig Pens, Hog Houses, and Manure 
Pits: A Century of Change in Hog Production," Material Culture 36 (Spring 2004): 18-42. 
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pay returns as high of returns as other uses for that land such as growing crops. Arnold 
Kolder of Butler County stated bluntly that "My fields are worth more to me in crops than in 
pasture." Dairy and beef farmers learned that it was more profitable to keep animals on a lot 
and haul feed to them than to let the animals graze because the rate of gain was faster with 
controlled feeding. As land values appreciated, farmers wanted to get the most possible 
production from that land, which often meant raising more livestock feed or a high return 
crop such as soybeans. Confining hogs to cement feeding areas allowed farmers to get the 
most from their land. It also allowed farmers to market hogs throughout the year instead of 
selling in January and February when everyone else sold hogs and prices were at their lowest 
point of the year.48 
The disadvantage of confinement feeding was the high labor requirement. Instead of 
letting hogs graze for themselves and deposit their manure across a large acreage, farmers 
who confined hogs to concrete lots needed to haul feed and move tons of manure, both labor 
intensive jobs. Oscar Tometen of Pottawattamie County emphasized that it not only took 
labor to move the manure but it also took time to clean and disinfect feeding equipment used 
in the lots to prevent the spread of disease. Confinement feeding meant large numbers of 
hungry mouths and tons of manure. It was not possible to continue to use the scoop shovel 
and manure fork with confinement feeding.49 
A small number of farmers experimented with automation and architecture to reduce 
the labor demands of confinement feeding. In 1959 the definition of confinement changed. 
Instead of simply confining hogs to lots with hard surfaced floors, confinement came to mean 
48 
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confining hogs to pens within a building. These pole-framed buildings were divided into 
pens of varying size. Max Bailey of Story County constructed a new building along these 
lines in 1957. A feed mill and storage occupied one end of the rectangular building. An 
auger system carried feed down the center of the length of the 176 foot long building, 
depositing feed along one side of the eighteen pens. These sixteen by eighteen foot pens 
included an automatic watering device for fresh drinking water. Lengthwise along the 
exterior walls there were dunging alleys. During normal operations, a portion of the alleys 
were included in each pen, but movable gates could close off each pen and open the alley 
from one end of the building to the other. A tractor loader could scrape the manure off the 
floor and push it into a pit at one end of the building. The new style of confinement feeding 
was a completely integrated system designed to handle large numbers of animals with 
minimal labor.50 
Manufacturers even offered prefabricated confinement feeding structures. The 
"Bacon Bin," manufactured by a company in Kansas City, Missouri, resembled a steel grain 
storage bin with corrugated siding and conical roof. The interior included two levels of pens 
arranged around the circumference of the structure, which could be rigged for farrowing or 
finishing hogs. In addition to automated feeding, watering, waste removal, the building was 
completely insulated and included a ventilation system temperature control. William 
Conover of Marshall County installed a Bacon Bin on his farm in 1964, one year before the 
structures were on the market, claiming that it was an inexpensive structure to build and that 
his hogs were gaining weight rapidly with minimal labor costs.51 
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Iowa farmers substituted capital for labor in livestock operations. One Carroll 
County farmer constructed a thirty-six by 100 foot building with twelve pens to 
accommodate up to fifty hogs per pen. This farmer, like Max Bailey, could feed many more 
hogs with this kind of operation than would have been possible to feed with older systems. 
By investing approximately $4,500 in materials and an undisclosed amount for labor, Mearl 
Pottroff attempted to produce a large number of hogs for the market as fast as possible. 
USDA economists estimated total costs for a 500 hog operation to be approximately $10,000. 
Other farmers such as Don Goodenow of Ida County probably spent less to convert an old 
barn to a confinement barn even though he installed separate augers for moving feed into the 
barn and manure out of it. He claimed that he spent approximately one hour per day to chore 
and inspect 400 hogs. E. L. Quaife, an Iowa State College swine specialist, believed that 
these new facilities were best suited for farmers who were willing to raise more than 500 
hogs per year. Expert farmers, bankers, and extension professionals encouraged farmers who 
kept small herds to keep hogs on pasture to keep production profitable. With large 
investments and large scale production, confinement feeding was the choice of a few rather 
than that of the many.52 
Robert Hamilton of Hardin County was one of those rare farmers who moved his 
animals off of pastures and into buildings. Hamilton not only confined the hogs he planned 
to sell but also his breeding herd. He constructed a $20,500 farrowing house in 1957 and in 
1959 invested $4,000 in a confinement building for finishing hogs. The automatic feeders, 
water system, and manure gutters were not unique features. Hamilton's system was unique 
52 Dick Hagen, What housing for feeder pigs?," Wallaces Farmer, 18 April 1959; Newt Hawkinson, 
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because he kept hogs inside all year long. Hamilton surmised that the labor savings that 
farmers realized by housing animals inside for part of the year could be realized the entire 
year.53 
Beef producers also wanted to realize the improved rate of gain that hog producers 
enjoyed from confinement feeding. Some of them already automated their feedlots, but few 
farmers provided shelter for their beef cattle. Cattle only needed shelter in the most extreme 
weather, but providing some kind of shelter would help them convert more of their feed to 
weight gain rather than keeping warm. For most farmers for most of the twentieth century, 
however, any potential gains were not worth the expense. Farmers who constructed shelters 
used simple pole sheds. A Taylor County farmer did not have any structures designated as 
cattle shelter. He explained, "My cattle spend the winter in the grove and around the 
buildings." In the 1960s a small group of cattlemen and farmers hoped that they could get 
more gain by controlling the environment for livestock, just as hog farmers had begun to do 
in the 1950s.54 
Farmers who confined beef animals could minimize the extremes of temperature 
while gaining all the benefits of automated feeding, watering, and manure removal. The 
most publicized cattle confinement in the state belonged to Jim Rock of Kossuth County. 
Rock constructed his seventy-two by 160 foot building in 1961 at a cost of $1.25 per square 
foot, including labor charges. He used cornstalks and corn cobs for bedding over a concrete 
floor for 300 cattle. The bedding helped keep the cattle out of the manure and dry, while the 
packed manure generated heat in the winter time. A fence line bunk along one side of the 
53 John Harvey, "3 Buildings, 1,200 Hogs—All Under Roof," Successful Farming, April 1965. 
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building allowed for automated feeding. In 1962 Rock reported that he was pleased with his 
operation, but would not know how successful it really was until he was able to use it for at 
least another year.55 
After several years of operation, Rock and other farmers who chose confinement 
praised the system. Rock moved cattle that weighed from 850 to 900 pounds into his 
building and kept them there until they were ready for market at from 1,050 to 1,150 pounds. 
Rock concluded that the barn "really pays off in this final push." His records indicated that 
cattle in his outside lots gained about .10 pounds per day less than his cattle in confinement. 
That small margin, spread over 300 cattle every year for several years added up quickly. 
After nine years of operation he calculated that the barn paid for itself in five years. Robert 
and Roger Clause of Grand Junction agreed that confinement feeding paid. They built their 
facility in 1968 when they hosted the Farm Progress show. While they would not divulge the 
specifics on the profitability of their operation, they maintained after two years of operation 
that the building would pay for itself in ten years or less. Some of the most persuasive 
evidence that beef confinement could work was the fact that Rock's brother-in-law copied 
his system in 1969 and that in 1970 Rock planned to build another barn like his old one.56 
In spite of Rock's success and willingness to invest in another confinement building 
as the 1970s began, there was no consensus among farmers that confinement was the best 
solution for finishing cattle. A new partial confinement operation opened in 1970 near 
Aurelia in Cherokee County to accommodate 12,000 steers. This was the exception to the 
rule, however. Farmers who voted with their money voted against the new system. There 
55 Chester Peterson, Jr. and William J. Fletcher, "Cattle feeding goes inside," Successful Farming, September 
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were fewer cattle confinement operations for cattle than there were for hogs. H. L. Self, an 
animal scientist at Iowa State University argued that confinement feeders needed to earn at 
least sixty dollars more per steer than those who did not use any shelter at all. Self 
proclaimed that that was a difficult goal to reach, implying that most farmers would be wise 
to continue traditional feeding practices.57 
Experts still played an important role in promoting confinement feeding for hogs and 
cattle. Livestock specialists at Iowa State and the extension staff studied the proper size of 
pens, construction materials, ventilation, and arrangement for manure disposal systems. 
Some of these experts were on hand at the 1962 Farm Progress Show, sponsored by Wallaces 
Farmer. In 1962 Iowa State University dedicated its exhibit to hog production. The 
"Pigneyland" exhibit focused on the ideal type of hog carcass for modern consumers, 
selecting proper breeding stock to obtain these ideal animals, and the architecture and 
equipment needed to raise hogs from farrowing to finishing. In the finishing building, the 
emphasis was on pens with slotted floors for keeping pens free of manure. Extension 
specialists were on hand to answer questions from interested farmers. Crowds were always 
large for these expositions, but large crowds and interest in learning more about the details of 
new technology did not indicate that a majority of farmers were willing to commit to the new 
technology.58 
The growth in the number of farmers who raised hogs in confinements was slow 
during the 1960s. In a 1966 poll of Iowa hog farmers only 2 percent of respondents stated 
that they raised hogs in buildings with insulation, ventilation, and automated feeding and 
57 John Dorr, "Iowa's Largest Feedlot: Pampered Beef, Inc.," Iowa Agriculturist, Winter 1972; "Beef 
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manure handling systems. Farmers still reported good luck with pasture systems, contending 
that they kept animals on clean ground and they did not have to do any manure hauling. 
Most of the interest in getting into modern confinement feeding was by farmers under the age 
of fifty. Nine percent of this group was interested in confinement feeding while only 2 
percent of the over aged fifty group indicated any interest in pursuing it. A majority of hog 
producers continued to use the pasture system. There were many farmers who profitably 
raised several hundred head of hogs on pasture during the 1960s. The handful of farmers 
who chose to use confinement feeding during the 1960s suggests that farmers regarded it as 
59 unproven, unwise, or unnecessary. 
Farmers who continued to farm with hogs on pasture explained their decisions to stay 
with their system. Some farmers simply liked the way they did business. A farmer from 
Plymouth County asserted that he would never abandon pasture feeding. "I raise over 500 
head of hogs in the field and it's simple and easy." For others, an investment in pasture 
feeding meant that farmers would want to use that system as long as it was intact. Roger 
Shaff of Clinton County converted to confinement feeding, but insisted that it was not for 
everyone. Farm families with capital and little labor could make it pay, "But if you have 
enough labor and not a lot of capital, there's no advantage." Age was also an important 
concern, as indicated by the 1966 poll cited above. "I'm not as young as I used to be," 
explained Don Kruse of Floyd County, "and I can't afford to invest that kind of money at this 
stage of the game." Renters were also discouraged from investing the thousands of dollars in 
permanently situated confinements, although there were a few exceptions. As one renter 
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commented, "It would make a difference too, if you were just in the hog business. I feed 
about 140 head of cattle a year too, and I have a lot of money tied up in them." This 
commitment to diversification was an important anchor for farmers who hoped to ride out 
low prices for one commodity with receipts from another commodity.60 
The high first cost of constructing a confinement system could pay off, but making 
that kind of investment necessitated expanding production. A farmer from Washington 
County explained it this way in a response to an inquiry from a producer who wanted to 
continue raising a herd of 500 hogs but was unsure about whether or not to invest in a 
confinement or continue raising hogs on pasture. ".. .Building a hog confinement building, 
in addition to your present equipment, would not be profitable unless you increase your hog 
production." While one Iowa farmer in twenty raised more than 500 hogs per year, the 
largest group of producers, 28 percent of farmers, raised between 100 and 200 head. 
Furthermore, the percentage of sales of hogs for producers in this category increased over the 
course of the early 1960s. The growth in this group suggests that most farmers liked raising 
hogs on pasture with family labor and that they were more risk averse than the handful of 
farmers who invested in confinements.61 
Farmers who turned to confinement feeding prized the potential for expansion. These 
risk-tolerant farmers were prepared to invest in systems that would allow them to ride out 
future price shocks. As a Boone County farmer observed about confinement feeding in 1965, 
"Oh, it's coming, all right. There aren't too many in our area yet—but it's coming." 
Farmers who used confinements believed in the future of this new system. In the mid 1960s 
60 
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Carl Frederick of Johnson County raised 1,600 hogs per year. He maintained that farmers 
needed to be fatten hogs year round to make their investments in buildings and equipment 
pay off. To speed the rate of gain, confinement was absolutely necessary. In explaining his 
vision for the future, Frederick explained "I feel that hogs will be in controlled buildings— 
they'll never leave buildings from birth to market." By removing variables such as 
fluctuations in weather and controlling feeding, industrial style production would allow 
farmers to be more profitable than producers who used pasture systems.62 
Industrial style production was not free of problems, however. Although the idea 
behind confinement feeding was to speed weight gain in animals by removing variables that 
caused stress, such as weather conditions, confinement caused its own stresses that were 
reflected in animal behavior or even illness. Veterinarians reported that farmers who used 
confinements saw more problems with aggressive behavior. Specifically, hogs would bite 
the tails of other hogs. The concrete floors took their toll on animal health, causing sore feet 
and legs. Some veterinarians argued that mineral deficiencies in confinement-raised hogs 
contributed to the tail biting and lameness, and that farmers needed to increase the level of 
salts and trace minerals in the hogs' diet. If ventilation was not adequate, the dust of feed 
and waste as well as airborne pathogens could cause respiratory ailments. One Oelwein 
veterinarian summed up the situation by observing that "practically the same disease 
problems [exist] in confinement as in pasture systems, except that I find more of them and 
more that are difficult to treat."63 
62 Hofmeyer, "Producers' views on hog growing systems,"; Carl Frederick, "How I Breed and Feed For No. 1 
Hogs," Successful Farming, July 1965. 
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The solution to these behavior and medical problems was for farmers to improve their 
herd management. On the pasture system, hogs took care of themselves as along as farmers 
provided feed and water. Confinement feeding was different. Farmers saved labor, but they 
also needed to pay closer attention to small details that could be magnified by the large 
numbers of animals and scale of confinements. This was a substitution of highly skilled 
labor for skilled labor. As one beef confinement feeder maintained, "There's a lot more to it 
than just pushing buttons." Farmers always had to watch their herds, but with the increased 
investment in buildings and automated systems, they now had to pay even more attention to 
the details. In some operations, workers and visitors showered before entering livestock 
areas. They even installed clothes washers and dryers to prevent pathogens from infecting 
the herd or leaving the property. It was critical to monitor nutrition, equipment, ventilation, 
health, and waste management. Farmers who did not risked seeing one small problem 
magnified many times into a major problem.64 
Waste management was the one detail that assumed monumental importance to 
confinement feeders. Large-scale confinement feeding brought a large-scale manure 
problem. Hogs on pasture were spread out over many acres, depositing urine and feces 
across a large area. By contrast, hogs in confinement buildings deposited their waste in a 
small area. The amount of waste excreted by one hog on full feed in confinement was 
staggering. A one-hundred pound hog that consumed approximately 4.7 pounds of feed per 
day produced 4.3 pounds of solid waste per day and 1.06 gallons of liquid waste. As the hog 
reached market weight of 250 pounds it consumed 8.2 pounds of feed per day and excreted 
64 Farm Progress Show confinement beef barn pleases owners," Wallaces Farmer, 14 March 1970; 
"Confinement setup for feeder pigs," Wallaces Farmer, 27 January 1968. 
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7.8 pounds of solid waste and 2.65 gallons of liquid waste per day. Animals in a 250 hog 
they generated almost one ton of solid waste and approximately 662 gallons of liquid waste 
per day just before they were sold. This was an unprecedented amount of waste to handle.65 
Farmers who practiced confinement feeding needed new ways to deal with massive 
amounts of manure. They constructed manure pits under the confinement buildings to collect 
solid and liquid waste. Large scale operations that included automated feed, water, and 
ventilation systems also included automated manure handling. Herman Tripp of Greene 
County constructed an underground pit made of concrete blocks five by six by eight feet to 
hold his hog manure. Each week he used a four inch auger to transfer the manure from the 
pit to a spreader wagon to carry the waste to his fields. These pits required regular labor to 
clean. If they could not be emptied for some reason the farmer faced a manure back-up of 
industrial proportions.66 
The manure lagoon was a labor saving solution to the manure problem. A lagoon was 
simply a large basin of variable width and depth to hold animal waste and to allow the waste 
to decompose before it would be removed and used as fertilizer. There were two types of 
lagoons, aerobic and anaerobic. Aerobic lagoons included enough water that bacteria that 
used oxygen could survive, while anaerobic lagoons were so concentrated that only bacteria 
that lived in environments without oxygen could thrive. While research from the mid 1960s 
indicated that most lagoons had both aerobic and anaerobic qualities, experts and farmers 
65 
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William Hines (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1967), 159. 
66 Dick Hagen, "Easy manure handling," Wallaces Farmer, 21 November 1959. 
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believed that the wide, shallow lagoons were aerobic while the deep lagoons were 
anaerobic.67 
One of the first manure lagoons constructed in Iowa was at the Northeast Iowa Swine 
Testing Station in Chickasaw County which opened in 1960. The purpose of the testing 
station was to help farmers make the transition from lard-type hogs which were falling out of 
consumer favor to meat-type animals. Farmers could have their boars raised at the station 
where they would be fed a standard diet and closely monitored for rate of gain, thickness of 
back fat, and ratio of feed conversion to meat. At the end of the test period the station 
conducted a sale of animals that met the minimum standards of the station. The farmer 
reimbursed the station for the number of animals that had been raised there. Approximately 
350 animals were on site at any given time, which meant that waste would accumulate 
quickly. To handle hog waste and to save labor, station managers installed the new lagoon 
technology.68 
In the early 1960s farm families who practiced confinement feeding began to 
experiment with lagoons, too. Robert Schrier installed a sloping gutter to carry manure to his 
lagoon on his Cass County farm. Every day he scraped the hog waste into the gutter and 
every week or ten days he removed the plug on the gutter and gravity would carry the backed 
up waste through an eight-inch tile line into his lagoon. This technique allowed him to 
remove manure from a thirty-eight by eighty foot building that housed between 250 to 300 
hogs. Farmers who had manure collection pits had to drain those pits on a regular basis 
depending on the size of the holding tank. Sometimes it was every week, other times every 
67 Newt Hawkinson, "What they're learning about manure lagoons," Wallaces Farmer, 18 April 1964. 
68 For more on the testing station, see William Colgan Page, Leaner Pork for a Healthier America: Looking 
Back on the Northeast Iowa Swine Testing Station (Iowa Department of Transportation in cooperation with the 
Federal Highway Administration and the State Historical Society of Iowa, 2000), 8-9. 
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few months. By contrast, farmers with lagoons were free from the regular and frequent 
round of moving manure.69 
Experts played a larger role in farming operations as farm families attempted to deal 
with waste. With the large sums of money involved, sometimes as much as tens of thousands 
of dollars for complete confinements, grain handling buildings, and waste management 
facilities, consultants could help farmers maximize returns on investment. The extension 
service and Midwest Plan Service provided free or low-cost advice and plans for farmers 
who wanted to construct waste handling lagoons or new buildings. The Midwest Plan 
Service was a consortium of agricultural engineers that drafted farm building plans and had 
headquartered in Ames. The Cooperative Extension Service conducted research on the 
effects of developments such as paved lots and shelter on the rate of gain in feedlot animals. 
By the late 1960s the publications of both extension service and the Midwest Plan Service 
showed the growing complexity of farm planning, especially for livestock manure.70 
By the end of the 1960s farmers who used the new manure handling technology 
confronted new problems that few people anticipated. The manure lagoons and manure tanks 
posed risks to farmers and livestock. There had always been discussions of the smell of 
manure pits and lagoons, but toxic gas was a real threat to safety. Methane and carbon 
dioxide were products of stored liquid manure that were released as farmers pumped out 
69 
"New approach to manure handling," Wallaces Farmer, 2 June 1962; T. L. Willrich and John Harvey, "Easier 
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Farmer, 6 July 1963. 
70 Page L. Bellinger, "Who will plan your system?," Successful Farming, January 1962. For an example of the 
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manure pits. Without adequate ventilation, these gasses could asphyxiate humans and 
animals. Similarly, ammonia irritated respiratory tracts, while hydrogen sulphide could 
cause severe headaches and dizziness and even be fatal when present in large quantities. 
Lagoons also proved to be more complicated. Farmers could not simply create them and 
walk away. Experts advised farmers to create a series of lagoons, including an anaerobic 
lagoon for solid wastes to settle, followed by an aerobic lagoon. In some cases, experts 
recommended that the lagoons be lined with clay to reduce groundwater contamination. 
Furthermore, the thick sludge needed to be removed to keep the bacteria in the lagoon 
working to breakdown the waste. Sludge build up prevented decomposition of waste and 
potentially allowed waste to leach into groundwater or runoff into surface waterways.71 
Agricultural engineers from Iowa State University corresponded with farmers and 
conducted occasional site visits to help farmers implement best practices. Extension 
agricultural engineer Dale Hull corresponded with several farmers and farm managers over 
the course of the 1960s, counseling them on the best practices they could use to minimize the 
runoff of manure into watercourses. From June through September of 1966 Hull and his 
fellow extension agricultural engineer, Ted Willrich, advised Rod Lorenzen, the manager of 
Group 21, Incorporated. Lorenzen initiated contact with Hull to find ways to prevent the 
contamination of Waterman Creek in O'Brien County. Hull recommended a collecting basin 
in which most of the runoff and solid waste would settle. Any overflow would go into a 
shallow, two to three acre oxidation pond. Three months after making these 
71 
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recommendations, Hull and Willrich agreed to fly to Moneta "to take a good look at your 
manure disposal problems in connection with pollution control on Waterman Creek." 
Shortly after making the trip Willrich submitted an evaluation of the feedlot site and provided 
two contacts for engineering services.72 
Willrich advised the feedlot manager that waste runoff from thirty acres of lots and 
roads entered Waterman Creek. Willrich warned that "The Iowa Water Pollution Control 
Commission would no doubt look unfavorably on the continued operation of this feedlot 
until such time as a satisfactory runoff treatment system or runoff utilization system was 
installed." Willrich's recommendations were more complicated than those suggested by 
Hull in June. If the directors of Group 21 wanted to utilize their manure, they could prepare 
a system of settling basins and install a sprinkler system to carry and deposit wastes onto 
crop land. The other option was to create a treatment and disposal system, which would 
include a settling basin, an anaerobic lagoon, an aerobic lagoon, and finally, an evaporation 
cell for removing the last of the liquid from the animal waste. Furthermore, Willrich advised 
that the potential site for the abatement system should be studied. He noted that the site 
should be mapped, tests conducted for soil type and permeability, and flood elevations noted, 
all to prevent pollution. Lorenzen may or may not have had the power to implement these 
recommendations, but they represented the most current thinking of the experts about waste 
abatement.73 
Farmers were not of one mind about large-scale agriculture, waste runoff from 
feedlots, and the role of government regulation in stopping pollution. One third of all 
72 Dale O. Hull to Rod Lorenzen, 14 June 1966, Hull Papers; Dale O. Hull to Rod Lorenzen, 15 September 
1966, Hull papers. 
73 Ted L. Willrich to Rod Lorenzen, 27 September 1966 and "Statement for Group 21, Inc.—Re: Treatment and 
Disposal of Surface Runoff from Cattle Lots and Roads," Hull papers. 
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farmers polled in 1968 about what should be done to curb runoff from feedlots claimed that 
they were not sure what the proper solution should be. Twenty-nine percent of farmers 
surveyed believed that only the large feedlots were responsible for any pollution problems 
and that the majority of farmers were not to blame and should not be regulated. Only 10 
percent of farmers believed that pollution control measures were not needed for agriculture. 
There was agreement among farmers that feedlots were an environmental problem. Ninety 
percent of farmers believed that something should be done to control runoff pollution from 
feedlots, but they did not agree on who was most responsible for that pollution and who 
should be regulated.74 
The differing viewpoints reflected divisions within rural society. Opinion varied by 
age group, education level, and also by income. Almost half of farmers under the age of 
thirty-five wanted more pollution control, while only one third of farmers aged thirty-five to 
forty-nine wanted more control, and only 19 percent of those from fifty to sixty-four agreed 
with the need for more control. Approximately half of those who had attended some college 
favored having regulations on all livestock producers while only 21 percent of those with 
eight years or less of school agreed. Producers with the highest income favored regulation 
for all producers, while those with gross income between $10,000 and $20,000 believed that 
only the largest producers should be held accountable for pollution control. One respondent 
made a vague claim that nature solved pollution problems, while another argued that feedlot 
waste was not responsible for water pollution because "Water is purified after it soaks thru a 
few feet of soil." Comments by farmers who favored regulation suggest that they were 
74 
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motivated less by the issue of water quality for the people of Iowa and more by the "not in 
my back yard" concerns. One Greene County farmer exclaimed that "Something has to be 
done. These large feedlots are a stinking mess." Similarly, another Greene County man 
complained about hog confinements, claiming that "these hogs raised in confinements are 
creating a problem for folks that [sic] have to live next door." One farmer who raised hogs in 
confinement noted that his neighbors and friends made "kidding" comments about the smell 
of his farm. He was concerned that at some point they might do more than joke with him. 
The threat of regulation, court action, or retribution was becoming a reality of agriculture in 
the late 1960s.75 
Farmers with feedlots, just like factory owners, located their facilities close to water 
to help carry away wastes. This solution became less tenable in the 1960s. Members of the 
public and farmers were more sensitive to harm to ecosystems than they had been in the 
1950s. Hull and Willrich were not the only ones counseling farmers to be cautious about 
establishing and operating feedlots and confinements. In the spring of 1968 the Iowa Water 
Pollution Control Commission called a series of public hearings in Iowa City, Ames, 
Atlantic, and Storm Lake to gather input to establish regulations for cattle feedlot waste 
disposal. The commission defined a feedlot as an enclosure or group of enclosures in which 
animal density was greater than fifty head of cattle per acre. Proposed regulations included 
requiring a permit for any operation of more than 1,000 head, that was close to watercourses, 
and if runoff or overflow from a manure lagoon or tank could flow into another's property. 
While there were very few operations of more than 1,000 animals, the other criteria applied 
to many more farmers with feedlots. The Iowa Livestock Feeders Association, the Iowa Beef 
75 
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Producers Association, and the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation opposed the proposed 
regulations. Feeders such as Durward Mommsen, chairman of the Clinton County Farm 
Bureau livestock committee, urged studying the issue for at least two years. Peter Vos, the 
Mahaska County Farm Bureau livestock committee chairman, reminded the public and 
members of the Water Pollution Control Commission that farmers earned only small profits, 
"Any more expenses," he warned, "and we're operating at a loss." At the Iowa Pork Industry 
Conference in Des Moines, a USD A official advised farmers that they could be prosecuted in 
court for the way they did business. He cited examples from Texas and New York in which 
farmers faced tens of thousands of dollars in fees and damages from nuisance suits due to 
odor, noise, dust, and insects.76 
In 1969 the Iowa state legislature amended its Water Pollution Control Law to require 
the registration of some livestock producers in spite of the opposition of livestock producer 
groups and the Farm Bureau. Large-scale producers were the target of the new law, 
especially those considered to be at high risk for polluting surface waters such as rivers and 
lakes. Feeders with over 1,000 cattle and a population density of one animal for each 600 
feet of lot were required to register. As proposed in 1968, the 1969 law also required 
registration for feedlots if there was a 3,200 acre watershed above the feedlot; if feedlot 
runoff or manure overflow entered an underground tile line, well, or sinkhole; or if the 
distance of the feedlot from a stream was less than two feet for every animal on the lot (500 
head had to be at least 1,000 feet from the stream). It is unclear how many farms met these 
76 Tom Patrick, "Attack Proposed Feedlot Rules," Des Moines Register, 24 April 1968; A1 Bull, "Water 
pollution control hearings aimed at Iowa's cattle feedlots," Wallaces Farmer, 13 April 1968. 
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conditions and were required to register. There were 46,000 beef feedlots in the state in 
1969, but only 135 farms claimed over 1,000 cattle.77 
In the fall of 1969 the state alerted feedlot operators to register. By July, 1970, fifty-
two cattle feeding operations registered with the Water Pollution Commission and fifty-three 
more notified the group that they did not need to register since they did not meet the 
registration criteria. State Health Department inspectors viewed sixteen feedlots and 
determined that eleven of those had potential water pollution problems. One year later, a 
total of 147 cattle feeders and twenty-nine hog feeding operations registered with the 
commission.78 
The Water Pollution Control Commission continued to inspect feedlots and require 
permits in 1971. For farmers, this meant more government involvement in their business. A 
farmer who wanted to create a feedlot during the 1950s and 1960s simply built it. Now, the 
process involved agricultural experts and bureaucrats and took months before construction 
could begin. First, the farmer consulted with an Extension livestock specialist at a regional 
office for advice on planning the layout of the lot or confinement and the waste control 
systems. The next step was to contact the Iowa Geological Survey office in Iowa City to 
determine if the site had enough underground water and of the proper quality to sustain the 
planned operation. Soil Conservation Service specialists provided advice on designing the 
facility. The local Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service was the contact for 
federal matching funds through the Rural Environmental Assistance Program (REAP). After 
77 Iowa Water Pollution Control Commission, State Department of Health, Water Pollution Control Progress 
Report, 1968-1969, 12; Wil Groves, "Iowa's feedlot waste disposal law," Wallaces Farmer, 14 August 1971. 
78 Iowa Water Pollution Control Commission, State Department of Health, Water Pollution Control Progress 
Report, July 1, 1969-June 30, 1970, 17; Iowa Water Pollution Control Commission, State Department of 
Health, Water Pollution Control Progress Report, July 1, 1970-June 30, 1971, 17. 
187 
approval by the SCS, the farmer could then register with the Iowa Water Pollution Control 
Commission. For operations situated in a flood plain or if the livestock required more than 
5,000 gallons of water per day, further registration was necessary with the Natural Resources 
Council. Registration and approved plans in hand, farmers could finally begin 
construction.79 
Public criticism, new laws governing feedlots, and concerns about future government 
regulation of water pollution from feedlots and confinements prompted some farmers to 
examine their operations. In 1970 Roy Olson of Dickenson County explained that he began 
to consider the problem of runoff control when some downstream neighbors saw some dead 
fish and speculated that they were killed by waste runoff from Olson's feedlot. Regardless of 
whether or not wastes from his farm contributed to the fish kill, Olson recognized the need to 
change. Arnold Olson of Emmet County had no abatement plan whatsoever. Solid and 
liquid waste simply washed off his feedlot into the county road ditch, through a culvert and 
into a nearby lake. Both farmers wanted assistance.80 
These farmers implemented new waste management plans to deal with their manure 
problems. Arnold Olson brought in local Soil Conservation Service workers and Ted 
Willrich of Iowa State University Extension. They designed a collecting basin at the base of 
the feedlot to hold five inches of runoff from his lot. As solids settled out, Olson pumped the 
liquid out and spread it on his fields. He also installed an eight inch diameter underground 
tile line to drain the liquids into his field. Olson planned to dredge the solids out of the basin 
79 
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every few years. Roy and Scott Olson fed 2,000 cattle on their twelve acre feedlot that was 
near the Little Muddy Creek in the Little Sioux River watershed. The Olson's faced the 
prospect of having the water from fifteen acres upland from their feedlot drain across the lot, 
picking up all the solid and liquid waste and carrying it downstream. To stop water from 
crossing the lot they installed a twenty-four inch tile line to divert this water before it crossed 
the feedlot. Water falling onto the feedlots themselves was also a problem. They 
constructed a collecting basin to catch water from the lot and small check dams along 
waterways to catch solids and let them settle out before the runoff continued to the basin.81 
In 1970 Dale Hull and Stewart Melvin, another Extension Agricultural Engineer, 
traveled to Peterson, Iowa to inspect the farms of Don Plagman and Walter Ankerstjerne. 
Both farmers hoped to construct beef confinements on their respective farms. Melvin 
suggested that both farmers construct oxidation ditches to carry wastes into a series of two 
anaerobic lagoons. Melvin predicted that there would be a possible odor problem for a 
neighbor located approximately one quarter mile away from the proposed site at the 
Anker stj erne farm. To prevent contamination at the Plagman farm Melvin suggested that the 
lagoons there should be banked and partially above ground due to the high water table.82 
Farmers who constructed these waste control systems expressed their desire to head 
off criticism, prosecution, and regulation as well as to be good neighbors. When Bill Conn 
of Kossuth County planned his 2,000 head feedlot in Kossuth County there was concern in 
the community that his livestock waste would drain directly into the nearby Des Moines 
River. Conn noted that a local women's group came to his farm to investigate and to see that 
81 
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his lots would drain away from the river toward a retention pond. As Roy Olson explained, 
"We don't want anyone pointing a finger at us for causing dirty water." Similarly, Arnold 
Olson stated that "Clean water, clean air, and clean environment is really the thing right now. 
I would surely advise anyone building a new feedlot to consider runoff controls." Costs for 
waste control measures ranged from approximately $1 per head to $6, depending local 
conditions and the size of herd. Many farmers were willing to pay these costs, especially 
with assistance through the REAP program. Farmers recognized that they were under 
scrutiny from outsiders and neighbors and wanted to avoid real and perceived pollution 
problems.83 
Farmers committed to highly automated and large scale operations who were subject 
to the new environmental regulations were the minority in 1972, but the new techniques were 
important to a growing number of farmers. Farmers who used push button techniques 
produced a growing portion of Iowa's farm output. Farm families could produce more milk 
and meat than ever before. Large-scale dairy and livestock production was a reality made 
possible by the combination of automated materials handling and new drugs. Farmers who 
used these new systems were leaders in changing the rural landscape. Wallaces Farmer 
recognized the ways in which farmers altered production strategies by sponsoring the annual 
"Master Farmer" program to honor farmers for excellence in farm management and 
community service. Each year the magazine solicited nominations from people across the 
state. A panel consisting of representatives of the Master Farmer Club, an editor from the 
83 Bob Dunaway, "What cost to stop feedlot pollution," Wallaces Farmer, 27 February 1971; "These livestock 
feeders stop pollution." 
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magazine, and an Iowa State University Farm Management Specialist selected several 
farmers among each year's nominees to receive the honor. 
The men who received the Master Farmer honor were all large-scale producers who 
used the latest technology. Every one of the five recipients in 1970 practiced some kind of 
automated materials handling technique, from bulk tanks to outdoor auger feeding to 
confinement feeding for hogs. One farmer piped water into feed boxes in his milking parlor 
to wet the feed to aid as an aid to digestion. Another farmer used a bulk feed delivery service 
for his hog finishing confinement. Not surprisingly, one of the five men even designed his 
own system, incorporating an old coal stoker from a furnace to add supplements to his feed. 
The commitment to innovation through labor saving devices and expansion was part of 
Iowa's remade agricultural landscape. Larger operations, more intensive livestock 
production, serious environmental consequences and government regulation relating to waste 
management on these new-style farms were the legacies of this generation of farmers.84 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Making Hay the Modern Way 
After World War II Iowa farmers reorganized their work by using new kinds of 
haymaking equipment. The old method of putting up loose hay in the barn was physically 
demanding, time consuming, and labor intensive. With the introduction of new machinery 
that automatically baled hay or chopped it into small pieces, farmers had to make choices 
about the ways in which they would deal with one of the most important crops in their crop 
rotation systems and production. Farmers could continue to use the tools that they, their 
parents, and grandparents used or they could try something new. While a handful of farmers 
continued the old techniques, most of them used new technology for the hay crop. They did 
so, however, in different ways. All farmers cared about costs of production, labor scarcity, 
and the quality of the crop, but the tools they used reflected different goals. Some farm 
families used forage choppers and hay balers to help them expand their farms or specialize in 
an effort to beat the postwar cost-price squeeze in which the prices they received for their 
products did not keep pace with their expenses. For other farm families, using a hay baler 
was a means of continuing to farm with a diverse mix of crops and livestock, frequently 
using labor exchanges to minimize expenses. New technology helped farmers with diverse 
goals meet their needs. 
In the years up to 1945, most farmers cut and raked their grass or legume forage crop 
with mowing machines and rakes, picked it up from the field with a hay loader, and hauled it 
to the barn where they used a hay fork to put it in the barn loose, just as it came from the 
field. This system was laborious, requiring three or four laborers who handled the crop at 
least three times to get it into the barn; once from the windrow to the hayrack, once from the 
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hayrack to the barn, and once in the barn to spread the new hay across the mow. Some 
farmers baled hay or straw using a stationary bale press or one of the newer pick-up balers 
that could be pulled through the field, but both of these machines required a tractor driver 
and two operators to tie the bales using lengths of wire. The most common use of the baler 
was to bale straw after threshing for use as animal bedding. Baling hay was advantageous 
for farmers who wanted to sell or move hay during the winter months, since it was easier to 
handle and stack for the second time without losing nutrient rich leaves. But for most 
farmers, baling hay did not pay.1 
Haymaking changed very quickly after the development of the self-tie baler and 
forage harvester. In the late 1930s, a man from New Holland, Pennsylvania developed an 
automatic twine-tie baler, which the New Holland Machine Company produced in large 
numbers beginning in 1940. In 1944 the International Harvester Company, based in 
Chicago, produced its first version of the automatic twine baler. Field forage harvesters, also 
known as forage choppers, were also new in the 1940s. These machines cut and chopped the 
hay into small pieces in the field and blew the cut forage into a truck or wagon pulled behind 
the harvester. Farmers then hauled the crop and fed it to livestock or stored it in a barn, shed, 
or silo. While engineers developed these machines in the 1930s, very few of them actually 
saw use in fields during the depression years or during World War II when the federal 
government focused on producing war materiel and restricted domestic industrial production. 
1 Albert P. Brodell and Martin R. Cooper estimated that in 1944 approximately 75 percent of hay stored on 
farms in the United States was loose, long hay. "The Costs and Ways of Making Hay," in Grass: The Yearbook 
of Agriculture, 1948 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 173. James A. Young's 
study of haying in the western United States is an excellent recap of different haying techniques in the period up 
to World War II. See "Haymaking: The Mechanical Revolution on the Western Range," Western Historical 
Quarterly 14 (July 1983): 311-326. 
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At the end of the war, however, there were two new options to consider when making 
decisions about handling hay.2 
In the late 1940s Iowa farmers began a rapid switch to new haying techniques, 
especially baling. In an effort to do more work, more rapidly, and with less strenuous effort, 
farmers began "Making Hay the Modern Way," as one journalist noted in 1946. Some 
farmers who used the older techniques of the hayloader or the two-man, hand tie baler 
complained that these methods involved too much work, especially when they were aware of 
the labor savings of the automatic, twine tie baler and the chopper. They considered 
investing money in more expensive implements to reduce physical exertion. By the time the 
of the 1951 haying season, 41 percent of Iowa farmers planned to bale all or part of their 
crop, while only 14 percent of farmers planned to handle almost their entire crop as loose 
hay. The rest of Iowa farmers surveyed were somewhere in the middle, with plans to bale 
varying proportions of their crop. Only 17 percent of farmers planned to field chop their hay. 
The next year's survey showed that baling was the most popular way to handle the hay crop 
in 1952, with 55 percent of farmers planning to bale their entire hay crop. The commitment 
to chopping remained approximately the same that year.3 
Farmers made this rapid turn towards new haymaking techniques as they confronted 
the looming postwar labor shortage. Many people and hired hands left rural communities 
during the war for military service or work in defense industries. As the war effort surged in 
1944, a writer for Wallaces ' Farmer observed that farmers were desperate for hired help, but 
2 W. R. Humphries and R. B. Gray, "Partial History of Haying Equipment," United States Department of 
Agriculture, Information Series No. 74 (Washington, D C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Revised October 
1949), 55-6; O. F. Scholl, "The Twine Baler," Agricultural Engineering, November 1947, 501. 
3 
"Making Hay the Modern Way," Wallaces Farmer, 6 July 1946; Richard George Schmitt, jr., "Economic 
Analysis of Haying Methods in Eastern Iowa" (M.S. thesis, Iowa State College, 1947), 52-54; "How To Handle 
Your Hay," Wallaces Farmer, 2 June 1951; "Half Of Farmers Bale All Hay," Wallaces Farmer, 19 July 1952. 
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asserted that Iowa farmers were confident that they would soon have more labor saving 
machinery available to help them do what they had done with human labor before the war. 
But even though the new machines were available for purchase or hire after the war, farmers 
continued to struggle with the labor shortage for years. One farmer from Wright County 
testified that one of his sons entered the army during the Korean War and that he would have 
to hire more custom work. He anticipated that he would "sell the hay in the field and let 
somebody else put it up." Farm families continued to deal with fewer hired men, smaller 
family size, and a contraction in the number of farm operations for the next twenty-five 
years.4 
Manufacturers and advertisers appealed to farmers' anxieties about the labor shortage 
as well as their optimism about technological solutions. An advertisement for John Deere 
haying equipment from 1958 focused on labor savings by invoking concepts of modernity, 
cost reductions, and freedom. Farmers could "Make Hay THE ONE MAN WAY" by using 
the "Revolutionary" new Deere haying system. A "one man crew" could use a combination 
mower and conditioner to get the crop on the ground, rake it, bale it and load the wagon with 
an automatic bale ejector, the center piece of the advertisement. The bale ejector pitched the 
newly made bale into the wagon hitched to the rear of the baler, replacing one or two people 
who would have been needed to stack the bales on a hayrack. The other revolutionary 
element of the system was the automated storage component. A conveyor would move the 
bales up into the barn and along the ridge of the barn before dumping them into the mow. 
Automating the work of hay storage would replace one or two workers who would have been 
4 
"That Hired Man," Wallaces Farmer, 15 January 1944; Marcus and Segal, Technology in America, 301; J. B. 
Davidson and D. K. Struthers, "Haying with Less Help," Farm Science Reporter, 4 (April 1943), 3-6; "How to 
Handle Your Hay." 
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needed to stack the bales in the barn, which was a hot, dirty, and physically demanding job. 
This revolution would enable farmers to not only profit, but to "find new freedom," an 
alluring claim in a time of Cold War tensions and labor shortages.5 
While baling saved labor, chopping hay was even less labor intensive. A University 
of Minnesota study indicated that farmers spent approximately 2.2 hours to put up one ton of 
hay using the old hay loader method, 1.7 hours with a self-tying baler, and 1.2 hours with a 
field chopper. A married couple from Jones County proved that a husband and wife team 
could make eighty acres of chopped hay by themselves without hired help. The Anderson 
family was firmly committed to livestock raising. Only seventeen acres of their 240 acre 
farm were planted in corn while eighty acres was in a mix of alfalfa and brome hay that they 
used to feed beef cattle. The Andersons used a mower with a crusher attached to cut and 
crimp the stems to speed drying. Then, Mrs. Anderson operated the chopper while her 
husband hauled the hay to the barn and unloaded it. The Andersons handled eighty acres by 
themselves by substituting machinery for a crew of three or more workers. Furthermore, 
they spared themselves a great deal of demanding physical work. With automatic unloading 
wagons, they conducted all the work from the tractor seat.6 
A rapid hay harvest was important because it coincided with the labor-intensive work 
of cultivating the corn crop, adding more incentive for farmers to choose baling or chopping. 
While farmers who used newly developed growth regulator herbicides such as 2,4-D could 
expect to reduce the amount of time they spent controlling weeds in their cornfields, only a 
few farmers gave up cultivating altogether. Most continued to face the difficult decision of 
5 John Deere Advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, 15 February 1958. 
6 
"Workday Pointers," Wallaces Farmer, 20 June 1953; "Two Can Make Hay," Wallaces Farmer, 4 September 
1948. 
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choosing between cultivating and haymaking. Almost half of farmers surveyed in 1957 
agreed with the statement that they cut hay when it fit in best with other work. An Ida 
County farmer stated, "Hay making has to wait on corn cultivating on our farm. Corn is the 
important crop." If farmers could find a way to speed haymaking, they could lessen the 
pressure to choose between two or more important tasks.7 
Hay crushers or hay conditioners were valuable tools in speeding the harvest. A 
conditioner was an implement that consisted of a set of rollers, either smooth or fluted, 
mounted on a frame that could either be pulled on its own or behind a mowing machine. The 
hay moved between the rollers that squeezed or crimped the stems and leaves of the crop. 
Hay that had been through a conditioner dried faster, since the moisture from the thick stems 
evaporated faster. A Marshall County cattle feeder with ninety acres of hay followed behind 
his mower with a conditioner in the 1959 season, claiming that crushed hay dried in half the 
time as it normally would in a windrow. "Last year was the first we'd ever tried a hay 
crusher," reported Earl Felt, a dairy farmer from Dallas County. "It eliminated at least one 
day's drying time." Hay conditioners became especially popular in Northeast Iowa where 
commercial dairying was more widespread.8 
Farmers who stored hay that was too moist found that their crop became moldy and 
was unpalatable to livestock. Furthermore, hay that was stored when it was too wet could 
spontaneously combust. The microbes that break down the carbohydrates in the plant 
material are killed off by the heat generated by tightly packed moist hay. Once the microbes 
7 
"Cultivate corn or make hay?," Wallaces Farmer, 4 June 1955; "Can you guess the weather?," Wallaces 
Farmer, 20 July 1957. 
8 Kenneth K. Barnes and Robert C. Fincham, "Yes, Hay Crushers Can Cut Field Risks," Iowa Farm Science, 12 
(May 1958); Dick Seim, "Early-cut hay is best," Wallaces Farmer, 16 May 1959; "Conditioned hay dries 
faster," Wallaces Farmer, 21 May 1960; "For faster haying and better hay," Wallaces Farmer, 23 May 1970. 
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are dead, a chemical reaction occurs in the hay which generates flammable gasses that ignite 
when they contact oxygen. As long as farmers stored loose hay they could put it in the barn 
with moisture content from 25 to 28 percent. However, baled hay is more compact, with less 
chance for it to dry. Baled hay could be stored safely with a moisture content of no more 
than 25 percent. Hay conditioners were important implements for farmers who baled, since 
they allowed a faster harvest and one that minimized the risk of using new baling 
technology.9 
Even though speed and labor savings were important considerations, farmers also 
needed to consider quality. Baling offered labor savings, but farmers who chopped hay or 
made haylage (a fermented product like silage) reportedly made better quality feed. By the 
1950s, there were reports that chopped hay and silage retained more vitamin A and protein 
than baled hay. Iowa State College and experiment station tests indicated that as much as 15 
percent more protein and from 10 to 20 percent more of vitamin A could be retained in the 
plant material with silage when compared to baled hay.10 
Making forage with the chopper also minimized the risk of getting rain on the cut and 
cured crop before it could be put in barn. Rain on cured hay caused it to break down and 
leach the nutrients out of the plant material. Farmers guessed what the weather would do; 
always hoping that they could make hay in sunny weather. One farmer who baled his hay 
reported that he baled on the second day after he mowed hay, making it a three day cycle to 
make the crop. Experts estimated that it took approximately thirty hours of sunshine to cure 
9 Midwest Farm Handbook, Fifth Edition (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1960), 613. 
10 
"Forage harvesting aimed at quality," Wallaces Farmer, 2 May 1959. 
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hay, but the odds of getting rained on during that period were one in three. Farmers who 
chopped hay could store it much more quickly and avoid a damaged crop.11 
It was also easier to control what cattle ate with chopped hay. When feeding loose 
hay, animals could select the leaves, generally the most attractive parts of the plant, and leave 
the tougher stems behind. William Pfab of Dubuque County testified that cattle wasted less 
of their feed with chopped hay. "The cows have to eat the tough stems right along with the 
leaves," he reported, "They can't sort out parts they like best." This was even less of a 
problem with silage. A farmer from Cedar County stated that he made grass silage out of his 
first cutting of hay. "Ensiling makes the stems more tender and palatable," he contended.12 
Manufacturers and advertisers emphasized the flexibility farmers could gain by using 
new haymaking machines. The Allis-Chalmers Company developed the Roto-Baler in the 
1930s and first marketed it in 1947, claiming that the small round bales made higher quality 
bales than competing models. The round bales preserved more protein because the leaves 
and stems were rolled together rather than packed. In addition, the round, tightly wound 
bales shed water much better than square bales, which meant that they could be left in the 
field after the third cutting. Farmers could turn their cattle out over the winter to consume 
the bales in the field, a practice that Doyce Miller and his son Lyle used in Clarke County in 
the early 1960s. Depending on the size of farm, this saved handling hundreds or thousands 
11 
"Take Sweat and Risk From Hay-Making," Wallaces Farmer, 7 August 1948; Wendell Clampitt, "Save 
Sweat, Dust In Haymaking," Wallaces Farmer, 17 June 1950; Jim Rutter, "Grass silage or hay?," Wallaces 
Farmer, 3 May 1958. 
12 Jim Rutter, "Will you bale or chop?," Wallaces Farmer, 1 June 1958; Rutter, "Grass silage or hay?." 
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of bales. These bales were also somewhat difficult for cattle to open, which meant that the 
animals would completely consume one before opening another, reducing waste.13 
Regardless of whether farmers chose to cut operating costs by using balers or 
choppers, they faced increased capital expenses for the new equipment. During the late 
1940s the lowest cost new equipment on the market was equipment for making loose hay, 
which included a hayloader and fork that farmers could purchase for $543 in 1946. 
Estimates for the new one-man field baler, which automatically tied the bale with twine, cost 
$2,365 while a forage harvester cost $3,486 that year. For the money invested in a baler, a 
farmer could expect to spend about half the time in getting hay to the barn. The chopper 
saved an estimated five-eighths of the labor when compared to making loose hay. The cost 
of new balers and choppers remained high through the 1950s, with farmers spending between 
$3,000 and $4,000 for a chopper, depending on the size, and as much as $3,500 for a baler, 
although William Adams of Fayette County purchased a new McCormick-Deering Number 
45 baler at the beginning of the 1952 haying season for $1,571.14 
The issue of farm finances in re-mechanizing the hay harvest demonstrated important 
distinctions between farmers. Farmers who either kept large acreages or those who were 
interested in specializing or expanding liked the forage harvester, since it moved rapidly 
through the crop and eliminated human handling, a savings in terms of labor and sweat. The 
baler saved money over the older technology and it was cheaper than the chopper. Farmers 
who did not want to make the investment in the machinery cost had to find alternative ways 
13 Doyle Brubaker, interview by author, 7 September 2001, Newton, Iowa, tape recording; Allis Chalmers Roto-
Baler advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, 2 April 1955; "Stacking trims haying costs," Wallaces ' Farmer, 2 June 
1962; "Which haying method for beef cattle?," Wallaces Farmer, 2 June 1962. 
14 
"New Hay Machines Save Labor," Wallaces Farmer, 16 August 1949; "What cost for making hay?," 
Wallaces Farmer, 6 June 1955; Adams papers. 
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of making the transition to the new technology, which included purchasing used machines, 
and more importantly, participating in labor exchanges and making joint purchases of 
machines. 
Exchanging labor on the farm was a popular method of accomplishing work while 
minimizing costs. Historians have documented the importance of labor exchanges in rural 
America, but in the case of haying, labor exchanges gained favor as hired men became 
scarce. In the prewar period, some farmers cooperated to make hay, but the results were 
mixed. Some farmers who exchanged labor were not prepared and consequently started late 
or had inferior or dilapidated equipment, while others were ready to go and maintained their 
machines. Farmers also had to deal with differences in acreages; one family's farm might 
have twenty acres of hay while another had fifty. In these instances, farmers had to reconcile 
the difference. These inequalities made changing work problematic, but it was successful for 
many farmers who shared a similar work ethic, managed their farms the same way, or had 
strong kinship ties. As farmers looked into the postwar world and anticipated continual labor 
shortages, some of them realized that they might have to do more work exchanges. As one 
farmer stated with a bit of hyperbole, "I guess we neighbors will have to get acquainted with 
each other and learn to work together."15 
Work exchanges were especially popular with farmers who had smaller acreages and 
practiced mixed farming rather than specializing in dairy production or beef cattle. Two 
brothers from Marshall County joined several neighbors to form a baling ring and hired a 
15 J. Sanford Rikoon demonstrated how new threshing machines actually complemented and even strengthened 
work exchange patterns in the nineteenth century Midwest. Mary Neth depicted the importance of work 
exchanges for minimizing cash expenses in the years up to 1940. See Rikoon, Threshing in the Midwest: A 
Study of Traditional Culture and Technological Change, 1820-1940 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1988) and Neth, Preserving the Family Farm. "Make Hay Together," Wallaces Farmer, 16 June 1945. 
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custom baler to do the job for them. In addition to avoiding the outlay for the machine, these 
farmers claimed that they saved time by sharing the workload and improved the quality of 
the hay they harvested. Younger farmers who were just getting started liked the labor 
exchanges and were more likely to exchange work than established, middle-aged farmers 
who owned more machinery.16 
Exchanging work during hay harvest also let farmers use family labor effectively. 
After the war, a higher percentage of Iowa farm youths attended high school, a factor that 
exacerbated farmers' labor problems during the school year, but it also meant that children 
were still available to help cultivate corn and make hay during the summer. Around 1954 
Charles Havran's oldest son joined the military, leaving a son who was in the eighth grade at 
home to help on the farm. When a neighbor purchased a used baler, his son and nephew 
joined with the Havran family to cooperate with hay baling. They set the baler to make 
small, light bales that were easy for the boys to handle. In the late 1950s, after the Havran 
family purchased their own New Holland baler, a pair of brothers from the neighborhood 
drove up to the Havran farm and suggested making hay cooperatively. Both families owned 
balers, so they would mow and bale at the same place at the same time to speed the work and 
get the hay in quickly to prevent rain damage. These families utilized teenage sons instead of 
hiring labor.17 
Some farmers took the practice of work exchange one step further and cooperatively 
purchased a baler or chopper. This spread out the initial investment in the machine and 
allowed them to share operating costs. Farmers accepted the need for cooperative 
16 
"What's Best Way To Get Quality Hay?," Wallaces Farmer, 1 June 1947; "Exchanging work with 
neighbors," Wallaces Farmer, 6 July 1957. 
17 Dennis Havran interview. 
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purchasing, especially for father-son ownership agreements. Cooperative ownership among 
non-family members was potentially more risky, but many farmers had successful 
partnerships. George Lee of Hardin County liked his arrangement with Floyd Lake and 
Emery Lake. They lived about two miles from each other and invested in a chopper. When 
they traded in a chopper for a newer model in 1952, each farmer only had to contribute $505. 
Cooperative ownership was advantageous for another reason. "What's nice about this 
arrangement," Lee noted, "is that you get your work done when you want it done," rather 
than waiting to fit into a custom chopper's schedule. In 1954 Melvin Hansen of Boone 
County purchased a baler with a second cousin without investing any money up front. When 
his relative suggested they purchase a baler together, Hansen replied that he did not have any 
money. His cousin bought the baler and Hansen paid off his share over the next couple of 
years. In 1956 31 percent of Iowa farmers owned hay balers with someone else, while only 6 
percent jointly owned choppers. Farm owners were more likely to have cooperative 
arrangements than renters, given that farm leases were for one year and tenants did not 
necessarily stay in the same neighborhood from year to year.18 
Hiring custom balers was a good strategy for farmers with smaller acreages. Balers 
were expensive, and there were only so many days that they could be used, including two or 
three cuttings of hay in the summer, baling some straw for livestock bedding after 
combining, and, in a few instances, baling corn stalks. An Iowa State College study from the 
late 1940s of the costs of baling in Eastern Iowa indicated that farmers needed to make at 
least ninety-three tons of hay per year to make owning a baler pay. Carl and Bertha 
18 Schmitt, "Economic Analysis of Haying Methods in Eastern Iowa," 56; Melvin Hansen, interview by author, 
9 June 2003, Madrid, Iowa, tape recording; "Own machines in partnership," Wallaces Farmer, 1 May 1954. 
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Petersen's farm account books show the premium they placed on custom baling as well as 
purchasing baled hay for their 113 acre farm. They hired balers for straw baling and hay on a 
regular basis in the 1950s and 1960s. By the late 1950s, the pattern of ownership versus 
hiring balers was clear. Only 36 percent of farmers who farmed between thirty and 179 acres 
owned their own machine, while the rest hired custom balers. By contrast, almost half of 
farmers who owned over 180 acres owned balers. For most farmers with smaller acreages, it 
made the most sense to hire a custom baler.19 
Older farmers who were making the transition to retirement by reducing the amount 
of land they farmed or their workload also liked the idea of custom baling. They could 
eliminate the heavy work of moving hundreds of bales that weighed between forty and 100 
pounds, depending on the farmer's preference. A 1957 survey of farmers indicated that 
farmers over the age of fifty exchanged work less often than younger farmers and also hired 
more custom work. This was true for the Petersons, since they began farming in 1931 and 
were at least in their fifties by the decade of the 1960s.20 
In contrast to the farmers who used field choppers alone or in combination with hay 
balers to increase production or to specialize, farmers who only used balers were more 
conservative in terms of farm strategies. They were less willing or able to expand production 
or to assume the increased capitalization to expand or to take the risks of specializing. For 
these people with limited goals, baling offered them ease of handling in combination with 
flexibility. This was especially true for farmers who hired custom balers. A farmer from 
19 Schmitt, "Economic Analysis of Haying Methods in Eastern Iowa," 48; "Can you guess the weather?," 
Wallaces Farmer, 20 July 1957; Peterson papers. 
20 
"Exchanging work with neighbors," Wallaces Farmer, 6 July 1957; Peterson papers. 
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Pocahontas County favored custom baling, since he did not have enough hay acres and 
livestock to justify owning a baler or a chopper.21 
Even though hiring custom balers made sense for many people, others found that 
purchasing a baler and doing custom work for others could be a source of income. Custom 
rate charts were a regular feature of Wallaces ' Farmer, noting average per bale charges, cost 
estimates on a per acre basis, as well as rates for almost every other farm task from planting 
to harvesting. It is likely that many of the farmers who owned balers and farmed small 
acreages hired themselves out as custom balers in order to make owning a baler pay. Farm 
families such as the Petersons provided a ready market for those who were willing to invest 
from $1,000 to $1,500 in a baler. A Tama County man reported that the increase in the 
number of balers was good news for those who wanted to hire balers. "Lots of balers in the 
country," he stated in 1951, "Maybe I can get it done cheaper this year." Custom rates for 
baling fell by as much as 20 percent from the late 1940s to the early 50s for the Petersons. 
They paid $.12 per bale in 1948, $.11 in 1949, and from 1954 to 1967 paid $.10 per bale. 
When Vernan Schnack, a twenty-two year-old renter from Shelby County, began farming on 
his own in 1959, he purchased a new baler for $1,500 to use on his rented farm and to hire 
out for custom work. "I figured I'd be paying out in custom charges ($150 for 3,000 bales) 
just as much as depreciation on the new machine would be," he explained. "Also, now I can 
bale when I want to and pick up some money doing custom work." For Schnack, buying a 
21 Jim Rutter, "Will you chop or bale?," Wallaces Farmer, 7 June 1958. 
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baler was a means of gaining independence in his farm operation as well as a method of 
increasing his income.22 
The labor savings of chopping grass made it especially useful for farmers who either 
wanted to expand their acreage or specialize in dairying or beef cattle feeding. 
The added expense of the chopper and wagon or wagons made it critical for dairy farm 
families who wanted to green chop their forage to have at least twenty-five milk cows to 
justify the cost. When discussing whether to make hay or grass silage, farm journalists 
noted that grass silage yielded about 10 percent more feed per acre then compared to grass 
hay, a figure that widened considerably when rain fell on the cured hay. If farmers were in a 
position to utilize the extra feed value of the silage by increasing their feeding operations, 
then silage made economic sense.23 
In the early 1950s farmers began to use choppers and wagons to haul forage directly 
to their cattle in lots, bypassing the need to store as much forage and reducing the pressure on 
pastures. This new system, called green chop or zero grazing, was a method of using the 
forage harvester and special wagons to chop hay and move it directly to feed bunks. By 
keeping cattle in the feedlot, farmers avoided the traditional pasturage problems of trampling 
and selective grazing by cattle that chose the most succulent plants and left the rest. With a 
22 
"How Much To Hire A Combine?," Wallaces Farmer, 19 June 1948; "How To Handle Your Hay," Wallaces 
Farmer, 2 June 1951; Peterson papers; Richard Hagen, "How much money for machinery?," Wallaces Farmer, 
2 June 1962. 
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green-chop system, there would be no trampling of pasture and all the feed was mixed 
together, preventing selective grazing.24 
Most importantly, green chopping was a means of increasing the size of beef and 
dairy herds. Gail Hemmingson of Plymouth County experimented with the system in 1954 
and found that he cut his acreage requirements for feeding his herd. In 1953 he needed thirty 
acres of pasture for fifteen cows with calves. In 1954 he kept fifteen cows with calves plus 
ten heifers by green-chopping nine acres. John Dane of Johnson County cut the acres he 
needed to keep his thirty-five dairy cows which allowed him to go through the winter without 
buying feed. The experiences of a farmer from Woodbury County who rejected zero grazing 
indicate just how important the practice was to farm expansion and specialization. He 
acknowledged that it allowed him to double his carrying capacity, but he claimed that his 
small herd did not justify the labor cost of feeding in the lot. He concluded that farmers with 
bigger herds were in the best position to profit from zero grazing. Even though it appeared 
that cutting acreage requirements for feeding could appeal to farmers with smaller acreages 
who wanted to increase their herd size, the high cost of the forage made it more economical 
for farmers with larger acreages who could spread the investment and operating costs over 
more acres and larger herds.25 
Green chop feeding allowed significant gains in productivity per farmer and per 
animal. Robert Liston, a Dallas County dairy farmer, began using a green-chop system in 
1957, claiming in 1961 that his forty-five dairy cows had not been on pasture in five years. 
According to Liston, "I find it easier and cheaper to haul feed to them." Liston began 
24 
"Want to stretch you pasture?," Wallaces Farmer, 5 June 1954; Dave Bryant, "Stretch pasture with "zero" 
grazing?," Wallaces Farmer, 7 May 1955; Vernon Schneider, "Green-lot feeding," Successful Farming, March 
1955. 
25 Bryant, "Stretch pasture with "zero grazing"; "Carry pasture to your cattle," Wallaces Farmer, 6 May 1956. 
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chopping in May and continued into October, cutting two loads for the morning feeding and 
one for the evening, totaling about an hour per day for one operator. Although farmers who 
used the green-chop system boosted their production with minimal work, they did have new 
work to do as a result of their commitment to dry lot feeding. Liston reported that his biggest 
problem was manure removal. With the cattle in a lot rather than on a pasture, Liston had to 
move tons of manure out of his lots to prevent them from becoming a quagmire. In 1960 he 
hauled approximately 190 loads of manure out of the cattle shed and another 100 loads from 
the feeding area, which meant that he moved manure an average of eight days out of every 
ten?* 
In spite of creating new work, dairy producers like Liston were especially interested 
in forage harvesters and green chop. In the years after World War II, most Iowa farmers 
abandoned dairy production, getting rid of their small herds of approximately half a dozen 
animals that provided income through a regular cream check. A minority of farmers invested 
new money in dairying to cut operating costs and improve quality. The forage harvester and 
related equipment, including hay driers, played a key role in allowing them to stay 
competitive in the late 1950s. Farmers found that cheaper forage crops could be substituted 
for some expensive grain in the dairy ration. In dairy farming, one of the key calculations is 
the difference between gross income from milk production and the cost of feed. The 
resulting figure, called income above feed cost, is a test of whether or not a dairy farm can 
stay in business. As one Fayette County farmer put it, "You have to feed for top production. 
Yet you have to hold feed costs down if you expect to stay in dairying." He cut costs by 
replacing grain with silage. Other dairymen echoed this conclusion. Two farmers from 
26 Dick Hagen, "Drylot dairying," 20 May 1961. 
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Northeast Iowa discussed their costs and production with a reporter from Wallaces ' Farmer. 
While their cows averaged from 12,000 to 14,000 pounds of milk per year per cow, their 
income above feed cost was good, in spite of the variance in production. The cows that 
yielded 12,500 pounds per year had an income above feed cost of $322 per cow, just two 
dollars less than the cows producing 14,000 pounds. Both farmers used almost twice as 
much hay and silage as they did grain or concentrated feeds, minimizing their commitment to 
higher grain costs and purchased feed.27 
Every farmer who decided to re-mechanize the hay harvest by baling or chopping 
their crop faced new storage problems. The large barns on most Iowa farms were built for 
storing loose hay, which was bulkier and required more space per ton than the dense, 
compressed bales or the chopped hay which packed in the mow tightly and also took up less 
space per ton. Iowa State College experts advised farmers that baled hay weighed three to 
four times more per cubic foot than loose hay, while chopped hay was twice as heavy as 
loose hay. Farmers who had overhead or second storey mows in their barns needed to 
reinforce their mows to prevent structural damage to their largest and most expensive 
building.28 
Handling the crop in the barn was also a major problem. Some farmers installed bale 
conveyors in their barns to reduce the heavy workload of handling bales, like the one 
described in the earlier John Deere advertisement for revolutionary hay making. Elwood and 
James Walker of Polk County installed a bale conveyor to get around the labor shortage. 
While the bales simply tumbled off the conveyor into a pile in the mow, the Walkers were 
27 Ray Franklin, "Cheaper milk from forage," Wallaces Farmer, 21 September 1957. 
28 
"Old Barns," Wallaces Farmer, 21 July 1951. 
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not concerned about the lack of a tightly packed stack. They believed that air circulation was 
better with the loose pile of bales than with a stack, which cut the risk of spontaneous 
combustion from hay that may have been too wet. Any lost space was more than 
compensated by reducing the need for one or two men in the barn stacking bales.29 
Chopped hay posed special problems for farmers who chose to specialize or expand 
their operations. Some farmers modified their barns by adding hay driers. These dryers 
forced air through wire, sheet metal, or slatted wooden ducts in the haymow. Hay dryers 
accelerated the drying process and enabled them to store larger amounts of chopped hay. In 
1950 Kenneth Parrett, a farmer who kept a herd of forty-five Holstein cattle on 210 acres in 
Washington County, began using a dryer in his barn. He believed that by bringing hay into 
the barn with higher moisture content he would avoid losing the leaves. Farmers who field-
cured their hay handled it more and risked losing as much as 15 percent of the total volume 
of the crop through knocking off dried leaves. By keeping more leaves on the hay farmers 
could get more feed for the labor and fuel cost they invested in cutting it, picking it up, and 
hauling it to the barn.30 
Using a hay dryer not only helped improve the amount of hay farmers could harvest, 
but it also improved the quality of the crop. Kenneth Parrett observed, "barn-cured hay has 
better color. It's more palatable," which meant that the animals consumed more of it. Eldred 
Mather, a Floyd County dairy farmer, related his success with a dryer. "The thing I noticed 
29 Jim Rutter, "Will you chop or bale?," Wallaces Farmer, 1 June 1953; "Easy ways to move hay," Wallaces 
Farmer, 21 June 1958. A study by an Iowa State College graduate student concluded that it was not worth the 
time to stack bales in the barn. It was more efficient to let the bales fall into the barn, especially since 3.4 
percent of the dropped bales broke upon contact with the bale pile, making it difficult and time consuming to 
stack. In short, stacking bales in the barn offset labor savings in the field. Gerald L. Kline, "Harvesting Hay 
With The Automatic Field Baler" (M.S. Thesis, Iowa State College, 1946), 78. 
30 R. B. Gray, "Equipment for Making Hay," in Grass: The Yearbook of Agriculture, 1948, 169; Dave Bryant, 
"Do you need a Hay Dryer?," Wallaces Farmer, 7 June 1952. 
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when I started [in 1955] feeding high quality alfalfa that was mow-dried was that it took less 
protein supplement in the ration to give the same results in butterfat production." Having a 
hay drier meant that farmers could cut hay at the proper stage of the growth cycle for 
optimum nutrition. Promoters of barn-drying were careful to point out that it was costly, 
which meant that only farmers who had large numbers of livestock should consider making 
the investment. As a result, hay dryers remained equipment for the minority of farmers who 
stored chopped hay in their mows.31 
Although filling barns with bales or chopped hay was the most common method of 
storing hay, farmers turned to other ways to deal with hay storage. Using and adapting the 
old barn might have been less expensive (unless it included a hay dryer) but it required a lot 
of handling to get the crop out of the barn to the livestock. Adaptive reuse of the barn for 
baled hay or forage saved labor at harvest time, but it did not help at feeding time, which was 
a daily chore. If farmers were to realize fully the labor savings they craved, they needed to 
either automate their feeding operations (see chapter five) or consider new structures for 
storing the crop that would give them ease of feeding. 
The haykeeper, a cylindrical or rectangular pole building, was one solution that some 
farmers turned to in the late 1950s and 1960s. Iowa State College experts designed the 
haykeeper to be a self-feeder for chopped hay. The building was wider at the bottom than at 
the top to reduce friction and let gravity move the hay downward as cattle consumed it. A 
large cone at the center of the bottom forced the hay to the outside of the bottom into 
mangers for feeding. This feature made the structure attractive to farmers who wanted to 
31 Dave Bryant, "Do you need a Hay Dryer?"; Keith Remy, "How to get the most from your hay," Wallaces 
Farmer, 21 May 1960; Dick Seim, "Early-cut hay is best," Wallaces Farmer, 16 May 1959. 
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expand their herds while simultaneously cutting labor costs. "The self-feeding feature is 
what sells me on haykeepers," noted a dairy farmer from Northeast Iowa. Leon Wengert of 
Story County constructed a rectangular haykeeper for beef and dairy cattle. This structure, 
fifty feet long, twelve feet wide, and twenty feet high, housed his first cutting of hay, since it 
could be stored in the haykeeper with less risk of spontaneous combustion than in a barn. It 
also helped cut labor costs at chore time. Extension agents offered plans for plans for fifty 
and sixty ton models, which could be built for approximately $800 to $1,100, depending on 
size as well as local costs for materials and labor. These haykeepers could also be built with 
central ventilator shafts that could be equipped with a large fan and motor to speed drying of 
the hay. This feature increased the costs of the building, but reduced the amount of time the 
crop needed to dry in the field, since more drying occurred in storage.32 
Upright silos were a costly solution to the problem of making high quality feed. 
The high first cost of upright silos generally meant that they were reserved for the com silage 
crop rather than the hay crop. Farmers, researchers, and extension professionals found that 
corn silage had higher nutritive value than haylage, which meant it was better to use the high 
cost silo for highest quality feed. Some farmers began to use their silos for storing high-
moisture corn that had been harvested by combines or picker-shellers that became popular in 
the 1950s rather than by the older corn pickers that harvested the entire ear instead of just the 
grain. With high moisture com and silage in the silos, farmers who chopped searched for 
other places to store haylage. 
32 Gene C. Shove, Kenneth K. Barnes, and Hobart Beresford, "A Self-Feeding Hay-Storage Structure," Iowa 
Farm Science, 8 (June 1954); "Cut hay handling with haykeeper," Wallaces Farmer, 15 August 1959; Glenn 
Cunningham, "They Gross $50,000 on 240 Acres," Iowa Farm and Home Register, 6 March 1955. 
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Farmers could cut haylage costs by making trench silos, a decades-old but still 
popular and low cost storage method of keeping corn silage. After leveling and scraping a 
strip of earth approximately twenty-four by seventy-five feet or large enough to 
accommodate the crop, they could build a fence along the edge and line it with Kraft paper to 
keep oxygen out and prevent spoilage. Then, they dumped the chopped hay onto the scraped 
earth, leveling and packing it as they piled it deeper and finally covering it. As farmers 
needed the feed, they could either use a tractor loader to haul silage to livestock or even use 
electric fence to let cattle eat directly from the silo.33 
Bale storage was easier and less expensive than storing haylage or chopped hay. 
Some farmers built low cost hay sheds to store bales, or even stored bales out in the open. 
One Greene county farmer built a thirty-one by fifty foot "umbrella shed" to store 3,200 
bales. A line of five center posts supported the roof, with no side or end walls to impede 
stacking and loading. The owner, Paul Williams, stated "The quickest and easiest way of 
unloading and storing hay was what we were after." Williams could simply pull up next to 
the stack without worrying about hitting walls or supporting members with his tractor or hay 
rack. Farmers who stored baled hay outside had the easiest work in unloading and stacking, 
but there was some loss through spoilage along the top of the stack. Some farmers accepted 
a small loss on an outdoor bale stack as a preferable alternative to investing in a new 
hayshed. As long as the farmer removed bales from the end of the stack rather than the top, 
he could minimize the inevitable loss associated with stack storage and still have good 
quality feed for livestock. As noted previously, the Allis-Chalmers Roto-Baler made bales 
33 
"A Silo In A Hurry," Wallaces Farmer, 15 July 1950; "Temporary silo for you?," Wallaces Farmer, 4 
September 1954. 
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that were well-suited to outdoor storage and self-feeding for beef cattle. Farmers who used 
these machines could further reduce the need to store hay. Regardless of how farmers solved 
their storage problems associated with the new haymaking machines, they did not envision a 
future characterized by the intense and time consuming work of putting up loose hay the way 
previous generations had done it.34 
The number of balers and choppers on Iowa farms reflected the interest and 
confidence Iowa farmers had in the new technology and their ability to adapt work routines, 
finances, and buildings to balers and choppers. In early 1962 there were 49,177 balers and 
12,774 forage harvesters on Iowa farms, while in 1970 there were 48,052 balers and 15,159 
forage harvesters. Although the number of balers declined by 1970, the proportion of balers 
to the number of farms was actually higher, which meant they were more common on Iowa 
farms. In 1961 there were 177,172 farms in Iowa, with a ratio of one baler for every 3.6 
farms. In 1970 there were only 135,264 farms, with a ratio of one baler for every 2.8 farms. 
The increase in the number of forage harvesters was even more profound in comparison to 
the changing number of farms, with the 1961 ratio of one harvester to every 13.8 farms and 
the 1970 ration one harvester to every 8.9 farms. Farmers decided to make hay "the modern 
way" because they could use machines to replace labor.35 
Balers were essential on all Iowa farms that included livestock in 1972. Not all 
farmers owned balers, but almost all farmers used them, choosing to hire or share one if they 
did not own one of their own. Farmers with small acreages frequently hired custom balers to 
34 
"Builds low-cost shed for storing hay," Wallaces Farmer, 21 July 1962. 
35 Fifth Biennial Report of Iowa Book of Agriculture, 1960-1961, (Des Moines: State of Iowa, 1962), 353; Iowa 
Book of Agriculture, 1970-1971, 368. While describing a very different place, historian Donald Holley depicted 
how southern farmers used mechanical cotton pickers to deal with postwar labor shortages. See chapters eight 
and nine of The Second Great Emancipation. 
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do their work, paying a flat fee per bale. Other farmers, large and small, decided to purchase 
a baler in cooperation with a friend, neighbor, or family member, minimizing their initial 
outlay and sharing operating costs. These farmers were less likely to enlarge their livestock 
operations or to specialize in beef or dairy animals. They kept a mix of animals and crops 
while they continued rural traditions of work exchanges. But even farmers who specialized 
valued hay balers. Compared to feeding strictly green-chop hay or haylage, it was cheaper to 
have some hay baled to maintain flexibility in their feeding programs. 
Only a minority of Iowa farmers purchased forage harvesters, although they were 
essential machines on farms that were larger and more specialized. These machines were 
very expensive, although they could be used for harvesting hay and corn silage, thereby 
spreading their cost over more of the farm operation. Chopping hay, however, was quicker 
than baling, which meant that it was possible to harvest more forage and feed more livestock 
with a better quality feed. Using a forage harvester was an important strategy to beat the 
cost-price squeeze by offsetting declining commodity prices with more production and 
improved quality feed. 
In 1967, farmers learned about a new baler that would allow producers to gain even 
more labor savings and literally increase the scale of production. The baler produced a giant, 
cylindrical hay bale of up to 700 pounds, with the potential of making one that weighed 
1,000 pounds. Iowa State University engineers developed the machine with the goal of 
completely mechanizing hay handling. One operator with a tractor could handle these huge 
bales, transporting them to storage and taking them to livestock for feeding without touching 
the crop with human hands. By using the giant bales, farmers could avoid the strenuous and 
repetitive lifting farmers had grown accustomed to doing themselves or hiring others to do 
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for them. Wesley Buchele, a mechanical engineer at Iowa State University, summed up the 
purpose of the new machine. According to Buchele, "The giant bale is designed for 
mechanical handling, while conventional bales are designed for human handling." It is 
difficult to know if farmers perceived this development as a sign of things to come or 
something so far-fetched and ridiculous that it would never be practical. If the postwar 
trends of substituting expensive machinery for scarce and expensive labor continued, 
however, farmers may have looked at the bale and glimpsed a future of completely 
mechanized hay handling.36 
36 
"Giant hay bale will mechanize handling," Wallaces Farmer, 26 August 1967. 
216 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
From Threshing Machine to Combine 
"Sit-Down HARVEST 
RIDE—AND WHISTLE WHILE YOU WORK; 
FAMILY HARVEST INSTEAD OF THRESHING GANG 
The man operating an All-Crop Harvester stopped near the fence to talk. "Look at 
my shirt," he said, "it's dry! I thresh sitting down." 
A dry shirt is only a symbol of the freedom and independence an All-Crop Harvester 
brings you and your family. DIRECT harvesting that frees you from the backaches of 
shocking.. .the dust and sweat of threshing. ..from big customs bills—and frees 
Mother from cooking for extra men." 
Allis-Chalmers All-Crop Harvester Advertisement, Successful Farming, March 1940 
When this Allis-Chalmers advertisement appeared in the spring of 1940 combines 
were relatively scarce on Iowa farms. Few Iowa farmers threshed their grain without soaking 
their shirts with sweat. The practice of harvesting and threshing with separate tools and at 
different times was still the prevalent method of making a small grain crop such as oats. 
Farmers used tractor- and horse-drawn binders to harvest the grain, set up the bundles into 
shocks and, after letting the shocks dry in the field for a week or so, hauled the bundles to 
tractor-powered threshing machines in the barnyard. There, family members and neighbors 
gathered to feed the threshing machine, scoop the grain from wagons into the bins and 
granaries, and stack or bale the straw for use throughout the following year. 
Between 1940 and 1970 most Iowa farmers turned to combines for harvesting their 
small grains and rejected the separate tasks of binding and threshing that had prevailed since 
the 1880s. When the implement industry developed a machine suited for the small farms of 
the Midwest, farmers began replacing the old tools with the new. The decision to use 
combines was based in part on the appeal of "sit-down" and "dry shirt" ease, but farmers 
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found more compelling reasons for abandoning their existing set of tools. Farmers in Iowa 
used combines during these years because they could afford to hire or purchase the machines, 
the technical obstacles were minimal, families enjoyed work and leisure benefits of increased 
mechanization, and the combine helped facilitate the transition from oats to soybeans that 
began in the mid-twentieth century. 
Combines were not new inventions in 1940, but they were relatively new to the Corn 
Belt. Inventor Hiram Moore and financier John Hascall developed a workable combine by 
the 1850s, sparking a chain of developments that led to the general adoption of combines in 
the arid regions of the United States by the 1920s. These machines were tractor-drawn, 
powered by either an auxiliary engine or the tractors power-take-off, cutting a swath of eight 
feet or more through the massive fields of the Great Plains, California, and Washington. A 
handful of Iowa farmers used these combines on their farms, although they invariably 
performed custom work for other area farmers.1 
It was only in 1930 when inventors developed a prototype combine that farmers with 
the smaller acreages of the humid Midwest could afford to own. Both John Deere and 
McCormick-Deering produced tractor-drawn models that they planned to sell in the region, 
but these had ten and eight foot cuts, respectively, making them too large to be efficient for 
mixed farming. That year, Farm Implement News, ajournai for dealers and manufacturers, 
1 Standard sources for the development of harvesting and combine technology include R. Douglas Hurt, 
American Farm Tools From Hand Power to Steam Power (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1986) 
and Agricultural Technology in the Twentieth Century (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1991); 
Graeme Quick and Wesley Buchele, The Grain Harvesters (St. Joseph, MI: American Society of Agricultural 
Engineers, 1978). Thomas D. Isern detailed the rise and eventual dominance of combines on the Great Plains in 
Bullthreshers and Bindlestiffs: Harvesting and Threshing on the Great Plains (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas); J. Sanford Rikoon discusses the beginnings of combined harvesting-threshing in Threshing in the 
Midwest, 1820-1940. A model study for Iowa farm mechanization in the twentieth century is Thomas Burnell 
Colbert, "Iowa Farmers and Mechanical Corn Pickers, 1900-1952," Agricultural History 74 (Spring 2000): 530-
544. 
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printed three stories about a "baby" combine with potential application for farms of the 
Midwest. This machine, pulled behind a tractor, had a five-foot swath which made the 
machine practical for a region where 160 acre farms were the average. The threshing 
cylinder was also five feet long, maximizing operating speed. In addition to threshing almost 
any crop with a cylinder of wire brushes, the machine had low horsepower requirements, 
making it suitable for farmers with older or smaller tractors. Allis-Chalmers purchased the 
license to develop and manufacture the Fleming-Hall machine, eventually scrapping the wire 
brush design during testing when they learned that the wire bristles broke off and mixed with 
the grain, posing a hazard to livestock.2 
During the 1930s, agricultural engineers conducted extensive tests on small pull-type 
combines, analyzing grain loss, speed, and performance in varying conditions. The authors 
of a 1936 study concluded that machine adjustments and crop conditions were more 
important in determining grain loss and quality of harvesting than the size or type of 
machine. They also noted that the small size, light-weight and use of pneumatic tires were 
important considerations in a region with relatively small or irregularly shaped fields. One of 
the questions about Corn Belt combines was their ability to handle Midwestern conditions, 
especially green weeds and "rank" or thick straw. Since the cutter bar was just as wide as the 
cylinder, the machine handled heavy crops without clogging. An engineer from the J. I. Case 
Company recorded strong objections to the combines, most notably that the small-sized 
tractors commonly used in the Midwest did not have enough power to operate the machines. 
According the Case engineer, "typical" farmers would be unable to operate "within the speed 
2 
"McCormick Deering Take-Off Combine," Farm Implement News, 27 March 1930; "John Deere No. 5 
Combine," Farm Implement News, 29 May 1930; "The Fleming-Hall Baby Combine," Farm Implement News, 
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limits essential to efficient threshing, separating, and cleaning." But engineers generally 
favored the new type of combine in spite of concerns about harvesting losses and fears that 
the small machines were easily overworked.3 
As the engineers tested the "baby" combines in the mid 1930s, a small number of 
Iowa farmers used the larger models, either purchasing one or hiring a custom operator. E. 
M. Brubaker of Prairie City, proprietor of an implement dealership during the 1930s, had his 
sons custom harvest with two of these large Rumley combines, but farmers who used 
combines were still in the minority. Even after Allis-Chalmers introduced the All-Crop 
combine in 1935, their production version of the Fleming-Hall "baby" combine, binders were 
still more popular than combines, outselling combines ten to one. By the end of the decade, 
however, combine sales had overtaken binders and threshers. In 1939 combines outsold 
binders two to one and outsold threshing machines by eleven to one. Doyle Brubaker, who 
set up and adjusted combines for his father at the family implement dealership in Prairie City, 
noted that in 1940 "you couldn't give a binder away; the market was gone."4 
Purchasing a combine could make good economic sense for a farm family. Allis-
Chalmers Company introduced the Model 40 All-Crop in 1938, their smallest pull-type 
combine with a forty-inch cut, priced at $345, the same as a power-take-off binder. When 
faced with the decision to replace a worn machine or invest in a combine, farmers could 
make a clear choice; purchase the older technology that was reliable and familiar or obtain a 
new machine with the potential for cost savings. Running a combine through the field 
7 August 1930; "Allis-Chalmers Announces 'Baby' Combine," Farm Implement News, 20 November 1930; 
Charles H. Wendel, The Allis-Chalmers Story (Osceola, WI: Crestline Publishing, 1993), 66. 
3 W. M. Hurst and W. R. Humphries, "Performance Studies of Small Combines," Agricultural Engineering 17 
(June 1936): 249 - 250; W. M. Hurst, "The Field for the Small Combined Harvester-Thresher" Agricultural 
Engineering 16 (June 1935): 221 - 222, Discussion by F. N. G. Kranick, 222 - 223. 
220 
consumed less fuel than operating a binder, hauling the bundles, and powering the threshing 
machine. Furthermore, families saved money on twine and the cost of feeding a 
neighborhood threshing crew, commonly known as a ring. 
Salesmen stressed the potential cost savings as they met farmers and spread the news 
about the new combines. Territory representatives visited local dealers and hosted suppers 
for area farmers, followed by a sales meeting. Doyle Brubaker related the selling technique 
used by an Allis-Chalmers representative in Iowa during the late 1930s. The local dealer 
provided the salesman with information about leading farmers in the area and then called on 
one of them at the evening meeting. After asking the farmer about how much grain he 
harvested and what expenses he incurred to harvest the crop, the representative would bring 
home the point by stating, "you know, every two years you're buying an All-Crop Harvester 
and you don't have one." The comparison of the costs associated with binding and threshing 
made purchasing a new combine look more reasonable.5 
Farmers who did not want to purchase new machines could purchase used models by 
the late 1940s and 1950s, easing the transition to the new technology. The Robinson family 
from the western part of the state bought a used Massey-Harris combine and kept it for at 
least two years before purchasing a new machine of the same make. The Holm family of 
Eagle Grove purchased a 120 acre Madison County farm in 1955, spending $1,591 on 
equipment that year to commence farming in Lincoln Township. Their largest expenses 
included $400 for a 1947 tractor and mounted cultivator, and $350 for a six-year old 
International combine. The cash saving on the used machines was significant and allowed 
them minimal capital expenses. For example, the Holm family's used machine only cost a 
4 Doyle Brubaker interview; "Combines Gain on Binders," Wallaces Farmer, 10 August 1940. 
few hundred dollars in 1955, while Elmer and Darlene Meyer bought a new International 
combine in 1954 for $1,750. Farmers who purchased combines frequently used them for 
custom work, helping to offset the cost.6 
Farm writers compared the costs of owning a combine versus hiring one. In 1952, the 
staff at Wallaces ' Farmer concluded that farmers with less than sixty-five acres to harvest 
should hire a combine rather than purchase one. They calculated that harvesting on a 173 
acre farm with forty acres of oats and another twenty-five acres in soybeans would cost 
$292.50, or $4.50 per acre for custom, or hired work. By contrast, owners would pay about 
$100 per year in depreciation on a $1,500 combine, with another $110 for upkeep, interest 
and housing the machine. Adding $2.00 per hour for tractor and operator covering one and a 
half acres per hour, operating costs equaled $1.35 per acre, costing $87.75 to run the 
machine. Added to the overhead cost of $210.00, the total harvest cost would be $297.75, 
slightly more than hiring the work. The authors concluded that farmers with less than sixty-
five acres would be wiser to hire their combining.7 
Two years later Wallaces ' Farmer published an almost identical article, this time with 
calculations based on seventy acres to combine, concluding that farmers who raised between 
sixty and seventy acres could make a combine pay, especially if they did custom work or 
bought a used machine. Writers from a competing magazine, Successful Farming, 
5 Doyle Brubaker interview. 
6 Quick and Buchele, The Grain Harvesters, 172 - 173; Keith Robinson, interview by author, 1 October 1992, 
Atlantic, Iowa, tape recording; Lennis J. Holm, "From Family Farm to Agribusiness" (Honors Thesis, 
University of Iowa, May, 1967), 115; Darlene and Elmer Meyer, letter to author, 7 September 2001 ; "John 
Deere No. 12-A Combine Paves the Way to Bigger Profits," John Deere Sales Brochure, A-534-50-8, 1950. 
7 
"Own Or Hire The Combine," Wallaces Farmer, 21 June 1952. 
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recommended that farmers who had less than eighty acres of their own and could not arrange 
to have another twenty acres to harvest should not purchase a new combine.8 
The experience of Rudolf Schipull of Eagle Grove illustrates the financial 
considerations of combine technology. Schipull kept extensive records of his farm operation 
from 1939 until he retired in 1952. When he commenced record keeping in 1939, Schipull 
conducted an inventory of his equipment. Among his machines, he owned a 1934 
McCormick-Deering binder valued at $223 that he used for harvesting his oats. Each year 
until Schipull sold his equipment in 1952, he recorded the expenses for equipment repair, 
twine, threshing machine costs and custom combining charges for a variety of crops 
including soybeans, flax and clover seed.9 
Schipull's records detail the significant expenses associated with maintaining a binder 
and threshing outfit. From 1939 to 1950 expenses for binder and separator repair ranged 
from a low of $ 1.47 in 1940 for binder sections (cutting surfaces) to a high of $28.25 in 
1943. That year, Schipull spent $17.40 for a new binder platform canvas (to convey the 
grain across the machine), $1.64 for twenty-five binder sections and $1.28 for a new 
separator belt. The largest equipment expense Schipull incurred was to maintain the tractor 
he kept to provide power for his separator. He finished paying off the machine in 1939, 
noting a $400 payment in that year's expenses, and spent an average of $77.29 for 
maintenance every year from 1939 to 1950, the year he bought a combine. As Schipull's 
records show, the threshing tractor became a problem by 1950. From 1939 through 1945, the 
average yearly cost to repair that tractor was $43.42, while the costs from 1946 to 1950 
8 
"Should You Own a Combine?," Wallaces Farmer, 5 June 1954; "Are you losing money on machinery?," 
Successful Farming, May 1950. 
9 Schipull papers. 
223 
averaged $124.72. During the last five-year period of use, Schipull's repairs included 
replacing transmission bearings, two valves, crankcase and camshaft bearings, piston rings, a 
connecting rod and numerous other adjustments. 
It is impossible to know if the mounting expense of operating the threshing tractor 
prompted Schipull to invest in a combine, but a comparison of the expenses for the old 
technology with the new technology suggests that, faced with sizable repair bills, the 
combine promised equal or lower costs. Schipull paid $200 for one half interest in a 
combine after spending almost $125 a year for repairs to the threshing tractor over five years. 
In addition to tractor repair, he incurred annual expenses of almost $32 for twine and close to 
$8 to repair to an aging binder and threshing machine, totaling approximately $165 to harvest 
his oats. When the average annual expense of $83.30 for custom combining soybeans from 
1939 to 1951 is added to this figure, Schipull spent $248.30 every year to conduct his 
harvesting, more than offsetting the cost of his share in the combine.10 
In addition to machinery costs, repairs, and supplies, there were costs associated with 
laborers at threshing time. Providing meals was a regular expense which could fluctuate 
depending on how large a crop a farmer planted. In 1947 Rudolf Schipull purchased thirty-
two meals for threshers during two days in August for $21.42. Joseph Ludwig of 
Winneshiek County regularly purchased beer and "pop" for his threshers. In 1948 he spent 
$8.50 for two cases of beer and one case of soda. While many families exchanged labor 
which minimized cash expenses, families sometimes hired help for threshing. Rudolf 
10 The expenses for combining, binding and threshing do not include fuel, which Schipull did not itemize by 
type of field work. If figures for fuel were available, the cost of combining would be even more favorable 
compared to binding and threshing, since the latter method required a trip across the field for harvesting, 
picking up bundles, and at least two days of threshing. Schipull papers. 
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Schipull hired laborers to help with his threshing, increasing the cash costs of an already 
expensive operation.11 
Threshermen like Schipull contended with a new type of threshing ring by the middle 
decades of the century, which influenced farmers' decisions to purchase or hire a combine. 
Once farmers owned their own tractors, which a majority of Iowa farmers did by 1940, they 
were liberated from the need to hire a steam engine for threshing. Instead of the large rings 
that used steam power, farmers who threshed in the late 1930s and 1940s frequently used 
their own tractors, smaller threshing machines, and threshed with fewer members. In 1945 
Herb Swaggart, a thresherman from Hardin County recalled his days of operating large 
threshing machines powered by steam engines in the early 1900s. Swaggart noted that he 
used to conduct two August threshing runs, one with a ring of fourteen or fifteen jobs and the 
second with sixteen jobs. The sixteen-family ring required the labor of as many as twenty-
two men and their families. By the mid 1940s, threshing rings like the ones Swaggart knew 
were the exception rather than the rule. Farmers and journalists perceived a significant 
difference between the threshing of an earlier era and the threshing conducted on farms 
during the late 1930s and 1940s. With families using small threshing machines that handled 
six or eight jobs, farmers worked with fewer neighbors and relatives.12 
Johnnie Westphalen's threshing experiences in western Iowa illustrate the way 
threshing changed. Westphalen's family participated in a twenty-seven member ring in the 
early 1900s, covering southern Audubon and northern Cass counties. Like Swaggart, these 
families threshed together for almost the entire month of August. When Westphalen and his 
wife, Marjorie, began farming on a rented thirty acre farm in Audubon County in 1939, he 
11 Schipull papers; Ludwig papers. 
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started a threshing operation to supplement the income from his small farm. However, the 
threshing rig and threshing ring Westphalen used were very different than the tools and 
organization his parent's knew. The younger Westphalen used a twenty-two inch 
McCormick-Deering threshing machine and purchased a used John Deere Model D with 
money he borrowed from his uncle. Westphalen utilized his "little rig" to thresh for five or 
six neighbors in his family neighborhood as well as for his in-laws in the Buck Creek 
neighborhood, finding a niche in the new rural landscape where tractors democratized 
threshing machine ownership.13 
As the older threshermen died or retired, their younger counterparts could not or 
would not sustain interest in the older technology. Schipull, an established farmer, probably 
continued threshing because his equipment was unencumbered by debt. Once he paid off his 
threshing tractor, he only had to worry about upkeep, and when that became too onerous, he 
made the switch to combining. One Cass County farmer returned from military service in 
Korea and participated in one of these small rings for a season or two. However, he soon 
purchased a used combine, abandoning tradition for the advantages of harvesting on his own 
schedule.14 
Once farmers decided to use a combine, they had to learn the best operating 
techniques, since operating a combine involved more than merely hitching, starting the 
tractor and heading into the field. When was the optimum time to harvest with a threshing 
machine? Each stand of grain ripened unevenly, depending on field conditions and the 
12 
"Has Threshing Lost Its Glamour?," Wallaces Farmer, 21 July 1945. 
13 Johnnie Westphalen, interview by author, 2 October 1992, Atlantic, Iowa, tape recording. 
14 Rikoon argued that farmers continued to thresh after World War II because they "weighed the financial cost 
of innovation and concluded that older practices still provided the most efficient way to complete the grain 
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variety of seed planted. How could combine operators ensure that the oats would be ripe 
enough without waiting too long, risking grain loss at the cutter bar due to shattering? To 
prevent threshing loss due to cracked seed or underthreshing, farmers needed to adjust the 
distance between the cylinder and concave and set the cylinder at the proper speed for the 
type of crop. Similarly, the flow of air had to be adjusted to match crop conditions and the 
crop type to capture all of the threshed grain. 
These issues, if not properly addressed, could make the difference between profit and 
loss and, ultimately, in the success of the technology in meeting the farmer's needs. 
Instructions from the manufacturer and sales staff, advice from farm periodicals and farmer 
adaptations helped farmers accept the combine. But the willingness of farmers to experiment 
on the faith that sooner or later the new machines would help them harvest with greater 
financial and labor savings was the most influential factor in the acceptance of this new 
machine. 
Although farmers believed that combines could save money and labor when 
compared to binders and threshing machines, the transition to combines involved a few 
technical obstacles. A perennial debate about combine use in Iowa concerned the proper 
time for harvesting. According to writers in Wallaces ' Farmer, "One problem in connection 
with the spread of combines is teaching the owner to avoid harvesting too soon." As long as 
farmers used binders and threshed their grain a week or ten days later, farmers cut grain 
when it was only partially ripe. "With the new machines," the journalists cautioned, "it is 
advisable to hold off an extra week or ten days past the binder stage." By waiting, the grain 
would ripen in the stand and fully develop as well as go into the bin with the proper moisture 
harvest," Threshing in the Midwest, 153. Lenis Holm "From Family Farm to Agribusiness," 115; Robinson, 
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content. If the stand was in danger of lodging (falling over), or was especially weedy, then 
the farmer could windrow it and let it lay in the field to let it dry. The article contained 
information on letting the crop cure in the windrow for a few days to get it dry enough so that 
the combine could separate the oats from weed material (known as trash). Moist trash mixed 
with the grain could cause the grain to spoil in storage. Farmers needed to make sure that the 
crop they were storing was at 14 percent moisture content to prevent deterioration in the 
bin.15 
The standing versus windrow debate continued in the weeks leading up to the 1942 
harvest season. One writer noted that farmers disagreed about whether it was preferable to 
combine standing grain or to windrow it before combining. He "had almost come to the 
conclusion that windrowing was practically imperative with oats, perhaps as much so as for 
flax," until he spoke with Glen Blanchfield of Lake City who regularly combined standing 
oats. While not taking sides, the author counseled farmers who used both methods. Farmers 
who combined standing grain needed to wait at least ten days after the time when they would 
normally start binding to ensure a ripe crop, noting that "ripe oats does not go to pieces as 
badly as we thought it would." Windrowing required stubble just a little higher than with 
binder operations to keep the windrow far enough above the ground to allow the grain to dry 
without bending the stubble under the weight of the windrow. If the cut grain touched the 
ground it would not dry properly and could even mold in the field.16 
Admonitions to windrow oats before combining became an annual feature in 
Wallace's Farmer by the end of the 1940s. In 1946, Merle Stansfield, a Marshall County 
interview. 
15 
"Combines Gain on Binders," Wallaces Farmer, 10 August 1940; "Pointers on Combining," Wallaces 
Farmer, 28 June 1941. 
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farmer, observed "There are a lot of fellows who just can't wait. But if you want good, 
heavy berries, you should let oats ripen on the stem." Stansfield used a windrower because 
he believed that weeds could dry out in the windrow and prevent clogging the combine. By 
contrast, a Hardin County farmer argued that windrowing actually increased the likelihood 
that trash would get into the grain bin. The regularity of advice to windrow suggests that the 
process of combine adoption involved trial and error based on local conditions and operator 
preferences. Regardless of the method, all farmers concluded that the oats needed to be ripe 
before harvesting.17 
The next year, Wallaces ' Farmer repeated the same theme of cutting only ripe grain, 
although author declared that windrow harvesting was the preferred method. In 1949, the 
editors came out in favor of windrowing, contending that it helped ensure grain quality. The 
next year a similar article titled "Windrowed Grain Keeps Better" echoed that finding. In 
spite of the editor's strong case for windrowing, a 1951 poll found that three of five farmers 
who used a combine cut their grain in the stand rather than windrowing it first. Dale O. Hull, 
an extension engineer at Iowa State College, traveled through Iowa at harvest time. He 
observed that farmers who sold grain for cash tended to windrow oats. By 1959 it was clear 
that farmers in the northern part of the state preferred to windrow while those in southern 
Iowa combined standing grain. The actual practices of farmers indicate that they used 
machines the way they believed suited their operation rather than heeding the advice of the 
journalists.18 
16 
"No More Threshing Ring Dinners?," Wallaces Farmer, 27 June 1942. 
17 
"Let Grain Get Ripe, Farmers Say," Wallaces Farmer, 6 July 1946. 
18 
"Windrowing Helps Grain Quality," Wallaces Farmer, 18 June 1949; "Windrowed Grain Keeps Better," 
Wallaces Farmer, 1 July 1950; "Need Straw Next Winter?," Wallaces Farmer, 21 July 1951; "Conditioning 
Grain For Harvesting with the Combine," Hull papers; "Oat harvest method varies over state," Wallaces 
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The debate over harvesting standing or windrowed grain illustrates that farmers had 
to select appropriate techniques to use the new technology, but farmers also made their own 
technological adjustments to solve problems or cut costs. Farmers who preferred 
windrowing had to get the grain cut and laid in a windrow, requiring an extra trip through the 
field with special equipment. Faced with purchasing a windrower or hiring one at an extra 
charge, farmers found their own solutions. Some farmers simply used their mowing 
machines and raked the cut grain into a windrow, although one writer noted that "ordinary 
mowing and side-delivering can sometimes make a terrible rope [of cut stems and grain] to 
handle." Other farmers converted their binders to windrowers, blending the existing tools 
that were already paid for with new tools to get in the crop. The easiest way to windrow was 
to disable the tying mechanism on the binder, allowing the cut grain to simply slide off the 
machine and onto the stubble. Loyd Reisdel from Carroll County, made more elaborate 
modifications to his binder. Reisdel, photographed in 1942 with his "made-over binder 
windrower," removed a section of the binder platform, leaving a drop-hole for the cut grain 
to land gently on the stubble. In the late 1940s Iowa State College experts estimated that 
farmers used eight times as many converted binders as windrowers as they did factory made 
windrowers. Charles and Minnie Havran of Benton County, purchased a new Allis-Chalmers 
All-Crop 60 in July, 1950 and used a modified binder for two years before bought a used 
nine-foot Case windrower. Farmers who combined soybeans also modified their machines. 
Plant material occasionally jammed in the straw rack of the All-Crop combine when the 
vines were rank. One farmer's solution was to take pieces of wooden fruit crates and secure 
Farmer, 20 June 1959. In 1960 the author of a brief article titled "Harvesting Oats" asked whether farmers 
should combine standing oats or from a windrow without offering any indication of a preferred method. 
Wallaces Farmer, 2 July 1960. 
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the wooden slats over the straw rack to allow the plant material to move over the rack and out 
of the combine while the beans fell through.19 
There were other challenges in using combines that threatened their adoption. In 
July, 1947, Ray Gribben of Dallas County hired two neighbors to combine his wheat. One of 
the men spent the first day adjusting his John Deere 12-A combine for the proper threshing 
speed, while the other successfully used a McCormick-Deering. Everything was in order on 
the second day and on the third day the harvesters wanted to finish, which meant that they 
continued to harvest until 9:30 P.M. Gribben recorded how impressed he was with his 
harvesters' work ethic in that day's diary entry, but the next day he tested the crop harvested 
after dark and found that it was too moist to store, concluding that the grain absorbed the 
moist night air. In spite of his concerns about the high moisture content of the nighttime 
harvest, Gribben did not want to go back to threshing. The day after the harvest he did not 
state that he would look for a responsible thresher to do a better job than his custom cutters 
did. Instead, he resolved that if he had wheat to harvest next year, "I'll not permit [combine] 
harvesting late in evening or early morning." Gribben recognized that there were risks 
associated with combining and needed to be assertive about minimizing or reducing 
problems.20 
The "straw problem" was another challenge for farmers, forcing them to find new 
solutions to unanticipated problems created by new technology. Farm families who raised 
livestock needed the straw, a by-product of threshing, for bedding and manure removal. 
19 
"No More Threshing Ring Dinners?," Wallaces Farmer, 27 June 1942; Hull, "Conditioning Grain for 
Harvesting with the Combine"; Charles and Minnie Havran Papers, Living History Farms, Urbandale, Iowa; 
Doyle Brubaker interview. A businessman from Bettendorf, Iowa offered farmers free instructions for 
converting binders to windrowers beginning in 1940. See George Innes, "Old Binders Make Good 
Windrowers," Farm Implement News, 2 May 1940, 33. 
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However, the combine left the straw in the field. Farmers who used threshing machines 
could blow the straw into the barn or use a straw stacker to create a stack, allowing them to 
have the straw close to their livestock. Throughout the late summer and into the fall, farmers 
could then use a stationary press to bale the straw for easy handling. According to Keith 
Robinson of Cass County, "My dad was a little later getting a combine than others because 
he liked that straw pile.. .he liked that in the winter time for the hogs to get in there." The 
straw was cheap shelter for hogs and the animals consumed any unthreshed grain in the pile. 
Farmers in the Irwin area of Shelby County reported in 1940 that they believed combines 
wasted the straw compared to threshing.21 
The solution to the straw problem was the pick-up baler, a parallel development in 
harvest technology. In 1941, an observer noted that farmers were "getting around the straw 
problem by calling in a custom baling outfit to follow the combine." Once families baled 
their straw, they could pick it up from the field with family labor and haul it to the barn or 
hog house for storage, using the straw as needed, just as they had done with the straw stack 
when they threshed. Ray Gribben hired custom balers to bale his wheat straw after his shaky 
combining start in 1947. After purchasing their combine in 1949, the Anderson family of 
Audubon County hired a custom baler to bale enough of the straw to get them through the 
next year. A 1951 farm poll showed that 83 percent of respondents baled their straw. Even 
though baling was the most common method of saving straw, farmers employed other 
techniques. A small minority of farmers reported using a field chopper to cut straw and blow 
it into a barn or other outbuilding, or make temporary storage with snow fence. Even fewer 
20 Ray Gribben diary, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City. 
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farmers said that they used hayloaders or other hay tools to pick up the straw. Most farmers 
found that their straw problem, created by the decision to use new combine technology, could 
be solved by other new technology.22 
Families who used combines not only changed the type of work performed on Iowa 
farms, supplanting threshing with combining and straw baling, they cut the labor needed to 
harvest the crop, altering family work patterns. When families belonged to threshing rings 
almost every family member was critical for harvesting and threshing the crop, but as 
combines became popular, the need for family labor diminished. Before combining, even 
child labor was vital on farms at harvest and threshing time. Darlene Meyer of Adair County 
recalled that her entire family would work in the evenings to shock the grain that the men cut 
during the day. Young children hauled water to workers in the field before they were old 
enough to help drive horses or tractors on the racks for the bundle pitchers. Teenagers 
helped pitch bundles and scoop the threshed grain out of the wagons and into the bins. Keith 
Robinson's father and a neighbor drove the tractor and binder while the two Robinson boys 
shocked the grain. When families began to use combines, one or two people could handle 
the crop from the field to the bin. One Audubon County farmer used the combine while his 
teenage son hauled the grain in from the field and scooped it into the bins, completing the 
harvest of forty-five acres with just two field workers. 23 
21 Edward O. Moe and Carl G. Taylor, "Culture of a Contemporary Rural Community, Irwin, Iowa," Rural Life 
Studies 5, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1942), 39, 78; Keith Robinson 
interview. 
22 
"Getting Onto Combines," Wallaces Farmer, 14 June 1941; Gribben Diary; R. D. Anderson, interview by 
author, 7 December 2001, Des Moines, Iowa, tape recording; "Need Straw Next Winter?" Wallaces Farmer, 21 
July 1951. 
23 Mary Neth stressed the importance of threshing as a farm survival strategy that allowed family farms to 
minimize expenses by exchanging labor within their communities. According to Neth, the break-up of 
threshing rings was a loss of community sharing that men and especially women mourned. I do not deny that 
farm family members valued aspects of threshing, but it is likely that they welcomed the new work more than 
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Of course, fieldwork was not the only work involved in harvesting. Combining saved 
other labor, too. Some women were happy to be free of the burden of feeding threshing 
crews, even the reduced crews of the late 1930s and 1940s. In many cases, women were 
responsible for feeding the crew an evening supper in addition to the noon dinner. Both 
midday and evening meals were extensive affairs, featuring several kinds of meats, vegetable 
dishes, pickles and preserves, and bread as well as pies and cakes. In 1940, a contributor to 
Wallaces ' Farmer wrote a long article urging the "streamlining" of threshing meals. The 
author, "Mrs. Leslie," noted that the older generation expected the elaborate meals but that 
farming and rural life was different, with different tools and conveniences. She suggested 
that the men could go to town and have a good meal at a café, where the facilities existed to 
feed large numbers of people. Furthermore, the extensive home-cooked meals wasted money 
and were actually too much for the men. "Men haven't iron clad stomachs" she wrote, "and 
many a man who begins to look a bit wan around the gills and feels weak in the middle by 
the time the threshing is half over could come thru a season of ordinary "vittles" hale and 
hearty."24 
In 1942 the magazine backed away from "Mrs. Leslie's" position. Wartime 
conservation measures of gas and tire rationing provided justifications for feeding the men on 
the farm rather than in town. In this instance, the increased demands of wartime production, 
the need to make do with existing equipment and the attending social customs of threshing 
they mourned the passing of the old. See chapter six, Preserving the Family Farm: Women, Community, and 
the Foundations of Agribusiness in the Midwest, 1900-1940. Elmer and Darlene Meyer, interview by author, 14 
August, Bridgewater, Iowa, tape recording; Keith Robinson interview; R. D. Anderson interview. 
24 
"Streamlined Threshing Meals," Wallaces Farmer, 27 June 1940. 
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took precedence over calls for reform. Relief from threshing meals would come with the 
combine.25 
The diminished need to feed threshers was one of the most significant changes 
associated with combine use. "With the decrease in large threshing rings and the like," a 
writer observed in a Wallaces ' Farmer article from 1950, "dinners for big crews of men are 
becoming less and less common." When Darlene and Elmer Meyer of rural Bridgewater 
began farming after their marriage in 1942, Darlene was up at 5:00 A.M. to kill and butcher 
the five chickens she needed for that day's meal. When the Meyer's purchased their first 
combine in 1954, a new International Model 64, Darlene no longer prepared special meals in 
large quantities. While combining did not necessarily change the daily bill of fare for rural 
dinners, women no longer fed a neighborhood crew. Instead, they focused on providing for 
their own family and, on some farms, assisting with the fieldwork.26 
Women began to play a larger role in fieldwork in the Midwest as hired men left the 
farm and more farmers turned to machine power. The decline in communal labor put a 
premium on women's labor in some families. A photograph of a family in an oat wagon next 
to a combine in the August 7, 1945, issue of Wallaces ' Farmer included a caption describing 
the oat harvest as a "family enterprise" for the Gurnett family of Linn County. Mrs. Gurnettt 
used the tractor to haul the grain from the combine to bin. On the Meyer farm, Darlene 
unloaded the oats, although Elmer operated the combine and hauled the grain.27 
As farm families with combines compressed the grain harvest season from two to 
four weeks into two or three days, families had more time for recreation. In a promotional 
25 
"Feeding the Threshers," Wallaces Farmer, 27 June 1942. 
26 
"Extra Men Coming For Dinner," Wallaces Farmer, 15 July 1950; Elmer and Darlene Meyer interview. 
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film for John Deere 11-A and 12-A combines, the fictional Sheppard family considered 
purchasing a combine to help them perform their harvest more quickly and at lower cost, but 
also for the added benefits of reduced work and increased time for family recreation. After 
the Sheppard family purchased their combine and successfully completed the harvest, the 
father, Fred Sheppard, observed "If it hadn't been for that John Deere combine, we'd have 
had a month of hard and sweaty work setting up bundles and threshing." The son replied that 
it only took four days to harvest their sixty acres of oats at half the cost of binding and 
threshing. After acknowledging that "mother" would enjoy a vacation as well as a new 
electric refrigerator that they planned to purchase with the savings, the family departed for a 
fishing trip with relatives. As the family drove away, they stopped to wave at their neighbors 
who were threshing just down the road. The film's narrator concluded the dramatization by 
stating, "You and your family can take a vacation next year if you shorten your harvest with 
a John Deere combine."28 
Like the fictional Sheppard family, real Iowa families prepared for a new type of 
lifestyle. If farm families could persuade or hire someone to milk the cows and take care of 
the livestock, they could justify taking a week or two holiday during the time that they 
previously needed for threshing. A photo essay entitled "How to Take Eight On Your 
Vacation" from Wallaces ' Farmer depicted one family's preparations for a 1950 vacation to 
Minnesota for fishing and then across Canada to Seattle and back home. The Gaines family 
of Linn County purchased an old school bus and renovated it with numerous conveniences, 
including bunk beds, electric lights, window screens, a gas refrigerator and water tanks. The 
27 Katherine Jellison depicted the growing role for women in field work after World War II in chapter six of 
Entitled to Power, "Oat Harvest," Wallaces Farmer, 7 August 1945. 
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final photo caption in the essay stated, "This is how they'll start out when combining ends 
and the bus is ready." One Audubon County family decided to take a fishing vacation in 
Minnesota after they purchased a new John Deere 12-A combine in 1949. In addition to 
saving harvest labor and time, the income from custom work actually paid for the vacation. 
Families who purchased combines, then, experienced a dramatic shift in their lifestyles. 29 
Tenants and landlords also experienced changes when they began to use combines. 
The traditional arrangement of labor sharing at threshing time included arrangements for cost 
sharing, too. Both tenants and landlords did their own binding and split the threshing bill and 
twine costs. But combining defied the traditional logic of harvesting. If an owner did not 
own a combine and hired a tenant who did own one, the reduced labor requirements and 
expense of machine hiring of meant that splitting machine hire costs was potentially more 
expensive for landlords, since they paid cash for what they formerly received as part of the 
tenant contract if the tenant used his own combine. When the editors of Wallaces ' Farmer 
ran a story titled "Power Farming Changes Leases" in 1946, they could only report on the 
problem without offering solutions. In 1950, writers at the magazine reported a variety of 
different solutions, including splitting the cost in half between landlord and tenant, minus the 
landlord's share of fuel.30 
While families and communities began to adapt to changes in labor requirements of 
the combine, their decision to purchase a combine also played an important part in the 
transition to soybean culture in Iowa. While journalists debated the best way to use 
28 The Sheppards Take a Vacation, produced by Ray-Bell Films for John Deere Company, directed by Reid H. 
Ray, circa 1940. 
29 
"How to Take Eight On Your Vacation," Wallaces Farmer, 15 July 1950; R. D. Anderson interview. 
30 
"Power Farming Changes Leases," Wallaces Farmer, 5 October 1946; "Who Pays: Tenant or Landlord?," 
Wallaces ' Farmer, 3 July 1948; "Who Pays For Combining?," Wallaces Farmer, 1 July 1950. 
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combines in small grains, soybeans gained rapid acceptance in Iowa. The first soybean crops 
were most valuable as forage. Up to World War II, farmers used as much as two thirds of the 
Iowa soybean crop for hay. But wartime demands for edible oils for humans and high 
protein meal for livestock spurred the demand and acreage for the crop. Farmers invested in 
cooperative soybean mills to process the crop in Manly, Sheldon, Eagle Grove and numerous 
other communities, creating an infrastructure to deal with the surge in acreage from 1.25 
million acres (for hay and beans) in 1939 to over 2.2 million in 1943. The wartime boom in 
soybean production helped create a high demand for combines. In 1942 some areas of the 
state had enough combines to harvest the bean crop, particularly the grain-livestock regions 
of the west and south, but in the rest of the state, where soybeans were most commonly 
grown, the number of acres per combine was quite high. In this area, each combine would 
need to cover anywhere from around 200 to as many as 422 acres in Emmet County to finish 
the harvest. While some observers predicted that soybean acreage would fall from wartime 
highs of over 2 million acres by half, in 1954 Iowa farmers matched their wartime production 
and, in 1961 they raised over 3.3 million acres, giving Iowa farmers an additional reason to 
purchase or hire combines.31 
Combines were the harvesting machine of choice for soybeans, the region's newest 
crop, even before the machines were popular for harvesting small grains. A Wallaces ' 
Farmer article from 1946 noted that farmers accepted combines as the best way to harvest 
soybeans, even as they continued to use binders and threshing machines for their small 
31 Earle D. Ross, Iowa Agriculture (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa Press, 1951), 180; Wilcox, The 
Farmer in the Second World War, 299; "We Must Have More Soybeans and Flax!," Iowa State College 
Agricultural Extension Service, Ames, Iowa, Pamphlet 26, March 1942; "Is the Soybean Boom Over?," 
Wallaces Farmer, 20 October 1945; U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1940, v. I, pt. 2, 121; "Combines on Beans," 
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grains. Farm records show the coexistence of two types of technology for harvesting and 
threshing. Rudolf Schipull hired combines for flax, clover and beans in the 1940s while 
continuing to bind and thresh his oats. Asa T. Meelchryst threshed oats on his Guthrie 
County farm in the summer of 1943 but spent $26.00 to hire a combine for harvesting his 
beans that fall.32 
One of the biggest challenges combine operators faced in harvesting soybeans was 
the problem of cracking or splitting the beans. Soybeans, like any seed crop, begin to 
deteriorate as soon as the outer hull cracks, causing storage problems if there are too many 
split or cracked beans in the bin. As early as 1942, farm journalists encouraged farmers to 
"Thresh Beans With Care," recommending that operators should "reduce the cylinder speed 
or there will be too many "cracks" or "splits." If there was too much chopped plant material 
over the sieve in the rear part of the machine, the beans "will be lost or will be returned to the 
cylinder and cracked."33 
Just as the editors repeated lessons of the oat harvest, the editors also reiterated the 
message of making proper adjustments for soybean harvesting. Recommendations to check 
the cylinder speed, distance between the concave and the cylinder, and air blast were almost 
annual caveats. In addition to checking the grain in the tank, farmers needed to examine the 
stubble to make sure the cutter bar was set low enough to get the low-setting bean pods. In 
1951, an expert reported that, "you can expect a 10 per cent loss when you combine 
Wallaces Farmer, 15 September 1942; Second Biennial Report of Iowa Book of Agriculture for 1954-1955, 
406; Fifth Biennial Report of Iowa Book of Agriculture for 1960-1961, 328. 
32 Rikoon included a skillful discussion of the importance of combines in the transition to soybeans in chapter 
seven of Threshing in the Midwest. Ross, Iowa Agriculture, 180; Lillian Church, "Partial History of the 
Development of Grain Harvesting Equipment" Information Series No. 72 (rev. ed.) (Washington, D.C .: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, October 1947), 51; Schipull papers; Asa T. Meelchryst papers, State Historical 
Society of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa. 
33 
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soybeans.. .tests have shown losses as high as one-third." Constant adjustment and oversight 
was the remedy for poor combining. Three years later a writer, noting that careful operation 
could keep combining losses to less than 5 percent, encouraged farmers to analyze their 
operation. By counting the number of beans on the ground in square foot blocks, farmers 
could determine their rate of loss. Four beans per square foot equaled a loss of about one 
bushel per acre while just twenty beans per square foot indicated a loss of five bushels per 
acre. Using the new machine to minimize losses meant maximizing returns on a profitable 
34 
crop. 
Industry observers noticed the shift from small grains to soybeans as well as farmers' 
abandonment of binding and threshing tools and their embrace of the combine. In the fall of 
1950, John Deere Company placed an advertisement in Farm Implement News titled "Time 
Out, Old-Timers." The self-serving text evoked nostalgia and images of modernity: 
"This fall, throughout the nation, the old crews have been getting together again.. .this 
time to thresh the past, to harvest the rich yield of memory, to claim and store forever 
the golden grain that only fellowship can sow and only time can nourish. And we of 
John Deere are proud to join them in their retrospect, proud to share with them their 
golden memories, proud that we and our John Deere dealers have been a part of the 
great progress in harvesting equipment they have witnessed."35 
The advertisement emphasized the new prominence of farmers who purchased combines by 
relegating threshing to the past, highlighting festivals such as the First Annual Midwest Old 
Settlers-Threshers Reunion held at Mt. Pleasant, Iowa that September. Rather than playing a 
vital role in getting the crop from the field to the granary or elevator, threshermen were now 
"old-timers," belonging to a golden yesterday characterized by intense farm labor. The 
34 
"Does Combine Save Beans?," Wallaces Farmer, 16 September 1944; "Lose One-Tenth of Bean Crop?," 
Wallaces Farmer, 15 September 1951; "How to Save More Beans," Wallaces Farmer, 19 September 1954. 
35 John Deere Advertisement, Farm Implement News, 25 November 1950. 
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advertiser's new world of grain harvesting was characterized by comparative ease and speed, 
requiring the labor of no more than two people or even performed alone with minimal sweat. 
Combine manufacturers could afford to be nostalgic in 1950. Combine sales were on 
the rise that year and increased throughout the 1950s. In 1952 farmers reported 71,728 in use 
on 197,741 Iowa farms, or just over one combine for every three farms. By 1959 there were 
90,027 combines on 184,866 Iowa farms or one combine for every two farms. Although the 
numbers of these pull-type combines for small grains and beans declined after 1959, so did 
the number of farms. Farmers' commitment to combining did not abate. Manufacturers 
introduced new self-propelled models that handled com as well as the lesser grains, 
supplanting the tractor-drawn models as well as corn pickers. Farmers who participated in 
the reduced threshing rings yielded to combines over the course of the 1950s, either by 
choice or attrition. By 1960, the "old-timers" could enjoy the nostalgia of their youth and 
fellowship of threshing at the two-day Mt. Pleasant Reunion without a month's hard work of 
production agriculture.36 
During the 1960s tractor-drawn combines also became a memory for some Iowa 
farmers. With the development of a self-propelled combine that could be used for the com 
crop as well as small grains and soybeans it was possible to own or use one machine to 
harvest all the seed crops grown on a farm. With new style self-propelled combines farmers 
merely had to change harvesting heads to make the switch from small grains or soybeans to 
com. Farmers could drive directly into the field with a self-propelled combine instead of 
driving over part of the crop as they did with the tractor when pulling a combine. This meant 
more of the crop would be harvested. Manufacturers discontinued tractor-drawn models that 
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were not suited for corn harvest in favor of the true multi-purpose machine. As one industry 
observer in 1965 noted, the trend toward harvesting shelled corn in the field (see chapter 
eight) meant the end of pull-type models. Self-propelled machines accounted for 
approximately 35 percent of all harvesting machines shipped to dealers in the US in 1958, 
but by 1964 they accounted for 51 percent of all harvesting machinery shipments.37 
For all the hyperbole about "dry shirt" harvesting in 1940, combine advertisers based 
their pitch on a degree of truth. Farm families looked back with pride on their tradition of 
demanding physical labor, but they also anticipated a future when they could, as another John 
Deere advertisement commanded, "Lift the Burden of Long, Drawn-Out Harvests." Farmers 
themselves reported their priorities for 1951. "This will be the last year we will cut and 
thresh our oats,' a Jackson county farmer stated that summer. A Dallas County farmer noted 
that he wanted to harvest the "quickest way possible—that's for me." During the 1950s, 
threshing with a tractor and threshing machine became obsolete. In the 1960s, a minority of 
farmers replaced their pull-type combines with self-propelled combines. The decision about 
harvesting small grains and soybeans was no longer whether or not to combine, but rather 
what kind of combine to use. Farm men and women who purchased or hired combines cut 
costs over competing technology, adapted the machines to meet their needs, reallocated time 
for other work or leisure, and, along with other developments on the farm, claimed a place in 
a new, dual crop regime of corn and soybeans.38 
36 First Biennial Report of Iowa Book of Agriculture for 1952-1953, 475; Fourth Biennial Report of Iowa Book 
of Agriculture for 1958-1959, 329. 
37 
"Scanning the Self-Propelled Combines," Implement and Tractor, 21 June 1965, 27-28. 
38 John Deere Combine Advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, 17 May 1941; "Need Straw Next Winter?," Wallaces 
Farmer, 21 July 1951. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
From Picker and Crib to Combine and Bin 
The period from 1945 to 1970 was a time of tremendous change in com harvesting 
and storage techniques. By the late 1960s many farm families replaced mechanical com 
pickers that harvested ear com with combines that harvested and shelled the kernels off the 
ear in the field. Families who stored their entire crop of ear corn in the drive-through com 
cribs that were ubiquitous in the rural landscape remodeled those cribs and added new types 
of buildings to accommodate shelled com. They purchased drying equipment to prepare the 
crop for storage or sale. The bundle of com harvesting technology was much more 
expensive than any technology farmers had ever contemplated in the postwar period. 
Converting to combines, crop dryers, and storage buildings was expensive for Iowa farmers, 
especially since they had a significant investment in equipment and buildings for ear com 
harvesting, which made the transition a slow process. 
Farmers who changed from hand picking to mechanical corn pickers as recently as 
the 1940s only turned to combine harvesting in the 1960s after they had invested so much in 
chemical and other mechanical technologies that they could no longer afford to avoid the 
more efficient and costly combine. Many farmers continued to use mechanical com pickers 
for all or part of their crop throughout the 1960s, but the value of the new technology was 
apparent to farmers who wanted to maximize yields. The combine, drying equipment, and 
new storage structures would be the catalyst for other changes in the countryside, including 
increasing indebtedness and the expansion of farm operations. 
Corn harvesting and storage posed major challenges for farmers in the post-World 
War II years. While most farmers in Iowa would have readily acknowledged the advantages 
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of mechanical corn picking over hand harvesting in the 1930s and during the war years, even 
if they did not use a corn picker, there was no such consensus about the merits of the new 
picker-sheller combination machines or the new combines adapted to harvest the corn crop in 
addition to the cereal grains, hayseeds, and soybeans that were on the market in the late 
1940s and 1950s. If farmers could bring in only shelled com kernels from the field instead of 
the entire ear, how would they store all of that shelled com when their storage buildings were 
designed for ear com? If they could harvest their entire crop in the course of a few days 
rather than a week or more, how would they keep the newly harvested but still moist corn 
from spoiling in the bin? With the ear com harvest, farmers spread one load a time on top of 
the previously harvested com before returning to the field, allowing air currents to move 
among the ears and dry the com enough so that it could be stored without spoiling until warm 
weather arrived in the spring. Furthermore, new harvesting and storage techniques were 
much more costly than the practices they replaced. 
Farmers had been eager to make the transition from hand harvesting to mechanical 
corn pickers in the 1930s and 1940s. The mechanical corn picker relieved farmers of what 
historians and contemporary observers called some of the most tedious and time consuming 
drudgery on the farm; harvesting ear corn by hand. When practical and reliable pickers were 
available in 1928, many farmers in the Com Belt were eager to purchase them, but farm 
finances during the Great Depression made it impossible for many to do so. Still, farmers 
with large enough acreages justified purchasing a picker during the 1930s, and the wartime 
demand for com coupled with labor shortages made pickers even more attractive. Labor 
saving machinery such as the com pickers were extremely valuable items. As one Mahaska 
County farmer who harvested his com and the crops of three other farmers stated, "with the 
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machine we were at it only two weeks and finished in time to go pheasant shooting." 
Potential labor savings were so great that during World War II the picker was a precious 
commodity. The cover of the January 7, 1943 issue of Farm Implement News featured a corn 
picker arriving on a flatbed railroad car at a small town station under an armed guard with the 
caption "The arrival of the corn picker." A crowd of farmers armed with firearms, axes, 
rocks, and pitchforks, led by a local law enforcement official greeted the machine. The 
mechanical corn picker was a valued piece of equipment that helped farmers get their crop 
stored sooner than with hand picking with numerous social and financial benefits.1 
Corn pickers, however, were far from perfect. Next to the tractor, they were the most 
complicated piece of machinery farmers used, and there was a lot of work to do to get them 
set up and to keep them operating properly. Ray Gribben of Dallas County documented the 
amount of work required to prepare the com picker for operations as well as the frequency of 
picker problems and the accompanying exasperation in his diary. In 1947 Gribben spent half 
a day just hunting for his operators' manual for his picker, plus a full day to get his machine 
in operating order. He began mounting the picker on the tractor on November 3, then 
borrowed a chain hoist on November 4 to get the large sections mounted, and finished 
mounting the machine on November 6. However, when the machine was in position on the 
tractor, Gribben found that some of the husking rolls that removed husks from the harvested 
ears were not working. In Gribben's words, these parts would "take a long time to adjust..." 
Getting a com picker ready for the field was a process that could take hours or days but was 
1 Colbert, "Iowa Farmers and Mechanical Corn Pickers, 1900-1952," 531; M. N. Beeler, "What Users Say 
About Their Corn Pickers," Farm Implement News, 21 September 1939; Sid Dix, "The arrival of the corn 
picker," Farm Implement News, 7 January 1943. 
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much more complicated and time consuming than the old work of mounting the bangboard 
on the wagon and hitching the team of horses.2 
Farmers were not free from machinery troubles when the harvest began. Frequent 
breakdowns and repairs plagued farmers who used corn pickers. Ray Gribben spent ten days 
picking corn on his farm in 1947, but on four of those days there were breakdowns that 
caused him to lose part or most of the day engaged in repair. After breaking part of the hitch 
on the corn picker on November 14, Gribben drove to nearby Perry and Dallas Center in 
search of a replacement part. He purchased a part for a more recent model of picker in hopes 
that it would work, but on the following day had the old part repaired in Perry. In this case, 
Gribben lost almost two days of work with a broken machine. That December Gribben 
assisted with repairs when a neighbor used the machine. Gribben spent the afternoon of one 
day and part of another day in repairs before the neighbor broke the machine on December 
13. In 1948, after a flurry of repairs in November, Gribben remarked, "... So-the old machine 
is up to its old ways-a few hours work-then a day's lay off.Repeated breakdowns, both 
major and minor, plagued almost every farmer in varying degrees during the years they used 
mechanical corn pickers.3 
New models were not exempt from breakdowns, although they were less likely to 
give trouble than older machines. Both new and old com pickers were so complex that there 
were many different things that could go wrong. Joseph Ludwig of Winneshiek County 
incurred an average of $15.16 of expenses each year he operated his picker from 1945 to 
1965, but the years immediately before the purchase of a new picker were some of the most 
2 Gribben diary. 
3 Gribben diary. 
246 
costly in the working life of the machine. In 1945, Ludwig made eleven repairs costing 
$24.13 on his picker in January, June, October and November, with ten of those repairs 
during the corn harvest. Ludwig purchased new com pickers in 1946 and 1955 but still 
incurred minor repair expenses in each of the years following the purchase of the new 
machines. Farmers such as Ludwig could expect several years of low-cost operation from 
new machines. The first major expenses for repair of the 1946 machine were in 1950 and 
significant repairs on the 1955 machine began in 1961 and continued to 1965, when Ludwig 
spent $110.83 on nine repairs on October, four in November, and a final repair of the year in 
December.4 
In spite of the predictable inconvenient and expensive breakdowns of mechanical 
com picking, it was more attractive to farmers than hand picking. Farmers who picked com 
by hand spent weeks, sometimes months, conducting their harvest. Carl Hamilton, an Iowa 
farm boy who grew up during the interwar years, claimed that corn picking by hand was the 
worst drudgery on the farm. Each ear had to be removed from the stalk and tossed into a 
wagon. Hand picking was not only a long day of labor, it continued over weeks or months 
until all the ears of com had been gathered from the field. The longer the com was in the 
field the more likely it was that some of the ears would fall off the stalks or the stalks would 
break in a wind, forcing the pickers to bend over to recover the crop from the ground.5 
Many farm women were especially thankful for mechanical com pickers. Farm 
families hosted itinerant com pickers during the harvest season to help get the crop in the crib 
in a timely manner. Unlike regular hired men who were paid a regular wage for an entire 
4 Ludwig papers. 
5 Carl Hamilton, In No Time At All (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1974), 78-84. 
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year, farmers paid hired corn pickers by the bushel they picked, with the family furnishing 
room and board for the duration of the harvest. Regular hired men did other farm work when 
it was raining or it was too muddy to get into the field, but not the corn pickers. Instead, they 
waited inside for conditions to improve in the field. Imogene Hamilton dreaded picking 
season in the age of hand picking, when she would have to deal with "a bunch of corn 
pickers loafing around the house." Carl Hamilton noted that many of these men performed 
their work admirably, but "they were not always the kind of fellows you would invite in for 
Sunday dinner. The extra work of hosting these men as 'house guests' for a few days of 
nasty weather was not appreciated." Even under the best conditions, feeding pickers and 
cleaning up after them in addition to the farm woman's regular duties was onerous. As one 
Wisconsin woman stated, no one mourned the end of the hand corn picking era, "And mother 
mourned it least of all." Two southwestern Iowa women contrasted the days of feeding up to 
seven men three meals a day for weeks. Instead of having meals ready before daylight and 
scrambling to get a pie baked by late morning, one woman whose family owned a picker was 
able to go to town in the morning and help a neighbor butcher chickens and only feed one 
extra man at dinner time.6 
At the conclusion of the com harvest, most farmers then spent the following year 
feeding the com to livestock. In some areas of the state there were stronger markets for cash 
grain, but com was generally most profitable when fed to livestock. For hogs, many farmers 
simply tossed ear com into the hog lot and let the animals strip the cobs, but the days of 
feeding shelled corn were passing. Scientists as well as farmers understood that animals 
6 Hamilton, In No Time At All, 82-3; Beth Wilcoxson, "We'll take machines," Wallaces Farmer, 20 October 
1956; "Thru Picking By Thanksgiving?," Wallaces Farmer, 16 November 1946. 
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received more of the nutritive value from the com when it was cracked, or ground into finer 
particles. Over the course of the winter, spring, and summer, farmers often hired someone to 
visit their farms and shell com on a periodic basis, and the farmer would then grind it as 
needed to maintain a supply of livestock feed. 
In the 1940s and 1950s this system of mechanical picking and the periodic work of 
grinding feed began to change. Farmers realized increased yields, due to other farm practices 
such as fertilizing and using hybrid seed. They stored com in aging buildings designed for 
small crops. Many buildings had been neglected during the Depression and were in need of 
updating. Farmers struggled with insect pests that caused ears to drop off the stalk before 
harvest, and they endured years of com with high moisture content at harvest time which 
threatened the crop with ruin. But in the postwar Com Belt there were new harvesting 
machines that harvested the kernels rather than the entire ear. It was possible to use a 
mechanical dryer to speed the drying process. These changes prompted farmers to consider 
new techniques. 
During World War II and the years immediately thereafter, farmers found that they 
had larger com crops than ever before. In November, 1948 the editors of Wallaces ' Farmer 
and Iowa Homestead proclaimed that "Corn Floods Iowa Farms." This was the biggest com 
harvest in the state's history, and farmers were caught without adequate storage. While com 
acreage was up from the 1947 crop year, the biggest reason for the gain was excellent rainfall 
and heat at the proper time in the life cycle as well as a dry fall that was ideal for a maturing 
crop. In 1947 com yields were low, with a statewide average of thirty and one half bushels 
per acre, but in 1948 the state average was sixty-one bushels per acre. According to farm 
journalists, the permanent com cribs were filled early, leaving farmers to fill the driveways of 
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their cribs and to construct a variety of temporary structures to hold the harvest. Another 
record crop in 1952 had farmers scrambling for storage space.7 
The increased yields of the 1940s and 1950s were part of a trend that began in the late 
1930s and continued during the war years. While corn yields were not increasing 
dramatically each year, they were higher in the 1940s and early 1950s than they had been for 
most of Iowa's history. Farmers of the 1920s could expect yields from the upper thirties to 
the low forties, while yields in the 1930s were more varied. From lows of twenty-eight and 
thirty bushels per acre, in 1934 and 1936, respectively, to highs in the low fifties in 1939 and 
1940, farmers had seen their yields increase. They benefited from the universal adoption of 
hybrid corn by the early 1940s and, to a lesser extent, increased fertilizer use. (See chapter 
three.) Farmers recognized that increased yields were possible in the future with the proper 
use of technology.8 
The shortage of corn storage space was not just a problem of increased production, 
but also of a lapse in construction due to agricultural depression in the 1920s and 1930s. 
There had been comparatively little new construction on Iowa farms during the worst years 
of the Great Depression compared to the period from 1900 to 1920, when farmers enjoyed an 
unfamiliar degree of prosperity. During the depression crop prices were at record lows and, 
in many cases, there were record poor yields. Families struggled just to stay on their farms. 
In many cases improvements to buildings and fences were out of the question. Farmers 
7 
"Got Enough Cribs?," Wallaces Farmer, 4 September 1948; "Corn Floods Iowa Farms," Wallaces Farmer, 20 
November 1948; Forty-ninth Annual Iowa Year Book of Agriculture, 1948,10; "Need Another Crib for Extra 
Corn?," Wallaces Farmer, 18 October 1952. 
8 Annual corn yields are included in the annual and later biennial editions of the Iowa Year Book of Agriculture 
and are also accessible on the web site: www.nass.usda.gov/ia/historic/crnl866.txt. 
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owned aging corn cribs and granaries and too few of them when prices and production 
increased during and after World War II.9 
When the war ended it was possible for farmers to consider building new cribs, in 
large part because of federal farm policy. In 1942 Congress guaranteed farmers supported 
prices for many commodities and passed the Steagall Amendment that provided for the 
continuation of support prices at wartime levels for two years after the war. This promise of 
protected prices gave farmers a degree of security that they had never experienced. Congress 
extended the provisions of the Steagall Amendment well into the 1950s, guaranteeing a 
degree of predictability in income that allowed farmers to consider making investments in 
their farmsteads, including permanent and temporary corn cribs. 
In the 1940s and 1950s many Iowa farmers were willing to invest in new corn storage 
buildings. The combination corn crib and granary was the ideal com storage building. The 
postwar cribs looked much like prewar models. The center driveway ran from gable end to 
gable end and rooms on either side of the drive called pens for storing ear com or shelled 
corn. The new cribs, however, differed in two major respects. First, the floor plan of new 
cribs was often larger than the cribs constructed during the "golden age" of farming from 
1900 through the 1910s. Modern cribs also included more overhead grain storage, which 
meant they were often taller than older cribs. As a writer for Wallaces ' Farmer noted in 
1948, there were few "modem" comcribs in the state. The center driveways of the older 
com cribs were designed for horse and wagons, not trucks. Furthermore, few cribs were set 
up to handle com with high moisture content, which was a perennial problem of the late 
9 Elmer Powers' diary is an excellent example of how one Iowa family struggled to stay on the farm. H. Roger 
Grant and Edward Purcell, coeditors, Years of Struggle: The Farm Diary of Elmer G. Powers (Ames: Iowa 
State University Press, 1976). 
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1940s. A few modifications to the corn crib plans, however, allowed farmers to create cribs 
that testified to new-found prosperity.10 
The cost of these new corn cribs varied, but they were the most expensive kind of 
storage farmers could buy in the 1940s and early 1950s. As Earl Van Doneselaar of 
Mahaska County commented, "The kind of crib most of us want costs more than a dollar per 
bushel of crib space if you hire the labor," a concern that likely prevented many farmers from 
building permanent cribs. Van Donselaar built a traditional style crib but saved money by 
doing the labor himself, while other farmers used rough cut, local oak lumber or recycled 
lumber from other buildings to build their ideal crib. Wallaces ' Farmer staff members 
photographed and highlighted many of these cribs in the magazine in the late 1940s and early 
1950s. Many of these buildings featured curved gothic roofs made with laminated rafters or 
gambrel style rooflines. As one writer noted in the early 1950s, "you see quite a number of 
wide-driveway, overhead bin type cribs under construction." Expenses associated with these 
new buildings are indicated in farm record books. In 1949 Melvin Laughlin of Hardin 
County built a new crib for $1,702.25, while Rudolf Schipull constructed one that same year 
for $6,792.25. Many farmers spent such large sums because these buildings reflected older 
ideas and traditions about what constituted proper corn storage. After years of privation and 
struggle, farmers had high yields and good prices and could construct the "dream crib of the 
20s and 30s," signifying their success and perseverance. New cribs equaled or exceeded the 
size of the barns on many farms.11 
10 
"How Many Buildings Are Modern?," Wallaces Farmer, 7 August 1948. 
11 A1 Bull, "What Kind of Crib Do You Need?," Wallaces ' Farmer, 6 September 1952. For examples of the 
boom in corn crib construction and the types of buildings farmers erected, see the following articles in Wallaces 
Farmer: "You Can Still Plant Early Potatoes," 3 April 1948; "How Many Buildings are Modern?"; "Got 
Enough Cribs?"; "Can Seal Corn in Round Cribs," 2 October 1948; A1 Bull, "What Kind of Crib Do You 
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Farmers who were open to new ideas about what constituted a good permanent crib 
could try new styles designed by agricultural experts from the private sector or the land grant 
colleges. The Quonset building associated with the military during World War II became a 
feature on Iowa farms for a variety of purposes, including storage for equipment and grain. 
In 1952 W. R. Mitchell of Grundy County constructed a Quonset as a granary, complete with 
a forced air drying system. Agricultural engineers at Iowa State College also drafted 
building plans for the Midwest Plan Service, a consortium of engineers from land-grant 
colleges who offered low-cost plans to farmers that matched Midwestern conditions. The 
Midwest Plan Service first offered corn crib plan Number 73281 in 1953. The crib was 
rectangular, with two pens running the length of the building separated by an A-frame center 
alley for air circulation. Hatches on the roof allowed for farmers to use portable elevators to 
move ear corn into the crib, just as they would a more traditional crib. These buildings were 
suited for natural air drying or farmers could use a fan in one of the gable-end A openings to 
force air through the cribbed corn to speed drying. These cribs did not become popular, 
however. The timing of these new buildings coincided with the rise of harvesting shelled 
corn. Farmers who built new buildings in the mid 1950s and into the 1960s preferred to 
build storage for shelled corn.12 
Despite the attention focused on new structures, the most common new type of com 
storage was the temporary crib. Temporary cribs were expected to last from one to four 
seasons and were made from inexpensive materials and erected in the simplest manner. 
Need?," 6 September 1952; "Where To Put Corn?," 15 August 1953. "When you build corn storage," Wallaces 
Farmer, 17 July 1954; "When you build corn storage," 7 July 1954. Melvin Laughlin papers, State Historical 
Society of Iowa, Iowa City; Schipull papers. 
12 For Quonset buildings see: "Forced Air Drying For Cribs?," Wallaces Farmer, 16 August 1952; Quonset 
advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, 19 September, 1953. For the MWPS structure, see: "Crib Built For Drying 
Corn," Wallaces Farmer, 19 September 1953; "When you build corn storage," Wallaces Farmer, 17 July 1954. 
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Farmers often used round posts or dimension lumber and snow fence or woven wire fence to 
contain ear corn and to keep most of it off the ground. Sometimes temporary cribs were the 
height of several rows of snow fence. These cribs varied in size and shapes; square, 
rectangular, and round. William Beardsley of Decatur County made a floor for his snow 
fence crib and even added a roof from an old steel grain bin. Other farmers such as Fred 
Beier of Buchanan County built a temporary crib in the driveway of his permanent crib. He 
allowed space on either side of the new crib for ventilation and gained the benefit of a roof 
that was already paid for. Melvin Laughlin prepared for his extra storage demands in 
September, 1946 by purchasing fifty feet of snow fence or wire cribbing and lumber, costing 
him $17.76. Laughlin's low investment suggests that temporary cribs were an attractive 
solution because they were inexpensive compared with the expenses for the cribs Laughlin 
and Rudolf Schipull built in the following years. Corn stored in temporary cribs, however, 
was more susceptible to moisture or rat damage than com stored in permanent cribs, but the 
low first cost was a way to ease cash flow problems.13 
Some farmers constructed portable cribs to meet their livestock feeding needs. In the 
fall of 1951 Carl Anderson of Washington County built cribs ten feed wide and thirty-six feet 
long in a pasture for feeding hogs. He set posts four feet apart and braced them across the 
narrow width of the crib to keep it from bowing under pressure from the ear corn, then used 
snow fence for the sides. In 1952 he rolled up the snow fence, removed the braces, pulled 
the posts out of the ground, and moved the crib to a new pasture. Anderson's crib required 
reassembly on the new site, but other farmers around the state solved that problem. They 
13 
"Need Another Crib For Extra Corn?," Wallaces Farmer, 18 October 1952; Laughlin papers. 
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built cribs on skids, or runners, with wire mesh or lumber sides, making it easy to move 
empty cribs around the farm to facilitate pasture feeding.14 
For all the flurry of construction of new and temporary cribs during the 1940s and 
1950s, few farmers considered the implications of new harvesting machines that were on the 
market in those years. The problem, according to the writer for Wallaces ' Farmer in 1954, 
was that the old-style crib was not necessarily the best thing for the future. He asked farmers 
if the old style crib "will fit your corn harvesting methods and corn storage needs in the 
1960s and 70s?" By the mid-1950s farmers had more choices in how they could harvest 
their corn crop. The mechanical corn picker was a proven item in the minds of most Iowa 
farmers, but new machines were on the market in the 1940s and 1950s. The picker-sheller 
was simply a corn picker with a shelling unit attached, but the combine for corn was 
something new. John Deere introduced the first self-propelled combine adapted for corn in 
1955. The combine with com harvesting head enabled farmers to harvest only the com 
kernels, leaving the cobs in the field.15 
The picker-sheller was the first of the new harvesting machines introduced. The 
Massey-Harris Company pitched the picker-sheller to veterans returning from World War II 
in a 1946 film titled "Into Tomorrow." The protagonist was a veteran returning to the farm 
who asked what kind of future he could expect in agriculture. The veteran viewed the self-
propelled picker-sheller, a machine that resembled a com picker in the front but also had a 
shelling apparatus on the back, which separated the cobs and husks from the kernels of com. 
Like manufacturers in most sectors of the immediate postwar economy, Massey-Harris 
14 
"Need Another Crib for Extra Corn?," Wallaces Farmer, 18 October 1952; "Ear Corn...where you want it," 
Wallaces Farmer, 4 September 1954. 
15 
"When you build corn storage," Wallaces Farmer, 17 July 1954. 
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presented an optimistic view of technology in which people who used new products would 
enhance their lifestyles in the future. In their vision of tomorrow, new equipment in com 
harvesting, haymaking, and small grain harvesting would be the technology that would give 
young people a future on the farm.16 
Farmers who used picker-shellers could expect several advantages over those who 
continued using mechanical corn pickers. One of the most important changes was the timing 
of the harvest. Farmers with picker-shellers could harvest earlier when the com in the field 
had higher moisture content which allowed them to harvest more of the crop. As com dried 
in the field the ears were more likely to drop to the ground beyond the reach of mechanical 
pickers. The problem of ear drop became a much bigger issue in the 1940s and 1950s as 
farmers contended with infestations of a new pest, the European com borer, which weakened 
both the ear shanks that held the ear to the stalk as well as the stalk itself. The longer com 
stayed in the field the more risk that high winds could knock stalks over or force ears to drop, 
especially in infested fields. Harvesting machines also created their own losses. Pickers 
inadvertently shelled some of the kernels off the ear as it moved through the machine and 
into the wagon that trailed the picker. This problem was worse in dry conditions. Harvesting 
corn early at high moisture content with a picker-sheller allowed farmers to get more of the 
crop from the field to the crib. 
Purchasing a picker-sheller made financial sense for farmers who wanted to get the 
most out of their harvest or harvested many acres of com. Harold Folkerts of Butler County 
invested in both a picker-sheller and drying facilities because his com yields were so high 
16 
"Into Tomorrow," produced by the Calvin Company for Massey-Harris Company, directed by Reese Wade, 
1946. 
256 
that he would have otherwise had to build new, expensive corn cribs. Folkert reasoned that 
the investment in a new machine would actually save money, since the cost of the picker-
sheller and dryer was less than the cost of cribs. Iowa State College engineers reached the 
same conclusion the following year when they recommended that farmers who harvested 
more than 125 acres of corn could use a picker-sheller for less expense than mechanical 
picking and storing ear com. Howard Sparks of Story County was in an ideal situation for 
converting to a picker-sheller in the early 1950s. He needed to replace a worn out picker and 
his landlord invested in storage bins for shelled com. Sparks claimed that the harvest was 
easier and allowed him to reduce harvest losses.17 
The picker-sheller was especially popular in the north central part of the state because 
farm families there raised more com for sale as grain than for livestock feeding. Farmers 
testified about the advantages of the picker-sheller, especially their ability to harvest early 
and labor savings. An optimistic young Webster County farmer asserted that "The picker-
sheller is the coming thing...It's lots less work and handling [of grain]." Albert Boes of 
Carroll County used a picker-sheller on eighty-five acres of com in 1954 and harvested by 
himself. He was also able to begin harvesting at 30 percent moisture content, allowing him 
to get more ears while they were still on the stalks and to avoid losses due to harvesting. 
John Johnson of Buena Vista County also favored harvesting at approximately 30 percent 
moisture with his picker-sheller. He harvested seventy-five acres of a total of 800 acres in 
1954 without any assistance; a remarkable feat compared to the hand harvesting that was still 
17 
"What They Say On Picker-Shellers," Wallaces Farmer, 5 September 1953; Floyd L. Herum and Kenneth K. 
Barnes, "What's the Best Way to Harvest Corn?," Iowa Farm Science 9 ( July 1954); Sherwood Searle and 
Vernon Schneider, "Here's why we like Field shelling," Successful Farming, October 1953. See also C. H. Van 
Vlack and Hobart Beresford, "The Picker-Sheller: Its Advantages and Disadvantages," Iowa Farm Science 8 
(July 1953). 
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popular at the beginning of World War II. Similarly, Clifford and Wayne Rabe of Sac 
County harvested with a picker-sheller because, according to Clifford, they "don't like to 
work." This tongue-in-cheek reference to labor savings reflected a real benefit of the picker-
sheller. By leaving the cobs in the field, hauling costs could be reduced by roughly half.18 
Moving shelled corn rather than ear corn meant that there was less bulk and fewer 
trips from the field to the storage building, a major advantage during a period of scarce labor. 
It was easier to utilize family labor or part time help rather than relying on a hired man to do 
the hauling. Fewer trips also meant less fuel consumption. Iowa State University extension 
specialists calculated that it cost farmers $.25 cents per bushel to move shelled com 
compared to $.32 for ear com. This small savings might seem small, but it was significant 
when multiplied by several thousand bushels. A farmer who harvested sixty acres of fifty 
bushels to the acre com might not see the savings of $210 enough to warrant investing in a 
combine, but a farmer with 200 acres of com at fifty bushels to the acre could save 
approximately $700, roughly 10 percent of the purchase price of a new combine in 1962.19 
Reducing labor requirements and hauling costs were only part of the advantages of 
new technology. An equally important issue was the need to get as much of the crop into 
storage as possible. Concern about getting every kernel became even more compelling in the 
1950s because farmers spent more money to raise a crop than they did before World War II. 
As detailed elsewhere, farmers began to apply commercial fertilizer to crops to get higher 
yields than they could have by simply using their traditional crop rotation systems. They 
used herbicide to control the weeds that competed with crop plants for moisture, sunlight, 
18 
"Corn storage plans," Wallaces Farmer, 6 September 1958; A. W. Ranniger, "Use picker-sheller and dryer?," 
Wallaces Farmer, 17 September 1955. 
19 
"How will you harvest corn?," Wallaces Farmer, 15 September 1962. 
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and soil nutrients. They also invested in insecticide to control crop pests that preyed on the 
root systems and stalks of corn and other crops. These expenses made it all the more 
important for farmers to preserve as much of the crop as possible. 
Combine promoters addressed the same concerns about minimizing harvest losses 
and early harvesting as the picker-sheller promoters had just a few years later. As early as 
1950 agricultural engineers worked to develop a harvesting attachment, called a corn head, 
for ear corn that could be mounted on a self-propelled combine. In 1955 John Deere 
Company introduced the first corn head on the market, the Number 10. The new corn head 
could be mounted on self-propelled combines in the place of the attachment head for cutting 
small grains or other seed crops such as soybeans. "Corn combining is here—and here to 
stay," boasted John Deere advertisers in the summer of 1956. According to the company, 
farmers who used combines cut their shelled corn loss by 75 percent and ear com loss by 50 
percent compared to mechanical pickers.20 
The reality of combining may have been less awe-inspiring than advertisers claimed, 
but it was still impressive. Farmers who used pickers expected to lose about 10 percent of 
the crop in the field, which meant that they would either have to go back and pick up ears off 
the ground by hand or turn livestock into the field to consume what was left behind. Earlier 
harvesting with a combine at higher moisture content of 25 to 30 percent provided an 
important edge over using a picker and harvesting at approximately 20 percent moisture. 
With a picker-sheller or combine, farmers could expect to lose only 6 percent of the total 
crop. Clarence Wolken of Marshall County used a combine in the late 1950s and claimed 
20 The following articles from Agricultural Engineering 36 (December 1955) describe the technical 
development of the corn head: L. W. Hurlbut, "More Efficient Corn Harvesting"; "Laboratory Studies of Corn 
Combining"; C. S. Morrison, "Attachments for Combining Corn." John Deere 45 Combine and Corn 
Attachment advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, 4 August 1956. 
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that "You can start harvest earlier in the fall, and get away from ear drop." In 1963, Paul and 
Gordon Christensen of Boone County purchased a new corn combine. They had used a 
picker-sheller since 1959, and, according to Paul Christensen, "saved a lot of com by 
harvesting earlier." He also asserted that "we even saved more corn with the combine." 
Marvin Bacen of Humboldt County testified that "You can pay for a combine just from the 
difference in field losses." By spending more for a new harvesting machine, farmers could 
expect to earn more by harvesting a greater percentage of their crop.21 
Harvesting shelled com also cut costs after the harvest, too, since it was no longer 
necessary to hire custom shellers to visit their farms and shell ear corn. Shelling was not an 
expense normally associated with harvesting, since farm families incurred shelling costs over 
the course of the year as they depleted stocks of shelled com. Shelling and grinding com was 
the best way to prepare it for feeding, since livestock utilized more of the nutritional value of 
the grain when it was cracked. This periodic expense was no longer necessary if farmers 
harvested shelled com. 
For all the advantages and promotion of picker-shellers and combines, farmers did 
not rush to adopt this new technology in the second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s. 
Most farmers simply did not have the kind of acreage to justify purchasing a combine unless 
they were prepared to do extensive custom harvesting. Two Grundy County farmers 
interviewed at the Farm Progress Show in 1959 estimated that a farmer would "need about 
300 acres [of com] to justify owning one." That same year agricultural engineers estimated a 
lower acreage threshold of 200 acres of corn for owning a combine, which only suited the 
21 
"Pick corn when you're ready," Wallaces Farmer, 15 August 1959; Jim Rutter, "Field shell your corn?," 
Wallaces Farmer, 5 September 1959; "A sign of the times—combining corn," Wallaces Farmer, 3 October 
1964; Norman West, "Which way to harvest corn?," Wallaces Farmer, 14 August 1971. 
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needs of a small minority of Iowa farmers. The discrepancy between the perception of the 
two men at the farm progress show and the carefully calculated figure of extension experts 
revealed the gulf between the majority of farmers who could not envision a profitable use for 
a combine and the minority who could afford to study the acreage threshold. Farmers with 
large acreages were often the first to purchase combines. Clarence and Lester Wolken of 
Marshall County began using a combine in the late 1950 to harvest their 150 acres of corn. 
A survey conducted in 1965 indicated that approximately one third of farmers who, like the 
Wolkens, planted 150 acres or more of corn would harvest at least part of their crop with a 
hired or purchased combine. By contrast, only 10 percent of farmers with less than 150 acres 
of corn that year planned to harvest shelled corn. Most farmers agreed with the Grundy 
County farmers at the Farm Progress Show that combine harvesting was impressive, but was 
someone else's business.22 
The boom in combine harvesting began in the mid-1960s, almost ten years after 
combines for corn were on the market. In 1964 Iowa farmers harvested only 13 percent of 
their corn acres with combines, but in 1967 they used combines on 32 percent of the state's 
com acreage. By 1968, farmers used combines on 35 percent of Iowa's 9.7 million acres of 
com, with picker-shellers responsible for harvesting another 8 percent of com acres. At the 
end of the 1960s, over half of the com crop was harvested as shelled com, a significant 
change from the beginning of the decade.23 
High costs accounted for part of farmers' reticence to purchase combines. The farm 
records of Joseph Ludwig indicate the high capital requirements of making the transition 
22 
"Field shell your corn?," Wallaces Farmer, 5 September 1959; "Outside Stuff," Wallaces Farmer, 17 
October 1959; "Trend is toward more field shelling," Wallaces Farmer, 28 June 1969. 
23 
"Trend is toward more field shelling." 
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from the corn picker to combine. Ludwig purchased two new corn pickers in the years after 
World War II, the first in 1946 and the second in 1955. These machines cost $943.23 and 
$1,300, respectively, making them some of the most expensive machines Ludwig ever 
purchased for his farm. However, in 1966 he invested $8,600 in his first self-propelled 
combine for harvesting corn, small grains, and soybeans. While this machine was capable of 
harvesting a greater variety of crops than his older corn pickers, the expense was more than 
the cost of a new corn picker and new small-grain combine put together, even at 1966 prices. 
Ludwig's new 1966 machine may have had more capacity than either a corn picker or 
combine, but it was still a sizable investment when compared to the older technology.24 
Just as the first cost of a combine was greater than that of competing technology, so 
were operating costs. The impact of the new high priced machines on farm operations is 
clear when comparing maintenance and repair costs. Corn picker repairs were often literally 
nickel and dime expenses. Farm records show that many farmers often spent less than a 
dollar or two at a time, totaling a few dollars per year. Joseph Ludwig spent an average of 
just $15 per year on com picker repair from 1945 to 1965. By contrast, combine repair and 
maintenance was costly. Ludwig spent an average of $98.76 per year from 1966 to 1970 on 
his new combine. Iowa State University economists estimated that repairs and depreciation 
costs would total approximately 14 percent of the original cost of the machine. Calculated 
this way, Ludwig's $8,600 combine was actually a $9,804 investment.25 
The most significant obstacle to harvesting shelled com with combines or picker-
shellers was the problem of how to store shelled com. The majority of farmers were 
24 Ludwig papers. 
25 Ludwig papers; Monte Sesker, "What it costs to own a combine," Wallaces Farmer, 14 September 1968. 
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equipped to store ear corn, not shelled corn. The writer for Wallaces ' Farmer who asked 
farmers in 1954 if the old style crib "will fit your com harvesting methods and com storage 
needs in the 1960s and 70s?" addressed an important issue. While the capital outlay for new 
harvesting equipment was high, it was compounded by the fact that farmers who harvested 
shelled com needed new storage buildings and special drying equipment. New storage was 
expensive. In the early 1960s, new driveway style cribs cost as much as $1.25 per bushel and 
metal bins cost as much as $.35 per bushel. One Story County family that built an old-style 
crib in 1956 converted it to shelled corn storage just three years later. As Ralph Gerlach 
explained, "We had no idea when we built it to hold ear com that we would switch to using a 
picker-sheller so soon." Most farmers were trapped with buildings designed for an earlier 
era. According to Ken Smalley of Johnson County, "Farmers already had these cribs and 
they felt like they had to use them." As a result, they continued to use the harvesting 
machines that matched their infrastructure.26 
Remodeling old com cribs was one of the most attractive ways to get storage for 
shelled corn throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The common drive-through cribs were the 
most obvious choice for conversion to shelled corn storage. If the crib was in good 
condition, farmers and experts reasoned, it was simply a matter of strengthening the floors 
and sides while making it tight enough to keep the grain in. To convert a crib, farmers added 
lumber wind bracing across each half of the crib. To keep the building from expanding 
outward under the pressure of the shelled com they added tie rods through the crib and 
secured to lumber on the outside of the crib. Lining the crib with plywood also helped brace 
26 
"When you build corn storage," Wallaces Farmer, 17 July 1954; Dick Hagen, "Remodeled cribs can double 
your storage," Wallaces Farmer, 3 October 1959; "Twice as much corn in the crib," Wallaces Farmer, 1 
October 1960; Marsha and Ken Smalley, interview by author, 21 June 2004, Iowa City, Iowa, tape recording. 
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the structure. Finally, they enclosed the building with plywood, boards, or sheet metal. If 
the crib was not on a concrete foundation, the floor joists needed to be reinforced to carry the 
heavier load.27 
Farmers who wanted to change storage facilities liked the low cost of crib 
remodeling. As Harry Wassenaar of Jasper County explained, "Converting our old crib was 
the cheapest way" to get more storage and convert to harvesting shelled corn. Delmar Van 
Horn of Greene County was one of the first of many farmers featured in Wallaces ' Farmer 
who remodeled cribs. Van Horn claimed that he spent $470 in materials to convert his entire 
4,000 bushel ear corn crib to a building that would store 8,000 bushels of shelled corn. The 
materials cost $470, or roughly $.06 per bushel. He did not note what the bill was for 
carpentry, but the total cost for new construction was approximately $.25 per bushel. 
Clarence Wolken and his son Lester of Marshall County converted a crib in 1958 for 
approximately $.07 per bushel by using salvaged lumber and their own labor. In 1959 they 
hoped to remodel another crib for $.05 per bushel in materials. Without salvaged lumber, 
farmers could expect to spend approximately $.15 cents per bushel for supplies. As long as 
the labor cost did not exceed $.10 per bushel, remodeling was cheaper than new construction. 
These kinds of savings made the transition to shelled corn storage affordable for many 
farmers.28 
Remodeling corn cribs was only one option for farmers who wanted to cut costs on 
shelled corn construction. Farmers could convert obsolete buildings into storage space. In 
27 
"Remodelling Corn Cribs For Small Grain Storage," Agricultural Engineers ' Digest, AED—12, n. d., Records 
of the Midwest Plan Service. 
28 
"Converting cribs to shelled corn storage," Wallaces Farmer, 2 September 1961; "Store shelled corn in 
remodeled cribs," Wallaces Farmer, 2 August 1958; "Pick corn when you're ready," Wallaces Farmer, 15 
August 1959; Frank C. Beeson, "Lined cribs make shelled-corn storage," Successful Farming, October 1959; 
"Convert corn crib to shelled corn bin?," Wallaces Farmer, 17 August 1963. 
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1954 Floyd Doxtad of Ida County invested $100 in reinforcing an old hog barn for shelled 
corn storage. The iconic barns of the horse-powered, mixed farming era were also good 
candidates for remodeling. Willis Scott of Hamilton County remodeled his barn that was 
designed for hay storage to grain storage. He removed a dozen horse stalls and feeding areas 
for cattle to make room for 42,000 bushels of shelled com. He removed the second floor hay 
mow, poured fifty yards of concrete to make a four inch thick floor to support the grain, and 
divided the building into three grain storage bins. Danny Bohrofen of Keokuk County 
owned an unused barn with an overhead hay mow and horse stalls and milking stanchions on 
the ground level. "The bam was idle," he noted, "and I was paying taxes on it," making it a 
candidate for demolition or remodeling. Bohrofen altered the bam in stages, first making 
the stalls and stanchion areas into bins for 16,000 bushels, then adding overhead bins in the 
mow to hold 7,500 bushels. At harvest time, he filled the bins with augers. These kinds of 
modifications allowed farmers to make the transition from ear com storage to grain storage in 
the most economical manner.29 
The modification of older cribs and farm buildings was a way for farmers to minimize 
expenses, but new grain storage buildings such as grain bins became common on farms as 
more farmers harvested shelled com. Steel grain bins were distinctive buildings 
characterized by their cylindrical shape, conical roof, and corrugated steel siding. On the 
inside, the bins were equipped with ventilation shafts, and bins for drying often had 
perforated floors to allow heated air to be forced up through the grain. Unlike com cribs, 
there was never any intention of holding ear com in these new-style bins or having separate 
29 A. W. Ranniger, "Use picker-sheller and dryer?," Wallaces Farmer, 17 September 1955; "From cow barn to 
corn bin," Wallaces Farmer, 21 October 1961; "Converts dairy barn to corn storage," Wallaces Farmer, 6 
February 1965. 
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spaces for ear, shelled, or cracked corn. Bins were strictly for shelled corn, grain, or 
soybeans. Although grain bins were on the market in the early 1900s, few farmers invested 
in them because most corn cribs or granaries included enough capacity for as much grain as 
farmers produced in the era of mixed farming and either hand or mechanical corn picking. 
Grain bins were structures of industrial agriculture, just as combines were machines 
of industrial farming. The largest and most highly mechanized farms were often the most 
likely farms to boast of new grain bins. A 1956 advertisement for the Behlen Manufacturing 
Company for cribs, bins, and dryers indicated the size of operation in which grain bins could 
be most successfully utilized. Cedar County farmer Carl Levsen and his three sons (all in 
their thirties) farmed 700 acres, of which they planted 250 acres in corn. They installed eight 
grain bins with a total capacity of 25,000 bushels and owned seven more 3,200 bushel bins 
that they had not yet assembled. According to the advertisement, Levsen emphasized cutting 
operating costs and marketing quality products. "We call it industrialization," Levsen and 
the advertisement copywriters proclaimed, suggesting that contemporary farm operators 
would have to borrow from the world of business management to survive. The Behlen 
Company emphasized the role that grain storage could play in industrializing agriculture by 
changing the farmstead landscape.30 
While the Levsen family represented the "think ahead" mentality espoused by the 
Behlen Company, most farmers resisted the move to new storage. A 1958 poll of Iowa 
farmers indicated that 98 percent stored ear corn in cribs while only 21 percent stored shelled 
corn in bins. The numbers total more than one hundred because some farmers stored corn 
both ways. When asked if they considered any changes in their storage systems, 83 percent 
30 Behlen Manufacturing Company advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, 21 July 1956. 
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of Iowa farmers responded that they did not. Disinterest in change reflected the fact that 
most farmers did not have the acreage to justify purchasing a picker-sheller or combine and 
therefore had little incentive to change. Even farm management specialists who advised 
farmers in a Wallaces ' Farmer column counseled farmers with average or small sized farms 
to avoid the shelled corn harvest and grain bins. "Don't invest too much in buildings and 
equipment on a 120 [acre farm]," counseled a bank president from Schleswig, Iowa. Ear 
corn harvesting and temporary cribs made from picket fence were a better option for the 
majority of Iowa farmers in the 1950s and early 1960s.31 
As the survey results from 1958 indicated, even the farmers who used bins continued 
to harvest ear com. The move to shelled com harvesting was a slow change. This middle 
way, using some new storage while continuing to use the old, was the only way that made 
sense to farmers who already had the structures for ear com but wanted to realize the 
advantages of earlier harvesting. In the face of mounting com harvests due to increasing 
yields, having some new storage was a hedge against wet conditions at harvest time. Arnold 
and Francis Krueger of Hardin County owned conventional comcribs as well as a twenty-one 
foot diameter metal bin that would hold 4,400 bushels. Francis Krueger liked the idea of 
having storage for that much com. "If all the rest of the com is wet," he stated, "we know we 
can count on the com in the new bin keeping." They could also harvest earlier and dry the 
grain in the bin, then move the dried corn into the overhead bins of the corn crib, saving a 
greater portion of the crop.32 
31 
"Corn storage plans," Wallaces Farmer, 6 September 1958; Timely Tips, Wallaces Farmer, 3 June 1961. 
32 Newt Hawkinson, "It pays to plan before you build grain storage," Wallaces Farmer, 19 August 1961. 
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Throughout the late 1950s and 1960s, more farmers erected grain bins. The 1958 poll 
indicated that a substantial majority of farmers were not considering any changes to their 
corn storage systems, but 12 percent of respondents' desired change. Of those who 
envisioned a new system, 43 percent wanted to install bins. The low cost of metal bins 
compared to other types of storage made them the most attractive method. Farmers modified 
older buildings and cribs to ease their storage needs, but the reality was that the yearly corn 
crop was increasing in size faster than farmers could modify old bins. An older crib that held 
4,000 bushels of ear corn was fine for a farmer as long as yields were around fifty bushels 
per acre (approximately the average yield for the period from 1941 to 1949). Farmers could 
hold their entire crop from eighty acres in a conventional crib. But by the late 1950s yields 
varied from sixty-two to sixty-six bushels per acre, and in the early 1960s yields ranged from 
seventy-five to eighty bushels per acre. The same eighty acres of corn could now yield 6,400 
bushels per acre, leaving the farmer 2,400 bushels short of storage space. Temporary cribs 
for ear corn were the least expensive option, but only for ear corn. The farmers who wanted 
new storage space needed bins to take advantage of combine harvesting.33 
Grain bins were the cheapest way to store shelled corn for farmers who wanted to get 
the most com from the field and reduce labor cots. As indicated, the construction costs were 
among the least expensive for any new construction. An Iowa State University extension 
agricultural engineer noted that metal bins cost from $.27 to $.35 per bushel of capacity. But 
the costs to actually keep that com in storage were the lowest, too. Any kind of stored com 
is at risk from too much moisture, so getting and keeping the com dry became an 
33 
"Corn storage plans," Wallaces Farmer, 6 September 1958. 
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increasingly important issue as farmers began to harvest earlier and move away from 
harvesting ear corn.34 
The development that allowed farmers to harvest and store shelled corn was the crop 
dryer. Farmers who harvested corn at 25 to 30 percent moisture content needed to reduce the 
moisture to 13 percent to prevent it from rotting in storage. Getting com dry was not such a 
problem when farmers harvested com by hand over the course of weeks, even months. In the 
1940s and early 1950s, farmers' desire to get com out of fields infested by the European com 
borer before ears dropped meant they were harvesting wet com. Farmers who tried to store 
wet ear corn experimented with dryers to solve these problems. As soon as farmers used 
picker-shellers and combines to speed the harvest, drying com became an absolute necessity. 
Ray Hayes of Crawford County summed up this viewpoint in 1958. "I picked [ear] com 
early last year and dried it. I liked the results," he stated. "Now I'm looking forward to a 
picker-sheller." Drop dryers made it practical to harvest shelled com because farmers could 
harvest early and dry the crop and reduce the risk of a wet com crop spoiling in storage.35 
Farm journalists first discussed crop dryers in the late 1940s as farmers dealt with 
extremely moist ear com at harvest time. In 1945 farmers experimented with placing 
ventilators in crops as well as forcing air through the stored corn. Farmers who used forced 
air used an oil burner and fan to push air into ventilators in cribs. On one Cherokee County 
farm, a dryer helped bring a load of 42 percent moisture corn down to 33 percent in two 
hours, which was promising news for farmers who risked losing a crop to mold. As long as 
farmers could get the corn to approximately 20 percent moisture by the time the crop froze it 
34 Hal Johnson, "Will you need more corn storage?," Wallaces Farmer, 7 September 1963; "What it costs to 
store corn," Wallaces Farmer, December 1967. 
35 
"Put dry corn in your cribs," Wallaces Farmer, 20 September 1958. 
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would last until the spring thaw without spoiling. Most farmers, however, were not so 
fortunate. In the spring of 1946 much of that stored corn was still so wet that a writer for 
Wallaces ' Farmer observed that "A lot of black and moldy com is going to be offered to 
hogs" in forty counties in northern and central Iowa that year. An Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration survey of 1,000 com cribs in that region indicated that almost half of com 
was higher than twenty percent moisture, which meant that it was likely to spoil in the 
upcoming warmer weather.36 
There were few commercial drying units available in the 1940s, however, and little 
demand for what farmers called artificial drying. Dry conditions prevailed during the 1930s 
so there was little need to dry grain. Farmers who wanted to dry com improvised by using a 
tractor to power a threshing machine fan to blow air through a canvas duct into the crib. 
Those who wanted heated air for drying enclosed the tractor engine with canvas to use the 
engine's heat to warm the forced air. These temporary expedients helped many farmers dry 
ear com, while other farmers installed wire or wooden ventilators inside their cribs to allow 
for greater air circulation through the crop. Ventilators, however, reduced the amount of 
storage space for com, forcing farmers to store more of their crop in temporary cribs.37 
Some farmers experienced success with drying ear com in the late 1940s. In 1949 a 
serious infestation of corn borers combined with a strong wind storm in October snapped the 
brittle ear shanks of the com, leaving as much as twenty bushels of com per acre on the 
ground, out of reach of mechanical pickers. Farmers salvaged approximately 27 million 
36 
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bushels by gleaning fields by hand while livestock cleaned up approximately 45 million 
bushels. Farmers who had com in the field suffered, but those who harvested early at high 
moisture content and then dried their com managed to avoid some of the worst damage. Guy 
Coulter, a Grundy County landlord had his crop picked and in his crib for drying before the 
big wind of 1949. His renter's portion of the crop was still in the field during the storm, 
which cut the yield on the standing com by 350 bushels.38 
The 1949 wind storm made a big impression on farmers who wanted to maximize 
yields. Denton Myers of Humboldt County considered purchasing a drying unit after the 
storm. In the 1950 season he planned to begin harvesting ear com early at high moisture 
content and dry the corn in his cribs. As the fall progressed and the moisture content of the 
corn dropped, he would begin to field shell the crop and store shelled com. Crop dryers 
helped farmers make the transition from ear corn harvesting and storage to shelled com 
harvesting because they allowed farmers to have a degree of flexibility in harvesting that they 
did not previously have.39 
Throughout the 1950s, farmers boasted of the benefits of early picking and drying the 
crop with batch dryers. Just before picking season in 1954, a farmer warned that those who 
did not pick com early were "likely to have trouble" with dropped ears because of severe 
European com borer infestations. Walter Cramer of Wright County used a portable drying 
unit called a batch dryer to dry shelled corn before storing his grain. He was able to use his 
picker-sheller when his com tested at 28 percent moisture, then dried up to 335 bushels of 
grain at a time in his batch dryer. Merrit Wassom of Sac County declared that his harvest 
38 
"This Is The Year For Dryers," Wallaces Farmer, 7 October 1950; "What's Ahead In Corn Storage?," 
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losses were so low after picking early and drying that "There wasn't enough com left in the 
field to keep a goose alive." Some farmers believed that any costs associated with drying 
shelled corn in the fall were made up during the following year when farmers with ear com 
paid to have their crop shelled. Warm weather in March and April of 1958 also convinced 
farmers that renting or purchasing a dryer was a necessity to save their stored crop from 
mold. As the temperature increased, com that had been cribbed with high moisture would 
spoil.40 
The ability to dry shelled corn at harvest time was an incentive for farmers to use 
picker shellers and combines. In 1958 Ray Hayes of Crawford County claimed that after a 
year of drying ear com he was "looking forward to a picker-sheller." The 1959 harvest 
season was wet, which meant farmers couldn't get into fields to harvest. Many farmers were 
left with corn in the fields that was too wet to harvest. Those who picked early had wet com 
in cribs. Both situations were bad. "I decided early this fall to let my corn stand in the field 
until it was good and dry," noted a farmer from Van Buren County. "Now I'm not so sure I 
did the right thing." While many farmers continued to take their chances that the weather 
would be suitable for harvesting and storing ear com, a minority of farmers harvested shelled 
com and invested in dryers or rented them to minimize risk to the crop.41 
Continuous flow dryers were even faster than the batch dryers. By 1960 farmers 
could use a portable dryer that continuously moved the grain in the dryer, drying faster than 
40 Dave Bryant, "Harvest corn early!," Wallaces Farmer, 4 September 1954; "Use picker-sheller and dryer?," 
Wallaces Farmer, 17 September 1955: "Put dry corn in your cribs," Wallaces Farmer, 20 September 1958; 
"Stop wet corn spoilage losses," Wallaces Farmer, 15 March 1958; "Emergency corn drying," Wallaces 
Farmer, 5 April 1958. Farmers also received advice about drying from dryer manufacturers. See Farmers ' 
Manual of Crop Drying, (Agricultural Development Division of the Lennox Furnace Company, n.d.), Hull 
papers. 
41 
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the batch dryer which simply held the corn in a chamber. Farmers added wet grain to the top 
which was dried by 180 degree to 220 degree air moving through the tunnels in the grain. 
Fans forced unhealed air through the grain at the bottom of the dryer to cool it to a safe 
storage temperature. By moving the grain during the drying process, continuous flow dryers 
allowed farmers to add and remove grain during the drying period. This type of dryer was 
expensive and best suited to farmers who harvested large amounts of shelled corn, since they 
could keep the combines running without having to wait for a batch to be removed from the 
dryer. Experts suggested that farmers who harvested more than 30,000 bushels per year 
could best utilize this system. John Russell of Lee County, a farmer who used a bin dryer 
claimed, "With continuous flow, you could hardly buy the dryer alone for what I spent [on a 
bin and dyer]."42 
Some farmers like Russell equipped grain bins with dryers instead of using portable 
machines. There were several options for farmers who used grain bins equipped with dryers. 
Farmers could simply use the grain bin as they would a batch dryer, loading from two to four 
feet of corn into the bin, running the dryer overnight, and they unloading the com to be 
stored elsewhere. The batch was a relatively small quantity which meant drying was fast. 
This was known as batch-in-bin drying. Farmers could also dry corn and store it in the same 
bin one layer at a time. This was known as multiple-layer drying, and took much more time 
than batch-in-bin drying, although it required less handling. The first layer was 
42 Timely Tips, Wallaces Farmer, 22 August 1970; Frank Holdmeyer, "Bin dryers...portable 
batch...continuous flow," Wallaces Farmer, 12 August 1971; "Boosting Profits with High-Moisture Corn," 
Pioneer Corn Service Bulletin, (n.d., circa 1965), 5, Hull papers; Norman West, "Match your dryer system to 
harvest rate," Wallaces Farmer, 28 August 1971. 
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approximately five feet deep. As soon as that layer was dry another four foot layer could be 
added. After three or four days, depending on moisture content, they added another layer.43 
Farmers could avoid the costs of purchasing drying equipment or incurring the costs 
of new storage buildings by hiring commercial dryers or storing their crop at grain elevators 
which provided drying service. The advantage to commercial storage was that farmers could 
use their time for tasks other than drying, such as fall tillage or fertilizer application. The 
grain elevator assumed the risk and management of the drying process. The major 
disadvantage to commercial storage was the fact that many elevators had limited storage 
space at harvest time, which put farmers at risk of having a wet crop with no storage.44 
The variety of new techniques, machines, and structures made grain storage and 
drying more complicated over the course of the 1960s. Just as farmers who dealt with 
herbicide and insecticide faced an ever more complicated array of products, combinations of 
products, and restrictions on the use of chemicals, farmers who used dryers found that corn 
drying also required careful management. They hoped to prevent problems of under drying 
and over drying. If farmers applied too much heat too quickly they risked cracking their 
grain, which allowed mold to grow and could ruin the crop. Corn that was to be sold in the 
fall only needed to be dried to 15 percent moisture while com to be stored for a year needed 
to be 13 percent. Sometimes drying was uneven, which meant some of the com might stay 
too moist and spoil.45 
43 Samuel R. Aldrich and Earl R. Leng, Modern Corn Production (Cincinnati, Ohio: The Farm Quarterly, 
1965), 280-283. 
44 
"Boosting Profits with High-Moisture Corn," 3, Hull papers. 
45 Monte Sesker, "Tips for better dryer operation," Wallaces Farmer, 28 September 1968. A good example of 
the growing sophistication of grain storage and drying can be seen in Planning Grain-Feed Handling for 
Livestock and Cash-Grain Farms, MWPS-13 (Ames, Iowa: Midwest Plan Service and Iowa State University, 
1968), Records of the Midwest Plan Service. 
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Farmers worked on the problem of uneven moisture content in their new-style bins 
designed for drying. In 1962 Eugene Sukup of Franklin County bought his first grain bin to 
dry and store shelled corn. He was not satisfied with the results, however. Sukup found that 
pockets of grain did not dry properly and were ruined. He designed a system to break up 
those pockets of grain that were not drying properly with an old coal stoker auger from a 
furnace and mounted it in an electric drill. He suspended the drill and auger from a chain at 
the top of the bin and used it to drill into the grain, stirring it and breaking up any pockets 
that were too moist. Sukup filed for a patent and began to sell his "Easy Stir Auger" to 
implement dealers and farm equipment companies. Elmer Horstman of Hancock County 
also experimented with stirring devices in the mid 1960s. He used his bin as a batch dryer 
and stirred the com during the drying process, cutting drying time by half and increasing the 
capacity from 1,000 bushels per batch to 2,400. Increasing drying speed meant decreasing 
costs. Without the stirring unit he spent $.06 per bushel for electricity and fuel to dry the 
crop but with the stirring unit he reduced those expenses to under $.04 per bushel. 
Horstman's stirring unit allowed for uniform moisture content throughout the grain bin, 
achieving a goal shared by all farmers who used artificial drying and grain bins. Tests by 
Iowa State agricultural engineers confirmed that stirring was a fast and effective way to store 
the highest quality grain.46 
Farmers hoped that the increased production that they gained by harvesting shelled 
corn early and drying it rather than a late harvest of ear com would pay for the increased 
costs of artificial drying. Cost figures ranged widely depending on the size of operation and 
46 Sukup advertisement, Farm Industry News, February 2003; "Stirring devices will speed grain drying," 
Wallaces Farmer, 23 September 1967. 
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type of drying outfit farmers used, but drying became a regular part of the corn harvest for 
many farmers. Joseph Ludwig purchased a portable dryer in 1952 and used it in his crib for 
ear corn drying in 1952, 1953, and 1954, spending an average of $121.86 per year for heating 
oil. He also used it on a custom basis, earning $40 over the course of those three years. 
Ludwig did not dry corn again until 1958, although only on a limited basis. In 1965 Ludwig 
installed a crop dryer and LP fuel tank for his grain bin and used it every year up through 
1970, spending an average of $145.65 each year on fuel. Ludwig made the transition from 
drying corn on an intermittent basis to making it a regular part of his operation. These costs 
made up a big part of the total expense of raising a crop. In 1967 one Wright County farmer 
calculated that of the $81.26 he spent to raise 150 bushels of corn on one acre, $11.25 of that 
cost was drying, making it the second most expensive part of raising an acre of corn behind 
fertilizer. Combine harvesting accounted for 10 percent of the cost of raising an acre of com, 
placing it as the third most expensive part of the operation.47 
Regardless of the method of drying and in spite of the expense, farmers did more of it 
during the 1960s. In 1964 farmers dried 86 percent of the corn crop in the crib without 
artificial drying. Only 13 percent of farmers used artificial drying on the farm while 1 
percent had their crop dried commercially off the farm. By 1970 there were significant gains 
in artificial drying. Farmers used cribs and natural air drying for 57 percent of the com crop 
and artificial drying on the farm for 41 percent of the crop with 2 percent of the crop dried 
off the farm. A growing number of farmers invested in crop drying equipment to use for 
custom work. Cyril Tiefenthaler of Carroll County invested $80,000 in grain drying and 
47 Ludwig papers; Ken Hofmeyer, "What does it cost to grow good corn?," Wallaces Farmer, 23 September 
1967. 
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storage facilities to handle his 50,000 bushels of corn and another 100,000 bushels for 
neighbors in 1969. Tiefenthaler explained that by using his equipment on a custom basis 
allowed him to make money and obtain the top quality equipment for himself and his two 
sons. Aggressive farmers such as this helped spread the practice of shelled com harvesting 
and drying.48 
Foster and Madeline Mason's farm inventory from 1970 reveals the investment 
needed to conduct this new kind of harvest. The Mason family did not own a combine, but 
they did invest in corn drying and storage facilities over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. 
In addition to two wooden grain bins and three corn cribs constructed in the 1950s, the 
Masons owned two metal bins. They purchased both bins in the 1960s, and one of those was 
a 13,000 bushel Stormor model. The Stormor bin cost $4,951 in 1965 and was the second 
only to a new John Deere tractor in terms of value on the inventory of machinery and 
buildings. The Masons owned several pieces of drying equipment, including a Butler 
manufactured dryer, two propane fuel tanks, and two devices to aid the process of drying 
corn in bins, a Stirway and Stirator. The value of these items as of January 27, 1971 was 
$7,596, which was 17 percent of the total value of the Mason's inventory. When the value of 
the two tractors are removed from the inventory, which were the items used for multiple 
different farm tasks, the value of the drying facilities comprised 21 percent of the tools and 
implements, making it the most expensive equipment devoted to a single process on the 
farm.49 
48 Biennial Reports of Iowa Year Book of Agriculture, 1964-1965; 1966-1967; 1968-1969; 1970-1971; Ralph 
Sanders and Richard Krumme, "How these farmers harvest and sell corn," Successful Farming, Harvesting 
Issue 1970. 
49 William Mason Family Farm Records, Foster and Madeline Mason, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des 
Moines. 
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Government programs helped farmers change their harvesting and storage practices, 
just as they were with pollution control measures and the transition to soybeans. Many 
farmers participated in the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) program that loaned 
farmers money to keep their crops on the farm until prices rose. The CCC, an agency of the 
USD A, allowed farmers the option of storing corn in bins or cribs at a low fee in exchange 
for government loans. A government inspector measured the storage area to determine 
storage capacity and then sealed the stored crop with a paper label across the door to prevent 
tampering. If prices advanced above the loan rate, farmers could sell their crop and keep the 
difference between the two prices. If prices failed to rise above the loan rate, farmers 
forfeited their crop the US government and kept the loan payment. This program, first 
introduced in 1933, would help even out the problem of low prices at harvest time when 
supplies were generally ample and high prices at other times of the year when supplies were 
low. 
But wet corn crops of the late 1940s posed problems for anyone who stored corn 
while increasing yields meant that storage needs outpaced capacity. Officials from the 
Production and Marketing Administration, the organization that replaced the AAA during the 
Truman administration, provided an incentive for farmers to reseal their corn in on-farm 
storage. They provided a payment of $.13 per bushel for resealing corn in 1953, with $.15 
per bushel in 1955, figures that amounted to almost half the cost of constructing new grain 
bins. By the early 1950s, one fourth of all Iowa farmers wanted to build or buy new com 
storage space, with another 7 percent willing to settle for temporary cribs. Those farmers 
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who planned to build new storage space had a special incentive to construct modern storage 
facilities that included grain dryers.50 
Government officials who were in charge of making CCC loans did not want farmers' 
crops to spoil in the crib or bin. If all or part of the crop spoiled the farmer would not be able 
to either repay the loan or would forfeit a damaged crop to the government. As early as 1949 
the USD A began to make low-interest loans to individuals and groups of farmers who 
purchased grain dryers. The loans covered up to 75 percent of the delivered cost of the dryer. 
Terms were generous, with three year terms at 4 percent interest. Corn cribs for drying 
could be constructed with loans from the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation 
Service, with the loan amount of up to 80 percent of the cost of construction. These 
programs continued into the 1960s. By 1965 construction loans for bins were available at 4 
percent interest for five years, with a one year grace period before the loan was classified as 
delinquent. The government even sold surplus CCC owned grain bins to farmers. In 1965 
the federal government prepared to auction 29 million bushels of storage capacity, providing 
many farmers the opportunity to obtain low cost bins. Rules for the 1967 and 1968 programs 
allowed individual farmers to borrow up to $25,000 to construct storage and drying facilities, 
although for loans of over $10,000 farmers needed to possess a real estate mortgage. Joseph 
Ludwig of Winneshiek County utilized this program to help him finance new bin 
construction in the late 1960s.51 
50 
"Many Will Get New Cribs, Bins," Wallaces Farmer, 1 August 1953; "Need more corn storage," Wallaces 
Farmer, 6 August 1955. 
51 
"To Make Loans on Grain Dryers," Wallaces Farmer, 5 November 1949; "A Federal Loan Helped Build 
This," Iowa Farm and Home Register, 2 May 1954; "Government grain bins for sale," Wallaces Farmer, 6 
February 1965; "Loans for bins and dryers," Wallaces Farmer, 26 August 1967; "Low cost loans for grain 
storage," Wallaces Farmer, 28 July 1968. 
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By 1969, the increasing number and capacity of grain bins and drying systems was 
testimony to the growing popularity of combine harvesting and new grain storage techniques. 
Bins as large as forty feet in diameter were under construction in the early 1960s, and there 
was no indication that the trend toward more and larger bins would be reversed. The 
Wiemers family operation located in Marshall County serves as an excellent comparison with 
the Levsen family farm discussed earlier. The Behlen Company featured both families in 
advertisements in the pages of Wallaces Farmer thirteen years apart. In the 1969 
advertisement, the Wiemers' operation included at least seven storage bins, five of which 
dated to the mid 1960s and a batch dryer and dump pit for unloading added in 1967. In 1968 
they added a continuous dryer with two large storage bins, giving them a total storage 
capacity of 57,000 bushels. The Levsen family, by contrast, had only 25,000 bushel capacity 
for their 700 acre farm in 1956. In 1969 Orval and Gene Wiemers had over twice as much 
corn storage space for their 1,000 acre farm. Increasing crop yields and the expansion of 
operations contributed to the need for more grain storage. While the storage needs for both 
families in the advertisements were different, the trend toward more and larger storage units 
to accommodate the increased yields and the larger scale of farming was clear in both 
advertisements.52 
Farmers who cultivated large acreages of corn could use a combine profitably, while 
those who harvested small acreages were best suited to ear corn harvest and storage. The 
combine could be used most profitably on farms with more than 8,000 bushels of com plus 
additional acres in soybeans and possibly even small grains. Farmers such as Joseph 
52 
"More farmers use bins to dry corn," Wallaces' Farmer, 7 September 1963; Behlen Manufacturing Company 
advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, 26 April 1969. 
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Ludwig, who purchased combine in 1966 used his for his corn and soybeans and also did 
regular custom work in the late 1960s, spreading the cost of his investment over more acres. 
But a combine could only make sense to farmers who were willing to invest in a grain drying 
system. As the Fisher family of Hamilton County learned, replacing a two-row combine with 
four-row model could even make on old drying system obsolete. They used a batch dryer 
and several small bins as long as they harvested with the small combine, but when they 
bought the four-row model they invested in a large bin for layer drying. As one son 
explained, "the big bin gives us the extra capacity boost we need to get all our corn harvested 
in ample time."53 
The prominence of combine harvesting machines by 1970 can be seen in efforts to 
commemorate corn harvests from the past. Just as Midwest Old Threshers' Reunions in Mt. 
Pleasant became a way for farmers to relive steam and tractor-powered threshing in the 
1950s after it was obsolete, farmers cooperated to remember older methods of corn 
harvesting and celebrate the change. A new open-air museum called Living History Farms, 
located on the edge of Des Moines, hosted its first com harvest festival on October 24 and 
25, 1970. The event featured demonstrations of hand com husking, one and two-row 
mechanical pickers, a modem combine, and various models of hand-powered corn shellers. 
Farmers from central Iowa volunteered to operate the machines and discuss them with 
museum visitors. In addition to allowing farmers to reminisce about the old days, the 
museum assumed an educational mission "to show the younger set how it used to be done" 
and to "compare the best of yesterday's methods with today's mechanization." With the 
53 Aldrich and Leng, Modern Corn Production, 280; Ludwig papers; Newt Hawkinson, "Which drying system 
for shelled corn?," Wallaces Farmer, 15 August 1964. 
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passing of hand harvesting in the 1940s and the gradual displacement of ear corn harvesting 
with shelled corn harvesting in the 1960s, the retrospective event was appropriately timed. 
People who participated in harvesting changes appreciated the significance of the transition 
to more capital intensive farming. They also taught a younger generation that had little or no 
concept of the labor intensive work Carl Hamilton's generation experienced in hand 
harvesting.54 
Combines, drying equipment, and structures for shelled com storage were much more 
expensive than pickers and cribs, but farmers used the combine on more acres by the early 
1970s. The claims that promoters and farmers made for them were true. Farmers could 
harvest earlier to minimize losses in the field, a critical consideration when they spent 
increasing sums of money on the chemical cocktail of fertilizer, herbicide, and insecticide. 
They invested their labor and the cost of fuel, machinery, and seed to get their most 
important crop in the ground and helped the crop reach maturity by applying chemical 
fertilizer and pesticides. A growing number of farmers viewed high harvest costs as 
necessary to justify the other expenses of making a crop. They needed to reduce harvest 
losses, harvest early, and do so with the least amount of labor. Spending money was a 
technique to minimize risk. Combine harvesting and new storage and drying facilities made 
sense to farmers who wanted to maximize the return on their investment and continue 
farming into the 1970s. 
54 
"Harvest show at History Farms," Wallaces Farmer, 24 October 1970; Corn Harvest Festival, 8mm, (Living 
History Farms Foundation and the Film Production Unit, Iowa State University, 1971), Special Collections, 
Parks Library, Iowa State University. 
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CONCLUSION 
"It ain't like the good ole days!" 
Donald R. Murphy 
Wallaces Farmer, February 10, 1968 
When Wallaces Farmer editor Donald Murphy wrote this headline in 1968 he 
compared the current state of agriculture and rural life in Iowa with that of 1940, the year two 
sociologists published a study of Irwin, Iowa, a rural community in Shelby County. One of 
the most noticeable contrasts between 1940 and the late 1960s was the lack of people in the 
countryside. A long time farmer from Shelby County estimated that every other farmstead 
that formerly provided shelter and a livelihood for a family now stood empty. Vacant 
buildings were silent testimony to the fact that fewer people made a living off the same 
amount of land. Farmers who invested in new tools and techniques continued to farm, while 
those who either did not or could not make that investment left farming.1 
Farming was no longer like the good old days because farm families confronted a 
new set of circumstances during and after World War II. During the war Congress promised 
to support farm prices for at least two years after the cessation of hostilities. Congress 
maintained supported prices far beyond the two year period, however. Price supports plus 
wartime demand for commodities during World War II and the Korean War allowed farmers 
to invest in new equipment and buildings. In addition to improved commodity prices, 
farmers also faced a labor shortage. Wartime demands for servicemen and workers in 
defense industries helped reduce the supply of hired men who previously performed much of 
1 Donald R. Murphy, "It ain't like the good ole days!," Wallaces Farmer, 10 February 1968. For a more recent 
study of the Irwin community see Eric O. Hoiberg, "Irwin, Iowa: Persistence and Change in Shelby County," in 
A. E. Luloff and R. S. Krannich, eds. Persistence and Change in Rural Communities: A Fifty Year Follow-Up 
to Six Classics (Wallingford, UK and New York: CABI Publishing, 2002). 
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the tedious work on farms in Iowa and the Corn Belt. Farmers turned to new equipment to 
meet the labor shortage. Beginning in the early 1950s farmers confronted a cost-price 
squeeze in which prices they paid increased faster than prices for farm commodities. While 
the squeeze eased in the late 1950s, the entire period up to 1972 was a time of decreasing 
returns per bushel of grain, gallon of milk, and pound of livestock. With lower per unit 
prices, farmers used technology to maximize production per acre and head of livestock. 
Faced with high labor costs and diminishing returns, farmers who hoped to remain in 
agriculture adopted new technology.2 
Even though Extension professionals, experts at Iowa State, implement and chemical 
manufacturers, and farm journalists urged farmers to change, farmers were the ones who 
reshaped the landscape. There is a familiar old rural expression that you can lead a horse to 
water but cannot make it drink. A horse is independent enough to do what it will, sometimes 
in spite of what people want. The expression also applies to farmers and technology in the 
postwar period in Iowa, one of the leading agricultural states in the nation. Farmers 
consumed new technology because it was something that they believed they needed to do to 
continue farming. A noted historian labeled this period of technological change the "Second 
Agricultural Revolution," but there would have been no revolution if no one had showed up. 
In this instance farmers were the revolutionaries. They were the people who actually 
transformed the land. Experts provided important information, but the people with grease 
under their fingernails and atrazine and crop oil on their overalls invested their time, money, 
2 For graphic representations of the postwar cost price squeeze, see Milton C. Hallberg, Economic Trends in 
U.S. Agriculture and Food Systems Since World War II (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 2001), 41-42. 
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and effort in new technology, even though no one could have foreseen all the ways in which 
changing technology would change the countryside.3 
The changes in the land were remarkable to anyone who understood what farming 
was like in 1940. The use of farm chemicals such as fertilizer, herbicide, insecticide, and 
feed additives had significant implications for the Iowa landscape. This combination of 
chemicals allowed farmers to forgo the rotations that they learned from their parents. Since 
the late 1800s, crop rotations on many farms prevented the buildup of weed and insect 
species by changing up the environment every year or two. A field of corn would be given 
over to oats for a season. The oats were seeded with a hay crop, which would then produce 
for the next two years before returning to corn. This rotation also balanced the draw on the 
available supplies of nitrogen, phosphorous, and potassium. By 1970 it was no longer 
necessary to alternate crops of corn, oats, and hay on a given field. A few farmers even 
reversed the old logic of farming and used chemicals to support corn in the same field year 
after year, a practice called "continuous corn." With pesticides and fertilizers, farmers were 
able to achieve dramatic increases in yields, fully realizing the potential of an earlier 
technology, hybrid corn. Corn and hay continued to be important crops on Iowa farms but 
oats faded in importance. Soybeans, boosted by chemical fertilizer, became Iowa's second 
most important crop in terms of acreage. Farmers used pesticides to reduce pest populations 
of insects and weeds in fields, farmyards, and barns. Antibiotics and growth hormones in 
livestock feed allowed animals to reach market weight faster and with less feed as well as 
3 Wayne D. Rasmussen, "The Impact of Technological Change on American Agriculture, 1862-1962," Journal 
of Economic History A (December 1962): 578-591. 
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helping to prevent outbreaks of disease. The gains from all of these chemicals astounded 
farmers. 
Machines were also important in transforming the land. While Murphy devoted most 
of his attention to the transition from horse power to tractor power, the full effect of those 
tractors was evident in the new machines they were designed to pull, notably combines and 
hay balers. As long as farmers simply modified older horse-drawn equipment for use with 
tractors and occasionally purchased a machine designed to be used with tractors, production 
remained limited. After World War II farmers used the power of the tractor's engine and 
supplementary engines to power machines designed for the tractor and to increase their 
productivity, especially in harvesting. Farmers made a rapid transition to pull-type combines 
since the new machines were often less expensive to operate than the existing technology. 
Hay balers, and to a lesser extent forage harvesters, became fixtures on Iowa farms where 
livestock production was a specialty. The combine harvester that could handle corn, small 
grain, and soybeans was even more expensive and impressive. In some cases, notably that of 
the combine with corn head, farmers resisted new technology. They preferred to use older 
com pickers that matched their storage capacity on the farm rather than investing huge sums 
in new combines, buildings, and drying equipment. 
While machines and chemicals allowed farmers to alter crop production patterns and 
land use, farm families changed the farmstead as much as they did the fields, pastures, and 
fencerows. They remodeled existing buildings to make room for larger corn crops and 
shelled com storage as well as more intensive livestock farming. New dairy parlors replaced 
stanchion milking, while old horse stalls were broken up into spaces for hogs. The most 
ubiquitous new buildings were the metal grain bins for storing shelled com. These buildings 
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were cheaper than corn cribs and suited to drying grain with forced heated air. Dairy farmers 
and cattle feeders installed new materials handling systems. They graded the land to make 
feedlots and built holding ponds to prevent waste from entering waterways. The most 
complex new buildings were the livestock confinement structures. These rectangular 
buildings with low pitched roofs included ventilation and automated feeding and watering 
systems were impressive examples of the application of industrial logic to agriculture. The 
manure pits under the confinement buildings and the manure lagoons were even more 
impressive examples of the industrial logic of waste and waste disposal. 
With chemical fertilizer, herbicide, and insecticide, farmers grew ever larger crops of 
soybeans and com from their acres. One of the biggest problems of this increased production 
was how to prepare com for storage and where to store it. Many farmers remodeled older 
corn cribs and constructed new corn cribs, but more farmers used temporary storage or built 
the circular metal bins to hold the new bounty. These new and remodeled buildings reflected 
the role technology played in the everyday work of farm production. 
Technological changes sometimes helped farmers. With chemical fertilizer, 
herbicide, and insecticide farmers grew ever larger crops of com from their acres. 
Chemically laced feeds allowed farmers to produce livestock at lower cost. These production 
increases helped offset stagnant prices by allowing farmers to increase income by increasing 
production. Machines enabled farmers to reduce labor costs when dealing with their major 
crops of com, small grains, soybeans, and hay. In the case of combining small grain and 
soybeans, the pull-type combine could actually be cheaper to purchase and use than the 
technology it replaced. Furthermore, farmers who substituted machines for human labor 
were dealing with tools and implements they understood. They were familiar with the 
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mechanical processes and principles involved in new machines because the old machines 
were similar to the new ones in many ways. Automated materials handling systems, the most 
complex machines, replaced the most labor, reducing the drudgery of hand milking and 
shortening the long round of daily livestock feeding. Farmers increased production per acre 
and per animal, which helped offset shrinking per unit costs. 
As much as farmers enjoyed many benefits of the new technology in terms of 
increased production and labor savings, they also contended with several problems that 
occupied a growing share of their time, effort, and money. One of the dilemmas they faced 
was that the pesticides they used to increase production by limiting populations of competing 
species allowed other species to thrive. Farmers reduced the threat of broadleaf weeds only 
to find that grassy weed species that were resistant to chemicals filled the void. Similarly, 
new insect species thrived when farmers used insecticide controlled targeted species. The 
western corn rootworm moved into Iowa as populations of northern corn rootworms 
declined. Livestock pests such as numerous fly species developed resistance to certain 
chemicals when some offspring survived and reproduced with other surviving offspring. The 
new chemicals that killed resistant species were much more toxic to humans and animals, 
increasing the dangers of a risky job. By the 1960s farmers applied more fertilizer per acre to 
maximize yields and new kinds of herbicide and in new combinations. Livestock manure 
was a problem for farmers who concentrated larger herds in feedlots and confinement 
buildings. Antibiotics appeared to lose some of their growth enhancing properties during the 
1960s, just as pesticides lost some potency. Farmers frequently responded by using more 
chemicals, new formulations, and, in some cases, using cultural, biological or mechanical 
control techniques. 
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The ways in which farmers used new technology sometimes brought criticism from 
other farmers, the public, and government agencies and officials. Experts and manufacturers 
introduced some chemical technology such as insecticides and growth hormones with severe 
warnings about the toxicity of these chemicals and admonitions to use with care, while other 
chemicals such as fertilizer and herbicide seemed benign. It was only after highly publicized 
incidents involving urban, suburban, and rural pollution problems that Americans became 
concerned about the consequences of technology use. After years of use, however, problems 
became apparent to farmers and many others. Concerns about misuse of chemicals brought 
unwanted publicity and increasing regulation. Iowa state law required commercial pesticide 
applicators to be trained and regulated livestock feedlots of specified sizes through a system 
of permits to minimize runoff problems. The federal government banned DDT and restricted 
the use of DES to implants. Many farmers believed that they were besieged by outsiders 
who did not understand agriculture or chemicals. As one journalist noted, farmers were in a 
"fight for survival."4 
Still, not all farmers believed that they were beyond reproach. Sixty-nine percent of 
Iowa farmers surveyed in 1971 believed that pollution was not yet a serious problem but that 
measures for prevention were necessary, while 20 percent believed that pollution was a 
serious problem and a vigorous control program was needed. But in the 1970s farmers 
would no longer be able to use their property exactly as they wanted. Farmers had to 
consider the effects of the way they conducted their business because it was the law. The 
days of untrammeled property rights were over. The fact that there was any government 
4 For a concise overview of the environmental movement in the United States see Rothman, Saving the Planet. 
Fred Bailey, Jr., "From DES to Fertilizer—We're In a Fight for Survival," Successful Farming, May 1972. 
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regulation of technology use at all would have surprised farmers of the 1940s who generally 
considered government in its relation to agriculture in terms of commodity programs and 
prices, tariffs, and soil conservation.5 
Farmers of the 1940s also would have been surprised by the increasing costs of the 
new technology that became essential on Iowa farms by the early 1970s. Every farmer lived 
with the financial consequences of replacing human labor with machines and chemicals and 
using chemicals to maximize production. Figured in constant 1950 dollars, farmers' labor 
costs fell by over half between 1950 and 1970. At the same time, other expenses increased. 
Farmers increased expenses for power and machinery costs by 30 percent and more than 
tripled fertilizer expenses. Farmers who wanted to stay in agriculture paid these new higher 
costs as a part of doing business. They found that paying capital expenses for machinery was 
preferable to paying increasing labor costs. Chemical costs were low in the 1940s and 1950s, 
but steadily increased in the 1960s. Farmers planned on paying for tillage, seed, planting, 
cultivating, and harvesting, so it made sense to use chemicals to get the largest crop possible 
out of the investment they already planned to make. Similarly, it was important to reduce 
labor costs by using new machines.6 
Farmers who purchased chemicals and new machines such as combines adapted for 
corn, soybeans, and small grains found it beneficial to spread the large investments they 
5 A1 Bull, "What kind of Iowa do we want?" Wallaces Farmer, 13 November 1971. In a study of Iowa farmers 
from the mid 1970s, a rural sociologist found that approximately 40 percent of farmers were satisfied with 
current government regulation of agricultural chemicals and pollution control measures, while from 10 to 14 
percent of farmers believed there was too little regulation. The poll, however, only addressed the issue of 
regulation, not the technology that helped create the sense among rural and urban people that regulation was 
necessary. Farmers accepted the chemicals and machines as essential to farming. They did not question the 
value of new technology or believe that it was bad; it was only potential abuses and abusers of technology that 
were to be regulated. Eric O. Hoiberg and Wallace Huffman, Profile of Iowa Farms and Farm Families: 1976, 
Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station and Cooperative Extension Service, Iowa State 
University, Ames, Iowa, Bulletin P-141, April 1978, 14-15. 
6 
"Big rise in farm costs shown in USD A study," Wallaces Farmer, February 26, 1972. 
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made in technology over more acres. In some cases, they did this by performing custom 
work for other farmers who did not own combines. Custom work was a good solution for 
farmers who purchased hay balers, sprayers and combines to recover some of their 
investment faster than if they simply used the machines themselves. It was also a way of 
obtaining labor saving machinery that might not otherwise be profitable to use on a small 
farm. Many farmers preferred to expand operations by purchasing or renting land to get the 
benefits of their technology investment rather than doing custom work. A study of Iowa 
farm records from 1968 indicated that those who farmed more than 500 acres paid much less 
in operating cost than smaller farms. The biggest savings was for machinery and fuel. 
People who farmed 160 acres paid $32 per acre for machinery, power, and fuel, while those 
who farmed 320 acres paid $25 per acre. Those costs totaled $19 per acre for 600 acre farms. 
The difference in overall cost per acre was even more remarkable. The farm family with 160 
acres paid $107 per acre in operating expenses and labor while the farmer with 600 acres 
paid only $64 per acre. Farmers who committed to the latest technology were leaders in the 
farm expansion movement of the postwar period.7 
As farm families left agriculture for retirement or to find other ways of making a 
living, the land they left behind stayed in production. With fewer farmers, there was more 
land per farm, especially after 1950 when the rate of migration from farm to town became 
more rapid. The size of the average Iowa farm in 1945 was approximately 169 acres, but by 
1970 the average farm was 249 acres. Farmers who owned all the land they farmed only 
increased the size of their landholdings a little, however. The demand for land was high and 
so were prices, making it difficult to increase farm size through purchase. The most common 
7 Dick Hanson, "It Costs Less To Farm Big," Successful Farming, March 1970. 
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response for farmers was to rent more land rather than purchase it. The strategy of part-
ownership allowed farmers to use their new equipment to increase the scale of operations 
without going into debt for land. Farm families who were part-owners increased the size of 
operations from 205 acres in 1949 to over 300 acres in 1970. The proportion of farmland 
farmed by part-owners in Iowa and the other Corn Belt states of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio 
increased from under 20 percent in 1940 to approximately 45 percent in 1970. During the 
same period the proportion of land farmed by full owners declined from approximately half 
of land in farms to less than 40 percent. Expansion was here to stay.8 
In the 1970s and beyond the trends of farm expansion, high land prices, increasing 
indebtedness, and larger machinery were even more pronounced. Iowa farmers realized the 
industrial ideal in American agriculture, although that was not necessarily what they intended 
to do. Industrial techniques of efficiency and the substitution of capital for labor were 
conservative strategies. The farmers discussed in the previous pages hoped to stay in 
agriculture for many reasons, but their goal was to keep producing and to make a decent 
living for their families. 
Who made the difference? Farmers were the most important people in transforming 
the work of agriculture and the land. They received advice, information, and encouragement 
from many sources. One of the most prominent of these was the Cooperative Extension 
Service. With a network of County Directors and experts based in Ames and at regional 
offices, Extension leaders were in a unique position to influence farmers. Farmers read 
articles in magazines and newspapers about their peers who used new techniques and the 
8 This trend toward part ownership is discussed more fully in John Fraser Hart, "Part-Ownership and Farm 
Enlargement in the Midwest," Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 81 (March 1991): 67-70. 
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degree of success those people experienced. Manufacturers and advertisers reached out to 
tell farmers about extraordinary gains and profits they would realize with new technology. 
Government policies that supported prices and encouraged farmers to take land out of 
cultivation put pressure of farmers to increase profits on land that was in production. But for 
all these voices and pressures urging farmers to change, none of them could make farmers 
change their behavior. Instead, Iowa farmers made the decisions, for better and worse, that 
contributed to the industrialization of the rural landscape. 
Vacant houses were not the only symbols of the depopulation wrought in part by the 
farmers who industrialized Iowa's farms. There were other new markers of change in the 
landscape. The new grain bins equipped with crop dryers, the combines, balers, and forage 
harvesters parked in sheds and barns were also tools of farm expansion. Automated feeding 
systems, new dairy parlors, feedlots, pole barns, and confinement feeding operations enabled 
a handful of farmers to do what many hands had previously done. Corn, soybeans, and hay 
were now the most important crops, while farmers relegated oats and other small grains to a 
smaller percentage of Iowa acres. Fields of thickly planted corn and soybeans were the rule, 
not the exception, after the rise of fertilizer and pesticides became common. The sprayers, 
containers of herbicide, and bags of purchased fertilizer and feed were evidence of the 
chemicals that allowed farmers to increase yields per acre and production per animal. By the 
1970s new weed and insect species which were previously unknown or of minor importance 
on Iowa farms in 1940 now inhabited fields, fencerows, and farmyards thanks to the 
technology that farmers used. These physical manifestations of technological change in the 
landscape were signs that Iowa, the heart of the Com Belt, was a very different place in 1972 
than it had been in 1945, even as it remained a place dedicated to agriculture. 
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Map of Iowa, 1950. U.S. Census of Agriculture: 1950, volume 1, part 9. Washington, D.C. 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952. 
APPENDIX B. 
Tables 
296 
Table 1. Number of Farms in Iowa and Average Farm Size by Acres, 1945-1970. 
Year Number of Farms Average Acres per Farm 
1945 205,399 169 
1950 200,401 173 
1955 192,028 181 
1960 180,595 192 
1965 153,699 223 
1970 135,264 249 
Source: Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 1945-1971. 
Table 2. Selected Crop Acreages, 1945-1970. 
Year Corn for 
Grain 
Corn for 
Other 
Purposes, 
including 
Silage 
Oats for 
Grain 
Hay Soybeans Pasture Total 
Harvested 
Acres 
1945 9,852,516 778,041 5,226,739 3,107,779 1,883,619 10,283,877 21,502,062 
1950 9,352,747 339,724 6,429,658 3,662,136 1,891,775 9,730,331 22,325,951 
1955 10,225,431 433,660 5,734,027 3,960,708 2,228,609 9,199,542 22,874,433 
1960 12,090,676 394,393 4,045,230 3,498,343 2,564,171 8,159,989 22,894,477 
1965 9,871,496 486,086 1,970,809 3,005,769 4,755,709 7,753,448 20,294,040 
1970 10,004,162 507,106 1,657,616 2,451,241 5,618,268 7,255,556 20,427,916 
Source: Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 1945-1971. 
297 
Table 3. Selected Field Equipment on Iowa Farms, 1945-1970. 
Year Tractor Drawn Corn Pickers Pick-Up Hay Forage 
Combines Balers Harvesters 
1945 20,918 39,137 3,215 -
1950 44,282 81,017 10,221 -
1955 76,672 105,074 36,442 -
1960 90,027 103,557 46,469 12,916 
1965 78,625 89,568 51,799 13,788 
1970 54,147 68,131 49,006 14,895 
Source: Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 1945-1971. 
Table 4. Percent of Iowa Farms with Selected Machines, 1945-1970. 
Year Tractor Drawn Corn Pickers Pick-Up Hay Forage Harvesters 
Combines Balers 
1945 10 19 2 -
1950 22 40 5 -
1955 40 55 19 -
1960 50 57 26 7 
1965 51 58 34 9 
1970 40 50 36 11 
Source: Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 1945-1971. 
Table 5. 
Percent of Corn Crop Harvested, Dried, and Stored by Method, 1964-1970. 
Harvest Drying Storage 
Year Mechanical Picker- Combine Hand Natural Artificial Artificial Cribs, Silos Off 
Picker Sheller with Pick Air Dry On Dry Off Bins & Farm 
Corn Dry Farm Farm Piles 
Head 
1964 81.6 6.0 12.7 .1 86.2 12.5 1.3 87.6 2.6 -
1965 75.2 5.8 18.9 .1 83.3 15.7 1.1 86.9 2.7 -
1966 66.2 6.8 26.9 .1 77.4 21.4 1.2 81.2 3.1 7.0 
1967 60.5 7.7 31.5 .3 68.5 28.2 3.3 80.5 2.8 9.7 
1968 56.6 7.9 34.6 .9 68.1 2 6 8  5.1 78.1 3.8 6.8 
1969 51.1 8.3 40.5 .1 61.5 35.1 3.4 74.1 4.4 8.0 
1970 45.8 8.4 45.6 .2 57.0 40.6 2.4 74.3 4.8 7.8 
Source: Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 1964-1971. 
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Table 6. Commercial Fertilizer Used on Iowa Farms, 1945-1970. 
Year Total Tons Used 
1945 n/a 
1950 283,000 
1955 507,697 
1960 585,730 
1965 1,045,172 
1970 n/a 
Source: Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 1945-1971. 
Table 7. Soil Insecticide Use on Iowa Corn Acres, 1953-1959. 
Year Corn Acres Treated with Soil 
Insecticide for Soil Insects 
Treated Acres as Percent of Number of 
Corn Acres Harvested for Grain 
1953 85,000 0.8 
1954 240,000 2.4 
1955 1,244,000 12.0 
1956 1,030,000 13.0 
1957 1,685,000 17.0 
1958 2,194,000 23.0 
1959 3,192,000 27.0 
Source: Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 1953-1959. 
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Figure 1. The broken stalks in this corn field indicate the extent of damage due to European 
corn borer infestation in 1948. Photo taken by Harold Sherma, Bristow, Iowa. Annual 
Report, Entomology, 1948. Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State University. 
Figure 2. More European corn borer damage in Butler County. Photo taken by Harold 
Sherma, Bristow, Iowa. Annual Report, Entomology, 1948. Special Collections, Parks 
Library, Iowa State University. 
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Figure 3. The photo caption is "Dusting for Corn Borer Control." In the late 1940s and early 
1950s farmers used DDT for mid-season rescue operations like this. By the late 1950s, 
however, they relied less on DDT and more on selecting varieties of borer-resistant hybrid 
corn. Annual Report, Entomology, 1948. Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State 
University. 
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MORE BEEF, PORK, ES6S 
IF YOO GET RID OF RIES 
v 
ACTUAL TESTS conducted at Iowa Stale College and 
other state experiment walk** show ihstt beef cattle 
make the same gains wtih 20Ci- less iced when you p't rid of flies! Hogs gain faster, hens hy better when you get rid <?/ pies! 
flies Begin to Die In 10 Minutest 
97 Va Are Kilted within 4 Hours! 
MAUNON*. m new development by the eritmakx* of DDT insecticides, kilts 
flies quickly, surely — even the most resistant strains! In practical tests in 
Iieavily4nfesled bams and poultry houses, Diazinon* began to kill flies m 10 
minutes ... killed 97% m 4 how»... continued to work for us long as H weeks! 
Diaaûnon* k inexpensive —. enough lo treat the average barn cmif> about 2k\ 
and a pound wiH protect an entire fsuml Easy to use — fust sprinkle from 
shaker-type canister on Hoots or litter. Get Geigy Diazinon* Fly Killer 
today from your local stone, elevator, hatchery or feed dealer. Am 
for Oemy Dbhaoa* My K*Mwr. the rcWy4o-UM dry bmh In I Wk 
shaker-type canisters and 5 lb, bags, or Cieigy Liquid Diazinon 
Fly Killer, an emulsion concentrate tor «« in sprays, available 
in pint bottles mod gallon cans. GEI6Y AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS, CUvision of Geigy Chtmictil Corporation, 89 Barclay St., Ntn* York #, N.Y. Branches m Des Mm'ties. Frewa, Calif, and Lehnd, Mixs. 
NOtl TO WIVESt Sprinkle Geigy Diazinon* Fly Killer in tmd around 
garbage cans and on litter in poultry house — watuh flies disappear, 
OEK5Y 
IIAZINOH 
. ' D«v«i»p«4 t>y the Orîgimstors «# DOT Insecticide* 
Try These Ofhrr Gt-igy Produtls 
asura, <sss 
Figure 4. Farmers liked DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticides for fly control 
but learned that some flies developed resistance to those chemicals. They turned to other 
varieties such as diazinon, an organophosphate insecticide, to obtain chemical control of fly 
species to increase milk and beef production. Successful Farming, May 1955. 
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Chain or Cable Treater 
«IfefcU'yill** , iiUldhuiMJl/ÙukZlWifeltxwi 
3 to 4 
feet 
15 to 18 
feet 
l J 
Figure 5. Farmers installed chain or cable treaters for fly horn fly control in their pastures or 
feed lots. The chain or cable was wrapped in burlap that was soaked in DDT for beef cattle 
or methoxychlor for dairy cattle. "Flies on Livestock," Agricultural Extension Service, Iowa 
State College, Ames, Iowa, Pamphlet 200, May 1953. 
305 
More Corn Î 
*T START* WITH TWE SEED Owd*f 
mtMtioB Is the start of » good com crop, 
HeptwAlor protects seed from wire-worms, 
seed corn maggots, beetles, end other insects. 
SAFE SEEDUMG» Hepwddor win pm-
wet mmlliagi from cwtwonn dm**#*, sod 
from root-feeding insects. Stand losses are 
mAwW 4 H*pl#ehlof uwmmoL 
S 
STRONG ROOTS When corn rootworms, 
white grubs, grape coiaspis tame sad other iosects ked o« com nx**, th«y «g yWds 
two way*. Fkst, ouldemf «nd moWm# op-
talcs are reduced, limiting ear development. Second, WWW pkW* b* their hoMhg 
power, arid go down easily m wind or rain, 
end Un» Wm##*# pMda* Inwri. 
RBATB 
FOU. EARS Cora with damaged roots 
produces smaller eer*. And adult com root-
worm beetles may eat elks, limiting pollina­
tion, If your stand is 14,000 per acre, I ounce 
less weight per ear will cost you 12 bushels of 
com per acre I Heptacblor prevents this loss. For oomiplw* im formation, write Mtùk#/ 
Chemical Corporation, 341 Mast Ohio Street, 
Kill soil insects 
with 
Heptachlor 
ASK FOE HEPTACHLOR AT YOU* DEALER'S TODAY! 
XX Gramttet # Bmtkifiabtt Ctmtmtrtm • Liquid mi Dry FtrtBh* Mix torts 
mm-mxum... MikottaKkyMo 
taw tegt» «Matait 
WW *<*• 
I VAholCWmWCowomlkm | 34IEMtOWo&M#l,<Sc«ga»mW*gD«: 
mm, cot/em | 
rOOAK FOK FUSE I 
semmmcr I 
SOOKUZT! I 
WtfUW «*£ 
Figure 6. Soil insects such as corn rootworms preyed on corn plants. Farmers applied 
insecticide at planting time to maximize yields. Wallaces Farmer, 6 March 1965. 
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Block indicates area where western com hoptachlor. Resistant strains may be present Large dob represent isolated cases wh 
tootworm tes become résistent to aldiin and in screened area but no checks were mode, northern species were Found to be resists 
MINNESOTA X WISCONSIN 
« 
r I MICHIGAN 
litiNMHsV-1 mowue 
Figure 7. By 1964 the Western corn rootworm moved into Iowa. As farmers reduced 
populations of Northern corn rootworms, a resistant species moved in and proliferated. 
Successful Farming, January 1964. 
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Figure 8. Spraying herbicide such as 2,4-D along fence lines at the edges of fields was an 
important part of the war on weeds. Weeds that spread into cropland and pastures through 
rhizomes or dispersing seeds cut crop yields. This photo from July, 1950 is of Orville 
Wilson from Dallas County, although the editors of Wallaces Farmer used the image in the 
16 June 1951, issue. 
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Figure 9. When 2,4-D was new farmers used it on weedy parts of their fields or only when 
wet conditions kept them out of the field. In the 1960s farmers often used herbicide on a 
greater percentage of their acres. In some cases they used herbicide to reduce the number of 
times they cultivated corn. This photo of Bernard Derner of Dickinson County is titled 
"Spray vs. Weeds." Derner used dropped nozzles suspended from the spray boom to get the 
chemical onto weeds below the corn leaves. Wallaces Farmer, 10 July 1963. 
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are choking out your corn, you can Midland, Michigan 4S£4U. 
ANNOUNCING 
The exciting old 
way to wipe out 
foxtail. 
Arthur—Wonehell Sstvice 
Atkina—Atkins Grain Company 
Atlantic—Malones Seed Co. 
Bondurant- Partners Elevator Co, 
Vonsiest Spray Service 
Brooklyn—Carpaoïers Feed Store 
Buffalo Center—ioren Aukes 
Celtimet—Priegniu Hardware 
Charles City—5ar Seed Farms 
Charlotte—Hsti Feed & Farm Supply 
Cherokee—-J & L Implement Co, 
Coon Rapids—Hague Hatchery 
Dana—JuM feed Store 
Davenport—Twin State Eng. & 
Chem. Co, 
Oexter'-Morford & Scot? 
Fertilizer Service 
Diagonal—Sthlapla Inc. 
Durant—Durant Elevator Co. 
Dyersviile—Farmers Union Co-op 
Et beron—Gardner & Oeff 
Eldora—Barnard Implement Co. 
Falrtex—Fairfax Grain Company 
Fairfield—Condon Grain & Feed 
Fort Dodge—Farmers Co-op Grain 
& Coal Co. 
Gelve—K & H Implement Co, 
Qermantewn—Millet's Store 
Gilbert—Crop Care Company 
Granville—Beck's Produce 
Green Mountain—Farmers Elevate# 
Co. Inc. 
GrtnoeH—Agricultural Service 
Grundy Center—Gew^e Beenken 
Havelock—McCoulough OH Company 
Houghton—Hottghton Elevator 
Hudson—Strayer Seed Farms 
Ida Grove—Miller's 68 Servie» 
Independence—Roy's Feed & Seed 
Iowa City—Kan's Auto & Farm Suppfy 
Jefferaon—Monthei Bros. 
Keota—Kesta Spray Service 
Tad lock & Osweiter. 
Spray Division loc. 
KnoxviNe—Ma»go Co, Produce 
|,*rrsbee—Don James 
Leighton—DeJong Seed Company 
Lenox-Barrsrts Farm Supply 
Unn Grove—Lyster OH Co. 
lost Nation—Lost Nation Mi8 
tow Moor—Low Moot Feed Service 
Mallard—Mallard Produce 
Mequoketa—B & Z Will & Feed inc. 
Mike's feed Service 
Marshalttown—Carison Agricul-
lural Sertiice 
Frank's Farm 
Supply 
Mason City—Farmers Fesd & Gram 
Wa&on City 
Warehouse 
Mechanicsville—Wiltisms Feed 
Service 
Mediapoli»-—Kline Hardware 
Miles—Feeders Supply 
Montezuma—Audas Supply 
Company 
Ronald Reams 
MonticeMo—tgyers Feed Service 
Montrose—Montrose Elevator 
Mount Pleasant—Petersons, Inc. 
Mount Union—Mount Union 
Elevator 
Newton—Nawtoo Seed Store 
Snook Bros. Produce 
Northwood—Harris Farm Service 
& Supply 
Olin—Ukrman Equipment Ohm Elevator 
Packwood—A, D. Haye* Company 
Peterson—Tad's Shop 
Pleesantville—Farm & Town 
Pocahontas—Barreti Milting & 
Prlmgher—Nagle's Farm Store 
Richlend—-Hoskios Farm Supply 
Rock Falls—Don's Cash Store 
R osaie — Anderson Elevator 
Rowley—Kaesser Implement 
Roth van—Metis's Truck Servie» 
Schaller—Dal® Swanson 
Scranton —Bhweogar Grain & Feed 
Stgourney—Wayne Feed Supply Co, 
Sioux Rapids—George's Drug 
Sparry—Spefry Union Store 
Spirit Leke—.farmers Elevsior Co. 
Stanwood--Jack's Feed & 
FenBbar 
Stockport—Allen Carter 
Swisher--Swisher Farm Supply 
Thornton—Farmers Co-op Company 
Tetter—Cas Feed Store 
Urbena-Benduti « McCeieb 
Villisca—Danielson Implement 
Company 
Vinton—Bendoil & Sons 
Walcott—Bernard Frye 
Welford—Pollock Fievatore 
Walker—F. J. Krob & Son 
Wapello—Farmers Elevator & 
Exchange 
Washington—Don Sheeu 
Waukee—Baet Ag. Supply 
Wellman—Homer Vincent 
Welton—Welton Elevator 
West Branch—Fa# mers Feed & 
Produce 
Wyoming—Sty BiH's. Feed tft«. 
Figure 10. Grassy weeds such as giant foxtail, pictured here, became more common as 
farmers used 2,4-D to reduce populations of broad leaf weeds. Farmers used new chemicals, 
combinations of chemicals, and application techniques to fight grassy weeds that filled the 
ecological vacuum. Wallaces Farmer, 27 May 1967. 
310 
i t  Dear, our son is going to be 
a farmer. He said his first 
words today: "Atrazine—Tref-
lan—Dowpon—2, 4-D—Ram­
rod—Knoxweed and Alanap!" 
Figure 11. In the mid 1960s almost all Iowa farmers used herbicide on a portion of 
their acres. As cartoonist Hank Warner suggested, knowledge of herbicide was essential to 
becoming a farmer in the postwar Corn Belt. Wallaces Farmer, 5 June 1965. 
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Figure 12. In this undated photograph 0-20-20 fertilizer is spread on oat stubble on the 
Russell Gould farm in Worth County. Wallaces Farmer. 
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Figure 13. Applying side-dressing fertilizer on a Cherokee County corn field on 28 June 
1949. The owner of this farm reported that he did not use fertilizer on his bottomland, only 
on his upland corn fields. Wallaces Farmer, 17 June 1950. 
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m 
Figure 14. Farmers boosted yields by using anhydrous ammonia, a gaseous form of nitrogen 
that was 82.2 percent nitrogen. Injecting the gas into the ground allowed the gas to bond 
with soil particles. Charlie Knudsen of Audubon County is pictured here, applying nitrogen 
to young corn in June, 1951. Knudsen reported that in 1951 he would use his applicator on 
sixty-five of his own corn acres and 1,600 acres for other farmers on a custom basis. 
Wallaces Farmer, 2 May 1953. 
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(Soil Productivity) ; 
Name _ 
.,„jciiy$fy A 
CROP AND SOU MANAGEMENT RECORD 
- County™ tonjLAr 
8R0/6 
', F*^\ E'ER 
,/^A 
A^/%*Wr/) 
a&%\ B Barley 
W WW 
Timothy 
Draw a farm evtline map showing si) 
field boundaries. 
Show in each field the following: 
a, crop grown d. soil treatment 
b. acreage c. crop yield 
Show the kind and rate of application of 
each soil treatment. 
Show fertilizer analysis. 
(Examples 4-16-8) 
Show Mme of lime application. 
Where only a portion of the field is 
treated, VosshatcK the pert or color as 
Manure Red or 
lime Green or 
Show grasses and legume sown with \ 
«nail grain as follows; O (AlBr) J 
ABBREVIATIONS J 
S Soybeans 
KB Ky. Bluegrass J 
SwCi Sweetclever . f 
CI Clover I 
AI Alfalfa -;| 
Br Brome 
bu Bushels 
lb Pounds 
_ Scale; 8 inches equals 1 mile 
Figure 15. Farmers applied an increasing amount of fertilizer per acre in the 1960s to boost 
yields. Joseph Ludwig recorded fertilizer application on maps in his farm record books. 
This 1961 map shows that on field A, located on the west side of the farm, Ludwig applied 
122 pounds of 5-20-20 fertilizer, most likely at planting time, and 150 pounds per acre of 33 
percent nitrogen fertilizer to the growing crop to yield 85 bushels of corn per acre. On field 
H, just south of field, he applied 144 pounds of 5-20-20 starter fertilizer per acre and 250 
pounds of nitrogen per acre to obtain the same yield as he did on field A. Schipull Papers. 
Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State University. 
315 
new gain-boosting ingredient 
Stilboso 
( D I E T H Y L S T I I B E S T R O L  P R E M I X ,  L I L L Y )  
now available for record beef feeding profits... 
APOWERFUL, gain-building ingredient is now available to help cattle feeders get more 
beef at a lower cost. It's Stilbosol. 
Stilboso! boosts gains as much as 37% on high-
corn fattening rations. Feed costs have been 
slashed as much as 20%. 
Scientific experiments and on-the-farm feeding 
trials indicate that Stilbosol may be the most 
important advance in animal nutrition since the 
introduction of antibiotics as growth stimulators. 
This is welcome news to cattlemen. Margins are 
tight. The dramatic, new development comes at 
a fortunate time to keep beef feeding profits 
from slipping. 
FASTER, CHEAPER GAINS WITH StilbOSOl 
Research conducted by Iowa State College, Eli 
Lilly and Company, various feed manufacturers, 
and experienced cattle feeders check closely on 
the benefits of Stilbosol, 
Rations containing proper Stilbosol levels have 
put an extra Vi to % pound of gain per day on 
fattening steers. Total gains have hit a record 
2>Vi pounds per day for sustained feeding periods 
of 70 to 112 days. 
Cost of gain has been cut from 2 to 4 cents a 
pound. Profit margins have been increased by as 
much as $25 to $30 per steer with the use of 
5frffro.ro/-fortified rations. That's good anytime. 
It's especially welcome these days. 
BENEFITS MANY KINDS OF RATIONS 
While most dramatic results have occurred with 
high quality steers on high-corn rations, Stilbosol 
has stimulated considerable gain with many types 
of rations. This has been true whether fed to 
steers or heifers for slaughter. And, true, when fed 
to feeders of varying weights above 600 pounds. 
IUST A PINCH DOES THE JOB 
StilbOSOl is exciting news from every angle. A 
little goes a long way. Your beef supplement 
manufacturer will mix 10 pounds of Stilbosol care­
fully into a ton of his brand of beef feed. The 
feed will look the same. It just packs more 
growth power. 
When steers or heifers are fed 2 pounds per head 
daily of such 5W6oM/-fortified supplement, they 
will receive the proper daily level of the growth 
stimulant. As usual, you use such supplements in 
your regular beef fattening ration. 
Because it is so powerful, Stilbosol will be sold 
only to professional feed manufacturers. Need for 
extremely accurate mixing prohibits its home use. 
CARCASS GRADE AND SELUNG PRICE EQUAL 
Cattle receiving Stilbosol-fortified supplements 
have been bringing at least equal prices when 
marketed. Dressing percentages and carcass 
grades have been essentially the same as check 
lots receiving no Stilbosol. 
Cattle getting Stilbosol appear normal and act 
normal in all respects but three. They eat a little 
more, gain a lot faster, and make their gains 
more economically. 
COSTS A LITTLE MORE...WORTH A LOT MORE 
Supplements containing Stilbosol are expected to 
cost an extra $7 to $10 more per ton than the 
same supplement without the gain-booster. 
At $10 a ton extra, it'll cost you about 1^ more 
per head per day. But that investment pays big 
dividends. Depending upon the kind of cattle and 
ration fed, Stilbosol has been returning $10 to $20 
for every dollar invested in the growth stimulant. 
g4 SUCCESSFUL FARMING, JANUARY. 1*55 
Figure 16. Advertisement for "stilbosol," a marketing name for Eli Lilly and Company's 
stilbestrol laced feed. The remarkable growth enhancing properties of DES were regular 
features of advertisements for feed additives. Successful Farming, January 1955. 
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Figure 17. Farmers faced increasing restrictions on the use of feed additives in livestock 
rations as the 1970s began. This cartoon by an Iowa State University student suggests that 
the rules were becoming more complicated. Many Iowa farmers followed the rules for 
feeding antibiotics and growth hormones, but some farmers could not or would not do so. 
Iowa Agriculturist, Spring 1972. 
MANDATORY D1ETHYLSTILBESTROL (DES) CERTIFICATION 
Required With Each Shipment of Cattle or Sheep 
tor Slaughter on and After January 8, 1*73 
In marketing on , 
(number) (cattle, sheep) (shipping date) 
I certify that these animals while in my possession for seven (7) days or longer 
(check one only) 
• were net fed DES; or 
• were fed DES in conformity with the feed or drug manufacturer's 
dosage directions, and were withdrawn as required by the Food and 
Drug Administration from feed containing DES at least seven (7) days 
prior to the shipment data specified above. 
Signed 
Address — 
IMPORTANT: AM slaughtered animals are subject to inspection for drug resi­
dues. Animals containing unauthorized residues will be con­
demned and the parties responsible for these residues are sub­
ject to prosecution under me Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 
Since January, producers have been required to cer­
tify that animals sold for slaughter have not been 
fed DES for at least seven days. 
Figure 18. Beginning in 1972 the US government required farmers who sold livestock to 
certify that they did not feed diethylstilbestrol to their livestock or withdrew the additive 
from the ration at least seven days before sale. But DES residues were present in beef livers 
throughout 1972, the US government banned its use in livestock feed. Livestock farmers lost 
one of the valuable tools they used to cut the costs of production. Iowa Agriculturist, Spring 
1972. 
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seomû tgitSHtHG 
Figure 19. This 1950 cartoon exaggerated the potential of pushbutton technology for saving 
labor on the farm. Farmers who were accustomed to moving tons of feed, straw, manure, and 
milk every year liked the idea of automated materials handling systems. Wallaces Farmer, 
21 January 1950. 
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"My PARI-KOOl Has 
Paid For Ikelfl  ^
wy» WiMiam Tsckudy, Route 5» Monroe, Wis. 
"By #**m* a minimum et 13 tsmhs wL m 
milk volume and butterlat, wWch 1 formerly h*# Shmugh milk e#n stieksge #nd spillage, I figure my DaiLKod hm âtoesdy paid for itself m fam th4*n 3 years of operation/' 
> BULK MILK COOLER 
rk Ww 7W W# 7W 4^/ 
»*4*t OKWW I WO sort»»*! 
e<«li Work «ai MaaJlitj Casts •imftam Milk 
Milk is eo$>l<*d ta well belo# 40* in la## Uwn ohe hour, assuring a lower bacteria count md better 
milk. It h impossible to tease 
miik in m Bari-Kxml because the 
coolant is ice water. 
D A f t l - K O O L  M  E S T  S  A L L  
Dmn-Kod Wn&i «* «##% #* d*w «md 
may b* wnWm* mth b* «ai* mth 
out damage. Uni** an** wady In op*r 
site — nothing else to buy or maintain. 
G* lb* «War lha* knd# in wka—lmd» 
In vWu* — bad# in performance! 
3-A S A M T A M Y  S T A N D A R D S  
D A I R Y  t Q  U I F M I N T  C O M P A N Y  
1444 let* A»*., Ma*»*» IS, Wi*. &«»*•$? 
Heme t#*d »* — ne otiieetion — t&mtiUi* WD^Wh#* Wk 
tenon,.,,., 
Figure 20. Bulk tanks, combined with pipeline milking systems, allowed farmers to abandon 
the heavy work of moving milk from cow to milk can to cooler by hand. Successful 
Farming, February 1955. 
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Figure 21. Modem milking parlors like this one allowed farmers to work more efficiently 
than in the old stanchion barns. Equipped with bulk tanks, pipeline milkers, and raised 
platforms, farmers could also work with more ease and comfort. Jim Depenbusch, pictured 
here, and his father milked a fifty cow herd when this photo was taken in April, 1964. 
Wallaces Farmer. 
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ÇMH f»*» 6wkei4 ****** C»t* S****» 
emen' concrete bunts are filed by overheetf auqsrt (plat» ai right). Snsef sfewi hew feed éropt Mo bunk 
nigh ihorf cW«k Ai each ehuie H piled fui, more feed moves on to the next chute unt8 *8 are filled. 
Figure 22. Automated feeding operations like this one used augers to replace human labor. 
Augers moved feed moved from the corn crib (rear) to the small shed (center) to be mixed 
with silage and then into the concrete bunks. The wooden frame over the bunk protected the 
auger and the feed from the weather. Orval Wiemers claimed that one person could feed 135 
cattle in fifteen minutes. Iowa Farm and Home Register, 2 May 1954. 
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Figure 2lb, Confinement finishing bvïIdîng: Figure 22, Open-shelter buiWings 
NARROW GUTTER MANURE STORAGE 
Feeder 
Alley~~t 6" Wide 
2* to 3' Deep-i 
" Wide 
to 3' Deep 
Train pigs to dung along the gutter by flooding to 
above the gutter os the pigs are placed in the pens. 
CENTRAL PIT OR GUTTER 
ALLEY ALONG WALLS 
Wolerer-
( j*~~ Feeder 
*2' to 15' 
t-2* to 3* 
4' to 10' 
Slotted Floor^jf 
i2' wide to r| 
Bui Wing Width 
Wide 
Two side alleys require more building space than 
one central alley. The pens may Have different 
lengths or widths to provide for different sized pigs. 
1 Open Front •—| 
- 4 '  t o  1 0 *  j 
4' by 22* pen - holds 10 pigs | 
10' by 25' pen - holds 25 pigs J 
r 22' ,o 25' 
O to 3' 
Install floor heat along the alley for small pig warmth 
and to discourage dunging away from desired area. 
SLOTTED FLOORS 
Open 
rAlley Front 
' 1 Floor-y J 
Pit 1 
Locate slotted area along open wall for maximum 
sun exposure in winter. 
Open 
' 7 — V 
| Pit 1 
In severely cold climates, design the arrangement so 
the pit is in Hie center or back portion of the building. 
Open 
r-Slotted Floor Alley Front 
\ JT I 1 
Lagoon 
In warm climates, a fully slotted floor finishing 
building may be built over the edge of a lagoon. 
SOLID FLOOR Bedded 
Feeder 
-^r—» 
Adjustable A • Bowing Stop Slotoge* 
J 
-Alley 
Gutter 
Cleaner 
Feeder 
3-
X 
Open 
Front 
S-14 
Figure 23. In the 1960s confinement feeding became a popular method of raising hogs 
among producers who wanted to specialize or engage in large scale production. Agricultural 
engineers played an important role in helping farmers to plan these new operations modeled 
on industrial ideals of efficiency and strict cost accounting. "Swine," Midwest Plan Service 
Structures and Environment Handbook, 1969 Edition. Records of the Midwest Plan Service. 
Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State University. 
322 
Figure 24. Automated feeding was easy with fence line feed bunks like this one. Farmers 
could avoid scooping feed, opening and closing gates, and getting stuck in muddy lots. Fred 
Hamilton of Pottawattamie County used this automatic unloading feed wagon in 1967. 
Wallaces Farmer, 11 February 1967. 
323 
The "flow chart" below summarizes 
the route you'll probably take from 
planning stage to finished system. 
Extension Service 
Iowa Geological Survey 
Soil 
Conservation 
Service 
Agricultural Stabilization 
nd Conservation Service 
Iowa Water Pollution 
Control Commission 
State Department of Health 
Iowa Natural 
Resources 
Council 
Soil 
Conservation 
Service 
Construction 
Finàl Inspection 
and Approval 
Figure 25. Creating a feedlot was a complicated job when the editors of Wallaces Farmer 
published this flow chart of the process in 1972. Responding to concerns about manure 
runoff and the potential for contamination of ground and surface water, state and national 
lawmakers acted to limit agricultural sources of water pollution. Wallaces Farmer, 26 
February 1972. 
Figure 26. Making hay was a two man job with the self-tying hay baler that was 
commercially available in 1944. Wallaces Farmer, 24 June 1958. 
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Figure 27. Farmers who specialized in livestock production could make high quality forage 
by feeding chopped hay directly from the wagon or storing it as haylage. Gilbert Hoch, a 
Marion County hired man, is pictured chopping hay in 1950 on a farm near Knoxville. 
Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Homestead, 2 June 1951. 
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Figure 28. Self-feeding haykeepers, designed at Iowa State College, permitted farmers to cut 
labor costs by reducing the amount of feed they handled for beef and dairy herds. This 1956 
photograph of a dairy farmer, cows, and haykeeper is from Carroll County. Wallaces 
Farmer. 
327 
Figure 29. Newal Foust of Floyd County cut his oats with a windrower in preparation for 
combining in 1952. Farmers who used combines for their small grain harvest often cut the 
oats with a windrower a week to ten days before combining to let the grain cure in the field. 
Wallaces Farmer, August 1952. 
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Figure 30. A pick-up attachment on a tractor-drawn combine lifts the windrowed oats onto 
the combine to be threshed. Farmers found that they could use a combine for their small 
grain harvest and abandon the labor intensive work of community threshing rings. Wallaces 
Farmer, 20 June 1959. 
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Figure 31. Farmers considered soybean harvesting as a job for combines, even before 
soybeans and combines were common on Iowa farms. As farmers raised more soybeans they 
had more reason to use a combine since it could be used for two crops. This Hardin County 
farmer used his combine on his own farm and as a custom operator for a total of 140 acres of 
soybeans in 1962. Harvesting at night during good weather was preferable to waiting for 
daylight and risk losing bean pods in a severe storm. Wallaces Farmer, 5 October 1962. 
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Figure 32. Farmers across the state constructed inexpensive temporary corn cribs from snow 
fence to store ear corn harvested by mechanical pickers. This roofed structure in Cerro 
Gordo County was more elaborate than most snow fence cribs. Wallaces Farmer, 20 August 
1955. 
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Figure 33. Farm families built many new corn cribs in the 1940s and 1950s to deal with 
increased yields due to hybrid seed, fertilizer, and pesticides. Cribs like this one in 
Washington County were built to hold ear corn harvested by mechanical pickers. Changes in 
harvesting soon made these cribs obsolete. Wallaces ' Farmer and Iowa Homestead, 6 
August 1955. 
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Figure 34. In 1953 Homer Bugby of Dallas County used his picker-sheller to harvest ten 
acres of corn per day on three farms: his son's, son-in-laws and his own. Picker-shellers 
allowed farmers to harvest earlier than farmers with mechanical pickers and avoid the 
problems associated with pickers such as losing ears to ear drop due to European corn borer 
damage or inadvertently shelling part of the crop in the picker. Wallaces Farmer, 21 
November 1953. 
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Combine Your Corn 
and Save Money 
with the John Deere Combine and Corn Attachment 
^76* 
A*»"'' 
0Afér&t*2m»r * 
QMF/f&edttt •*%*#*&• 
ÏSitâmfCi&m 
» 
VjORN combining is here—and here 
to stay, The tremendous saving in 
money, in tint*, and in work made 
possible by the John Deere 45 Cam-
bine with Corn Attachment has wen 
tor it th« highlit regard «? com 
growers in ait sections of the «nmtry. 
Owners report 75 per cent reduction 
X» fi«M nheilmg iamts .,. &6 pw «##% 
reduction {» ear corn tosses—they 
tell oi eemWmg corn with 36 per 
vent Hsaisstuw . . and ai getting 
tie&w core thai keep» Wiser, Here 
$s the pro*l that you, too, can make 
«ter# money from your corn when 
it's harvested with * John Deere #. 
Reducing «earn \<mm is. only part 
of the Hi a*#* at»ry of the 4& Com­
bine. Yoa cut storage space require, 
meots in h&U . . . you leave husks 
; e&t# in th$ fte'id . , , you have 
• control of ike r«rn sttaeb-
meat from the operator's platform 
—making com harvests a *aier #W 
emtet jab. As a "bonus," you can 
make top money <k»»ng custom work. 
You combine »8 your grain, bum, 
aftfi seed crops by mepely intor» 
(hanging the eera attachment with 
the euttvt bat fAatîorm, This »>{ter-
atiao takes km than «a haer. Yeu 
can combine sorts b the morning, 
besrn in the mfomwwn. Because you 
camtrfae *ti combineat/to crops with 
this one efficient machine—your Ja­
is spread over more acres 
See your John Deere dealer in time 
> put a 4& «a your form thU ye*r. 
J O H N  D E E R E  
SEND FOR FREE MTERAUIR 
JOHN MtK • Metine, »B#eî« * Oept 
Pi«»te teni m* ywr free (older oo 
ioho ÙMM 4$ Corn Cûmbift* Q. f w< 
I't* to twve your free 3é^*ge . 
e*tfof*$ book en combining, «trying, 
d own Q. 
Figure 35. Combines with special attachments called corn heads gained acceptance in the 
1960s. Instead of owning a tractor-drawn combine for harvesting small grains and soybeans 
in addition to a corn picker or picker-sheller for the corn crop, farmers who purchased 
combines could harvest their entire grain crop with one machine. Wallaces Farmer, 4 
August, 1956. 
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Corn States advises 
HARVEST EARLY 
HARVEST IT ALL! 
Heavy Ceni low Damage 
will tiwi many ears 
HA#VEST 
EARLX aed you'll save 
"".ytwWb'",*™. ONLY %*95.00tRQBr 
Thia fall, more than any other in recent year*, early 
harveat will pay big dividend*. Harvaat while the mola-
ture content !» high, before the earn drop. You can aafely 
do It If you dry it In your own CAMPBELL DRYER, 
auch a» Model AF-18 ahown above. 
You'll gave enough com to more than pay for your 
drying coat* . . . perhapa enough to pay for the dryer 
itaelf. You'll make more than you'd pay for gleaning or 
wasteful!? turning cattle and bogs Into the Oeld. 
STORE IT SAFELY IN STEEL 
Once harvemted, be aure your corn will *tay in perfect 
condition, «tore It in a B. S. & B. Perfection Grain Bin. 
No vermin can get in. Waterproof—with a special campy 
roof. You'U never see auch high quality at auch a low 
Vlait our exhibit at the Iowa State Pair. 
CALL COLLECT 01 MAIL COUPON TODAVI 
CORN STATES 
HYBRID SERVICE 
1101 Walaa* St 
PES MOINES, IOWA 
Telephone 8-7491 
s*«d »» «II Hie fecti yeer Dryer» mmd Srata Sim. Alio »«*» #• Hirtit dealer. 
Na##e 
Address— 
Tow# S*a*a 
JID IOWA M»IC#T*1D VI 
Figure 36. Harvesting shelled corn was a viable technology choice for farmers if they could 
dry the grain enough to prevent spoilage in storage. Portable crop dryers like this one made 
it possible for farmers to use picker-shellers or combines for corn. Wallaces Farmer, 21 
August 1954. 
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WXU.ACK8 FABMES 
Figure 37. 
jîukuB, 
I IJ 
Choose Amy System-Add On Anytime 
STIRWAY 
HKCfStON ST1RRIM6 MISERS — ONLY 
machine on tbe market that has positive stirring pattern, AM agger driven (R© Cables That Slip) Tested and proven at low» State 
University, 
AIRWAY 
»8iEs mm mxt n bin mil — by aw tiwotsgh petfotaled jkjs«s attend bin m&%. Eliminâtes Freezing, farm tested 
and proven- ^expensive to install. 
FOREWAY UNLOADS FROM UK BOTT&H — tee* V , « - „UK '«WW® *w grains from ih« Worn 
.» »j. ; ;i £ :f; saw ttottimiMisljf while wet &fm irem field 
 ^ « W, . . . Nm W *e 
" fk :4; fiwfij W <n#i w-
Suggested Retail Price 24" 
.Foreway Only $1,250.00. 
M ' <**»* WM wj JI 
PROVEN OH - THE - FA RM RESULTSl 
"i harvest corn at 
about 25% moisture. 
And combine 2,000 
bu. daily into a 9,080 
bu. bin. Two stirring 
augers keeps corn 
level — dries fast 
enough to keep up 
with normal combm- " 
tng- Real satisfied. 
Wouldn't be without 
one." 
Ray Frank 
Riverside, lawn 
"It takes less gas to 
dry com with a Stir-
way. Com dries faster 
and more evenly—no 
wasteful overdrymg of 
a bottom layer. Corn 
is kept all stirred so 
it dries faster and 
more uniformly. My 
Stirway has worked 
well, it does the tob î 
want it to. 
'1 harvest about 1500 
bushels per day, Com 
goes into a W0Û bu. 
bin equipped with 
dryer, grain spreader, 
Stirway and Airways, 
The Stirway has been 
In 5 season# and han­
dles about 22,900 bu. 
a season, it's depend­
able—no adjustment 
problems." 
Harold Marth 
Rcx'kferti, Imva 
\lSukup Manufacturing Co. 
Cccil Smith, jr. fawn Ctiy, tuwa 
Sheffield, Iowa w0 
Figure 37 shows the way a 
"drying front" moved through 
corn in a grain bin equipped for 
drying. As the forced, heated 
air moved through the grain and 
dried it, more grain could be 
added. Wallaces Farmer, 4 
September 1965. 
Corn did not always dry evenly 
in bins. Farmers such as 
Eugene Sukup designed stirring 
devices shown in Figure 38 to 
break up pockets of wet grain 
that could ruin the contents of a 
bin. Wallaces Farmer, 10 July 
1971. 
Figure 38. 
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